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To

MY FATHER AND MOTHER

CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE.	vii
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.	xiii
CHAPTER I	
SCOPE AND FUNCTION OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.	1
CHAPTER II	
METAPHYSICAL BASES OF EDUCATION.	24
CHAPTER III	
EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASES OF EDUCATION.	53
CHAPTER IV	
EDUCATIONAL VALUES.	76
CHAPTER V	
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.	101
CHAPTER VI	
THE INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY, AND EDUCATION.	123
CHAPTER VII	
EDUCATION AND POLITICAL THEORY.	140
CHAPTER VIII	
EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER.	167
CHAPTER IX	
THE CIVIL STATE AND EDUCATION.	them examined
CHAPTER X	
AND SOCIAL PROGRESS	

CONTENTS

	Page
CHAPTER XI	
THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS—I	245
CHAPTER XII	
THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS—II.	278
CHAPTER XIII	
RELIGION, MORALS, AND EDUCATION.	309
CHAPTER XIV	
SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION	324
INDEX.	351

PREFACE

The study of educational philosophy is at least as old as the Greeks. Probably the first systematic treatise on it in Western literature was Plato's Republic. Not till the twentieth century, however, did the philosophy of education become widely recognized as an important part of the professional preparation of teachers. Prior to this time, if teachers were trained at all in this direction it was through a study of general philosophy. More recently, however, the tremendous growth in the knowledge of teacher training has required the differentiation of educational philosophy from the field of general philosophy.

Beneficial as this specialization has been, it has, perhaps, gone too far. Educational philosophy has tended to slip its moorings to general philosophy, especially under the leadership of pragmatism, which some indict as a veritable denial of the possibility of philosophy. This specialization has been widened almost into a breach by the further fact that teacher training is frequently carried on in separate institutions. Normal schools, and later teachers' colleges, have been offshoots from the main trunk line of education represented by the university. They have developed not only separate physical plants but independent curricula. Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, if educational philosophy has tended to grow up in isolation and to forget its parentage. One purpose of the present undertaking is to relate these two fields more closely again.

Although frequently the problems of educational philosophy are, like icebergs, merely the visible portions of the larger, more fundamental problems of general philosophy, no direct attempt has been made here to solve the perennial riddles of the latter by the implications and consequences which the theory and practice of the school may have for them. Neither have all the principal concepts of general philosophy been worked out in terms of their educational equivalents. In fact, many of them are irrelevant. Only those have been examined

here which have actually found their way into the thinking and practice of twentieth century education.

While Western educational philosophy has a tradition which stems from the Greeks, the instant presentation has been chiefly limited to educational philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. Occasional reference to earlier points of view has been inescapable, especially as they continue to be contemporary viewpoints, but for systematic accounts of them the reader will have to refer to standard historical works.

The number of places in educational literature where outcroppings of philosophy occur is almost legion. Consequently the scope of this presentation has been restricted for the most part to topics which have been elaborated with philosophical purposes primarily in mind. With this qualification, practically all the American literature since the turn of the century has been canvassed so that this introduction might afford a broad acquaintance with varied philosophies of education. Several foreign sources of recognized importance have also been drawn upon from time to time. With such a background, a much more extended, even minute, documentation of the various shades of philosophical opinion might have been expected than is offered in the following pages. As a matter of fact, the author had the sources marshaled to present, but the length and readability of the volume dictated against their inclusion.

Practically all this literature in educational philosophy sets forth some individual author's personal philosophy of education. The candidate planning to enter a career of teaching is confronted with a variety of such philosophies of education. If he wishes to be critical and widely informed, he will have to read and study from a wide number of sources, requiring more time than he usually has to give to a single phase of his preparation. This is not only unnecessarily burdensome, but it fails to economize the student's time by sorting out and setting conflicting views over against each other. Consequently, there seems urgent need for a comprehensive general treatment. Another purpose of this volume, then—and the principal one—is to afford within the covers of a single book an introduction to the whole range of viewpoints on the main problems of educational philosophy.

Further to expedite this purpose, the style of presentation has for the most part been limited quite in

Only very occasionally has it extended into criticism. The last quality has been minimized to prevent this volume from becoming just another text in the philosophy of education, which would merely represent the personal view of the present author. In contrast, it is rather the object of this endeavor to present in a form as unbiased as possible the alternate possibilities on which the careful student may base his own philosophy of education. The order in which different points of view are presented, therefore, indicates no preference as to the merit of the view under consideration. In balancing various views over against each other, too, it may sometimes appear as if more evidence is presented for one view than another. This is generally due to the amount of exposition which appears in the literature, not to any predisposition on the part of the author. At other times, it may seem that one view is set forth in warmer and more appealing terms than some other. If so, it will be regrettable and unintentional. Yet it is probably too much to expect that the author will be completely successful, however earnest and sincere his effort, in concealing his own inclinations.

One ordinarily classifies these various philosophies according to different schools of thought. So, too, the systematic accounts of educational philosophy could probably be assorted into idealistic, pragmatic, scholastic, and other well-known categories. Although these terms will occur occasionally in the following discussion, it has seemed better to organize the main exposition on a more functional basis. Wherever possible, therefore, the topics discussed are determined by the categories of actual school experience. To focus contrasting philosophies on some concrete issue in educational practice is held better than to subordinate school procedures to the different systems of philosophy. But no attempt has been made to go to the other extreme, of form educational philosophies for different subjects in the curriculum or for different levels of the educational ladder.

The author has not been without encouragement, advice, and criticism during the preparation of his manuscript. To his father, A. R. Brubacher, president of the New York State College for Teachers, he is indebted for having read the whole manuscript at various stages of its preparation and for offering timely criticisms. He is also under obligation to several others who have read selected portions of the manuscript and made valuable

PREFACE

comments thereon, notably Professors W. H. Kilpatrick and Edward H. Reisner of Teachers College, Columbia University; Professor J. Warren Tilton of Yale University; and Dr. Lawrence G. Thomas of Stanford University.

JOHN. S. BRUBACHER.

HAMDEN, CONNECTICUT,

June, 1939.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

In education, as in other human enterprises, it is easy to erect an artificial barrier between the theorist and the practitioner. The man who specializes in the task of thinking through the crucial issues which underlie the surface activity of the profession is sometimes tempted to regard those who carry on the activity as being mere rule-of-thumb operators unaware of the real meaning of the things they do. The man in the field, similarly, is often too ready to look at the educational theorist as an impractical dreamer juggling verbalizations and unable to cope with the everyday problems of the craft. Thus a wall of mutual distrust, sometimes tinged with contempt, is built between those who work at doing the job and those who work at examining the job critically.

Not only is this barrier unnecessary; it is also a distinct drag on professional progress. The mutual attitudes of superiority giving rise to it are often compensatory responses to suspicions of inferiority, suspicions which are usually justified. Many an educational theorist could not manage a school successfully to save his professional life; sometimes he cannot even teach a university class competently. It is also true that many a practical school administrator or teacher, proud of his mastery of workable devices and technical minutiae, has so little knowledge of what the educational shooting is all about that he is doomed to be a mere mechanic without real comprehension of his direction and purpose.

This barrier between the man who does and the man who knows is broken down when each one recognizes the justice in the other's position and thus secures a summation of the truth concerning the nature of professional competence. The whole truth is that no man can hope to achieve a high quality of practical success unless he bases his activity on a firm foundation of sound theory, and no theory is worth formulation unless it includes all the available suggestions of everyday practice. The great practitioner is always a theorist, and the great theorist is always a practical man.

For the school-administrator and teacher, the present book gives a critical summary and interpretation of various basic concepts upon which a sound theory for a sound practice must be built. For the educational theorist, it offers a listing of viewpoints against which his own philosophy may be compared and checked for practical implications. For the general student of education, it furnishes a complete and stimulating treatment of the field of educational philosophy.

HAROLD BENJAMIN.

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND,
August, 1939.

MODERN PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

CHAPTER I

THE SCOPE AND FUNCTION OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

Education is one of the most commonplace activities to be found in any society. In fact, education of an informal character is going on all the time. Hardly an enterprise can be undertaken that some learning does not incidentally result. In this informal guise, education has never seemed very problematical. Neither has it received much conscious attention. It is only when an intentional effort to teach is made that the inherent difficulties of education become apparent. It is then that the need is felt for making some systematic attack on the problems presented. This might be done in various ways. The approach selected here is that of philosophy.

By entering the mansion of education over this threshold a number of inquiries open up. (1) What service can a study of philosophical theory perform to enlighten the educational program? (2) How is the approach of philosophical theory to educational problems to be distinguished from the scientific? (3) What essential difference is there between the philosophy and art of education? (4) What is the relation of the philosophy of education to the field of general philosophy?

1. There are a number of views as to the role philosophy should play in the conduct of the educational enterprise. Most widespread approval would probably be given to a conception that philosophy directs attention to a certain totality of experience. The classroom, the school too for that matter, is always in danger of being isolated by its four walls. It is even more in danger of being walled in by the folkways of the community. What the acts of teaching and learning require for fertilization is

to be related to the total¹ context of human endeavor. They must be related to the past, educational history. They must be related to what the sciences of education, such as psychology, sociology, and medicine, know of the present. Save as they are further related to the political and economic milieu, their meaning will be far from clear. Equally, if not more, important are their connections with religion and morals. Finally, their bearings must be gained in some measure from the speculative future. When one tries in this manner to order his teaching or learning in the light of its ultimate and most inclusive ramifications, an educational philosophy may be said to be emerging.

This totality of circumstances, however, should not be thought of as merely a quantitative affair. Only an encyclopedia could effectively build such a summation. Furthermore, merely to multiply the circumstances which the educator should take into account is as likely to confuse as to enlighten practice. The wholeness that educational philosophy seeks is more concerned with unity and consistency. It seeks a comprehensive viewpoint which will operate as a common denominator for the diversities of experience.

While wholeness or unity of outlook may be the legitimate object of educational philosophy, the manifold details with which it deals need not necessarily be reduced to a single principle of interpretation. Some philosophies actually succeed in doing just this, as, for instance, the totalitarianism of fascism or the theocentricism of certain religious philosophies of education. But others, paradoxically, find unity in diversity. Those reducing to two principles are dualistic. This type is illustrated in the antitheses that have frequently been set up between such items as mind and body, child and curriculum, interest and effort, thought and action, and many others.¹ All other philosophies which are neither monistic nor dualistic are included under pluralism. Such are philosophies like pragmatism, which exalts the importance and uniqueness of individuality, the varieties of which are seemingly endless.

While there is perhaps fairly general agreement that philosophy enables the teacher to see education steadily and see it whole, disagreement immediately arises when the question is raised, to

¹ or a more complete list, see B. Bogoslavsky, *The Technique of Controversy*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1928, pp. 257-258.

what end? Some treat the quest for unity and inclusiveness as an occasion for obtaining a more adequate picture of ultimate and eternal reality. Others view it as an opportunity to enlarge the implications of contemporary educational practice. The differences consequent upon these two positions must now be detailed.

Proceeding with the latter view first, it is worthy of note that most education, whether formal or informal, is carried on with complete absorption in the hurly-burly of the demands of the immediate situation. Whether there is a philosophy underlying one's practices and, if so, what that philosophy may be, rarely rises to the level of conscious attention. Philosophy receives direct attention only when practice has unexpected and baffling outcomes, or when conflicting demands are simultaneously made on the educational program. Indeed, if the factors of the educational situation present no contradictions, the need for educational philosophy will hardly be perceptible. Philosophizing, seeing the isolated predicament in the light of its total context, then, is instrumental to solution of the difficulty. The purpose of educational philosophy is pragmatic.

Educational philosophy is thus concerned primarily with a criticism of experience. The teacher, for instance, frequently wonders why, with the best of intent and endeavor, his achievement is often so meager. At other times, the demands made on school policy by varied pressure groups are so contradictory that he is at his wit's end to form a course of action suitable to all. Either sort of experience is likely to give rise to a temporary impasse. At this point, one is usually forced to turn aside from overt action to the clarification in thought of what further action will entail. Under the stress of an ongoing educational situation, the number of circumstances which one can bring within the focus of attention is necessarily limited by the pressure of time. When this pressure is temporarily relaxed, the educational situation can be proportionately enlarged. But, according to this view, if one reviews the events leading up to the impasse or pushes their origin back into educational history, if one consults the experience of others, if he seeks the advice of science—psychological or political—or if he seeks guidance from religion, it is all as a means toward an end, the solution of a practical educational problem, to restore the continuity of experience.

In contrast to a philosophy which invokes the whole as a tool for the solution of practical problems stands a philosophy which pursues the whole on its own account, as an end in itself. For some, the pragmatic view is too circumscribed. They hold that the wholeness of educational philosophy should also shed light on the final truth and ultimate meaning of the universe.¹ Just as the temporary impasse is but a segment of a wider context of educational forces, so the educational process in its entirety is but a part of a still larger world process. From this view the whole not only lends significance to the part, but also the part may reveal something of the nature of the whole of reality. If the philosophy of education, therefore, informs anything as to the nature of man and his destiny, it will have a significance beyond the practical situation out of which it arose. In this direction the contemplative, rather than the practical, character of educational philosophy will be emphasized.

The acceptance of this position for some hinges on the connotation of such words as "reality," "final," and "ultimate." If reality is something different from the type of difficulty out of which the resort to theory arose, they would reject it. Education with a basis in metaphysics makes them apprehensive. They feel that educational philosophy has no private access to the ultimate nature of things. To claim that it does, risks a danger that someone will lay claim to the philosophy of education, to an absolutistic and exclusive theory of the educational process. Where men are obviously moved by diverse personal motives, such a pretension fosters concealment of these real differences of opinion and a consequent insincerity. Furthermore, an absolutistic philosophy can tolerate no rival. Such supremacy can only be maintained by the external support of some powerful institution, such as the church or state. These critics would also be disinclined to take ultimateness or finality in a literal sense. If these terms indicate that a terminal has been reached, that educational experience is now complete, then they feel the philosophic pursuit of wholeness has been carried to unwarranted lengths. If, on the other hand, these terms designate merely a tendency to penetrate to ever deeper levels of meaning, then they can be usefully employed:

¹ HCRNE, HERMAN H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. 12, 258, 297.

Consistent and closely allied with the quest for eternal reality is the function sometimes expected of educational philosophy, that it construct an ideal of what education ought to be. Here, too, much depends on what is meant by "ideal." To some, the ideal carries no authority unless it transcends the usual order of experience. Educational philosophy for such seeks universal truths. It is at one with Plato's search for those changeless patterns of reality which lie back of the shadowlike appearances of this world and which by their very permanence should command our allegiance.

But how is one to describe this ideal when he has never seen it, inquire others?¹ Any picture attempted will be imperfect, will have elements of randomness in it born of the vicissitudes of time and place. Other inquisitors are able to accept this function of educational philosophy only if ideals are seen to be continuous with ordinary experience. The ideal and the practical here must not be regarded as different parts of experience; the ideal is to be regarded merely as fragmentary experience filled out to its completion. Furthermore, such an ideal is conceived in order to guide learning. In turn it must be reconstructed by the outcomes of the learning experience. In fact, it is just such improvement in the redirection of education that one seeks and expects when he relates his immediate purpose to a wider context.

Opposed to these views are those who think that philosophy follows rather than leads educational practice. They view educational philosophy as a rationalization of usages already in existence.² Educational practices are seen to arise in informal random fashion. On the face of it, they do not appear to be parts of a large-scale coordinated design. By the artful use of logic, however, the philosopher manages to supply this intellectual structure. He states with as much consistency as he can what seems to be the common theory which underlies these diverse practices. But in doing this, philosophy is retrospective rather than prospective in character. It is a conservative rather than a progressive influence.

In pursuing an interpretation of education which will enable one to achieve unity of outlook in the face of diverse demands, it

¹ ROYCE, J., "Is There a Science of Education?" *Educational Review*, 1: 19, January, 1891.

² KANDEL, I., *Comparative Education*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933, p. 24.

would be a mistake to overlook the part which preference plays. The pattern of consistency which philosophy of education seeks is not an unemotional affair of cold logic. Desire and bias play a large part. The fact that there is a variety of educational philosophies testifies to different schemes of value. Referring one's professional problem to a wide range of circumstances is a qualitative as well as a quantitative matter. Of relevant facts one may have a plenty, but educational philosophy will be more concerned with one's general attitude and disposition toward them. Thus, the person philosophically inclined will inquire of his facts not only whether they are true, but also are they right and just, are they adequate, what do they mean in terms of purpose and value? At the same time, he will seek to avoid merely subjective opinions by adherence to the canons of reflective thought. Philosophy seeks, not to eliminate preferences, but to make them explicit and to show to what consequences they lead in action. Hence it becomes a major obligation of educational philosophy to be concerned with theories of ethics and value.

Another service expected from educational philosophy is a critical examination of the assumptions upon which educational practice, and especially educational science, is conducted. Educational policy must frequently be formed in spite of a certain incompleteness of evidence on which to base it. To expedite the formation of policy one imagines, or assumes, what the complete state of affairs actually is. When assumptions are incorporated into educational programs two possible results are to be noted. The program may be of such a character that, when finished, it affords the data originally missing. Here a more or less exact check can be made as to whether the initial assumption was warranted. Such assumptions are better called hypotheses. Other programs are launched with no expectation of obtaining data which would corroborate their assumptions. The latter are employed as a short cut to the prosecution of some more immediate project.

The determination of educational aims is a case in point. Sometimes they are selected by taking a consensus of opinion. Because the results are objective and so emulate science, they often receive greater credence than they deserve. This is because no attempt is first made to examine into the validity of the

method. This is just assumed, taken for granted. The investigator is eager to get on to the aims. Yet certainly no evidence he gains as to aims will test whether consensus as a method is sound. Actually the whole case ought to be justified, the technique as well as the outcome. This type of assumption is frequently hidden or lost sight of, just because the emphasis is on the outcome or result. Because it is, the most rigid and penetrating scrutiny of the whole undertaking is demanded. Of course, educational philosophy can make no exclusive claim to the function of criticizing assumptions, but it can, perhaps, make the most plausible one. Since criticism is carried on by relating the educational practice under consideration to a wider range of pertinent factors than originally taken into account, it seems peculiarly to belong to educational philosophy, for philosophy aims at wholeness.

In contrast to the criticism of assumptions is the position that educational philosophy should start from some postulate, something "given," and seek to bring other pertinent ideas into harmony therewith.¹ Because philosophic thinking starts with something known or regarded as true, it is to be differentiated from the usual type of thinking, which generally originates in doubt or perplexity as to what to do next. Thus one comes to the final conclusion that one cannot philosophize unless he already has a philosophy. As a matter of fact, no learning or thinking, not even that arising out of a problem situation, can start without some base. This is a cardinal point which those engaged in teaching should never overlook. This being the case, it seems a pity that anyone should teach without looking into the warrant for his presuppositions.

So far, educational philosophy has been described in terms of the functions it performs. It has followed the pattern of the old Greek motto, *οὐ φιλοσοφία ἀλλὰ φιλοσοφείν*, not philosophy, but to philosophize. The question now arises, does educational philosophy have a substance as well as a process? The point is made that, in dividing up the domain of facts among the various academic disciplines, philosophy receives no domain peculiarly its own. Nor is educational philosophy concerned with seeking

¹ SKEELER, A. G., "What Is an Educational Philosopher?" *School and Society*, 32: 62-64, July, 1930.

MIRICK, G. A., *Progressive Education*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923, pp. 12-13.

out new facts. Rather is it ^{born} content to get its facts from those who are specially fitted to provide them, the scientists. In fitting concrete educational problems into the broad context of relevant information, educational philosophy must go to every science that bears on human life, especially where learning is involved. Thus it will go to biology, psychology, history, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, ethics, and others. While philosophy of education is not equipped to add to these fields, yet it does secrete a kind of knowledge which grows out of attempting to integrate the varied and often contradictory data from these disciplines. In the course of this process the interaction of certain kinds of data tends to recur again and again. When it does, the concepts so developed become strategic for use in later attempts at unity and consistency. Such are the concepts of academic freedom, respect for personality, self-realization, continuity, education as growth, "precarious" universe. Only in this derived sense, then, does philosophy develop and deal with a content of its own.

Some go so far as to assert that educational philosophy does not even have an indigenous technique of its own.¹ If so, this would readily explain why educational philosophy makes only a secondary addition to the professional store of facts and must obtain its primary data elsewhere. From this point of view there is no such thing as philosophical research in education. The absence of such a methodology, however, need not imply that the conclusions of educational philosophy rest on unscrutinized presuppositions. Yet others hold that there definitely is a method of philosophical research in education. What they probably refer to is not fact-finding, but the technique of achieving consistency. This resides in the rules for gaining logical coherence and follows the usual canons of reflective thought. Of course, it needs no pointing out that philosophy has no monopoly on the processes of logic, but it may require noting that it applies them to a wider range of data than does science. Whether the results of an attempt to gain an inclusive point of view are a contribution of the order of research is, perhaps in the end, just a dispute of terminology. In any case, pointing out unwarranted assump-

¹ SYMONDS, P., "A Course in the Technique of Educational Research," *Teachers College Record*, 29: 30, October, 1927.

tions and consistency or inconsistency of interrelated viewpoints is a service by no means to be neglected.

2. Perhaps some of the points descriptive of the role of educational philosophy can be sharpened by comparing them in certain aspects with the function of educational science. 'Scientific method is an excellent place at which to begin. The process of locating and defining a problem, gathering relevant data, constructing hypotheses, and testing the hypotheses against further data is well known. Various advantages are claimed for this method over that employed in educational philosophy. Outstanding is its practical character. Baptized and reared in facts, it is contrasted to educational philosophy cradled in the armchair. Since the armchair is pictured by the fireside and not the classroom, practitioners are warned to be skeptical of the theories conceived there.

Theory, however, is not always impractical. It may be of the highest practical value because, as already expounded, it enlarges the sphere of circumstances observed to influence conduct. Without philosophical theory, there is danger that educational practice will be no more firmly grounded than on empirical rule-of-thumb common sense or uncriticized tradition. One can hardly teach successfully, therefore, unless he studies the fundamental reason for things. But, again, educational philosophy has no monopoly on the practical uses of theory. The hypothetical stage in the scientific method is also theoretical. The difference between the two uses of theory lies, not in the degree of utility, but in the variety and extent of data for which a theory is formulated.

If educational philosophy does seem somewhat removed from the arena of practice, it needs only to be pointed out that, to do its best work, thought must be at least temporarily somewhat liberated from practice. It is thought which enables one to escape from the time and place in which he finds his educational endeavors cast for the moment. If thought were shackled to the particular, it could never explore alternate possibilities. Strangely, it is just this quality which alarms some people. When thought is liberated from the concrete and individual, it seems to them to slip its anchors. If they pursue such ideas or theories they feel helplessly adrift. Philosophy in this sense is a kind of luxury of the imagination, without responsibility to

concrete occurrences. When there is a crisis in practice, it may be one of the first things to be jettisoned. What these people fail to appreciate is that this excursion in thought is but for the purpose of returning to action with sharpened tools. Unless theory stems from practice and returns to illuminate it, it is in danger of becoming mere intellectual gymnastics. If educational philosophy be pursued as an end in itself, it becomes a mere sentimental indulgence. And educational philosophies which make no difference in practice must surely be artificial.

Extended a step further, this train of thought involves the contention that educational philosophy is at a disadvantage in practical efficacy, because it has no means of experimentally verifying its conclusions. So one-sided is the case here that the best advice some can give is for philosophy to ape science. Because pragmatic educational philosophy does just this, it is sometimes awarded a preferred status. But, in general, the methods of educational philosophy and educational science are thought to share common ground only up to the stage of verification. From the moment overt action is resumed, so it is declared, the role of educational philosophy ends.

This view, however, is not universally held. Another view holds it would be a mutilation of educational philosophy to limit it merely to thinking. Thought is too integral with action for that. Educational philosophy would remain as mere opinion till measured against actual conditions. To sever thought and action might be characteristic of some kinds of philosophy, but certainly not of all. The empirical testing of thought, therefore, can hardly be restricted to scientific thought based on controlled variables. Hypotheses reached in the face of most diverse and conflicting demands, as well as scientific ones, require testing. Of course, the results will not be strictly demonstrable, but in the face of the data available they will state or predict what is most probable.

But it is further claimed that the results of educational science are more dependable than those of educational philosophy. The former are praised for their objectivity and uniformity. Because of these characteristics, the outcome of educational science is agreement among investigators, while philosophical conclusions proverbially end in disagreement. There are various reasons for this. First, and most important, educational science arrives at

only limited solutions. Of the variables which affect any educational enterprise, it can only take into account such as are capable of control. Let the outcome be infected by one uncontrolled variable and the dependability of the results will immediately be vitiated. Naturally such variables must be either brought under control or the problem more narrowly defined by its exclusion.

But such an exclusion of variables is inappropriate when educating individuals, especially when a study of the whole child is held important. Educational philosophy, on the contrary, aims at inclusive solutions. Its conclusions lack cogency if any relevant variable, however difficult to control, has been left out of account. By including all the factors, no matter how variable, philosophical solutions for educational problems are bound to be lacking in precision. If they must concede to educational science here, nevertheless they exceed science by far in the comprehensiveness of their conclusions. Educational philosophy thus has a dependability all its own. From this angle, neither educational science nor educational philosophy can claim a blanket superiority over the other. Each is superior in achieving its own objectives. The two methods of approach to educational problems are not competitive, but complementary.

Since the scientific attack on an educational impasse limits its variables, it is small wonder that greater agreement can be gained among educational scientists than among educational philosophers. This great consensus is further improved by the fact that the scientist rigidly excludes his own personal bias from his researches. He will isolate each variable and describe its changes, but as far as he is concerned, no one change has more value than another. Bias is a very individual affair. By eliminating it, objectivity is made possible. The educational philosopher, on the contrary, because of his inclusiveness, must give bias its due place. This subjective element inescapably increases the variability of philosophical formulas. But, simultaneously, it permits him to claim an adequacy of solution while the educational scientist can only claim accuracy for his. So, in part, dependability involves taste.

Again, the educational scientist frequently can gain more uniform and cumulative results by employing instruments of precision, such as statistics or laboratory paraphernalia. The more exact terminology of educational science might also be

classed as such a tool.¹ Of course, the educational philosopher has no implements so sharp as these.² Yet he is not without his own peculiar resources. His chief weapon is logic. This he has sharpened to such a very fine edge that, with it, philosophy rates as a major means for solving educational problems. Moreover, educational science can hardly lay exclusive claim to a refined terminology. Philosophy has sometimes pursued that goal so intensively as to draw down the opprobrious epithet of making hairsplitting distinctions. Perhaps in part this has been deserved. But from another view this precision must be seen as a praiseworthy attempt to gain accuracy.

The distinction between the methods of educational philosophy and educational science can be further illuminated in terms of the time involved. When an educational scientist is called upon for help in breaking through an impasse that has arisen in educational practice, he will frequently postpone offering a solution until he can make a thorough study of the situation. This usually requires time, especially if experimentation is necessary. It must not be hurried. But, in the meantime, while the scientist's conclusions are awaited, education must carry on. Some policy must be formulated for immediate action. Educational philosophy prefers time to mature its judgment, too, but it does stand ready to say what ought to be done in the light of all the circumstances at hand. This is a timely function. On this account, some are inclined to think that educational philosophy is a mere stopgap till science has had time to investigate and report. If time were the only factor, this might be true. But, as already indicated, philosophy has its own inclusive way of treating variables which always assures it of a role beyond that of temporary expedient. Finally, it needs pointing out that one may well be disappointed if he delays action till all the facts are in. Some facts never do appear except as the outcome of engaging in action.

¹ Note the treatment of terminology by H. C. Morrison in *Basic Principles of Education*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934, pp. 27-29; also by M. V. O'Shea, in "Should We Endeavor to Secure Uniformity in Educational Terminology?" *School and Society*, 19: 134-136, February, 1924.

² At least one claim is made that educational philosophy should employ measurement. See D. B. Leary, *Living and Learning*, New York, Ray Long and Richard R. Smith Company, 1931, pp. 124-126.

Pressing the factor of time a bit further, the method of educational science must be restricted to present or past conditions. Science is descriptive; it can only describe with exactness what obtains here and now. Educational philosophy must take off from such a contemporaneous platform, but it will be more concerned with what to do next. Because learning involves change, educational philosophy is deeply committed to potentialities. The existing state of affairs is chiefly significant for what it may be transformed into. But the fact that each succeeding moment involves some novelty does not discourage all scientists to abandon any attack by science on the future. With good reason, it is pointed out that were the future entirely precarious, no verification whatever would be possible. Since the random element in the future is often insignificant, and the repetitious outstanding, much latitude is still claimed for scientific method.

One attempted distinction between the techniques of educational philosophy and educational science must be made with great care, to avoid confusion. Because science deals with the isolation of variables, its special province is said to be limited to the particular. Correspondingly, educational philosophy is declared to treat of the abstract and general. This differentiation would neatly coincide with the inclusive character of educational philosophy. But from another point of view these roles are apparently reversed and interchanged. Here, it is stated that educational science has relatively permanent conclusions, not only because it limits its variables, but also because it abstracts them from the particular and generalizes them for all similar occasions. By contrast, educational philosophy is preoccupied with the local and the particular. The balance it strikes between conflicting interests and widely varied demands, it docs for a particular educational impasse. It has very definite dimensions in terms of a particular time and place. Each educational problem is regarded as unique. While educational philosophy is engaged with wholes, the distribution of forces included therein will require redistribution for each unique problem as it comes along.

If it be conceded that educational science has this quality of generality, its reputation for greater dependability can be approached from another side. The generality so described has an air of relative permanence. Science's conclusions hold, not just for these particular facts, but for others arising under similar

circumstances as well. Further, the conclusions will be the same no matter who the experimenter. Educational science thus has a cumulative effect. Ground, once won, is held. By comparison, educational philosophy has no way of compounding its conclusions. Though it acquires a capital of concepts, the cumulative effect of educational philosophy is largely destroyed since these need constant revision for each unique educational situation. But here again, if there is not accuracy, at least there is adequacy in philosophy.

Other distinctions as to techniques are advanced, but possess little validity. It is sometimes said that educational science deals with the concrete, while educational philosophy deals with the abstract. Such a division is not very useful, for both techniques employ these two concepts. The hypotheses of science will usually be abstract, while philosophy will frequently rise out of and minister to concrete educational problems. Again, a division is sometimes recognized between logical analysis and synthesis. Because of the inclusiveness connoted in the term synthesis, synthesis is supposed to be peculiarly the function of educational philosophy, while science, with its motto *divide et impera*, divide and rule, is assigned analysis. This is hardly justifiable. Both disciplines employ all the steps involved in the complete act of thought. Each has to break down complex data into their elements and later rearrange them in wholes again. So, too, of awarding induction to science and deduction to philosophy. Science may work inductively up to its hypothesis, but it usually works deductively in proving it. Philosophic thinking is frequently identified with seeking consistency with its presuppositions. But science has its own assumptions, and neither it nor educational philosophy should ever be unmindful of how these are inductively derived.¹

¹ There are even more indefensible distinctions made in Mirick, *op. cit.*, p. 14. These place educational philosophy in the position of championing viewpoints which are alleged to be final and absolute. In contrast, the scientific approach holds its positions tentatively daring experimentation. Again, educational philosophy is inventoried as idealistic while science is pragmatic; it is static and conservative while science is progressive and liberal. An astounding final conclusion has it that scientific thinking is more difficult to do than philosophic! The defect under which these distinctions labor is that they condemn educational philosophy in general because they disapprove an individual philosophy of education in particular.

In turning from a comparison of the methods of educational philosophy and science to a comparison of their content, it is an interesting coincidence that, just as educational philosophy has no subject matter peculiarly its own, so too there is no independent science of education. Like medicine, education as a science is based on other sciences. It is a mistake for educators to think that, because they employ the techniques of the older sciences like physics and mathematics, education is a science. A social science like education has too many more variables than one of the more exact sciences to make this so simple a matter. The practice of education is a source for a science of education, but the scientific content of education is to be found in such separate disciplines as psychology, biology, statistics, sociology, and the like. Surprisingly enough, to this list may be added philosophy.¹ The dependence of educational philosophy on science is a commonplace, but it must not be overlooked that educational science is definitely indebted to educational philosophy both for providing and for criticizing its own fundamental assumptions.

Finally, the function of educational philosophy can be clarified by contrasting it with educational science in the matter of educational values. Several statements may be inspected. One view has it that it is for science to describe education as it exists, but that it remains for educational philosophy to state what ought to be. Again, it is often asserted that the aims of education concern philosophy, while the means of their achievement involve science. Perhaps the most frequent statement declares that science determines the facts, but it is the duty of educational philosophy to interpret or evaluate them, to indicate what disposition or attitude should be taken toward them. Given the first in a series of consequences, facts tell what the remainder of the series will be. Educational science is expert at such prediction. But which series of consequences should be initiated? To answer this question, the facts of the educational scientist must be taken in conjunction with other facts, other series of consequences. In the day-to-day conduct of education, facts do not stand alone but always stand in relation to other facts. One of the most important of these other facts is that of bias, desire, inclination, emotional disposition. Consequently, when all the

¹ DEWEY, J., *Sources of a Science of Education*, New York, Live Light Publishing Company, 1931, pp. 51, 55.

facts are put together, some are bound to be preferred to others. It is in this sense that educational philosophy evaluates or interprets the data of educational science.

Dissenting opinion has contended that science, too, can appraise facts. Some of the elements of prejudice and interest in educational policy, it is claimed, can be measured.¹ Indeed, a device is awaited whereby the technique of multiple correlation can combine qualitative and quantitative factors into a weighted multiple criterion. The early realization of such an instrument, however, is not in the offing. But concede that educational science could measure isolated items of value, nevertheless this would hardly suffice, since educational philosophy is preoccupied with the whole scheme of values. Nor does the educational philosopher feel that he can wait for some one to reduce qualitative aspects of education to some quantitative base. Moreover, it may not be so great an advantage, since in mathematics the concept of order, which borders on the qualitative, outranks the concept of quantity. Furthermore, quantitative measurement involves repetition and uniformity, and, if one is not very careful, this may obstruct flexible adjustment of educational procedures to individual differences. At any rate, the quality of educational activity is of much greater importance to teachers than its quantity.

It would be unfortunate to conclude from the foregoing comparison of educational philosophy and educational science that the two fields of educational effort necessarily stand in opposition to each other. As a matter of fact, there is good authority to the contrary.² It is only to unexamined routine and tradition that educational philosophy is opposed. On close inspection, it

¹ MAY, M., "The Relative Value of Science and Philosophy in Appraisal," *Yearbook of the National Society of College Teachers of Education*, 1932, pp. 89-90.

Mirick, *op. cit.*, p. 16, makes the contention that educational science deals with relative values, while philosophy with absolute ones. This seems untenable. Science is not usually concerned with values and philosophy certainly is not to be limited to absolutes. The position of H. H. Horne in his *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. 8-9, that educational science determines both what is and what ought to be, is an obsolete use of the term science.

² DEWEY, J., and CHILDS, J., in *Educational Frontier* (Kilpatrick, W. H. ed.), New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1933, p. 289.

should become evident that the two disciplines have much in common. Both attack any and all educational problems. Both may use the logic of hypothesis and testing. Although there are important differences, it is not always easy to tell where one method leaves off and the other begins. So obscure may this be that it is even argued that, in a fundamental way, there is neither philosophic nor scientific method, but only method of inquiry. The qualities of dependability such as clarity, impartiality, care and skill in testing, and similar ones are held common to all method. This probably goes too far in obliterating differences. In reviewing the case of educational science and educational philosophy, it is probably best to think of the two, neither as antithetical, nor as having insignificant differences, but rather as being complementary to each other.

Such a moderate conclusion meets with slender approval among certain enthusiasts for science. Theirs is the conviction that ultimately science will solve all educational problems. They only await the trained personnel who will discover the appropriate techniques. Then it will no longer be necessary to speculate on education, but an educational theory justifiable on scientific principles will be possible. If science is unsuccessful, the only remedy will be more science. In no case will bad science be cured by a resort to educational philosophy.

When science purports to exclude the need for philosophy in the solution of educational problems, it is, paradoxically enough, asserting a philosophy.¹ It is making a statement as to the totality of circumstances which affect the educational process. In this, it is assuming that they are of such character as to lend themselves to the technique of isolation and description. If there were a limited number of problematical factors in the educational universe, perhaps this might be the case. The scientific approach to education might then become supreme. But is it justifiable to assume this finite quality of the world of education? There seems to be a growing conviction that the world is more than a sum of its parts, that it is possessed of an integrated wholeness. Furthermore, each scientific solution of an educational difficulty seems to beget as many and often more problems than it solves. Indeed, new solutions frequently unsettle old ones and thus add to, rather than diminish, the

¹ DEWEY and CHILDS, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

problems awaiting solution. If so, perhaps it is better to assume that the world has an infinite capacity for stirring up new variables and hence unending problems.

In the face of such increasing difficulties a superficial cocksureness in scientific method oversimplifies educational problems. A Catholic position would even go so far as to hold that an educational system without a philosophy would be unscientific.¹ This close identification of the two approaches is probably due to the fact that an expansion of the Catholic position would reveal philosophy as deserving the title of pure science, since it deals with the ultimate causes of all things. Perhaps this also is the position of those who think of philosophy as a science of sciences. Those who do not award an important place to metaphysics in their educational philosophy will be likely to reject this conception. But, in any event, the status of educational philosophy seems to remain secure.

3. Since recourse has been had to educational science as a means of clarifying the function of educational philosophy, it may be further informing to compare a third field, that of pedagogy, or the art of education. The art of education lies in actual educating, teaching, instructing.² It should be obvious at once that it differs from the science of education. The latter is concerned with universal principles which are applicable to all participants in the educational process. The art of education may be and usually is based on such principles but generally goes beyond them. Since some data do not appear until one engages in practice and since the results of science are bound to be incomplete where an infinitely problematical world is assumed, the art of the educator is ever in demand. It is he who must take up the slack constantly occurring, in an evolving precarious world, between universal principles and individual learning. With this premise the science and art of education could only come into conflict where science would put unquestioned approval on some particular procedure, where some universal direction for education would overlook the way particulars frequently deviate from the universal.

¹DE HOYRE, F., *Catholicism in Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934, p. 7.

²HOWERTH, I., *The Theory of Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1926, p. 44.

Since educational philosophy may be much concerned with the local and individual, it is clear that it can be of great assistance to the art of education. It is on philosophy that art will have to wait for a design of action. Conversely, educational philosophy, whose solutions can only be achieved in action, will have urgent need of the art of education. Philosophy cannot bring its constructs into existence merely by thinking them. This the art of education can do, and in doing so can make education a laboratory where philosophical distinctions can be empirically tested. A philosophy of education that constantly appeals its validity to practice, is in that degree necessarily dependent on the art of education. Only a philosophy truncated from practice can be clearly distinguished from education as an art.

4. It but remains now to indicate the relation between educational philosophy and general philosophy. On this point there are varied and conflicting views.* Most obvious is that which holds a philosophy of life basic and primary to a philosophy of education. To the former is assigned the establishment of fundamental principles; to the latter, only their application. If this be the case, it is obviously of utmost importance that one's general philosophy be sound. This order of importance, however, has been protested. Its danger is that educational philosophy can be bent to serve narrow purposes. A more independent standpoint finds that while philosophy of education will be enhanced by the more technical phases of philosophy, the latter are by no means essential.¹ These conflicts, in turn, are resolved by a further position which defines philosophy as the theory of education in its most general phases.² This identity of general and educational philosophy is supported by observing that the common denominator of both is the formation of satisfactory mental and moral habits in regard to the problems of life. To those holding philosophy and education to be different and separate things, this merger seems quite unwarranted.³ It is objectionable to others because it defines philosophy too narrowly. Philosophy, instead of being the theory of education, is preferred

¹ Adams, J., "The Teacher as Philosopher," *School and Society*, 36: 418, November, 1932.

² Dewey, J., *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 386.

³ DeHovre, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23.

as the study of the whole of reality.¹ Finally, to complete the medley of opinion, is the claim that, strictly speaking, there is no philosophy of education at all.² Rather than identify philosophy with the theory of education, education should be absorbed into philosophy, for which it is said to exist.

The importance of general philosophy for educational theory has been minimized in one quarter by the remark that educational philosophy is no more than the thoughtful study of education as a whole. Needless to remark, it is a simpler task to formulate policies for the whole of education than for the whole of the universe. But how much further may requirements be relaxed and the product still qualify as educational philosophy? There is a widespread tendency to extend the term philosophy to cover everything from severe logical reasoning to mere fancy. It is even said that every teacher, whether he recognizes it or not, has some sort of philosophy of education. Doubtless common-sense viewpoints are often adequate to enable individuals to make successful adjustments of immediately conflicting demands, but, though these may lay claim to being homespun philosophies, they hardly qualify as systematic ones. Crucial here is the degree to which there has been a conscious and thorough articulation of a wide range of conditioning circumstances.³ Relatively few probe very deep. It may be generous to share the term philosophy with any offhand opinion drawn from a hodgepodge of educational experience. Yet a proper respect for terminology seems to require the reservation of educational philosophy for the more profound systematic effort.

This attempt to be discriminating about terminology is not intended to alienate educational philosophy from the everyday concerns of educational practice. All too often has this been the case in educational history. Because philosophical methods comprise matters beyond common sense, educational philosophy has also frequently inferred that its proper sphere lay beyond the ordinary learnings of day-to-day life, too. As a result, it has been indicted for being more concerned with the problems of philosophers than of men. This was especially true during the

¹Horne, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. 297-298.

²Woodbridge, R. J. E., "Philosophy and Education," *Teachers College Record*, 31: 134, November, 1929.

nineteenth century. In becoming too preoccupied with transcending common experiences and with explaining the educational process by deductions from the *a priori*, educational philosophy suffered a decided loss of prestige. This absorption further caused it to be tardy in recognizing the significance of the rapidly growing body of educational science. When these results cast serious doubt on the speculative assumptions of the then current practice, educational philosophy went into eclipse. Recently, science has been so ascendant that there has been the opposite danger of a merely empirical education. To correct this tendency, educational philosophy has been summoned from behind the penumbra of science to take the field again. It is important, therefore, that care in terminology should not lead to a repetition of this cycle.

If one will reach back to the very beginnings of Western educational philosophy among the Greeks, he will find a striking example of the relation of philosophy to the problems of education. The rise of Greece to leadership in trade, politics, and culture was sufficiently rapid to make her necessarily changing mores a matter of great contemporary concern. This was particularly acute because, with Persia defeated and Aegean commerce at its peak, the Greeks had the security and the wealth to develop along individualistic lines. Those itinerant teachers, the Sophists, epitomized the educational philosophy of the time in their famous dictum, "man the measure of things." In other parlance, education should adjust to individual differences; the individual should be encouraged to be critical of the social heritage. This influence of the Sophists was deeply disturbing to the conservatives, who thought that education should perpetuate the traditional customs, should emphasize group stereotypes.

Out of this conflict arose certain crucial educational problems.¹ Should learning occur through apprenticeship to custom, or be set free from such a local setting by making it an affair of the intellect or theory? What is learning? How can, and does, one move from ignorance to knowledge? Are change, becoming, development, growth really possible? What is knowledge? Does knowledge find its authority in the senses or the intellect, in practice or in custom? Or are there universal principles of nature? What ends of life and education are to be preferred?

¹ Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 385-386.

How shall the individual be reared in relation to society, the universe, reality?

The questions raised here have, of course, a significance that runs far beyond their origin. Consequently, in the course of time they were cut loose from education and developed in the broader phases of general philosophy. Yet, however abstract philosophical thinking may become, this brief account of its source should be an eloquent and constant reminder that educational philosophy should never be so vain as to lose contact with common educational practice.

The fundamental problems of education just noted as arising at the birth of Occidental philosophy can be reduced to certain broad and well-known classifications or disciplines. The queries attempting to relate education to the universal nature of things constitute the ancient discipline of metaphysics. The questions having to do with knowledge, its possibility and acquisition, are generally known as epistemology. And those inquiries seeking to direct education toward the good and the preferred make up the subject matter of ethics. These, then, are the perennial areas into which all educational problems fall. The dimensions of time and place may vary the answers which are afforded these questions, but they are unlikely to alter the questions themselves. Though these problems interpenetrate each other, they remain sufficiently distinct to afford a general plan for the rest of this exposition.

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CHAPTER II

METAPHYSICAL BASES OF EDUCATION

Nearly all arguments to settle fundamental conflicts in educational practice, if continued long and penetratingly enough, will be found to have an important source in the fact that the parties to the argument differ in their metaphysical assumptions. Metaphysics deals with speculation as to first principles. Just as the builder must go deep to establish a solid base on which to erect the modern skyscraper, so too the educator must go down to fundamentals to found a base for the structure of education. The bottom point for this latter enterprise is the nature of reality. No foundation of professional thinking in education is properly laid unless it rests on a well-considered conception of the way things really are in this world. Obviously, if there is disagreement about first principles as to the nature of reality, it is bound to be reflected in notable differences of opinion as to the way educational practice shall be carried on.

The amount of attention given to the metaphysical foundations of educational practices has fluctuated widely. During certain periods, as, for instance, during the nineteenth century, metaphysics was the main preoccupation of educational philosophers. At others, as in the twentieth century, there seems to have been a movement to renounce metaphysics entirely, and to found education on purely positivistic principles. In defining the scope of educational philosophy, it has not been uncommon in this period to find metaphysics specifically excluded. Some recognize that there are metaphysical considerations but fail to see that they have any practical bearing on the conduct of the educative process.¹ This popular distrust in metaphysics has grown up because of its speculative character. The development of educational science has had much to do with this. Why speculate about learning, it is asked, when scientific educational psychology can afford positive assurance of the nature of the process?

¹ FREEMAN, F. N., "Scientific and Philosophic Methods in Education," *Science*, 73: 55, January, 1931.

But, in spite of such criticism, metaphysics persists as an important factor in educational undertakings. Notwithstanding its apparent remoteness, it has been declared involved in every great educational philosophy. To those who do not think it necessary to start with basic principles, it may be pointed out that the very attempted avoidance of an educational metaphysic inescapably implies a metaphysic.¹ Indeed, it takes a metaphysic to reject a metaphysic. If an educator will not build his professional foundations here, he must erect them there. He cannot stand without some sort of platform beneath him. Laymen and teachers are all metaphysicians, whether they will it or not. They only differ in the amount of conscious attention they give their metaphysics. This being the case, it will be in the interest of clarity and common understanding to make explicit what might otherwise implicitly and unwittingly control professional considerations.

Catholics have always recognized that metaphysics is indispensable to education. With them even the science on which education depends ultimately rests back on such a foundation. Indeed, many scientists no longer grudgingly make this acknowledgment. The science of the twentieth century is not so haughty as that of the nineteenth. The newer science is quite willing to admit that some of its aspects go beyond physical science—that they are metaphysical. Accordingly, it has been conceded in some quarters that experimentalism as an educational philosophy involves a metaphysic as well as an epistemology or philosophy of method. And conversely, be it noted, in holding to a metaphysical position in educational matters there is nothing which need prevent one's being an experimentalist.

The necessity of pressing back to first principles may be made more evident by examining a sampling of conflicting educational practices. In a period of greatly accelerated social evolution, there is much dispute as to what the role of the school should be. Some would have the school in the vanguard. Others would have it maintain the *status quo*. The former contend that change is inescapable, and that, save as the school illuminates the way,

¹ CHILDS, J. L., *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1931, pp. 43-46.

HORNE, H. H., *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1935, pp. 471-472.

progress is retarded and even retrogression may occur. The latter are convinced that there are social values which do not change with each succeeding invention that is registered at the patent office. These values it is the duty of the school to conserve. Correspondingly, in the classroom there are those who only set the objectives from week to week or month to month. They feel the future is so uncertain and precarious that they cannot plan with confidence beyond a limited length of time. Indeed, even these plans are held tentatively. Other people, trusting in more abiding values, make up their curricula with greater assurance. They are willing to prepare for adult life. Even the life beyond the grave helps in steadying their aims. In developing moral character they are committed to invoking supernatural sanctions. Those whose aims are contingent center moral instruction around the natural consequences of conduct. For them much will be relative to individual differences. Electives will bulk large in the course of study. Opposed to this practice will be greater emphasis on the core or prescribed curriculum. Prescription, too, is advocated for teachers by those who advocate loyalty oaths. But many staunchly protest for individual and academic freedom.

There are many who seek to settle such controversies as these by appealing to what is practice in the institutions which form the social context of the school. There is, however, no final answer here. Strangely enough, the perennial problems of industry, the church, and the state are in no wise different from those of the school. They, too, must be pushed back to first principles. Take the contrast between the changing and the changeless. This controversy has been perennially disturbing to church and state alike. Both have frequently claimed to base their action on immutable and imperishable principles. But opposition groups as frequently rise to challenge these premises. Similarly, institutions have been puzzled with the apparent opposition between the interests of the individual and those of the group. It is ever difficult to decide whether the individual who is eccentric from the common mold is heretic or saint, traitor or patriot. Again, these are obviously problems besetting man in the present. For many, the moving present is all there is to it; nothing lies beyond except more time. If that is the case, the arrangements of church and state are never more than tentative, always awaiting the

arbitration of time. But many others have sought peace from this restlessness by lifting their vision beyond the ephemeral to the everlasting and eternal. And so one is finally led to inquire what are the sanctions which are to be invoked to assure justice in industry and the state and righteousness in the church? The problems themselves occur in the natural order. Will natural consequences guarantee proper conduct? Or are consequences only a court of first instance from which a final appeal lies to a supernatural order?

Fundamental problems such as these cannot be approached either individually or superficially. They can be adequately handled only in the light of a comprehensive and fundamental theory as to the ultimate nature of things. Only with the nature of reality as a frame of reference can the educator keep an even horizon and a consistent policy in his educational activities. This central problem can be considered under several subheadings.

- (1) Shall the educator limit his frame of reality to the system of nature? Or will it be incomplete unless it includes that which lies beyond and above nature as well, namely, the supernatural?
- (2) Is reality one or many? Does each of the apparently infinite variety of circumstance and individual capacity show forth some aspect of reality? Or are these differences accidental and capable of being subsumed under some more inclusive title of reality?
- (3) Is there an emergent novelty in these differences, or do they merely disclose forms of an antecedent reality? How is novelty conditioned by change and the passage of time? Is there an ultimately changeless and eternal character about reality to which the educator can anchor his program? Or is change and temporal exigency the essence of the reality which conditions educational practice?
- (4) Whatever one's theory of change, is there any discernible trend of cosmic events by which education should be guided? Or are the observable changes capricious and purposeless?
- (5) Do parents, teachers, and pupils have freedom of choice to affect their educational destiny? Or is there an educational determinism which rules their fate?¹

¹ In approaching these issues, and many of the issues in subsequent chapters as well, an important caution is in order. The problems are often stated in the form of a dichotomy, as an either-or proposition. The inference may seem warranted that one must take his stand for either one or the other of the two positions stated. While to do so satisfies some, there are

1. When baffled by conflicting educational practices and by the way in which authorities contradict each other as to their solution, many puzzled educators are inclined to appeal their dilemmas to the court of nature. But direct and dependable as this remedy may appear, one must be immediately clear as to what he means by nature. Nature is subject to various interpretations. Generally, it simply means a description of the way things are or the way they function. But it may also connote a contrast with the artificial. Here the tendency is to exclude man from nature, to oppose human influence to the forces of nature.

The soundness of the advice to follow nature seems generally to be based on the conception that nature is a process which is working itself out according to some grand, inexorable pattern that undergirds the very constitution of the universe. Such a design need not be justified to man. It is enough that man learn what it is. Educational controversies harmonized to the law of such an objective process are bound to be adjudicated with an accuracy and finality which must inspire great confidence.

But following the lead of nature raises a crucial question. Should the teacher step in and interfere with the course which nature seems to be taking in the learner? Doubtless he can; but should he? If nature is right, it is the conviction of many that the parent or teacher interposes at his peril. If man stands outside the natural process, of course anything that he does must risk being unnatural and artificial. Any conscious direction which he may try to give the educational enterprise will indeed jeopardise its success. If, on the other hand, man be included as part of nature, the question of his interference with her workings hardly arises. If intelligence be naturalized, it will be quite normal to expect that the teacher will attempt to manipulate educational outcomes.

To appeal the problems of pedagogy to nature, human or otherwise, has been roundly condemned by some authorities. The main complaint is the omission of the spiritual or supernatural. Nature by itself is not invariably right, as perhaps a Rousseau would have teachers believe. It is not supremely

others who prefer to establish various mediate points of view in between. Since it is impossible to enumerate all of these, especially since exceedingly fine distinctions separate some, the antithetical form of statement is merely for economy, clarity, and emphasis.

law-abiding, but is possessed of some chaotic elements. Human nature, particularly, has disorderly inclinations—original sin, to state it in another phraseology. Furthermore, to rest education on a study of such natural sciences as biology and psychology is too mechanistic and materialistic. Naturalism looks too much to the past, to how things evolved. It is too content with what is rather than what might be through cooperation with the divine. And the idea of subjecting educational concerns of the supernatural order to the experimental method of the natural order is profane and irreverent.

The inadequacy of naturalism, obviously for these critics, is only to be made up by the superior insight of revelation and grace. If any grand strategy is found in nature, on which educators can rely, it is because there is a God behind nature, guiding and directing it. If the pupil senses that the world to be learned is problematical in character, it is because the Deity has so arranged the universe. But, likewise, Providence has ordered the cosmos so that solutions will be suggested. These solutions, from the Catholic view, at least, have even been made easy of access through supernatural revelation and a divinely ordained teaching church.

This intrusion of the transcendental is very distasteful to others. They prefer a metaphysic where the onward surge of nature is an emergent evolution. Nor is this order of events to be thought of as created by some underlying principle or spirit which is more real than its own product. That the natural order can be so self-sufficient and self-sustaining is, of course, a logical absurdity to the supernaturalist. For him there must be an adequate cause of it all as a foundation for educational philosophy, something more than the observed uniformities of nature and the school. But, in any event, they hold it of decisive importance for the dignity of teaching that children be considered not just organisms behaving according to nature, but "images of their Great Original and children of eternity."

[2.] Whether one's appeal be to the natural or to the supernatural as a frame of reference, one of the first issues he must decide is whether reality so conceived is one or many, single or plural. The taking of a monistic or pluralistic view here usually gives rise to two distinct views of education.¹ One school

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 124-128.

of thought holds individuality or variety is a primary, irreducible quality of existence. Not only that, but there is apparently an endless process of progressive differentiation which the theistically minded pluralist educator may well associate with God.¹ Each child, therefore, is a unique case. His individual experience, and not universal reason, becomes the ultimate reality of the educative process. Each event in the school-day is an indigenous occurrence. Educational systems must be fashioned for a particular society in a particular country for a particular date in history.² The individual child and the particular situation which encompasses him can each be understood by itself. Although nearly always found in relations, relevancy does not demand that the whole of reality, the sum of all relations, be taken into account in the consideration of any particular situation.

The chief objection to this position is its implied materialism. The danger in pluralistic materialism is its atomism. Each factor in the educational process enjoys an existence more or less independent from every other. Whatever characteristics it possesses are indigenous to itself. It may be found in relations, but these in no way affect the intrinsic character of the factor. Change the relations but the factor remains itself. Yet if one espouses this position, he is immediately confronted with the difficulty of explaining how interaction of the various elements takes place. And this explanation must be forthcoming, for education cannot occur without interaction between the learner and his environment. A familiar answer has it that relations are the result of physical impact. Education would then occur through the physical impact of the sound waves of the teacher's voice on the tympanum of the pupil's ear, or of the light waves from the printed page on the retina of the pupil's eye. Such a theory would make of education a mere matter of mechanical manipulation. Teaching would be just a management of efficient causes. Final cause or purpose would not enter.³ The activities

¹ HARTSHORNE, H., *Character in Human Relations*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932, pp. 217-218.

² American Historical Association, Report of the Social Studies Commission, *Conclusions and Recommendations*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934, p. 31.

³ "When the teacher studies the parts of the school and their organic relation to each other, he is in the realm of efficient causes; but when he considers the purpose of the school, in relation to life, he is led to contem-

of teacher and pupil would be no more than a redistribution of matter and motion.

This dreary mechanical outlook can easily be brightened by starting with different assumptions. Many recognize an infinitely variegated world but hold it all part of a single reality, thought. Interaction, they admit, cannot be proved empirically or inductively. Indeed, all that observation can disclose is the concomitant variation of things. The only possible escape from such vague proof of the interconnectedness of the world is to make the assumption that each factor in the educational process can only be understood through the relations it bears to every other factor. Let any one who doubts this assumption just try to define pupil, teacher, or curriculum, without reference to either of the other two terms. Clearly, it cannot be done. Rather must the properties of each be defined in terms of the others. Their respective qualities are not locked up in solitary isolation within themselves.

Rational as this assumption may seem, it yet rests back on the more fundamental assumption that the universe itself is rational.¹ One cannot trust his own intelligence, the proponents of this position hold, unless he posits the rationality of the object of his thought. But one can no more prove thought by thought than he can stand on his own shoulders. Hence the assumption of rationality is rock bottom. From this the conclusion seems to follow that the basic reality for education is not many but one and that that one must be thought.

Accordingly, the possibility of bringing together mind and matter, pupil and curriculum, student and class rests on the theory that both have a similar nature, a common denominator. This common denominator must be thought. Thought or reason so conceived is a primordial quality of the world. It is not the product of the human mind, but discovered by it. This being the case, school as a thought or an ideal must antedate the school

plate and study final causes of the educational process." FLESHMAN, A. C., *The Educational Process*, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1908, p. 184.

¹ Cf. R. M. SHREVES, *The Philosophical Basis of Education*, Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1918, p. 193, who proposes "will" rather than thought as the ultimate basis for an idealistic philosophy of education.

of brick and mortar. So, too, the model and normal schools have their genesis in this same idealistic source. Should all these institutions be wiped out by some terrible cataclysm, the ideal school would still persist. Its pristine undivided character would still have sufficient causative energy to raise up any number of new school edifices.¹ After all, these are but auxiliary to the realization of the abiding ideal.

Some go so far as to hold that such a powerful force must, in the end, be personal, since thought or reason by its very nature and origin is personal. If so, it follows that all literature, science, and history in the curriculum are personal because they, too, are the thought of persons. It further follows that the corporate organization of the school personnel is a person writ large. Moreover, the basic ethic of the profession will demand that teachers and pupils respect one another as persons. The final logical consequence to ensue is that educational philosophy itself will ultimately be based on a personal theism.

Whether one incline to materialism or idealism, to some form of pluralism or monism, the diversity of factors in the educative process presents yet another problem. The multitude of these factors not only interact, but their diversity leads to conflict as well. The individualities of pupil and teacher, instead of being complementary at every point, often seem to have interests which contradict each other. Not only that, but the interests of pressure groups in their demands on public education frequently appear at cross-purposes. Can these be harmonized in ultimate reality, or is it of the character of such reality to have some random elements? The educational pluralist takes the latter position. For him, life is made up of tensions resulting from the conflict of opposing principles whose reconciliation eludes the educator's grasp. Instead of lamenting the untidy character of his universe, he counts this an asset. It is what secures freedom and creativity for him in the school.

To the monist it seems there must be some ultimate harmony. However intricate or complex educational problems may be, if the universe be rational, there must be some all-embracing formula which will secure all values without loss. Perhaps no one person,

¹ Cf. M. DEMIASHKEVICH, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York, American Book Company, 1935, pp. 347-357, where the same idea is applied to the curriculum.

not even the educational philosopher, can rise to the eminence of stating what this philosophy is. Nevertheless, its possibility in the ultimate rationality of things must be assumed if some are to retain their faith in a philosophical approach to education.

Just what are the logical steps in gaining unity out of the diversity of educational practices has been stated several ways. At the turn of the century many educators succeeded in achieving unity by employing Hegel's ingenious dialectic.¹ Educational policy was founded on no single educational thesis or its contrary. Rather were thesis and antithesis telescoped into a common synthesis. This fundamental triadic process in education is also technically known as source, separation, and return. Source (thesis) is the ideal. But the school as an ideal, for instance, seeks its actualization. Separation (antithesis) is the ideal objectified. It is the ideal realized in concrete form. It is found developing in the course of study and in equipment of the school, to mention but two illustrations. Return (synthesis) is to get back to source, the ideal. It is an attempt to perfect one's endeavors in terms of the ideal. This is the final aim of education. It is attained in and through the teaching process. Summed in a single statement, education projects or objectifies the self into the world of thought, the social heritage, and brings it back enriched in knowledge.

Another way of reaching the same result is through the logic of universals. Contrasted to the singular in existence is the generic or universal. Members of a class may have their differences but they still have the common quality of belonging to the class. Thus, though children may have a myriad of individual differences, they all find a common denominator in childhood. Childhood here is a general or universal concept. Though it is a single concept, yet it summarizes a wide variety of particulars. In this fashion there is unity in diversity. The sweep of this logical process can be widened till it engulfs everything educational and finally everything at all, educational and noneducational. At this point, universal unity merges with a theory of creation. The One is seen to be omnipotent and omniscient. It is the Author

¹ The influence which this dialectic has had on the educational philosophy of John Dewey has been explored by W. J. Sanders in "The Hegelian Dialectic in the Educational Philosophy of John Dewey" (unpublished doctoral thesis at Yale University, 1935).

of the species. * While It manifests Itself in an infinite variety of ways, yet is It always superior to the "many."

From these premises some draw the corollary that it is foreign to a true conception of education to aid a child to adapt to any particular environment during any given epoch.¹ That would be too narrow. Rather must his adjustment be universalized in both time and place. The curriculum should be constituted of undying classics whose universal value has been recognized among all peoples and in every period of history.

To such an employment of universals the pluralist would doubtless take exception. With him, universals are not points of departure. They are not final statements of the reality which the one engaged in education is sure to find. As far as he is concerned, to generalize the individual, to sum up the particular in the universal, by no means exhausts all there is to individuality. Universals merely summarize experience to date. Their function is to lead and direct the invasion of tomorrow. Hence they are of secondary importance. They are of derived or instrumental significance. Their use is to show such continuity as holds in the plurality of circumstance from individual to individual. But no matter how connected individuals or events may be, this continuity must never be expanded into an all-devouring monistic absolute.

A much looser, more pluralistic conception of the whole for educational purposes considers it as a dynamic organization of activities. These activities have a certain continuity or relation to each other. As organizations, they form and disintegrate, have beginnings and endings. Such "wholes" are also known as "events" and "organisms." As such, they are the only concrete realities.² The way in which child experience clusters about certain purposes, the manner in which personality is integrated by the problems it meets, constitute the only wholes. But the very fact that they are plural wholes is a telltale paradox; they are merely wholes, not *the* whole. Furthermore, then, integration must be progressive, not static. Indeed, the integration of a completed or static world would be educationally meaningless.³

¹ HUTCHINS, R. M., *The Higher Learning in America*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936, p. 66.

² SAYRES, E. V., *Educational Issues and the Unity of Experience*, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1929, pp. 38-39.

³ HARTSHORNE, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

[3] What the pluralist is strongly hinting at in his attitude toward universals aptly opens up the next issue in the present consideration of educational metaphysics. Those who think that the universal is primary and that diversity is secondary imply that there is no genuine novelty attendant on the emergence of any hitherto unknown variety. Such emergence is but a disclosure of an antecedent reality. How can it be otherwise if the one antedates the many? The passage of time, then, does not affect fundamentals in education. These remain unchanging. The change one sees about him in education is thus either only apparent or an inferior status because incomplete. On the other hand, those who make of universals merely a summary of particulars to date imply the possibility of genuine novelty appearing in some new particular or variety. They are unwilling to make a finally complete generalization because of the factor of time. The passage of time, they anticipate, may bring forth novelties which will require the reconstruction of the universal. Consequently, ultimate reality with them is neither eternal nor immutable but constantly undergoing change. Change to them is not apparent but of the very essence of reality. It is not a cause for lament but a challenging opportunity. The significance of these differences of point of view for educational philosophy must now be traced out in greater detail.

The advocates of novelty think they can make out a very strong case for their position. They admit at once that some differences or varieties just are. They even concede that they are old because they recur over and over again. A type of such a difference is that between boys and girls. But some differences, they claim, are novel. They occur for a first time. This is true about the individuality of any particular boy or girl. It is inescapably unique since any given offspring of bisexual reproduction is the only one of its kind. Such a child commences and lives his life at a juncture of space and time which simply cannot be duplicated for any one else.

If this brief for novelty be accepted, then it follows as a corollary that the future must in some degree be contingent and uncertain in outcome. In fact, it is this very quality of the future which makes it interesting and challenging. But enticing though the novel be, it does not obscure the significance of the old and familiar to educators of this opinion. Problem-solving as a method of instruction, they readily recognize, not only involves

unpredictable elements but also includes the traditional and immemorial. Without the past's overlapping the present and future, education would indeed be capricious and chaotic. The past is a necessary tool for probing contemporary and future events. But, similarly, the importance of the past must not becloud the fact that the uncertain precarious character of the future is genuine. The future is not merely the unfolding of a reality already complete in the past. The kind of future under consideration here implies that reality itself is incomplete! It means that novelty did not occur just once at the beginning of the world. On the contrary, it is asserted that novelties are and always have been emerging in the evolutionary process. The last ones are just as truly novel as the first ones. The universe is not a closed, but an open, one—open at the end marked future. It is William James's world with the "lid off," a world in which the book of genesis is still being written.

For some, such a world is an irrational, even impossible, one. For them, every result must have a cause and that cause must be at least sufficient to create the result. On any other basis the emergence of novelty is virtually equivalent to creating something greater than the creator, that is, creating something out of nothing. If accomplishing that be conceded absurd and contrary to reason, then it follows that no novelties can evolve over the course of time which have not always been involved or eternally realized for all time. According to this view, there is no contingent or random element abroad in the universe. Novelty is only temporal and not an eternal or ultimate reality. Such a view of reality need not altogether blight education as creative or experimental. Education may still be adventurous in a temporal sense, and perhaps that is enough to make it challenging. What the creative scholar or pupil composes or invents is not entirely the product of his unique genius or individuality but rather something which he is able to create because he has found what already exists.

Whether or not the educator's philosophy is to be guided by the old adage that there is nothing new under the sun, it is already evident that he cannot discuss the oldness or newness of reality without coincidentally making implications as to the temporal dimensions of reality. Thus, the old refers to passed time and the new to the present and future. Consequently, educational

philosophy has a temporal aspect which cannot be overlooked. Education obviously takes time. It is developmental and, being so, belongs to the temporal process. But time extends all the way from the remote past through the immediate and fleeting present on into the distant future. Perhaps beyond that, and maybe encompassing the whole of time, lies the eternal, the timeless. Where, in this expanse, shall one adjust the focus of his educational vision?

Since the passage of time is always accompanied by constant changes, some insist that the present is the only satisfactory portion of time for education to occupy. Only so can it take into account the unanticipated changes which accompany the passing of time. If one prepares for the future, intervening changes may make the preparation obsolete. As for the accumulated treasures of the past, it can serve no useful end to orient education in that direction. The flow of time is irreversible. Hindsight may be the best foresight, but it is far from being the direction in which events are moving. If the present is to have a bias, it is better, therefore, to incline it toward the future than toward the past. On this basis education and life are to be lived forward. If changes occur, in the meantime, they will but constitute one of the inescapable risks of life.

Others are fearful of finding ultimate reality in the "imperious now." Of course there must be a now, a temporal process, in which eternal purposes are worked out. But the vagaries and uncertainties of this process are to be stabilized and guided by lifting and fastening one's educational vision on the eternal. The advantage of locating ultimate reality there is that the eternal is timeless. In it is neither past, present, nor future. So much is Catholic education based on this idea that its educational philosophy has come to be referred to as the *pedagogia perennis*.¹ While on the one side it may be difficult to imagine how education would be needed or could take place in a timeless eternity, it is just possible, since the temporal is implied in the eternal, that the study of education as a temporal process may reveal something, though finite and inadequate, of course, as to the nature of the infinite. In any event, since the eternal is readily associated with the changeless, as the temporal is with the changing, a high

¹ De Hovre, F., *Catholicism in Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934, p. 91.

degree of certainty and security seems possible. In fact, such a connection has much to recommend it. Let those who will, refuse to bow down before either temporal or ultratemporal absolutes. There are many others who find a surpassing peace and strength therein which enables them to endure and overcome the perplexities besetting education.

Of course, if one bases his educational metaphysic ultimately on the timeless, there can be no genuinely novel intrusions into the educational process. Education will hardly be truly creative. And conversely, if one limits his educational philosophy to the temporal process, the probabilities of novel, contingent occurrences are greatly improved. But still more deeply underlying this whole problem is the educator's attitude toward change. The eternal and immemorial recommends itself to many, because of its completed and changeless character. Others see nothing but continuous change, with its consequent novelty, in the passage of time. How shall this issue be resolved? . . .

Its resolution will depend, in the first instance, in carefully defining the issue. Many are inclined to make a sharp contrast between dynamic and static philosophies of education. Taken absolutely, probably neither is a defensible position. If everything were in a constant and an exclusive state of flux, the chances are that education as a consciously planned enterprise would be impossible. If change were absolutely all-pervasive, there would be no recurrence. If there were no recurrence, there would be no anticipation. And without dependable prediction of what the learner will do, the educator's task would defy undertaking. Contrariwise, if everything were absolutely static, education would be equally out of the question. Learning would have no meaning, because to learn implies a change in the *status* of the learner. Whereas a moment before he did not know something, now he does. He has become transformed. Education, then, must be some kind of an intermingling of the changing and abiding. But just what kind of mixture is it? The real issue for a philosophy of education, then, is as to the proportion and way of blending the ingredients.

In some quarters it is very popular to weight heavily the dynamic qualities of the universe. This is particularly the position of "progressive" educators. With them, education is undeniably an affair of action. Witness the emphasis on the activity curriculum and child activity among other things.

Education is growth, a becoming. They have found support for this point of view in the sciences. Especially has Darwin's theory of evolution influenced them. But latterly, developments in the physical sciences have reinforced their conclusions from biology. Even among the physical sciences there has been a swing away from the old category of substance to the new one of process.

But process is orderly. Education can hardly be progressive if the transformations on which it is predicated are capricious and arbitrary. To attempt progress there must be at least some constancy or consistency amidst transition. Nor is this so paradoxical as it may seem. It is a matter of common observation, for example, that some changes tend to recur and be repeated. Variables are noted as having norms. Furthermore, not all change occurs with equal rapidity. Neither is all change equally important. There is a continuity of events whose significance is proportionate to the length of its range. Stability, from the progressive point of view, is thus largely statistical in character.

While probability as stability may be better than chaos, it falls short of what others think is the true description of the world in which educational endeavor must be put forth. Their formula for compounding the changing and abiding elements of the educational process weights the latter ingredient. They recognize the existence of process but nevertheless think that there are some things which are not in process at all. These are not just statistically probable; they are absolutely certain. Like the banks of a river they guide the flow of educational movement and are a protection against the dangers of a radically progressive pedagogy. People of this conviction take no comfort in the claim that the only constant is change itself. They hold that the very notion of change implies the changeless. If there were only change, one might not be conscious of it, for he would have nothing by which to contrast it.

Proponents of this philosophy do not deny that education involves a continuous development, but do assert that being, rather than becoming, is the category of ultimate reality. Thus it has been stated, "Through education the individual becomes in time what he eternally is."¹ The learning child changes as he

¹ HORNÉ, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 286.

learns, and yet throughout the process maintains his identity. So too the Catholic church, custodian and teacher of a changeless truth, manifests a veritable genius for adaptability to various local cultures. The aspects of education which change are mere details; the heart of education, if properly understood, will be the same for any place and time.¹ There seems to be a cycle of growth. A generation is born; it grows from infancy through adolescence to adulthood, and then dies. The next generation completes the same cycle. There is change, maturation, learning, within the cycle, but it is the same human cycle. Generations come and go, but the cycle seems immutable.

Before leaving change and time, a word is in order as to the "relativity" which these terms seem to impart to education. In one sense there is nothing startlingly new about relativity. It may merely mean that it is difficult to think of any educational factor which stands altogether in disjunction from the rest. No factor is just this or that. Each must be understood in the relation it bears to the complex of experience in which it occurs. A boy may behave well at home, be a nuisance at school, and a leader in his gang. Again, where there is a high degree of religious homogeneity in a population, religion may be included in the curriculum, but if there is a great heterogeneity it may have to be excluded. This sort of relativity of time and place is well known. So long as some factors are recognized as permanent and abiding, no particular objection is taken. It is only where everything is relative, where change is so all-pervasive that all relations are relative, that educational philosophies divide on the significance of time and change for educational theory.

Most of those who support a theory of the immutable and immemorial in education concede that the temporal and changing have at least a subordinate role to play in educational philosophy. Their chief criticism is that these factors present but a fragmentary and incomplete picture of ultimate reality. There are others, however, who, in clinging to the eternal and immutable as the ultimately real, think that the novelty constantly emerging from a changing world is not even real, that it is only apparent. As one perceives the world, it is conceded, one's senses profusely attest to changing circumstances, unique individuals, and novel outcomes.

¹ HUTCHINS, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

But when one conceives the world, it is claimed,¹ his reason bears witness to a realm of unvarying essences and universals.

Indeed, it has been suggested that education follow Plato in treating the perceptual world as the mere appearance of reality, while true reality lies behind.¹ To illustrate this view of reality it may be well to pause at this point to recall that peerless philosopher's famous cave by the side of the road. The owner was chained in the mouth of his cave so that he must ever look inward toward the wall opposite. Consequently, his only acquaintance with the objects which passed on the highway was the shadow which each cast on the far wall of his cave. Hence, the only world his experience revealed was a world of appearance. The world of true reality behind was hedged off. Presumably, the argument might be extended to claim that the educator is chained to the comings and goings of his school. He deals with this child and that. Time passes. One class graduates and a new generation enters the kindergarten. The teaching personnel changes, and even the curriculum may undergo constant reconstruction to keep up-to-date. Thus the educator lives in a shadow land. Only as intellect aids him to a grasp of concepts and universals can he strike off the shackles which bind him to the changing temporal order and escape to the realm of true reality where the enduring quality of education can be seen.

Resulting education would then, doubtless, seek reality through the rational and disregard sense-training. Few even of the traditionalists would probably accept such a one-sided theory of education. The Aristotelian position would be preferable—and is actually preferred by Catholic educational philosophy. There appearance and substance are not competitive, but complementary. Both library and laboratory would constitute important parts of the whole of education. One could then claim citizenship in the infinite world as well as the one of finite limitations.

✓ 4. Whatever conception one forms of the dynamic character of the universe, one question yet remains which is of the utmost importance for education. Are the successive stages of change

¹ CHANCELLOR, W. E., *A Theory of Ideals, Motives, and Values in Education*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1907, pp. 3-4. Contra, WHEELER, R. H., in *Integration—Its Meaning and Application*, (HOPKINS, L. T., ed.), New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1937, pp. 33-34.

occurring according to some grand purpose or design? Or are the changes just capricious and purposeless? Is the universe chaotic or teleological?

For those who think that change is only apparent, or at best an indication of a lack of perfection—the perfected obviously not requiring further change—there can be little doubt as to the purpose of this changing temporal process. What is immutable, what is eternal, what is immemorial, determines the design of life and education. The form and purpose which one finds in the finite world argue the existence of an infinite and perfect intelligence as the first cause and final end of all things. Herein cosmic evolution finds its origin and ultimate goal. If the educator only consults man as to what the end of life and education is, he will get as many answers as history records. If, on the other hand, he will examine the revealed word of God he can find the answer to his quest with conclusive certainty. The child is God's creation and is destined for eternal happiness with Him if he successfully passes the probationary period of human life.

Those who think that change itself is the ultimately real can claim no certainty such as this for their conception of the trend of cosmic events. Paradoxically, change is the only certainty with them. Such a view has various interpretations. If change results in mere caprice, obviously no significant metaphysic of education can be based on it. Much the same conclusion seems warranted if the patterns of cycles of change are so stupendous as to dwarf the efforts of education into insignificant amelioration of these inexorable events.

Many erect a theory of progress on the foundation fact of change. This they support with the doctrine of evolution, which they claim is moving on to ever higher and higher levels of development. But others, in general sympathetic with this point of view, think it is a mistake for the educator to confuse evolution with progress. They declare it purely gratuitous to assume that each successive stage of evolution is an advance on the preceding. Such a judgment could only be passed from the point of view of eternity. Moreover, education would again play a relatively inconspicuous role where progress is thought to be as inevitable as evolution is often thought to be inexorable.

Many think of "progressive" education as successive steps in the direction of some fixed goal of perfection. On the contrary,

the educator committed to a dynamic metaphysic will reject progress as a condition to be definitely and finally attained. Commencing with the premise of change, "progressive" education must be thought of as a process of continuous growth.¹ The goal of the process will be found in the process itself. The process of growth will be its own end. This will necessitate continuous adjustment of the learner to his environment. But beyond adjustment will lie only readjustment. What is "progressive" will be experimental. There will be no general formula for progress.

This theory of the drift of the cosmic weather puts heavy emphasis on what are the immediate and efficient causes of educational events. Because change is ultimate, it shows no concern for final causes. So, too, of ends. Their immanence in the process of education virtually excludes the transcendental from education. This is very disappointing to a large number. For there it denies the infinite. Because it eschews the trans-experiential it makes learning one-sided. Furthermore, the theory pauperizes education by depriving the pupil both of his soul and of his God.

A goodly number of those who have searched the cosmos for the inherent and abiding pattern whereby education may plan the making of men have found it in an analogy to plant life. The theory that children are to be likened to plants and the school to a garden has already achieved a prominent place in educational vocabularies through the German-derived "kindergarten." Just as the full-grown plant already blooms in the seed, so too the pupil's mind already has latently concealed within it all the powers it can ever hope to develop. Neither plant nor child has the potentialities for becoming anything which is not already foreshadowed in the germ. Education thus becomes a process of unfolding what was originally enfolded. It cannot endow a child with capacity that he does not have; it can only develop what he already is. The process of education is, then, indeed well named from the Latin *e-ducere*, to lead forth, to bring out. What was potentially implicit it makes actually explicit. This view may be made all the more inspiring if one further believes that the child is

¹ For a criticism of this theory in terms of the opposite metaphysic, see J. M. Raby, *A Critical Study of the New Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1932, pp. 61-63. For further discussion, see *infra*, pp. 96-99.

made in the image of God and therefore should unfold in accordance with divine purpose.

So stated, this theory of educational development may seem to neglect the influence of environment. It is, however, not so intended. Neglect of the environment can stunt the finest potentialities of both plant and child. Just as the gardener must cultivate, fertilize, and water a plant to get the best results; so too the parent and teacher must be diligent if they would cultivate in the child the right habits of manhood. And the same doubtless applies to the training of teachers. Though teachers, like artists, are born, not made, there can be no doubt but that the professional study of education will be necessary to bring into full play whatever genius a person has.

Some go so far with this theory of education as to suggest a more or less exact pattern for unfoldment. It finds its most complete statement in the culture epoch and recapitulation theories of education. The thought here is that the child becomes adapted to life by passing through all the stages of culture that the race has already passed through. Thus he should learn the culture of the nomadic, pastoral, agrarian, and industrial epochs. By recapitulating these, the child proceeds from being a little savage to becoming a civilized man. Nor is this pattern of development an offhand suggestion, for it is rooted in the very constitution of the universe itself. It is the way history itself has unfolded. And what is history but the unfolding of the mind of God Himself, a dramatization of the ultimate nature of things on the world as a stage.

Attractive as these theories are, they are not entirely free from criticism. Following out their consequences, an early danger is encountered in revering every activity of the child as a manifestation of primordial purpose. This would probably put too high a price on his nuisance value. Consequently it is necessary to have some standard by which to judge whether a child is unfolding properly. Naturally this must be his state of complete unfoldedness. Such a state or criterion is obviously transcendental, beyond human experience. Because it is so, some working substitute must be set up for practical purposes. As to what this shall be, there is much difference of opinion.

The recapitulation theory has been put forward as a cure for doubts at this point. The best insight into unfoldedness is

declared to be had from what history has unfolded of divine purpose to date. But even this plausible theory is not free from the objection of critics. If each school generation had to repeat or recapitulate all the experience of the race, it is maintained that no evolution or progress at all would be made. Short cuts are of the essence, if an advance on the present is to be made. If this is the case, then, it is further objected that the roles of heredity and environment have been misconceived in the theories under criticism. In these, heredity and environment have been treated as parts of a completed whole. The future significance of each has been predetermined in the past. This is one reason, of course, why the curriculum is to recapitulate the past. Over against such a theory is proposed one wherein heredity and environment are merely taken for what they are, the original endowment of the individual in the circumstances in which he finds himself. What the future holds is an open question. It is unique and certainly not a reproduction of the past. But to make this assertion is, of course, but to reiterate the progressive's preference for a metaphysic of novelty, time, and change.

5. The inquiry into whether there is any ultimate architecture of the universe to which education should be sensitive leads to one further topic which an educational metaphysic can hardly overlook. It may readily be introduced by presupposing the validity of such a theory of education as that of unfoldment. If the adult is already enfolded in the youth, as the plant is in the seed, and if, after all, the environment can only call forth or stunt what is already potentially there, is not one's educational career so predetermined as to crush any sense of free will? In an even wider sense, in a world where ultimate reality is posited as eternally changeless, how can freedom, like novelty, be anything more than apparent?

The problem of freedom has been struggled over so long that in its extended history it has accumulated many meanings.¹ Of the many problems involved, two categories need to be kept

¹ McCallister, W. J., *The Growth of Freedom in Education*, New York, Ray Long and Richard R. Smith Company, 1931, p. 543.

CHILDS, J. L., "A Way of Dealing with Experience," *Progressive Education*, 8: 695-698, December, 1931.

For a detailed consideration of the general problem of the freedom of the will, see any standard work. Only the aspects which have found their way into philosophies of education are included here.

distinct at the very outset. On the one hand, there is the question whether in the ultimate nature of things there is any freedom at all. This is the metaphysical problem of free will to be dealt with here. On the other hand, if there is freedom of this sort, there is the added social question of whether any particular individual shall be allowed to exercise such freedom as there is and under what circumstances. This latter gives rise to such problems as academic freedom¹ and creative teaching in the classroom.²

The case denying freedom of the will and championing determinism or mechanism has been implied in the opening and may therefore be stated first. It is based on the simple relation of cause and effect, the law of sufficient reason.³ Take anything that a child does in or out of school. How did he come to do it? There must be definite reasons or causes in the past. The reasons or causes for the present situation, then, are to be found in the immediately preceding state of affairs. This, in turn, is the result of the circumstances which preceded it, and so on indefinitely. If a complete investigation of all these antecedent factors could be made, however remote their relevancy, no uncertainty whatever would be left in accounting for the child's deed under consideration. The fact that no such analysis has been made may be laid to the limitations of human intelligence rather than to its impossibility in the ultimate nature of things. Far from having been free to select his own course of conduct, then, the pupil's choice will be seen to have been determined for him by the necessity of preceding events. Nor need this view be depressing. Just as the present is the result of the preceding state of affairs, by the same token the present is also the cause of the succeeding state of affairs, the future. Therefore, given a complete chart of the configuration of past events, one will be able unfailingly to predict the future outcome of present educational efforts. And think what a factor for human welfare that might be!

Even conceding the "ifs" in the determinist's case, the libertarian would doubtless still think the sacrifice of freedom too

¹ *Infra*, pp. 233-242.

² *Infra*, pp. 299-303.

³ THORNDIKE, E. L., "The Contribution of Psychology to Education," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1: 6-12, January, 1910.

great a price to pay for the picture of educational efficiency offered. Yet again, where is there room for freedom in such an apparently common-sense account? Must not the events of this world seem at least that simple and complete to an omnipotent and omniscient deity? Various theories have been put forward to account for freedom and to secure the pupil and teacher from the ironclad determinism described. Some of these must now be considered. Much will depend on one's attitude toward novelty, time, and change.

Among those who hold that reality is already eternally realized and that change and novelty are merely appearance of reality so conceived, perhaps most popular is the theory that there is a transcendental freedom of the will. Since every event in the past, present, and future is already accounted for in a changeless eternity, nothing less than a will able to transcend the ordinary chain of cause and effect relationships will be sufficient to assure freedom. According to this theory the individual is himself an originating source of energy, an original cause. Because he is self-active, he is self-directive, self-determining. He is the author of his own deeds, the captain of his destiny. This enables him to modify the stream of causation which is operating upon him. He is free to coincide or interfere with it at will. Freedom is a primary quality of reality. It is God-given.

So stated, it would almost appear as if the freedom of the will transcended all conditions, as if it were absolute, even indifferent. While some libertarians actually hold such an extreme position, others are inclined to set limits to freedom. One count against absolute freedom of the will is that it might encroach on omnipotence itself. It would enable one by taking thought, or by willing, to add a cubit to his mental or physical stature, an act obviously absurd. Again, the idea that the will is so conditioned that it acts without motivation, the so-called liberty of indifference, is also rejected. Motives are very definitely recognized as bearing on the will. As has been noted elsewhere, there cannot be willing without knowing. There is no freedom from motivation, but rather freedom to pick between the different motivations presented. And be it noted that this freedom is not full-fledged if the will is only free to respond to the strongest motive. It must also be free to choose, on occasion, the initially weaker cause.

Yet even with such conditions, a transcendental freedom of the will presents the educator with knotty problems. If the pupil is free to pick between the stimuli to conduct, is he not also free to accept or reject the instruction of the teacher? How, in other words, can the teacher make his teaching stick? If he is quite frank, the teacher will probably admit that he cannot assure that learning will follow teaching. To be consistent, the libertarian teacher would probably say that in the last analysis the pupil is self-educated. Neither the teacher nor any one else can educate him; an education is something he must win for himself. He can no more be constrained to learn than the proverbial horse can be made to drink. So if, in the day of the visitation of the teacher, the pupil willfully refuses the teacher's ministrations, it is unfortunate, but the responsibility is the pupil's. This is comforting doctrine for the teacher. Yet he must be cautioned not to take refuge too quickly in this theory, when failure crowns his efforts. He must first searchingly inquire whether he has put forth the best effort of which he is capable.

Another problem may be set by inquiring what this freedom of self-activity is for? A good transcendentalist would probably reply that only in freedom can the pupil achieve self-realization, that is, develop his individuality. In the language of the unfoldment theory of education, he must be free to unfold properly. Freedom consists in voluntarily becoming what one was intended to become. The addition of this condition further circumscribes the concept of freedom. In a sense it almost seems to cut it off. But there is an all-important choice still left for the child. He is free to choose between his destiny and the privation of failing to realize it. Stated in this fashion, great pressure is brought upon the child to exercise his freedom of will as he "ought" to. His freedom of choice lies between duty and fault.

Quite a different theory of freedom occurs to those who are committed in the first instance to viewing novelty, time, and change as basic realities. The alternative to determinism or mechanism here is found in predicating freedom on the indeterminism which such realities entail. Instead of being an original datum transcending determinism, freedom is conceived as a quest; it is something to be wrought out in a contingent and precarious universe. Some changes occur with a high degree of uniformity and regularity. They are highly predictable. These

may be said to be determined. It is even desirable that much of education have this quality. It is what gives dependability to the teacher's method. Other changes are less regular. They are often the product of variables which have never been combined before. The combination of heredity and environment is constantly presenting such unique relations. What the outcome will be,* is almost always unpredictable in some degree. From this point of view, then, indeterminacy is ascribed to the outcropping of genuine novelty, to an emergent evolution. Freedom of the will is the human phase of this creative process.¹ Here one's range of freedom of choice is not just between good and bad, between great happiness or abject misery, but between alternative goods.

Some think unpredictability, and hence freedom, is but a cover for human ignorance of the underlying determinism really at work. To the one with complete knowledge of all the factors, they say nothing is unpredictable or new. But no educator, it is retorted, has or ever is likely to have such omniscience. Were he to, he would no longer be an educator. Such complete understanding is only hypothetically possible. There is no evidence that the theory has a basis in fact. The passage of time with its accompanying change and novelty ever prevents a complete configuration of acting forces. Indeed, it is asserted that the more one tries to get complete control of the educational situation, the more he increases the contingent elements and hence the number of permutations and combinations possible.²

• Keeping this background in mind, evidence of freedom can be found in several aspects of education. At the very outset, the power of choice is referred directly to the pupil's individuality. No attempt is made to get behind this fact by instituting a faculty of the will. To be an individual means to be a particular person and not somebody else. Individuality is thus inevitably biased. Its characteristic mode of action is by preference. Choice, consequently, is as free as individuality is free. So, the very tendency of the pupil to grow, to learn to reconstruct his

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., *Education and Emergent Man*, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1934, pp. 65-66, 68.

———, *Education, Crime, and Social Progress*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1931, pp. 121-122.

² DEWEY, J., *The Public and Its Problems*, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1927, pp. 198-199.

habits, may be held to be an assertion of freedom too. Freedom is thus further evidenced as a function of the plasticity of the nervous system. From this angle it reaches its highest point in intelligence. Ability to think is what is said to make the pupil free. In this capacity intelligence is not a passive butt of the forces of the past and present. Rather is it a clearinghouse and point of redistribution of these forces. The freedom described here is obviously far from absolute. No pupil is free to open himself to all sorts of possibilities. If he were free to become anything, he would have no individuality. Individuality, then, is at once source and limit of the pupil's freedom.

It would be amiss to close the discussion of the role of free will in education without a mention of responsibility. It is generally held that without some sort of freedom there can be no responsibility. Thus, if a rigid determinism obtains, the child can hardly be held accountable for what he does. Accountability must be predicated upon choice. But even so, there are many who incline to lay the blame for past acts at the door of early training. If this is the case, responsibility is not merely individual but social as well. The teacher, parent, and community are jointly accountable with the child. Others would ground responsibility, not on what has already happened, but in the anticipation of future consequences. The child is responsible, then, only as he can be taught to become responsible, to act in the light of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his acts. Some think that this function has been performed when the child has been educated to know better. Others insist that he does not truly become accountable till he *does* better as well. This does not mean that ignorance is an excuse before the law. Public liability may attach to one's acts in spite of one's ignorance. But moral responsibility must be based on anticipation of consequences, on education.

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CHAPTER III

EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASES OF EDUCATION

Important as it may be to base one's philosophy of education on metaphysical first principles as to the nature of reality, the wide differences of opinion already noted on this point are very disconcerting to many. On a matter so basic, they must know the source from which these differences flow. Is it the intricate texture of reality, or is it the diversity of the human mind? If it is the latter, then perhaps there is a problem here that is even prior to the first principles already considered. Perhaps one should make sure of his logical equipment to know reality before he draws conclusions about it. How does the investigator or learner come to know and how can he know that he knows? These are main questions in the theory of knowledge or epistemology. They form the next indispensable basis of a philosophy of education.

Since knowledge is the stock in trade of education, it is easy to understand that a philosophy of education must be based on an adequate consideration of epistemology, or knowledge theory. However obvious this may seem, nevertheless, there is opinion which maintains that epistemology is too abstract and speculative to affect the practical issues of learning. As a matter of fact, knowledge is such a familiar, everyday occurrence that few unsophisticated people ever stop to demand inspection of its credentials. Even sophisticated people like scientists and teachers, who are constantly accumulating and dispensing it, seldom propound such fundamental questions. Rather is knowledge assumed. While this assumption suits the human mind better than a thoroughgoing skepticism, it behooves the careful student to inquire closely into the grounds which may reasonably be said to support it. As a matter of fact, these are various. Each points to a different type of school practice.

The point of departure for a more ample discussion of this phase of educational philosophy again may well be a consideration of a sampling of conflicting educational practices. Some schools

lay great emphasis on child activity. The curriculum is made up, not of subject matter, but of activities. Construction, drawing, painting, dramatization, field excursions, and the like are exploited. There is also usually much greater physical mobility in the classroom. But physical activity is not pursued to the exclusion of mental activity. There is constant intellectual direction of the former.

These practices are contrasted with schools where there is a greater degree of passivity on the part of the pupils. Instruction is more academic. Children learn their lessons in the old familiar way. These schools, to quote one of their earliest child patrons, are "listening" schools. Naturally there is a greater emphasis here on *memoriter*. Even where these schools have stressed activities there has been a premium on mechanical skills. Repetition and accuracy have taken precedence over understanding. This contrasts greatly with practices where learning is more experimental.

In the one case, to study means to absorb the lesson assigned to be learned. In the other, it means to investigate. Operations need to be undertaken. Obviously, in this latter instance, the curriculum is made on the spot. It grows out of the project under investigation. The resources which are needed to pursue the inquiry become the curriculum as the inquiry unfolds. In the other practice, the curriculum is more easily made up in advance; it is already in existence before learning commences. Here knowledge exists for its own sake. It is tucked away in books, libraries, and teachers' heads. It is merely waiting to be apprehended. From the more experimental approach, knowledge does not have this tailor-made, ready-to-wear aspect. On the contrary, knowledge is instrumental. Use varies with aim or objective. Consequently, the purpose of the learner becomes very prominent. But where knowledge awaits its conqueror, the intent or interest of the student, while important, is not paramount. There the forces of knowledge are drawn up in logical array. They may be overcome, that is, learned, but when they surrender, it will be in original formation. Where pupil purpose dominates, interest is likely to warp the logical organization of the curriculum into a more psychological form.

Here, then, are conflicts aplenty as to the nature of knowledge, and the best way of learning it. Even superficial inspection will

show that the problems proposed by these diverse practices are by no means unrelated. Certain fundamentals beneath the surface are recurrent. Among these, two problem areas stand out. (1) With what authority does the knowledge included in the curriculum speak to the pupil and teacher? Should it be learned because it is the truth? What is truth? Is it always the same for all who would learn it? Or does truth vary with the time and place of its learning? Is it relative? (2) What is the function of mind or intelligence in learning knowledge or truth? What is the role of mind in the world order? Is mind a lens through which one gets a picture of the world as it is? Or is intelligence to be viewed as a means for adapting to and reconstructing the world order itself?

1. Manifestly, these two inquiries are interdependent. Perhaps the significance of epistemology for educational practice will be clearer if the question of the nature of truth be raised first. The importance of doing so may be judged in part from the fact that it is a fundamental starting point in the training of Catholic teachers. In general, there are several theories as to the nature of truth. One test of truth is its correspondence with reality. Another is its internal coherence. And finally, there is the pragmatic way of testing truth by whether it "works."

Doubtless, most laymen and teachers think of truth in the first sense. Truth is largely a question of the agreement of statement with fact. The one mirrors the other. Hence truth is objective; it is out there. The person engaged in educational research literally "finds" the truth. It is pre-existent to the search for it and there is no ambiguity about it, once discovered. Once true, always true. The ancient reputation of truth has long implied that the standard of comparison is of unimpeachable accuracy. In fact, truth is variously stated to be immutable, eternal, everywhere the same. If it were not so, truth would lose its cardinal virtue.

How, now, shall this correspondence of truth with reality be tested? In one quarter, it has been laid down that educational philosophy must be systematically empirical. The experience of the learner—whether he be an adult engaged in educational research or a child in the classroom—is the ultimate criterion. Some have been so extreme in their empiricism as to limit instruction to training of the senses. The variability of indi-

vidual experience, however, is notorious. Its evidence can nearly always be impeached or discredited by inquiring, "Whose experience?" On this account some are disposed to differentiate between truth and reality. They maintain that reality is what actually exists while truth is merely what some one says exists. The correspondence of truth to reality eludes exact determination through empiricism. The absolute truth about reality, they allege, can only be transcendently known. In spite of this possible infirmity, many remain doggedly empirical in their approach to educational problems. Experience may be fallible, but they find nothing to substitute for it. Certainly experience cannot transcend itself and, even if it could, it would by that very fact probably be unintelligible. Therefore, the empiricist finds it purely gratuitous to assume that reality, if the truth could be completely known, would be something quite different from what is learned firsthand about it.

Others think a restatement of the nature of truth is demanded for the guidance of educational activities. This they offer in a *theory of truth as consistency, the second of the three theories* proposed for consideration. This does not mean that truth needs an entirely new vehicle. Perhaps repairs can be made on the former one of empiricism. Accordingly they start with experience but admit at once that no amount of educational research will reveal things-in-themselves, things as they objectively are in their naked protean actuality. Such truth as there is, then, is to be found, not in the correspondence of experience with reality, but in the correspondence or consistency of different experiences with each other. If the experiences of numerous people or the varied experiences of a single person tend to support the same conclusion, consistency will have been a valuable guide to verification. Obviously such a theory does not radically supplant the correspondence theory, but is a valuable supplement to it. The eternal immutable character of truth, for example, is not superseded. Thus it is noteworthy that both these theories—the realistic and the idealistic—define reality as eternally made existence and therefore truth as something the relation of whose parts is already complete for all time.

But granted now that rational processes have gone as far as possible in detecting a coherent frame for truth, how can one be sure that educational practice will bear out rational prediction?

One answer is that determination of the truth is not done till some operation is undertaken. This third criterion of truth, testing it by its consequences, goes by a variety of names. It received its initial popularity under the title of pragmatism, a word taken over from a Greek root meaning to do, to work, to accomplish. In some quarters, chiefly English, it became associated with the term humanism. Because of its emphasis on methodology, the means which best serve our ends, instrumentalism is also a nomenclature honored by frequent use. This, in turn, more or less identifies it with scientific method, and hence the label experimentalism.

But by whatever handle one grasps the idea, what is its significance for educational philosophy? From this view, experience is neither true nor false. Neither are ideas in themselves, nor facts as facts, to be classed as true or false. Verification waits on employing these in some problem. If as hypotheses they are adequate to clear up the confusion or ambiguity which has occurred in educational practice, then they become true. Truth does not just exist; it happens! Determining the truth is literally verification, truth-making. It is part of the process of evolution. Every judgment actually reconstructs reality itself. Truth is never complete nor perfect, but always in the making.

Assaying truth in the crucible of a problem suggests that aims and purposes have a part to play. If truth is that which "works"—as so frequently asserted—"working" must mean the achievement of purpose. Some facts might be true for one purpose, but the identical facts be untrue for accomplishing some other enterprise. Ask an educational psychologist the true way to learn or to motivate a lesson, and he probably will reply that it depends on what the teacher is trying to do. It will also be contingent on the child under consideration. "Man is the measure of things" rather than any universal eternal ideal. Thus human interest becomes a vital condition of truth. Both new and old ideas in education will be continued literally on their ability "to make good."¹ The true and the good will be seen to overlap.

¹ Cf. COUNTS, G. S., *School and Society in Chicago*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1928, p. 344. "Toward truth in any abstract sense, social groups have no inclination; rather do they seek effective instruments for the winning of battles. If truth, however it may be defined, serves them, well and good; but if it does not, so much the worse for truth."

Truth in the abstract passes. Only truths are left. If truth has to await its consequences, it becomes infected with temporal infirmities. In the temporal order, things change and truth is no exception. Absolute finality is not to be had. The third test, then, proving truth by its consequences, finds congeniality in a dynamic and individualistic metaphysic.¹ As a basis for school practice it would oppose fixed objectives; no curriculum could be rigidly prescribed; nor could any method be authoritative or indoctrinating.

Such a radical epistemological base for educational philosophy, needless to say, does not pass without a challenge. The question arises at the outset, why does any educational theory "work"? Is it an arbitrary, accidental happening? Or is there some inherent quality or interconnection of the factors at work which makes them "work"? If the latter, then educational theories are not true because they "work" but, conversely, they "work" because they are true.² Hence, truth is objective and not a matter of private interpretation. Therefore, the school should educate the child to *be* something rather than to *do* something, as with the pragmatists. The notion of being outranks that of doing, just as in metaphysics being was found superior to becoming.³ Further, there seems to be an objectionable affinity of the pragmatists and their ilk to those ancient Greek teachers, the Sophists. Both have the attitude of Pontius Pilate when they inquire, "What is truth?" The spirit in which they put the question implies the rejection of absolute standards of truth and the acceptance of its relativity. This is plain sophistry. Certainly Catholic educational philosophy finds this epistemology so subjective as to be dangerously misleading.⁴

¹ *Supra*, pp. 29-30, 32, 34-39.

² HORNE, H. H., *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1935, pp. 500-503. In his *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 303, Horne qualifies this statement by saying " . . . or will work when conditions are better." This seems like a vital concession to those who contend that truth is temporal and contingent on circumstances. See also *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, pp. 420-421, where the author states that truth does not have to wait to become true.

³ *Supra*, p. 36.

⁴ Cf. T. E. Shields, *Philosophy of Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1921, p. 97, where this Catholic author remarks, "Pragma-

Others criticize this theory of truth because it appears to confuse the true with the good. To the plain man it certainly seems that the two can easily be differentiated. To him an educational theory might easily be true, and yet at the same time work out very badly for certain children. When prizes have been posted, pupils have been known to make extraordinary improvement in their studies. The truth of this fact is far from proving its desirability, however. So one should distinguish between what a thing is and what it does. What it is, is capable of objective corroboration. But what function it performs, what it is good for, depends on need and desire. The truth, then, is true for everyone, while the good is relative to individuals. Through success in making this distinction, some manage neither wholly to accept nor completely to reject the pragmatic or humanistic educational epistemology. Thus they salvage the importance of purpose or value for learning, but jettison it as a determinant of truth.

Some further criticize this philosophy of education, because its supporters can find nothing in it which would support firm convictions. How can there be undying loyalty to a wavering truth? Further, it appears to encourage opportunism and mere expediency rather than professional conduct according to an undeviating standard of worth. To these objections specific answer has been tendered. The only convictions that convince these respondents are those which are firm because confirmed in experience. In these they have great faith. And in their method of attaining conviction they have a confidence as productive of martyrs, as in the more authoritarian tenets. They concede that this method might be an opportunistic one if applied to educational circumstances of limited scope and short duration. Most situations, however, require comprehensive programs for long spans of time. Moreover, smaller problems are usually caught up in larger, more protracted ones, if one has but the sight to see. Hence, the more inclusive situations, no less than the narrower ones, are to be tested by this same workability.

A last indictment of this educational epistemology specifies that it results in a "methodomania." Systematic methodical doubt is exalted. Pursuit, rather than the possession of truth, is

tism and the Gospel unite in establishing a test for the value of educational doctrines. "By their fruits you shall know them."

avored. The inability of the modern educator, with all his investigation and experimentation, to terminate the chase with the formulation of permanent conclusions seems to him to base educational philosophy on skepticism. This charge is admitted, but only in part. Doubt is cultivated, but not as an end in itself, as did the ancient skeptics. Such doubting paralyzes action. The pragmatist employs doubt to clarify action—to clear up ambiguity. Yet even with this qualification the critics of pragmatism are only half-convinced of the return of methodomania to sanity.

2. The time is now ripe to inquire what role intelligence plays in these theories of truth. It requires little imagination to anticipate that the foregoing disagreements will cast their shadows ahead into this further area of discussion. Indeed, they almost inevitably forecast corresponding differences of theory as to the way in which intelligence learns or lays hold of such truth as there is. Since truth of whatever sort can hardly be known save through the operation of intelligence, it becomes of first importance to inquire into the relation of intellect to the world about it. Just as the principle of the lever cannot be invoked unless the fulcrum has a solid base on which to rest, so too intellect cannot pry the truth loose from its matrix of perplexities unless it also has a firm footing. Is that footing to be found inside or outside the world of nature? This is the first question.

The pragmatist is inclined to make mind a part of the order of nature, to naturalize it. He views intelligence as a relatively late comer on the world scene. He adopts the evolutionary viewpoint that mind has evolved in the natural order as a more flexible means of adapting the organism to a changing environment. It is definitely an instrument of survival. This fits very neatly with the theory that reality is a mixture of the stable and the precarious. The educational procedure it mandates is necessarily experimental.

Others see difficulties with this view. If mind or intelligence operates wholly inside nature, then some fear that it will also be bound by nature. It will have no freedom. It will be unable to reach out and grasp truth unhampered by the eccentricities of nature, the truth which is eternal in the heavens. To do this mind must be autonomous. The apprehension of the certitude of knowledge must be independent of any voluntarism of will or

purpose on which the experimental procedures of progressive education are so dependent.¹ Rational processes must be trained to grasp the inherent rationality of the world. Indeed, reality is viewed as an antecedently completed pattern merely waiting the grasp of the trained logician. This cannot be done wholly from within nature. Mind must exist outside as well. Mind so conceived, of course, is no recent addition to nature but has existed from all time.

With opinion so divided, a second question may well ask just how the individual, child or adult, comes to know his world?² The simplest answer seems to be that he must experience it. Teacher experience is important, but, after all, his account of truth is at best only vicarious for the learner. Having recourse to experience, however, raises the further question, what is meant by experience? What part does intelligence play? Those who think of mind as able to grapple with truth in its naked protean form are inclined to think of experience as limited to sense impressions. Thereafter it is for reason to act on the data of experience, to correct it and perchance even to add to it from its own private sources. Getting a true picture of the world is achieved basically through the direct energy of the intellect. With the pragmatists, on the other hand, intelligence is much more closely bound up with experience. With them, experience is rather an active-passive affair. It is a trying, on the one hand, and an undergoing, on the other. Intellect is inextricably involved as a means for guiding experience to fruitful outcomes. From the former point of view the learner seeks to form an inner picture of the outer world as it exactly is. From the latter point of view, he is constantly trying to make a mutual adaptation of himself to his world and the world to himself. These two contrasting epistemologies of education lead to quite different educational consequences. Hence they must now be examined in greater detail.

Most plain people, and probably most informed educators, throughout the greater part of educational history would probably incline to the first view. It seems common sense enough to

¹ KOTSCHNIG, W. M., ed., *The University in a Changing World*, London, Oxford University Press, 1932, pp. 197-200.

² For an historical setting to this question see J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1916, pp. 341-343.

posit an outer world and an inner mind. The senses are apertures through which contact between the two is established. Gradually, as one learns, he builds up an inner world which corresponds directly to the outer one. Because reality and truth are ready-made, the paramount function of intellect is to insure that the inner idea is a facsimile of the outer object. The role of thought is thus clearly superior to that of sense in education. *

For instance, to the idealists the facts of science, instead of being as concrete as they seem, are really the reactions of intelligence to the objective world. The word science, in fact, comes from a Latin root meaning to know. Any given science, then, such as botany, is what thought knows. It has more to do with ideas than plants. Indeed, according to this train of reasoning, the plant itself is basically ideal. The ideal thus furnishes the basis for all educational work.

This has sometimes been called the copy theory of intelligence. Mind is a spectator. It literally "takes in" what goes on in the world about it. The counsel and advice which one would take back to guide the confusion in educational practice hardly requires extended capitulation. The curriculum will be largely abstract, constituted of ideal knowledge classified and arranged in the most teachable form. With truth fixed and mind an intricate picture-taking device, children will be considered to have learned a thing when they can reproduce or define it.

This statement of the role of intellect may seem oversimplified. The idea of two worlds, some would caution, should only be employed as an expository device. As a matter of course, there really is only one world. Subject and object, child and curriculum, are but terminal aspects of a unitary process. Even if there were two, their exact resemblance would be open to serious question. Of crucial importance, rather, is the question whether the individual's reactions to his world bear a constant relation. In such a restatement of the copy theory it will readily be recognized that there are many things which a pupil cannot define but toward which he can act quite consistently or intelligently. How many children could define a dog? Yet in spite of this obvious difficulty, how many children would have any trouble in integrating their various impressions to make a proper adaptation to one?

The Catholic or scholastic position on this point merits special attention. To commence, it should be recalled that Catholic philosophy posits an eternal undeviating truth. The scholastic's knowledge of it is achieved in two ways. One is by discovery without any help from a teacher and the other is by discovery with the teacher's aid. That knowledge is "discovered" in both cases argues the spectator or copy theory of intellect. Truth being unchanging, this must be the appropriate nature of learning. Although the scholastic conceives of truth as static, it is important to point out that he thinks of intellect as an active principle. Indeed it is because of this principle that the child can learn at all without the aid of the teacher. Moreover, except for such a principle, teaching would be ineffective when the aid of the teacher is invoked. In other words, knowledge must pre-exist in the learner before teaching can fructify. In like manner, a knowledge of universals must precede a knowledge of particulars. To facilitate this process it is the peculiar function of intelligence to lay hold on the innermost reasons or essences of things.

But how does that first knowledge originate, the knowledge in terms of which later learning may take place? The answer is that the inner principle of knowledge stems from God.¹ In Him both subject and object, knower and known, student and studies, find a perfect identity. Stated in other terms, because of His perfection, God has nothing to learn. Man, on the contrary, because of his imperfection, does. Consequently, for him the act of knowing and the thing known cannot be one and the same. The knowledge which pre-exists in man is only there potentially. There must be activity on the part of the learner to bring it into actuality. Education thus is not an imparting of knowledge but rather a solicitation or prompting of the mind to exert its natural power. So stated, Catholic educational philosophy incorporates the activity theory of education. The Catholic position even goes so far as to state that instruction implies "perfect action of knowledge" in the teacher.² The importance of this conception

¹ Cf. H. H. Horne, *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, Mac-Millan Company, 1927, p. 271: "The world (the curriculum) is only intelligible to man because it is the product of the thought (*λόγος*) of God."

² MAYER, M. H., *The Philosophy of Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company, 1929, p. 65.

for the teacher's attitude toward problems of method and curriculum can hardly be minimized.

From the foregoing, it emerges that the intellect apparently is not capable, by itself, of making complete copies of the truth that is to be learned. Instinct and intellect on the plane of nature have defects—as has any mirror. These deficiencies can be compensated by extraordinary aids to the learning process. In the first place, it is an old article of Catholic faith that one must have faith in order to understand. The weaknesses of human nature's equipment for learning, however, can be further strengthened by divine grace and revelation. This does not argue the neglect of man's animal nature, but merely its need for help beyond its own powers. Yet no single one of the three—faith, grace, or revelation—is sufficient by itself to help intellect to the deeper vision of truth; it is necessary that all three be employed. Moreover, not even conceiving intelligence as a possession held in common by the race will make up for the shortcomings of individual intelligence. There will still be need for divine authority. Only later, as learning expands, is it expected that authoritarianism as a crutch can be discarded. By that time, it is hoped, the intellect will be so strengthened that it will be able to record the truth from a distillate of intrinsic evidence alone.

Those inclining to a behavioristic philosophy of education take no comfort in the introduction of these supernatural aids to the child's reason. Indeed, they hold that in proportion as this process becomes sacred it becomes a mystery and past finding out through psychological research. Moreover, to invoke forces not directly demonstrable to account for reasonable behavior amounts to the very abandonment of reason itself.

There is yet another variety of acquiring knowledge which has results closely akin to the copy theory. This is learning one's world through an intuitive or mystical experience.¹ Here neither rationalism with its thoughts nor empiricism with its sensations is held sufficient by itself alone to give an accurate picture of reality. Rather is a certain wholeness of experience necessary to know one's world. To depend on science alone, for

¹ DRESSER, H. W., *Education and the Philosophical Ideal*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900, pp. 21-22.

HORNE, H. H., "The Application of Ontologies to Education," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 2: 557, November, 1916.

instance, would be inadequate, for science is analytical. Such an intellectual operation more than likely would knife any insight or inspiration to be found in the totality of the learning experience.¹ In mysticism or intuition one must, as it is often said, get the "feel" of things. Just what the nature of any experience is, however, each one must find out for himself. This is fundamental in any philosophy of education. It must be remembered that only the pupil can learn his lesson. No one else, like the parent or teacher, can, to express it ungrammatically, "learn him." The ultimate nature of what is learned is an intimately private affair. It is inscrutable, ineffable, *sui generis*.

Because what is learned is so private to the knower or learner, his individuality is easily marked as specially accountable for this peculiar quality. Since individuality itself is unique, it is perhaps not surprising that intuitive learning defies transplantation. But whatever else one may say of it, the vivid yet incommunicable character of this knowledge is at least one way of asserting the finality of the individual in the educative process. Yet, at that, some think individuality runs a different course. While mysticism may originate in unique personality, they hold that individuality does not survive to the end but is emancipated from the external order and merged with universal unity.

Both the strength and the weakness of learning through a mystical or intuitive experience seem to be its ineffable character.² Incommunicable knowledge—granting there is such—cannot be taught. If it cannot be shared between pupil and teacher, it is in danger of becoming educationally sterile. This seems a definite limitation. It appears to justify the judgment that the role of mysticism or intuition is not primarily the apprehension of truth. Rather, if it is to have an effective and productive role in education, it must emphasize its potential qualities of criticism. These can be brought into bold relief by pointing out that what is learned is as variant as the learning personality is unique. In

¹ It is difficult to determine whether to include here the way in which H. O. Rugg distinguishes the inward orientation of the individual for the creative act from his outward orientation for problem solving. See his *Culture and Education in America*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1931, pp. 364-369.

² Cox, G. A., *What Is Christian Education?* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930, pp. 278-281.

just the measure that learnings are divergent and dissimilar, they offer either a contrast to, or a criticism of, what is already well known. Yet even criticism will be well-nigh stillborn unless it can be constructive through common sharing.

So far, the role of intelligence has been treated from the angle of making a double of existing knowledge. It could scarcely be the epistemological base for creative educational procedures. It has been creative, if at all, only in the sense of revealing a portion of an antecedent truth or reality not hitherto known. Such, however, are the consequences of testing truth by either its correspondence to reality or its own internal coherence.

Suppose, now, that truth is pragmatic, instrumental, or experimental, how then should intellect be cast to play its proper role in learning truth? If truth is relative to its consequences and its ability to make good, if truth is a process of verification spread over a period of time, if, in short, truth is dynamic, then intellect, instead of reflecting the truth, will have to reflect on it. Only truth that is finished and completed can be mirrored as in the copy theory of intellect. Truth which is incomplete or unfinished requires an intelligence which does not merely look at the situation, but looks into and beyond it. To say that the present is unfulfilled implies that its outcome is uncertain, perhaps even precarious. It becomes the function of thought in this situation to employ the evidence of the past and present as an instrument to anticipate the future. Intelligence has developed because it has survival value in the evolutionary process. Intelligence is begotten of doubt and can only thrive in a world which is diversified and changing. Where there are alternate routes to completing in the future what is going on in the present, intellect will have to choose which one is to be the future, or the truth.¹ In performing this role, intellect does not merely discover what has been foreordained as in eternally completed truth. On the contrary, the future might have turned out in various ways, but the particular outcome it took was the direct result of judgment. Thinking

¹ How ridiculous of Edward Caird's professor to oppose augmentation of the professional study of education at the college level because "it is inconsistent with the idea of a university as it exists in the divine mind." Quoted in E. C. Moore, "John Dewey's Contribution to Educational Theory," *School and Society*, 31: 39, January, 1930.

makes a difference in the course of events. There is, thus, genuine "creative intelligence."

From this, it follows that learning is not just a beholding of the universe in its various disciplines. The mere *memoriter* mastery of the different subject matters has obvious shortcomings. In contrast, instruction should find its point of departure in some problematical situation which requires thinking. Of course, such an education will involve risk, for the conclusions of thinking, till confirmed by their consequences, must necessarily be tentative and hypothetical. While suspense may involve insecurity, it has the compensation of fascination. Teaching and learning will both be in the nature of an adventure. Original research will not be limited to scientists and advanced students. Whoever is learning by thinking his way through the precarious and contingent is conducting research.

This theory appears to contrast sharply with the rationalistic theory of intellect and with the view that thinking only alters our ideas about reality, not reality itself. In spite of this fact, far from claiming a radical departure, its supporters contend the position to be a mediate one between rationalism, realism, and idealism. While it identifies itself with empirical method, in that it starts and ends with a particular concrete situation in educational practice, it concedes thought relations—the universals of the Catholic rationalistic position—a primary role in pointing to a formula for clearing the way to the resumption of classroom procedures. Again, it holds with realism to a reality which exists prior to the exercise of intelligence and is not constructed by it, a reality to which intellect must adapt itself to be successful. But at the same time it does not maintain that this adaptation demands exact conformity to environment or a precise counterpart "by way of copying it." Rather is the adaptation directed toward the further evolution of life in complexity and richness of meaning, as the idealists hold.

The theory that mind mirrors knowledge it further declares to be a false metaphor or analogy. Mind does not report the world impartially like a mirror. Like human vision, mind has a focus. Earlier impressions bias subsequent ones. They focus attention on this or that aspect of the environment. Mind is selective; it discriminates. Knowing, therefore, should involve interpreting

or judging. Mere intuition is not such. Too much education has been conducted as if learning were primarily a matter of knowing. As a matter of fact, life is a being and a having, a doing and an undergoing as well as an affair of knowing. Indeed, they precede knowing; nor is knowing complete without their supplement. Direct immediate acquaintance with one's environment is rather an aesthetic experience. Even though one's consciousness of things has the hypervividness of the mystic, nevertheless the experimentalist derives no knowledge from such experiences because there is no attempt at criticism or interpretation.

Unless learning requires judging, it seems one risks being impaled on the horns of an ancient dilemma. This dilemma states that either one knows or he does not know. If he already knows, there is nothing to learn. If he is ignorant, he will not know where to look for knowledge; nor could he recognize it, in all probability, if he accidentally found it. Hence the futility of learning. This is a discouraging situation for the educator unless he extricates himself from both horns by another alternative, "getting to know." Here is the certainty of neither ignorance nor knowledge. In this twilight zone is uncertainty, doubt, contingency. To learn, or get to know, under such circumstances, will necessitate decision and judgment.

Interestingly enough, some critics of pragmatism think that the pragmatic view of truth and the instrumental relation of intelligence to it cause education to be too heavily concerned with the contingent character of the world and to underemphasize the familiar and settled; they fear education disproportionately exalts intelligence at the expense of habit. The anxiety is probably unfounded. The pragmatic or progressive educator does not sacrifice either habit or intelligence at the expense of the other.⁴ As the universe is a mixture of the shifting and recurrent, so too are habit and intelligence not divorced, but intertwined. Each has need of the other. While events are recurrent, habit will suffice. When they shift, habit will no longer be sufficient. One must then think. One's repertoire of habits, however, are the chief tools of intelligence to reduce the novel to the familiar. This done, habit can once more take charge.

Not only is it the opinion of some that the copy theory of knowledge underestimates the importance of preference and

judgment, but it also is quite too passive. At no point do pragmatism, instrumentalism, and experimentalism make a greater difference in educational practice than in their insistence that learning is an active affair. Indeed, instead of being something complete in itself, mind is here held to be a name for a course of action. Even the very word "activity" has come to have an exalted importance in educational terminology. "Activity" schools and "activity" curricula have been built around the conception of child "activity." Most teachers think this is due to a belated recognition of child nature. Generations have tried to suppress or curb the boundless energy of children with only indifferent educational success. What is more natural, then, than to go along with nature rather than against it; to seek improvement by building education around this fundamental fact of biological activity? Doubtless this is an important origin of the activity concept. However, a more important genesis of the activity movement in education is to be found in the epistemological significance of the term.

On the one hand, activity is important and necessary, so that the pupil will have direct experience of the matter under consideration. The pupil's notion about the farm or the factory must necessarily be partial and incomplete until he has had direct experience of them. Pictures and books are good as far as they go, but at best they are only symbols. They merely denote, point to, kinds of experience which may be had. They do not convey, for instance, any actual hum of machines or smell of new-made hay. The quality of these experiences can only be apprehended and assessed directly by each individual. The indebtedness of the pragmatic theory of learning to intuition at this point will be easily recognized. Really to learn about the factory and the farm, then, the school must provide physical activities, as, for example, an excursion to these centers of economic life.

On the other hand, to test the truth of an educational program by whether it "works" means to translate the program into a series of activities, to institute a chain of specific physical changes in the educational situation.¹ Only by the consequences of such operations can one tell the truth about the initial program.

¹ DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 393.

Short of such experiments, the truth of such a program is merely an hypothesis, perhaps only a guess. What is true of truth is also true of knowing. Learning is akin to verification, truth-making. It is essentially experimental.¹ Laboratories, shops, excursions, and the like are instruments to facilitate this process. Dewey's famous five steps in the thinking process conclude with doing something overtly to the existing circumstances to see whether the consequences will corroborate the conjectured hypothesis. Here, then, is the paramount reason for the organization of "activity" programs in our schools. They are not just a pleasant and interesting way to pass the time. Activity is indispensable to determining the truth about this novelly developing world.

Moreover, it is no accident that "ken" and "can" are allied words. Nor will it longer suffice to say that one knows a thing but cannot do it. Awareness of knowledge—as of the Ten Commandments—and proficiency in their execution cannot be held apart. Neither do learning and thinking have an exclusive locus inside the head. Overt conduct is also involved. Not only that, but the knowledge of the participator must be seen to yield genuinely different results from that of the mere spectator. One cannot learn to play tennis by watching it or reading its rules. He must execute real strokes of his own production. Nor can there be a literal handing over of knowledge from teacher to pupil. To study geometry is merely the occasion for constructing one's own geometry.* Academic and bookish education can no longer maintain their monopoly on the avenues of learning. It is a mechanical education which leads the student to the library and bids him behold wisdom and learn to repeat her words. This

* ¹ While this is the general view in the particular case of John Dewey, it has been argued that there is no necessary connection between the activity school and the pragmatic point of view. In *A Critical Study of the New Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1932, especially pp. 34–39, Sr. Joseph Mary Raby contends that all the elements of Dewey's educational thought had been enunciated in either essay or practice before 1900, while his exposition of the philosophy of experimentalism was published in later volumes. Although his educational philosophy and his general philosophy admittedly have a common source, and in spite of the fact they are found joined in his *Democracy and Education*, Sr. Joseph Mary thinks this stated historical sequence permits the "new education" to stand independently from a pragmatic justification.

robs the student of his birthright to learn through the agency of his own senses and his own mental constructs.

Considerable exception is taken to this emphasis on activity, especially the limitation of inquiry to action. The chief resistance centers about that knowledge which is alleged to be true, even though it produces no change and controls no environment. Astronomy might be selected from other examples in the curriculum to point out the fallacy of limiting thinking to experimentation. Or, closer by, imagine trying to contrive a manipulation of the school environment which would, to the satisfaction of all, test the validity of the activity theory itself or the futility of speculation in educational philosophy. What, too, of moral education? Need there be a doing and an undergoing of vice in order to learn to eschew it? Merely to ask the question is to discredit it. And may it not even occur that some people will delight in the acquisition of "impractical" knowledge? Thus, should there not be time and place allotted in the school for enjoying great art, hearing edifying music, and watching inspiring drama? Finally, there are those who will want to know why thought should not be cultivated for its own sake. Aristotle is good authority for stating that the contemplation of contemplation is the highest activity of man.

These are pointed questions. They do not, however, want for a rejoinder.¹ In the first place, it has been affirmed that not all human needs are practical. Some needs originate in the practical, but subsequently become transformed by intelligence into aesthetic, scientific, and moral ends. But even these, it is further elaborated, cannot be satisfied without action. In the second place, it may be admitted that thought does not exist for action. Yet, it must be cautioned again, thought cannot be carried through all its stages without involving action. To summarize and apply these clarifying statements to education, it would seem to follow that teachers should utilize the activity program, not as the aim and end of the educational process, but rather as a means to more fundamental and pertinent objectives. Activity is to verify thought which is necessary to illuminate action. Only as this reciprocal relation of thought and action is understood will many progressive teachers evade the criticism,

¹ MONTAGUE, W. P., *Ways of Knowing*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1925, footnote to pp. 134-135.

often ridicule, so frequently heaped upon the activity school by the lay public and conservative educators.

It may appear from the foregoing as if the pragmatic theory of truth and the instrumental theory of intelligence have an exclusive monopoly on experimental learning. As a matter of fact, those supporting the correspondence or coherence theories of truth and the copy theory of learning also lay claim to its service.¹ Presumably their claim is based on the contention that one must try out various tentative hypotheses to determine which one accurately reflects or copies the truth. Experimental learning in this sense, however, is merely discovery.² Truth, being eternal, antedates and is unaffected by learning. Experimental educational procedures, therefore, merely uncover truth; they do not invent it. There is nothing creative as in progressive education. If the truth is hidden or obscure, it merely awaits drawing aside the veil of ignorance.

There are some who would like to avoid the responsibility for deciding between these two trends in epistemology. Whether truth be a relation of correspondence, coherence, or efficiency, whether it be eternal or relative, so their argument runs, are imponderable questions. Therefore it is unnecessary to make a commitment on such baffling problems. But can the teacher escape so easily? If the pupil wants to know *the* answer, what will the teacher say? Even if there is no answer in the back of the book, the pupil may well want to know whether there is one in the ultimate rationality of things. If the teacher then lets it be known that he is in doubt on which theory of truth to base his teaching, his admission seems equivalent to a commitment to the theory which doubts the possibility of any ultimate truth.

So far, knowing, getting to know, or learning have absorbed most attention. What now of knowledge, knowing, or learning already completed? What epistemological considerations will clarify practice in regard to the curriculum? The conflicts in practice here largely derive from those in the act of getting to know. Should the curriculum be treated as material which antedates learning, as culture waiting to be learned, or is it something that is coincident with learning and emerging as learning

¹ HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 296.

² DEWEY, J., *Logic*, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1938, pp. 87-88.

develops and moves forward? The former view would find support in the copy theory of learning, the latter in the activity theory.

The most common connotation of the word knowledge is oriented to the past. Knowledge represents acquisition and accumulation over the ages. Its most conspicuous repository is the library. There, arranged shelf after shelf, are the solutions which man has found for his diverse problems. What an armory of weapons they afford against the buffeting perplexities which, it requires no gift of prophecy to predict, will beat upon the teacher and her brave band of little pilgrims! How assuring it is to know that these weapons have been tempered by the ages and hammered on the anvil of experience into a shape as near their perfect prototype as human thought has been able to approximate! No wonder there is a perennial reverence for a curriculum with such a tradition.

Yet one must not be off his guard for flaws. Many have slipped into the worship of knowledge for its own sake. This risks the severance of intelligence from action or volition. Moreover, the content of the course of study too easily becomes largely verbal, to say nothing of being stated largely in other men's words. Vicarious experience gets to be substituted for that which is firsthand. The trouble with this view is that it fastens on the schools a regime of *memoriter* and cramming. Children become preoccupied with facts and mere words. Man is taken captive by his own spoils. Teacher and student alike forget that the formulations of knowledge in encyclopedias and atlases are really weapons for waging battle with the unknown, that they bridge the gap from doubt to discovery and invention. Knowledge really consists in acts of knowing, in responses to the environment. It grows out of the defeat of purpose and redeems the continuity of practice which has been temporarily interrupted. The old idea that knowledge is power can now be brought down from the attic and dusted off. Yet, until knowledge is put to work, it does not achieve the status of knowledge. It is mere data or information till reflected on and comprehended. Knowledge, therefore, is not primary in the learning process. It is rather secondary, something derived from the attempt to solve a challenging problem. So, too, the curriculum made up in advance is not a curriculum; it is a mere course of study, sugges-

tions of things that might be studied. The real curriculum is what children draw from the treasure chest of the past to achieve their current purposes in solving problems; it is the curriculum in action.

The serious espousal of this theory of knowledge would impose radical alterations on the course of study. If knowledge must go to work, then no true statement can be made about the past unless some contemporary problem is being solved. Much, though far from all, ancient lore, included particularly in historical and linguistic studies but too remote from the circumstances of today to be usable, must now lose its status as knowledge. In the light of such a demotion, many conventional courses of study appear to include much that is literally "dead wood." This will have to be chopped out. But the operation will be painful to many who love the past. Consistent with the instrumentalist theory of knowledge, there appears only one way to stay the pragmatic woodman's ax against this part of the grove of knowledge. As ancient truth becomes fossilized, it may merely suffer a reduction in rank from knowledge to information. Perhaps, in this status, a study of the dead dry records of the past can be salvaged for the schools as an æsthetic experience.

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CHAPTER IV

EDUCATIONAL VALUES

In laying down the foundations of an educational philosophy it is necessary to examine not only what the nature of reality is and how one learns to know it truly, but also to inquire how one likes it and how he would like to have it. Consequently, it is always pertinent to investigate what it is that educators are trying to do, to raise to the level of conscious attention whatever fundamental biases and preferences are conditioning their endeavors. The importance of a theory of values will probably be much more readily accepted by educators than will the importance of a theory of knowledge or a theory of reality. In fact, it is inescapable. From forming the educational policy of a whole state or national system of schools to making the plan of an individual lesson, the problem of educational values is persistently at the schoolman's elbow.

Educational values, moreover, are as variable and conflicting as they are persistent. Most obvious is the way in which educators disagree in choosing educational aims. Sometimes, however, they disagree even more radically on the very nature of value itself. In some schools there is an elective curriculum. Election puts the determination of value up to the pupil. In other schools the curriculum is prescribed within either broad or narrow limits. Prescription implies that the components of the curriculum may have a value independent of the student's recognition of it. Similarly, some teachers make much more of the student's sense of value, his interest, than do others. These latter often depend on an entirely extraneous motivation. A final sample of difference of practice is instanced in the relative worth of studies. Some base their guidance of students on the use or service a study will perform. Others advise that studies have a hierarchy of worth that transcends mere utility.

The general or theoretical study of these conflicts in educational value can be subsumed under three heads: (1) What is the nature

of value? Does value originate in the taste of the pupil, teacher, or parent, or does it inhere in the object of one's inclination, the textbook, curriculum, or item of school equipment? (2) Where there is a plurality of values, how shall they be compared or evaluated? How does one determine when things are not just desired, but desirable? (3) What are the chief educational aims or values? What, if any, is their order of worth?

1. At the very outset it is of great importance to clarify terminology. One must distinguish between value as desire and value as the desirable. It requires little examination to reveal that there are many things which children desire or want to do which it is not proper or desirable for them to execute. Desires are simple expressions of biological urges. They become elevated to the level of the desirable only when, after taking other things into account, they have been judged desirable. So much more worth-while are the considered values than the unconsidered ones of mere desire, that there are some who would restrict the word value exclusively to the former sort. The latter they would merely call "goods" or "interests." Others continue to use value to express both these meanings but call the desired, consummatory values and the desirable, instrumental values.

Still others describe these two aspects of value theory as to value and to evaluate. So, too, of esteem and estimate, prize and appraise. To value is to appreciate, to realize the worth of the object of one's consideration. It is an aesthetic experience. It corresponds, in the epistemological approach to education, to getting information about the thing valued, to getting acquainted with it.¹ Sometimes, however, there is doubt, not about value, but about which value. Here one will have to think about value as well as feel it. Just as the term knowledge is reserved for circumstances involving judgment, so here, too, value in the sense of evaluation is reserved for situations which involve discrimination. In this sense, value becomes a category of reflective comparison.² If value is to be used chiefly with this connotation, naturally truth and value will be instrumental.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 61, 64-65, 69.

² H. H. Horne summarizes Dewey's position, "It is not likings that are values, but intelligent likings." *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1935, p. 324.

"The same discussion holds of moral conduct. The heart of behaving

Whatever one's terminology, the question first arises whether educational values are independent of the valuer or whether they have their sole source in the organism of the valuer. A great many educators incline to this latter view. With them value is biological in origin. The environment is neither of worth nor worthless unless an organism is involved. Upset the organism's equilibrium, and instinct, emotion, and intellect will, at once combine to express a preference. Value is then realized in the native demand for the restoration of balance. In ascribing value to his environment, man is merely projecting these feelings into the objects to which he pays attention. But by themselves these objects have no value until connected with some human interest. Those whose philosophy of education is predicated on psychological data arrive at a similar result. In either case, it is quite obvious that valuation is a very subjective process.

The more subjective view strongly imputes the soundness of human inclinations. It amounts to the endorsement of child likes and dislikes. Pupil interest is made the arbiter of educational procedure. This raises the old question whether child nature is fundamentally good or bad. An older theology had it that children are born in sin and that their hearts are, therefore, desperately wicked. Under the influence of Rousseau the opposite view came to prevail; child nature was assumed to be originally good. A third theory with a substantial following contends that at birth a child is neither good nor bad, that rather he has potentialities in both directions, becoming either, depending on the standards of the community into which he is born.

Some are inclined to a more objective view of educational values. To them value is not just a private inner experience. Rather is it an external quality in the things and circumstances which surround teachers and learners. It is a trait found in curricula, laboratories, buildings, techniques, and the like. Adherents of this view do not doubt that personal desire is an important element of educational value. What they do deny is that it is the complete account. They are unable to find the whole meaning of value in the relation of teacher or taught to his environment. Value, in short, is independent of desire. It

morally is to have action appropriately on thought. Situations do not come already labeled as right or wrong." KILPATRICK, W. H., *Remaking the Curriculum*, New York, Newson & Company, 1936, p. 82.

antedates and arouses desire. They are ready to defend the thesis that unless value inheres in the universe as a whole, it can scarcely be said to abide in a fragment thereof such as man. Consequently, there must be more to educational value than the mere wishful behavior of persons engaged in the instructional process.

Perhaps this difference of opinion as to the locus of educational value may seem entirely theoretical. As a matter of fact, the two views lead to significant differences in school practice. The problem of whether Latin should be continued in the curriculum will further illustrate the importance of the distinction. If children do not feel the *need* of it, if parents do not *want* it, if it is not *esteemed* highly by college entrance requirements, then it follows that Latin should probably be dropped from the secondary school course of study. On the other hand, if the value of Latin is independent of the attitudes of persons studying and teaching it, then a different situation confronts the curriculum maker. If the value of Latin has an objective existence, then, if the value is great enough, Latin merits inclusion among the secondary school studies in spite of the fact that no one may particularly like it.

2. From this illustration it is an easy step to the comparison of educational values. How is the educator to know which values, whether desired or not, are desirable or to be preferred? Some determine the desirability of an educational procedure by whether it is an effective instrument in achieving some purpose of the pupil or teacher. Such tool values are judged by their consequences, by how well they do their work. The value of what is taught, for instance, depends not only on the objective of the lesson, but also on what the child actually succeeds in learning. Because different children have different needs, instrumental values will be found to be very specific. They will have to implement each child to achieve his individual wants. Consequently, items of school procedure will not be capable of value in general. A fact will not have value to a child till it is related to other facts and oriented to some scheme of things.

But how close must this relationship be? To limit the child's educational diet to what he requires for the solution of his immediate problems seems to some to be altogether too narrow an approach to what is educationally desirable. It invokes the law

of parsimony with a vengeance. How is a child to be prepared for sudden emergencies in the precarious world of adulthood? Must he not, while in school, learn some things which are not of immediate, but of contingent or "background" use?¹ Yet, if one answers affirmatively, will not such deferred values become general ones, desirable independently of their immediate instrumental character? Obviously the question is one of degree. Certainly mere postponement in time should not surrender the instrumental character of a study's value. But its instrumentalism will be forfeit when value is justified independently of any reference to any specific time or place.

That what is educationally valuable or desirable is frequently relative to the ends it serves, that it depends on its efficiency as an instrument will not be denied by those who lean toward the more objective view of value. The question they raise, however, is whether there are not some values which, instead of being means to the achievement of other values, are end or final values. Education as a value, for instance, is said to possess both these qualities. It is an indispensable condition for personal development but it is also, at the same time, a good on its own account.² The latter sort of value is desirable in and of itself. It is intrinsically, ultimately valuable. Because it is so securely anchored in this fashion, it is peculiarly suited to be a standard or yardstick of value. A subjective explanation of value, depending so much on the individuality of the valuer, could hardly serve so important a purpose. Objective values, being independent of human desire, are much more satisfactory.

From this it would appear that those who subscribe to a theory of intrinsic educational values seem to have one distinct advantage in determining what is educationally desirable. They have some value or values which are final, unconditional, or absolute, to which the desirability of other values can be referred. The instrumentalist, on the other hand, seems unable to give as convincing an answer as to what is desirable. To say that educational values are instrumental means that they are good for something. They are not intrinsic, self-contained; rather are

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., *Education and Emergent Man*, New York, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1934, pp. 70-74.

² URBAN, W. M., *Fundamentals of Ethics*, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1930, p. 165.

they extrinsic, dependent on something else. Since the desirability of these values is contingent on achieving other values, the desirability of the latter are called in question. If these in turn are dependent on yet other values, and so on ad infinitum, there seems no way of ever being decisive about what is educationally valuable or desirable.

The only way the instrumentalist seems able to put a stop to this infinite series is by saying that there are some things that are not good for anything, that there are some things that are just goods. If he does so, then a seeming paradox arises. Commencing with the theory that goods are good for something, one finally comes to the surprising conclusion that they are only good for something if something is good for nothing, that is, if something is good on its own account, is invaluable.

Take the social studies as an example. What are they good for? A variety of ends might suggest themselves, but suppose their position in the curriculum be justified on the grounds that they improve the quality of citizenship. Then the question arises what is citizenship good for? A fairly satisfactory reply might be the perpetuation of the state. And why is that valuable? Because one can live more abundantly in and through a social group than he can outside it. And why seek to live more abundantly? Why live at all? If one is an instrumentalist there seems no end to the pursuit of this elusive question of value. Not even if one say that we live now to earn immortality hereafter is the question quieted, because the dogged and indomitable instrumentalist will inquire why one should desire immortality. Unrelenting persistence in asking what a series of goods are for seems absurd to some. Most people, in fact, are not unswerving instrumentalists. They will give chase after value for a while, but when it settles down to the value of life—whether temporal or eternal—they stop short and postulate that life is its own justification. It is good per se. It is invaluable, not in the sense of having no value, but of having such a value that one cannot, or does not, stop to compare it with other values.

The fact that the instrumentalist should feel the need of admitting the necessity of some values being valuable on their own account makes a shining target for the critics of his position. If, ultimately, instrumental values must have the stable support of some thing that is intrinsically valuable, then does it not follow

that instrumentalism is infected with a grave infirmity? As a matter of fact, the instrumentalist affects to be unfrightened by this situation. He readily admits that some values are intrinsic. But—and this point cannot be made too emphatically—whatever is accepted as intrinsically valuable for any situation is only the intrinsic value for that situation! It is not an abstraction which necessarily holds for other circumstances as well. For him, intrinsic values are not metaphysically final. Neither are they archetypes of ultimate reality. They are merely a simple, direct, aesthetic awareness or intuition.

To illustrate the point, take any two studies such as the social studies and chemistry. Each has a consummatory value; it satisfies a particular desire. This value is just what it is. Save to say that it is *sui generis*, it is indescribable. It must be validated internally. Neither one of these studies could possibly be substituted for the other. Both are indigenous to their respective situations. Both are in this respect invaluable. But, in spite of this fact, situations may present themselves wherein these two interests conflict with each other. For example, the amount of time available for study may only permit the election of one of the two fields. At this point judgment enters in. To concentrate on the value which either study has as an end in itself gets nowhere in expediting preference. From this avenue the two studies are incomparable; they cannot be the objects of judgment. One must rather find some end outside and beyond them, as a student's proposed vocation. The two can then be compared in terms of what each has to offer in achieving this third value. Of course this third value will and must be invaluable to be the controlling factor. But it will only be imperative if it is accepted as common ground on which the competing values can be contrasted. Change the third value to avocation or anything else, and the question of desirability is wide open again. Indeed, from the instrumentalist's viewpoint, there can be no ultimate or absolute determination of what is valuable or desirable.

The instrumentalistic and intrinsic approaches to educational values have their counterparts in the metaphysical bases of education. Values which are characterized by their relativity and instrumentalism are very apt to coincide with a metaphysical view of the world wherein change, variety, and novelty are ultimate. Some who once thought good to be "eternal in the

heavens" find that "time makes ancient good uncouth." A shifting, novelly emerging environment will require learning new adjustments. Successful adaptation, therefore, will be a guidepost to value. Not only that, but change, variety, and novelty in the school program will themselves be prized. The proverbial spice of variety will be frequently infused in educational recipes for curriculum offerings and the daily schedule. The value of projects undertaken in school will be enhanced if their successful outcome is *genuinely* in doubt. A present sense of jeopardy, if not too great, will make learning a fascinating adventure. Indeed, a world that can get better is more suited to the enterprise of education than one which is a static best.

Noninstrumental or intrinsic values are more likely to be congruous with a world view which holds to some things as fixed and eternal. There, value will not be created by the desire of man. Values will endure in spite of changing circumstance. In fact, the school will place a special and pre-eminent value on those very characteristics of the world which show forth its permanent and imperishable qualities. Traditional studies will be honored. The eternal verities will form the backbone of instruction. Man's eternal moral ideals will be put on a list of unchanging educational objectives.¹ The artist teacher will be the one who has his eye on the eternal aspects of his work.² Instead of a melioristic philosophy of education, a perfectionism will be idealized. The conservation of educational ideals and values will be recognized as indispensable keel and rudder for even a progressive education. If fixity and sureness of purpose lead to a certain rigidity, the resulting discipline will not be an unwelcome value.

The matter of educational value also has a close affinity to those problems of epistemology which concern education. The instrumental theory of truth or knowledge and the instrumental theory of value have a sufficiently common terminology to lead one very naturally to inquire whether any close relationship exists between them. Those who assert that truth is instrumental make truth relative to the achievement of purpose and

¹ DEMIASHKEVICH, M., *Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, New York, American Book Company, 1935, p. 354.

² BROWN, E. E., "The Fine Art of Teaching," *Educational Review*, 16: 334, November, 1898.

desire.¹ Truth becomes a subjective concept. Those who resist this view find that truth is not contingent but absolute. It is objective. As already seen, the different views on educational values split on practically the same issue. One body of opinion holds that value arises when things are valued, esteemed, desired. This is the subjective view. The other school of thought finds that the objects of our attention have value per se. Here value is objective. Instead of creating values, education will rather be a process of realizing values that are already pre-existent. Those inclining to a subjective view of truth will probably be biased to the same view of value. And those who find an objective view of truth congenial will doubtless espouse the same attitude toward educational values.

3. So far, the general characteristics of educational value have been considered without pointing or paying much attention to particular educational values themselves. These are most frequently found stated in the form of educational aims.² They may be either specific or general. The number and variety of the former is truly beyond census here. They are as varied and numerous as the differences between individual capacities or purposes and the changing circumstances of time and place.³ Reduced to their utmost specificity, educational values would virtually merge with what is more usually called the curriculum.

While it would be inadvisable here to make an inclusive catalogue of specific educational aims or values, it is perhaps more within the realm of possibility to afford a comprehensive inventory of the more general ones. The number of captions, together with the correlated degree of abstraction, seems to be the only variable to be decided. The fewer the number, the more generally the aims will have to be stated. Probably the most widely accepted statement summarizes all educational values under the following seven heads: (a) Health; (b) Command of the Fundamental Processes; (c) Worthy Home Membership; (d) Vocation;

¹ *Supra*, p. 57.

² To the extent educational aims are expressions of worth, concern, or interest, they will receive attention in the present exposition. To the extent, however, that their significance is logical and directive in the thinking and learning process, their further elucidation will be postponed to Chap. XI.

³ For one of the most detailed published statements see F. Bobbitt, *Curriculum Construction in Los Angeles*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1922.

(e) Civic Education; (f) Worthy Use of Leisure; (g) Ethical Character.¹ The most notable omission from this list is religion. It may be that its authors mistakenly thought this to be included in the item of ethical character, or it may be that the list was being recommended as a program for public schools from which religious instruction is ordinarily barred. In either event, with its inclusion this enumeration of educational values should be fairly complete and satisfactory.

The advantage of such a general set of aims or values over the specific ones is that they permit greater flexibility. By the very nature of their derivation they apply to a multiplicity of possibilities. Where the social structure is in a state of accelerated transition, general aims are more likely to have enduring value. The danger of the general educational aim or value, however, is that because it is general it is also abstract, detached from particulars or a specific context. The risk here is that the life line between end and means will be cut if the end seems too remote. Paradoxical though it may seem, every specific value or aim is also general, that is, general in its ramifications, the things to which it leads and with which it connects. In this sense, aims and values in education can hardly ever be too general. Their utility exists as prospective points of view from which to survey existing conditions and estimate future possibilities.

The major philosophical problem here, however, concerns not so much the recording of the various general and specific educational values as the possibility of ordering them in a hierarchy of worth. Is there a yardstick of value which can be of general use on all occasions? Or is the order of value relative to the particular educational situation at hand? The fact that the bewildering number of specific aims of education have been gathered together into a comparative handful of categories already argues the former position. Although these groupings were constructed to afford an inclusive survey of the field rather than to express a

¹ National Education Association, Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education, "Cardinal Principles of Education," *United States Bureau of Education Bulletin*, 1918, 35: 11-15. For other similar statements see W. H. Burton, *Introduction to Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1934, Chap. 2. It is also interesting to note the great similarity of the Commission's list with the table of values in Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

scale of value, nevertheless the fact that their number and definition obviously change with the interest or bias of different authorities suggests that some scheme of preference is implicit.

There are two groups who are most confident of developing a general scale of educational value. On the one hand, are those who think that the aims and objectives of education can be determined by scientific procedures. Since scientific realism generally posits an existence to the objects of its research which is external to and independent of the investigator, it may be expected to take the same position in its determination of the aims of education. If it does view aims or values as independent of the valuer, it is also clear that a general order of their worth can be established independent of particular people or places. Some, of course, will still doubt that science can probe so private a matter as the sense of educational value. But even if valuation is a subjective experience, the scientist will still press the employment of the scientific method to achieve a general standard. His argument is simple. Values are seen to recur, and recurrence is not only an important key to scientific accuracy, but its frequency will be crucial for an objective determination of comparative worth.

Commencing with these premises, some have sought direction from the science of biology.¹ How can one know the relationship between education and life unless one first determines what life is, they inquire? Education must get its vision in what is, rather than in what ethical considerations dictate ought to be. Others have resorted to social science. They put trust in the fact that sociology studies not only the origin and growth of social institutions, but their tendencies as well.² In one case, the data has been utilized to form "blueprints" of the individual and society to be brought into being through the efforts of the school.³ The least one can say for such practices is that they eliminate personal bias and that they bring the school abreast of contemporary usage.

¹ SCHOEN, M., "Education and Life," *Education*, 47: 321-322, February, 1927.

² HOWERTH, I. W., *The Theory of Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1926, p. 376.

³ PETERS, C. C., *Objectives and Procedures in Civic Education*, New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1930, pp. 21-22.

In spite of this, the attempt to determine educational values and objectives scientifically has been under heavy adverse fire. After all, the scientific method is basically fact-finding, descriptive. Certainly one cannot put too much dependence on children's needs or interests as a basis of directing the educational process. On the one side, there is a risk here of erecting instincts into an absolutism. From another, facts reveal that interests are too much the product of previous training. Such a procedure is tantamount to saying that education ought to do what it always has done. The same objection has been entered against the recommendations of a sociological job analysis or consensus of opinion. These techniques merely enthrall the present and the future to the past—and that in the name of science! Instructive as such studies are, it inescapably emerges that fact-finding by itself is an insufficient base on which to make up the program of the school. A scientific finding of fact will not *ipso facto* be a finding of value. Indeed, the converse is more likely to be true, that the investigator's values have played a large part in determining the particular facts he has collected. In the absence of some criterion of value there is no way of telling which facts are worthy of perpetuation and which should be eliminated.

In the last analysis, only philosophy can construct such an instrument of measurement. It alone can emancipate itself from science's short tether to description of the past and present. However, it cannot play a lone hand. While philosophy must be the general to plan the grand strategy of education, it will need science as its staff officer. Though sympathizers with the scientific point of view may be startled at this subordinate position, advocates of the philosophical approach must not be blind to the contribution which science can make to a determination of educational values. Science may very well do fact-finding on selected aspects of value, but it must refrain from exercising the prerogative of legislating which value should control in a given situation. Doubtless, careful and modest scientists never intend to go beyond this point.¹ From there the philosopher must take up the burden. From the raw materials of science, tradition, and opinion he must fashion the finished yardstick of value.

¹ For a more complete discussion of the relation of scientific and philosophical method in education, see pp. 9-18.

This is done by taking these isolated items and relating each to the other till some consistent totality of experience emerges as a formula or criterion for conduct.¹

The others who are most confident of developing a general scale of value are those whose philosophy of educational value leans in the direction of absolutism. Naturally, they would order their values from lowest to highest on the basis of that value which they believe to be finally or absolutely valuable. Granted such a base, a standard could command considerable respect. It would be rooted, according to its own premises, in an eternal objective reality. Instead of varying with each valuer or thing to be valued, it could stand as a general standard of value. To many, such a standard is not only possible but much to be desired.² Unless something be accepted as unconditionally valuable, they feel that any sense of oughtness lacks the backbone for its own enforcement.

A great variety of values has been put forward as possessing such ultimate and imperative value. Among these, the individual is frequently mentioned as the final educational value. This is not definitive enough for others because the individual has such a plurality of interests as evidenced in the expanded modern curriculum. Realizing that the individual must choose among them, they make the liberation of intelligence, rational freedom, paramount.³ Yet others, knowing that choices are not always consistent, go farther and make the unity and integrity of the individual the absolute of educational values.⁴ More abstract still are those who take the process of self-realization, the individual's state of being educated, as the conclusive value in education.⁵ Accordingly, while education must prepare him for

¹ *Supra*, pp. 1-2.

² HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. 304-305.

DEHOVRE, F., *Catholicism in Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934, p. 160.

³ BODE, B., *Conflicting Psychologies of Learning*, Boston, D. C. Heath & Company, 1929, p. 295.

⁴ GENTILE, G., *The Reform of Education*, (translated by Bigongiari) New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1922, pp. 190-191.

⁵ FISCHER, A., "The Philosophy Underlying the National System of Education in Germany," *International Institute, Educational Yearbook*, 1929, pp. 274-275.

vocation, citizenship, and other duties, it is by none of these that the individual is to be permanently known. Rather is his enduring worth to be found in his soul achievement. Unfortunately, the individual as the final value in education is not always held to such a lofty level. So it is that some measure education by no more ultimate standard than that of "individual success."¹

The danger of such a low standard of individualism has led many to seek educational ultimates in other directions. Some have found one in society. No aim, they declare, can have ethical finality if isolated from institutional life.² So it is that social efficiency has received prominent mention as the basic educational criterion. Culture, vocation, morality, even the "harmonious development of the individual," are held to find their true significance in this inclusive value. So, too, the time-honored absolutes of truth, goodness, and beauty are not to be sought singly in the curriculum but rather in the organic unity of the social process which is basic to the pupil's self-realization. Many devout educators react from the individual toward their religion as the capstone of educational value. Education, they think, should be dominated by man's final destiny, union with God.³ This would not imply the dwarfing of the individual's natural faculties, but it would definitely subordinate them to securing the "Supreme Good, that is, God."⁴

Many would hold that these aims or values, though stated as absolutes, have not yet been reduced to their lowest terms. When this is done, two main categories of value generally emerge. Perhaps the simplest ultimate measure of value is found in the satisfaction of biological wants, cravings, urges. Conversely, the less good or the bad is found in those things which thwart and frustrate desire, or which positively annoy. The kingdom of

¹ COUNTS, G. S., *The American Road to Culture*, New York, John Day Company, Inc., 1930, Chap. 5.

² DEWEY, J., *Ethical Principles Underlying Education*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1903, p. 12.

³ JOHNSON, G., "Fundamentals of Catholic Teacher Training," *Catholic Educational Review*, 21: 451, October, 1923.

HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 301.

⁴ PIUS XI, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Educational Review*, 28: 131, March, 1930.

value, then, in the last resort is ruled by the dual monarchs of pleasure and pain. This is an old approach to value. It is more familiar under the name of hedonism, from the Greek *ἡδονή*, meaning pleasure. Many of the educational garments which are cut to the form of child need would classify under this head. So, too, of the doctrine that the child is naturally good. The law of effect among the laws of learning also clearly belongs here.

There are comparatively few who accept so simple a hedonism as the ultimate standard of educational value. For them the problem is much more complex than that. The unperturbed impulses of childhood may have an innate biological bias toward the good, but unaided they cannot solve the perplexing problems of life.¹ For instance, in the case of child needs so often referred to, how can one tell what a child needs apart from the social patterns in which he is reared? To make bare need the criterion is to make the desired rather than the desirable the measure of value. Consequently, there is a rational factor that must be taken into account. One should seek to satisfy not only desire, but ideals as well. Desire is blind without the guidance of thought.

Thus, not only does pain conflict with pleasure, but pleasures themselves are not always in harmony with each other. These, it is said, must be balanced off against each other, and a view of the whole taken. Because the satisfaction of desire requires the lapse of time, it is necessary to think what will be most abiding in the long run. Moreover, one must not overlook the subjectivism to which such a theory of educational values may lead. Different individuals will disagree among themselves as to what is pleasant and repellent. Under these circumstances, the ultimate value will have to be changed from the maximum for any one individual to the greatest good for the greatest number.²

The foregoing rational computations proceed on the theory that pleasures are more or less homogeneous, differing from each other chiefly in intensity and duration. But are pleasures all of a kind? Would it not really be impossible, practically, to make an algebraic sum of one's pleasures from which he would subtract his

¹ NUNN, T. P., *Education: Its Data and First Principles*, New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1920, p. 99.

² BAGLEY, W. C., *Educational Values*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1911, p. 113.

pains in order to determine educational policy? Are there not qualitative differences as well? Most thoughtful people responsible for the management of schools hold that there are.¹ Children must be taught duties to the state, for instance, which instead of generating a glow of animal well-being may result in extinction of the individual. Certainly such values are not of a kind with those of vocation and recreation.

The moment qualitative differences^a are admitted it seems to many that even an enlightened hedonism collapses. Whatever it is that qualitatively marks one pleasure off from another must become the final measure of value. This is not to deny that pleasure is a value, but merely to point out that it is not the only value. Many find a second and more satisfactory absolute standard of value in the doctrine of perfectionism. The perfect they define in terms of function. Ascertain what the peculiar function of a thing is, then the measure of value of that thing lies in the degree it approximates the perfection of that function.

The function of desks and seats in the schoolroom, for example, is to afford the pupil a place at which to pursue his studies. If there is to be improvement in this equipment, it must come along lines of more sturdy construction^a and greater suitability to the theory of instruction. The desk may also afford an excellent test for the blade of a new knife. But that, as the teacher will doubtless point out, is not what the desk is for. That is therefore a lesser value. If values were only instrumental, one might properly conclude that for the boy's purposes the desk had a greater value as a whittling block. But perfectionism implies a more objective quality of value. In good Aristotelian fashion it must be maintained that the ideal of a thing is the perfection of that thing, not the making of it into something else.² Its manufacturer gave it a particular design. He might have given the same wood and metals a different form. The comparison of value must take this form into account as well as the employment to which it is put. This form in turn conforms to a perfect form or prototype, an ideal. Furthermore, this ideal is more than an hypothesis; it is part of the eternal mold of the universe. Unless the draftsman and the artisan get some conception of it, they

¹ DOWNTON, I., *Modern Public Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1935, pp. 484-485.

² Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

can neither direct nor evaluate their own work. Here, then, is the ultimate standard of comparison. Educational value swells or ebbs according as it approaches or falls away from this ideal of perfection.

Now what is the attribute or function of the human learner which sets him off from all else? Is it not his rational nature, his capacity to reason? If this abbreviated analysis be accepted, then the cultivation of the intellect becomes the supreme good.¹ The hierarchy of value is graded according to the opportunity afforded for the development of man's rational nature.² Social studies and chemistry will be more valuable than stenography or shopwork, because they involve more opportunity for reasoning. Not only selecting the best curricula, but conditioning the child and positing the preferred social system in which education is to operate, will be evaluated according to whether they help or hinder the child in achieving the purpose of his being.³

Some draw different educational conclusions from an argument which, in the main, resembles this perfectionist doctrine. Instead of selecting reason as the cardinal value of distinction, they make all values relative to individual self-realization, which is to be gained through the only eternal values, truth, goodness, and beauty. As he is, the child is immature, imperfect. His lifelong purpose will be a quest for maturity, perfectability. But each self is different from every other self. Therefore the curriculum that will help one realize the eternal verities may prevent another. No subject or type of study, then, can be picked and assigned absolute value, and all the rest arranged in some order of precedence with reference to it.

This does not mean that individuality is to be unconfined in education. Basically, the pupil becomes in time what he eternally

¹ HUTCHINS, R. M., *The Higher Learning in America*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936, p. 67. This view is not to be confused with Bode, in his *Conflicting Psychologies of Learning*, *op. cit.*, p. 295, where the "liberation of intelligence" is advocated as the "supreme task of education." Bode holds to an instrumental theory of intelligence which would, of course, be at odds with perfectionism.

² MCGUCKEN, W. J., *The Catholic Way in Education*, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company, 1934, p. 117.

FLESHMAN, A. C., *The Educational Process*, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1908, pp. 125-126.

³ SHEED, F. J., "Education for the Realization of God's Purpose," *Social Frontier*, 1: 10-11, January, 1935.

is. The child is not to be educated for self-expression, to express the self he now is. That self may be a weak, narrow, unlovely self. Rather is he to be educated to become the self which he was meant to be.¹ To realize such a selfhood will require much denial and restraint of the present self. Yet the discipline so imposed is not an end or measure of education, but only a means or a result. Only if the child's nature were in the order which obtained before the fall from grace and the exit from Eden would self-expression be a satisfactory aim of education. If the child is an immortal spirit, it is his eternally progressive soul-life that is to be cultivated. The soul instinctively strives for perfection and rejoices in its attainment.² Moreover, it is as a soul and not as a citizen or worker that he is to be permanently known. He is to be educated for himself, just because he is educable. In Kantian fashion he is to be treated always as an end in himself and never as a means merely. His powers are to be developed because that is their destiny. Of course, there will be political, economic, religious, and social consequences of his education, but these will be effects and not objectives.

Some, however, contend that the self can only be realized through a balanced participation in all the institutions of society. The criticism of this view is that institutions are imperfect. Man should aim, not at the partial perfection of evolutionary social idealism, but at the full perfection of a theocentric education.³ Naturally, when one pursues the most perfect form of perfection as his standard, some all-embracing theistic objective of education is usually bound to emerge. So education has been defined as perfecting humanity in the image of divinity, as revealed in that perfect self, Jesus.

Exceptions have been taken even to the perfect. Perfecting one's powers may involve growing and development, yet note that growth is toward that which is already perfect. But what kind of growth is it which is not significant on its own account, which is only meaningful in terms of some thing toward which it is growing but which itself is not growing? The asserted imperfec-

¹ RABY, J. M., *A Critical Study of the New Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1932, p. 53.

² TOMPKINS, A., *The Philosophy of Teaching*, Boston, Ginn & Company, 1898, pp. 124-125.

³ CRONIN, J. T., *A Basic Plan for Catholic Curriculum Construction*, Washington, 1927, pp. 36-38.

tion in perfectionism is that it has a static quality about it. The goal is already complete; no improvement on it can be made. In a dynamic world this is an anomaly. For education to be genuinely progressive, progress must be a reaching indefinitely into the future, not the attainment of a specific status. But more than that, perfection is very distant; in fact it is so remote as to be practically beyond human reach. Consequently, the only working pattern which one can use in the daily comparison of educational values is someone else's idea of what the perfect is.¹ Since this carries no greater authority than the prestige of its author, it would seem that one is reduced to an experimental following of growth again.

To the criticism that the perfect is static many would enter an immediate demurrer. Save as educational progress has a fixed star by which to steer, they would have no confidence in making port. Bearings so derived afford a cozy security that is well-nigh without equivalent. But another possible rejoinder to this complaint is that it is a mistake to define perfectionism in static terms. Goals that are really valuable are never reached. If they were, higher ones would straightway appear. Reaching goals in such a system is like approaching infinity in mathematics—one approximates it but never catches up with it. If this is so, the pursuit of perfectionism will hardly result in the ultimate arrest of growth.² Perfection itself, no matter how earnestly teacher and pupil strive for it, is not likely to be realized—at least in this life. Such an infinite ideal can scarcely be attained in a temporal process; nothing short of infinite time will be required. And even then one must not forget that only God is perfect, the value of all values.³

The instrumentalist in educational philosophy would probably join the absolutist in criticizing the attempt of science to set up the aims or values of the educational process. But he would have to part company with him in the endeavor to set up a

¹ For an interesting but adverse criticism of the Froebelian and Hegelian patterns here, see J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916, pp. 67-70.

² HORNE, *op. cit.*, pp. 241, 280.

———, *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, p. 72.

³ DE HOVRE, F., *Catholicism in Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934, p. 53.

hierarchy of value based on the acceptance of certain educational values as absolute. He would disagree with any general standard of value which elevates a single educational value to the apex of a pyramid of educational values, thus making of it a *summum bonum*.¹ In fact, quite to the contrary, he is a pluralist about educational values. Instead of one or a few all-embracing values, he believes that the number of educational values is legion. For him, values can only be compared in their instrumental efficiency in achieving other values or aims which the individual seeks to gain. Standards are tentative, *ad hoc*. When new problems arise, the objectives will shift. When objectives are made over, the standard of comparison must be reconstructed. Specific aims, objectives, purposes themselves hence become the only measures of value. Since these vary from one specific learning situation to another, there is no one standard which can be accepted generally.

Critics of this position have tried to discredit it by pointing out that it leads to the conclusion that all subjects in the curriculum are of equal value. Until some particular demand arises, one cannot tell, so they interpret the theory, which of the various studies offered in the course of study is most valuable. Up to this moment, no subject is more prominent than any other, and therefore all must be of equal value. The instrumentalist would preferably say that up to this point the subjects are not equal, but incomparable. Abstracted from the personal ends and purposes of teachers, pupils, and citizens, they merely represent values desired. No one study is more desirable than another, for at the level of desire each is so unique as to be invaluable, incomparable. The educator must be careful, consequently, not to confuse equality with incommensurability.

While the absolutist criticizes the instrumentalist for the absence of "set" educational values, the omission should not be interpreted to mean that the instrumentalist altogether excludes any classification of educational values. A table of categories of educational values, such as health, citizenship, vocation, and the like, has already been proposed. Adhering strictly to the tenets of this school, however, these are not standards of value. To repeat, they are merely "generalizations," more or less adequate,

¹ TABA, H., *The Dynamics of Education*, London, George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., and Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932, p. 207.

drawn from a variety of concrete particular goods. They only become standards when employed in the formation of preference in solving a particular problem. Apart from that, to reiterate, their significance is chiefly that of a provisional platform, somewhat elevated above the details of the educational process, from which one can survey whether its items are organized and distributed in proper proportion. The future chemical-engineer must not study chemistry, forgetful of his obligations as citizen. But citizenship can only have force as a measure of educational value where the teacher and pupil are dealing with citizenship materials and striving to do what citizens do.

The nearest the instrumentalist has allowed himself the luxury of an absolute is in his use of the term growth as a criterion of educational procedure. For this idea he is largely debtor to the evolutionary hypothesis. Reduced to simplest terms, survival becomes the crucial value. Here one finds that famous syllogism that education is all one with life, that life is growth, and therefore that education is a process of growth. Educative activities will, therefore, be differentiated from each other according to the growth they produce. They will be valued in terms of the further relationships and continuities to which they are perceived to lead.¹ Pleasure may be the concomitant or result of such an experience, but it will hardly be the aim, or motive of conduct. The growth that is thought of here must not be just the kind which grows and then stops, but rather the sort which leads to continued growing. Growth, instead of having an end or aim, becomes its own end. It is relative to nothing save more growth. Growth must not only be sustained, but expanded. The task for the teacher is to seek not only to deepen control and appreciation, but also to make present experience the instrument of further control and appreciation. And further, he must not only deepen experience, but enrich it in variety just as far as the actual environment will permit.²

There is a clear preference here for the educational metaphysic in which change is the fundamental category. But one must be immediately cautious that this bias does not lead him to the

¹ DEWEY, J., and TUFTS, J. H., *Ethics*, rev. ed., New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1932, p. 405.

² WHITEHEAD, A. N., *The Aims of Education*, London, Williams & Norgate, 1929, p. 61.

illogical conclusion that all changes are improvements, that change in the abstract is progress. Though change and growth are not to be confounded with each other, yet the subtle and strategic significance of change is to be found in further possibilities of change. This does not mean a deference to the mere drift of the cosmic weather, nor superstitious reverence for inner growth.¹ It will rather find value in employing observed uniformities to date to achieve a "basic reconstruction" in the light of the added changes of the future.

Measuring education's value in terms of the growth of its devotees is probably typical of Occidental educational philosophy. It evinces a restless activity which is not usually found in the Oriental point of view. The Occidental views unfulfilled desire as a challenge to appease it. Discontent growing out of unsatisfied desire leads to striving which, in turn, leads to active growing. The Oriental more likely finds value in denying desire. In either case, it seems necessary to maintain a certain ratio between one's ambitions and one's achievements.² If the latter are not a sufficient proportion of the former, the pupil will sense failure and discouragement. And similarly, if he satisfies too many of them too easily, he may suffer a surfeit of ambition or become arrogant.

To name growth as the unit of measurement for the scale of educational values seems confusing and vague to a considerable body of careful thinkers. For one thing, it seems to confuse a consequence of education with an aim. All learning inescapably involves an increment of growth of some sort. But should not an aim specify which sort? For another, growth implies enlargement. This may be either of physical organs or scope of experience. But certainly mere expansion of activity can be no dependable index of value. There is continued growth in cancer, but manifestly that is not the kind of growth which is wanted. One can grow in lazy and careless habits of study as well as in industrious and painstaking ones. The suggestion is put forward by some that it would be better to use the term growth to designate the quantity of change produced by education, but to reserve some other term, such as development, to indicate the

¹ BODE, B., "Education as Growth: Some Confusions," *Progressive Education*, 14: 152-153, March, 1937.

² MCCALL, W. A., "My Philosophy of Life and Education," *Teachers College Record*, 35: 566, April, 1934.

quality of the change. These anxieties should not be construed as a denial of the importance of activity in the educational process. The apprehension rather obtains that educators will be content with mere commotion.¹ Perhaps there is also the anxiety that, if growth is only for the purpose of further growth, there is risk of the same degeneration which overtook the aim of culture when it became mere ornamentation. The chief indictment of the growth theory of value, then, is that it seems to fail to indicate what is a desirable or right direction for growth.² It appears to have the fatal weakness of instrumentalism, the lack of finality or decisiveness.

Some supporters of this philosophy of educational value have a therapy for this alleged infirmity.³ They insist that one must be patient and take a long-range view of growth. From this perspective, it will be seen that baleful and obnoxious activities, though they may seem to flourish for a time, eventually sow the seeds of their own decay. Good and righteous habits, on the other hand, tend to lead to indefinite expansion. They increase and lead out into a variety of other activities, as well as grow in stature themselves. Cancerous growth undoubtedly leads on with increasing vigor—but to death. Some instructional methods also lead to growth, but only in school; after graduation the interests cultivated there, as in literature and public affairs, cease. The kind of teaching on which a high value can be placed is that which results in a permanent disposition to continue one's education, one's growth, as long as one lives. One must ever be on the quest of achievement that leads on to further achievement, and not only for one self, but for others also.

Yet, even with this further exposition of value as growth or sharing, there may be genuine perplexity as to which of several possible courses of action would lead to the greatest growth or sharing for a specific school, child, or teacher in training. Other things being equal, it would seem that those learnings are of most

¹ COUNTS, G. S., *Dare the School Build a New Social Order*, New York, John Day Company, 1932, pp. 5-7.

² BODE, B., *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, New York, Newson & Company, 1938, pp. 75-78, 83-85.

O'HARA, J. H., *Limitations of the Educational Philosophy of John Dewey*, Washington, Catholic University Press, 1929, p. 75.

³ NUNN, T. P., *Education: Its Data and First Principles*, New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1920, p. 99.

value which apply to the largest number of life situations. This is largely a statistical approach to value. One simply counts the frequency of recurrence. But other things are not always equal, Emergencies sometimes arise. For these, children must be prepared, even though they rarely or never occur. The appropriate habits and skills here have a crucial value for growth. The whole sum of future growth may depend on one exercise of them, as, for instance, learning to swim well enough to save life.

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CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

Before the predominance of the scientific approach to education, theories of learning were usually reached through some sort of philosophic speculation. The subdivision of philosophy most preoccupied with this problem then was psychology. Later, however, psychology acquired an affinity for the sciences. It not only copied their methods but also assimilated much of their content, especially in the field of biology. In fact, so much have the methods and point of view of the more exact sciences come to dominate educational psychology that some students in the field have tried desperately to erase philosophy from psychology's genealogy altogether. Perhaps this is but a temporary reaction to an earlier overdose of speculation. However that may be, though psychology may prefer other company and a different environment, it is, unhappily, only confusing in the long run to repudiate its heredity altogether.

The attempt to reduce the psychology of education to scientific statement is entitled to every encouragement. • Indeed, what educational psychology has been able to do on its own has already profoundly influenced its parent, educational philosophy. No trespass is intended here on scientific educational psychology by reviewing or criticizing its general results. The point of departure of this exposition is rather to examine to what extent the notorious contemporary conflicts in psychologies of learning may be due to assumptions about perplexities which have perennially bothered philosophy and which psychology, however far it may have developed, has never fully outgrown.

It is perhaps just as necessary to distinguish the following discussion from the epistemological aspect of education already considered.¹ Obviously, epistemology, as the theory of knowing, must bear an exceedingly close relationship to educational

¹ *Supra*, Chap. III.

psychology, as the theory of learning. In fact, it is in no small part due to this similarity of subject matter that psychology has been unable to clear itself entirely from the skirts of philosophy. In the epistemological treatment of education the study of the individual in relation to his world was guided by such questions as whether the individual could get dependable knowledge about his world, and, if he could, what role was played by mind or intelligence in helping him acquire it. The orientation of the present exposition is not so much outward, toward authenticating what is to be learned, as inward, toward the nature of mind at learning how the novel is assimilated to the familiar.

The type of difficulties which lie somewhere between epistemology and the scientific study of educational psychology is to be found embodied in a variety of conflicting educational practices. Some teachers seek, almost literally, to make an impression on the child's mind or to store it with knowledge. Others, in opposition to the implications of passivity in such learning, prefer to develop children's capacities for action. Among these latter are those who favor a teacher-centered schoolroom. Here pupil responses await a teacher-initiated stimulus. Others assume that children have self-starters, and that their motor selves are already running in some direction when they come to school. These teachers seek to enlist children's present purposes as the central feature of the learning process. Yet many tend to ignore this propulsive element. They, or the society of whose culture they are custodians, have conduct patterns which they set out to be learned. If these values do not readily find secure lodgment, the lesson is repeated to fix it in mind. This, in turn, is facilitated by analyzing the assignment into its constituent parts and practicing each separately. Those who emphasize purpose oppose this atomistic kind of learning. They insist on keeping the problem as a whole in view. If this is done and the child accepts or purposes the need of its solution, they feel the conventional type of drill can be dispensed with.

Again, it is an ancient axiom of teaching to proceed from the known to the unknown. This involves forming a concept of one's activity that is inclusive enough to embrace both the old and the new subject matter. But how are such concepts or generalizations formed? Some think they occur automatically and hence make no special provision in their teaching practice to

cultivate them. Others hold it necessary to make some conscious arrangement of their work to achieve or improve them. But these differ widely among themselves as to precisely what should be done. One group depends on analysis again to find the identical elements in the old and new situations. Another group thinks this is entirely too mechanical, even static. They fall back on the need for purpose to transform continually the novel and the customary into ever wider meanings, to keep pace with the way in which the problem changes under the effect of progressive steps toward its solution.

The differences in practice emerging become more pointed when one examines the practices of psychological research in education. Some concentrate on investigating learning through the manifestations of overt behavior. This yields them the highly prized objectivity of the more exact sciences. Others contend that this sort of research is vitiated by being only partial in its results, that there are mental phenomena, like consciousness and particularly purpose, whose nature escapes this type of description. These latter incline more toward introspection and philosophical dialectic.

Abstracting the basic issues from the preceding practices, one finds three for further study. (1) How shall the age-old problem of the relation of mind and body be stated to make the most exact and effective approach to the learning process? (2) Is mind to be conceived as aggressive in acquiring knowledge, or as a sort of container into which wisdom is poured? (3) What is the logic of learning, of capturing the unknown and reducing it to the status of the known? These, it is submitted, are questions to which answers are proposed by an educational philosophy, not educational psychology. The latter is generally predicated on the answers of philosophy, but does not itself afford them.

1. Of these problems the mind-body one is not only the oldest, but also probably the most fundamental.¹ Roughly, teachers divide in their practices according to whether they base their methods on some form of behavioristic psychology or on one of the more mentalistic schools of psychological thought. If educational psychology were a mature science, teachers should not be divided by such a basic schism. As a matter of fact, the thing

¹ GRIFFITH, C. R., *An Introduction to Educational Psychology*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1935, p. 713.

which prevents educational psychology from putting its house in order is the stubborn fact that this division stems directly from the mind-body problem. Are mind and body one or two? Or just how shall their relation be stated for educational purposes? Will a study of the body, especially through the physiology of the neuromuscular system, reveal all that the teacher needs to know about the learning activities of the mind? Is teaching just a matter of arranging the physical environment so as to take effect on a physical organism? Or are the functions of purpose and concept formation in a category which cannot be reduced to some aspect of bodily behavior?

Ask the casual teacher where mind or intelligence is located and it is an odds on chance that, in a generation where a smattering of knowledge about anatomy is quite general, he will say in the brain or cerebrum. Further, he probably holds that educating the child will involve some alteration of the cerebral situation. But just how this takes place is usually very vague and indefinite. There is even authority for a comprehensive finding that this is a profound enigma whose solution may not even be necessary. Nevertheless, several theses have been offered to clear up this uncertainty and obscurity.

Probably the most extreme view is that the mind is identical with the central nervous system. From this angle there is nothing mysterious about what goes on there. The brain is a part of the system of nature. It evolved in biological evolution just like any other organ of the body. It may even be included in a biochemical or physicochemical system. In this event, one thinks of learning as changes in the neural system. Conditioning or association is a definite physical linking together of cause and effect, stimulus and response. The teacher does not communicate with the child through the medium of nonphysical ideas, but through the crude or refined manipulation of an inorganic environment. The pupil's mind almost literally becomes what it studies. That what goes on inside during this act of incorporation has a unique quality all its own is generally either denied or disregarded as of no consequence by this thesis.

A less extreme form of behaviorism makes no commitment on reducing learning to a completely physical system. Nevertheless, learning is studied altogether objectively. To draw conclusions which can be examined equally by other experimenters

in the field, only overt behavior is studied. As a result, there seems to be an equal disregard for any inner consciousness—and of course subconsciousness—as a critical factor in learning. Perception, emotion, recollection, and thinking there are, no doubt, but behaviorism prefers to describe them in terms of overt responses rather than in any mentalistic fashion. Purpose, in fact, is held to be just as mechanical as anything else.¹ All human activity is reactivity. It is not spontaneous, but the response to stimulation.²

There are many, however, who do not have such confidence in behaviorism. They are willing to employ it as a methodology, but denounce the arrogance of those who propose it as a philosophy of learning.³ As a philosophy, it is classed at once as the offspring of materialism. Naturally they think the explanation of all children's behavior in terms of physics encounters insuperable obstacles. Others are quite convinced that neither physiology⁴ nor neurology⁵ has advanced far enough to be of much use in formulating a satisfactory theory of learning. Glorified physiology, biology, and anatomy give only a partial and a far from rounded view of the "psyche" of the learner.⁶ The danger with a materialistic behaviorism is asserted to be that learning will be entirely too mechanical. Mechanism cannot make sufficiently varied or refined adjustments to an environment which is precarious and which changes while one learns. In a mechanism, the total number of adaptations is known in advance. Whereas, no doubt, there are limits to the learning of the human child, the range and precision of his adjustments are hardly predictable ahead of time. Mechanism may suffice in a laboratory where the conditions of learning can be rigidly controlled

¹ THORNDIKE, E. L., *Human Learning*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1931, p. 122.

² THORNDIKE, E. L., and GATES, A. I., *Elementary Principles of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930, p. 62.

³ CHAPMAN, J. C., and COUNTS, G. S., *Principles of Education*, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1924, p. 98.

⁴ KILPATRICK, W. H., *Remaking the Curriculum*, New York, Newson & Company, 1936, p. 17.

⁵ RAGSDALE, C. E., *Modern Psychologies of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932, p. 393.

⁶ DE HOVRÉ, F., *Catholicism in Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934, pp. 93-94, 101-102.

but hardly in a dynamic contingent social situation. Consequently, education cannot escape conformity to the *status quo*, unless it can be served by a psychology which escapes the confines of physics and chemistry to deal with a unique type of flexible behavior.

A second thesis, far from identifying mind with any bodily correlate such as the brain, holds mental phenomena to be the very antithesis of the body. The latter is material, but mind, the quintessence of human learning, is immaterial. It has an intrinsic independence of the body. The body occupies space; the mind, while it thinks space, does not occupy it. Contrary to the materialistic behavioristic thesis, it is through the exchange of nonphysical ideas and the formation of nonsubstantial concepts that education goes forward. Yet, though mind is immaterial, it is nonetheless to be thought of as an entity. This, in turn, is indestructible and ageless; at death it survives as immortal.

The danger of this view is that it may lead to an undesirable dualism. If mental and bodily activities are so vastly different, their courses may cross and their interests conflict. As has been pointed out,¹ the child inescapably brings his body to school along with his mind. Since the body naturally has its own activities, they are only too likely to become insurgent and intrude upon the child's attention at just the time when his mind ought to be occupied with his lessons. The teacher, consequently, has to spend much of his time restraining physical activities and insisting on order and quiet. Not only is this dualism a source of disciplinary problems, but it also poses the problem of how what the mind learns is to be translated into conduct of the body.

Various solutions to the problem of dualism have been offered.² The Catholic, which is the most notable in practice, will be the only one considered. It retains the dualism, but does not find mind and body so disparate as to have no significance for each other in the educational process. Just how the dualism is bridged is admittedly difficult for human understanding. Suffice

¹ DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916, pp. 165-166.

² It would be irrelevant for educational purposes to review here the various dualistic theories of the relation of mind and body. For a detailed account of interactionism, parallelism, and others, the reader is referred to standard philosophical works.

it here to point out that one must not be misled by the ethereal quality of mind into thinking of it as entirely independent of the body.¹ The school is neither a morgue nor a limbo of disembodied spirits. Rather is the teacher confronted with living children whose minds and bodies function in highly integrated fashion. In fact, probably no learning could take place without the union of the two. Thomas Aquinas himself found reason to think that after death the spirit, then alienated from the body, is so incomplete as to be unable to acquire new truths. So, too, it is recognized that thought and physiological processes are sufficiently interconnected that educational measurement of the latter will admit of inferences and conclusions about the former. Yet, no matter how highly physical life is developed, it must always be borne in mind that at no point does it ever pass over into the mental.

A third thesis seeks a compromise between the other two. The inner experiences of mental imagery, of thinking, and especially of consciousness or awareness, are so real and obvious to certain educators that they do not think that a satisfactory theory of the learning process can be stated without taking these experiences into account. In this they differ from behaviorism and agree with the dualistic position. On the other hand, while they insist on preserving the educational and mentalistic import of such words as meaning and purpose, they are opposed to maintaining mind as a separate psychical entity to be sharply contrasted with the body. Nor do they hold mind a thing-in-itself which lies back of consciousness and has experiences. Rather is it the unity or synthesis of its manifestations such as sensation, thought, feeling, will, and the rest.² In this regard it differs from the dualistic position and tends to accept the monistic position of behaviorism. Stated more positively, mind is viewed as a function rather than as a structure. The word intelligence should consequently be used as an adverb rather than as a noun.³

¹ SHIELDS, T. E., *Philosophy of Education*, Washington, Catholic Educational Press, 1921, pp. 123, 194-195.

JOHNSON, G., "Fundamentals of Catholic Teacher Training," *Catholic Educational Review*, 21: 453-454, October, 1923.

² HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 106.

³ CHILDS, J. L., *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1931, p. 75.

It describes the way one acts when confronted by a situation in which meanings and purposes are so conflicting that they must be clarified before conduct can go forward. Teaching, accordingly, will not be just a conditioning process or a training in abstract conceptualization but an arrangement of the learning situation such that there are gaps or obstructions which a child's native urges will seek to overcome, guided by a consciousness of meanings.

2. Whatever one's attitude toward the mind-body problem as a focus of educational perplexity, there next awaits the issue of whether to conceive the learner as a dynamic agent or more as a passive recipient in the educative process. The term passive here need not necessarily indicate a total absence of action on the part of the learner, but there is, at least, a contrast of degree which it is important to bring out.

The theory that the learner comes to school with a "vacant" sign hung on his mind and that it is the duty of the school to furnish the empty spaces is probably held more frequently by popular than by expert opinion. Nevertheless, some authorities still cling to the view first expounded by John Locke that the child's mind at birth is like a clean slate on which the school, little by little, writes the accumulated heritage of race experience. Each inscription is relatively independent from every other. While these inscriptions do receive some organization, this is secondary and subsequent to the first stage where impressions are received through the senses, a stage during which the learning is thought to be relatively passive.

Some have been quick to point out that this assumption easily leads to a denial of the unity of the learner's personality. If from this point of view he will examine his stock of ideas or knowledge at any given time, all he will find is now this experience and now that, but apparently nothing to hold them together. This has led to a reformulation of the basic theory in terms of a stream, or passing states, of consciousness. Here, mind is formed by setting up associations or connections in the subject matter to be learned. Organization, instead of originating within, is presented from without. The educational result is much the same as above. Education is something which happens to the learner rather than something instigated by him.

This theory of the nature of learning has energetic competition. From a normative point of view, the practices which would follow from such a theory would be unacceptable. To hold that the mind is what it is taught unduly exalts the powers of teaching and demeans the privileges of learning. There is further danger that teaching will become preoccupied with furnishing the mind with patterns of the past, since these can be more readily cut and measured than those of a yet undetermined future. All this is to say nothing of the difficulty of translating knowledge into conduct. If teaching treats mind like an empty container to be filled, the problem arises how to empty it into action. Practice in filling is certainly not the equivalent of practice in pouring out.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find the weight of informed opinion holding to the theory that child nature is fundamentally dynamic. One has but to watch the child in the act of learning to become convinced of this. Take writing, for instance. Legs are employed as well as arms and hands, not to mention facial contortions. Even listening involves muscular coordination. A little further examination must also reveal that learning is not just a matter of perception but of apperception as well. The new is worked over by what is already familiar. The immaturity of the learner, far from being a void which needs to be filled, is a positive capacity or potentiality for growth.

While the weight of authority seems to favor the theory that mind in the act of learning is dynamic, there are significant differences as to how this activity is to be theoretically stated. One view takes its point of departure from the apparent disintegration of personality which follows from the blank-slate or wax-tablet theory of learning. If certain items like integration, causation, and others are missing from the world as it is learned through the senses, then it is asserted by the idealistic view that these forms are imposed on the raw data of sense by the very nature of mind itself.¹ From this angle the learner does not come upon a world already completed. If he succeeds in knowing a coherent world at all, it is only because he builds it forth from his own categories of thought. The corollary of this for the

¹ Cox, G. A., *Social Theory of Religious Education*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons 1918, pp. 26-27.

teacher is not far to seek. Instead of imposing ready-made ideas on the child's impressionable mind, it becomes his duty to provide a medium which is favorable for the child's exercise of the forms or categories already implicitly in him. He should be given a learning situation where he can analyze, select, and synthesize for himself. This wisdom was early epitomized in the dictum "no impression without expression."

Closely akin to this view, but much older, is the one that the mind or soul is a separate entity endowed with the ultimate principles of animation. This basic capacity to act usually varies according to circumstances. That is to say that there is a differentiation of mind according to various distinct powers or faculties. A faculty, as the derivation of the word from the Latin *facultas* implies, is an "ability to do." Faculties are classed according to whether they are appetitive or cognitive. The former include feeling and will, while the latter consist of the sensuous and the spiritual. Of course, the spiritual faculties such as reasoning and judgment are most important. Naturally the schoolroom practices to which such a theory leads can easily be portrayed. Given the assumption of faculties, education becomes primarily a matter of exercising and training them. The curriculum for these purposes is treated as so much gymnastic apparatus, as a medium of resistance, rather than as instrumental information for the meeting of everyday situations. The latter function of the curriculum is not excluded, but it is definitely relegated to second-rate importance.

This theory, however, does not square well with those philosophic tendencies which put utility of the curriculum first.¹ Consequently, there has been a search for another theoretic statement of the "psyche" of the learner. Many have united in finding the learner's ground plan in a theory of instincts and impulses. From this side, the dynamics of learning are not merely intellectual, but muscular and especially visceral as well. Learning is pallid at best unless stoked with the responsive thrill of emotion. This view has a strong behavioristic tinge. A question has been raised whether this view makes any real advance on the theory of faculties. Is not an instinct or an impulse also just an "ability to do"? If so, then what gain has been made

¹ Of course no attempt will be made here to review the scientific studies directed at the theory of formal discipline.

but to rename and reclassify these abilities? Whatever the difference in theory, there docs seem considerable difference in educational practice. Faculties are trained to improve their own excellence; instincts and impulses are exercised, not as ends of education, but as means of making adjustments with the learner's environment.

A last theory now deserves attention, the *Gestalt*, or organismic. It, too, assumes that the learner has original patterns, "configurations,"¹ that prevent education from simply being the making of characters on the wax tablet assumed to be the mind. Two things distinguish this organismic point of view. In the first place, the unlearned or ambiguous tends to create gaps in these configurations. When this occurs, an underlying rhythm is set up which resists the interruption and which demands maintenance or closure of the pattern. Not only that, but the organism will persistently vary its behavior till it achieves the reduction of the strain. This self-assertion of a configuration is said to be teleological, or goal-seeking. In the second place, it is characteristic of the organismic point of view that the learner's organism acts as a whole. Learning, instead of being broken up into such integers as intellect and emotions, always occurs integrally. This emphasis on wholes is especially congenial to Catholic educational philosophy.²

A special instance of the dynamics of education, that of will, deserves attention at this point. By whatever dynamics the child comes by his learning, it is nevertheless often said that knowing and doing are far from the same thing. Many who fail to act, do not fail for lack of knowledge of what to do. Rather they fail for want of volition or will. But as to the nature of this act there is disagreement.³

According to one doctrine, the will is a distinct faculty. It is not only to be distinguished from impulse, desire, and emotion, but it is to be elevated above all these as the sovereign faculty. Furthermore, will is not to be confused with intellect. It works closely in conjunction with the intellect but is separate from it. The way in which these two function is that the intellect appre-

¹ The most common translation from the German.

² DE HOVRÉ, F., *Catholicism in Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934, p. 141.

³ For a discussion of freedom of the will, see *supra*, pp. 19-22.

hends the facts of any situation and presents them to the will for choice or decision. Nothing can be willed which is not first known. So conceived, will is a datum. Its training results in no intrinsic increase of the faculty itself. Strengthening the will merely affects its habits of execution as to whether they be deliberate and resolute or vacillating and weak.

An opposing school of thought rejects the view that will is a special faculty. For them it is not a power separate from the energy expressed in children's other activities.¹ It is to be found not only in integrated personality, but in every manifestation of motor energy. It is the urge of life, the *élan vital*. But yet this description must not obscure the fact that willing or choosing is always between specific options. Consequently, training the will is to be viewed genetically. One wills with all that he has willed in the past. The pattern of the will evoked cannot be distinguished from the form of the culture which is coincidentally transmitted.²

Perhaps a third conception of will is held by those who advise "breaking the child's will." Certainly they cannot mean to destroy the very basis of conduct. They must have as much need of the will to do good as they have indignation when will stiffens wrong inclinations. What these people rather seem to be reacting against is not will, but individuality. What they aim to do is to compel the child to efface or subject his unique point of view to that of the parent, state, or church. They seek to regiment the direction of his will to the common will. As such, this is not so much an instance of will, perhaps, as it is of individual differences.

3. The educational problem of the nature of mind and the preceding one of its relations to the body both come to focus in the further problem of the theory of learning. Learning has already been suggested as the term of escape from the awkward consequences of choosing either horn of the old Greek dilemma that one either knows or does not know. Rather than conclude

¹ BOLTON, F. E., *Principles of Education*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910, pp. 722-723.

NUNN, T. P., *Education: Its Data and First Principles*, New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1920, p. 173.

² HOCKING, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1923, p. 258.

that education is either superfluous or hopelessly without direction, learning suggests a mediate condition wherein one neither knows nor yet is ignorant, but is getting to know. Learning thus involves a sort of metamorphosis. This transformation is one of the commonplaces of life, and yet just exactly what happens in the process of transition is variously stated theoretically.

Perhaps the simplest theory is that of impression or imitation. Learning is like writing on wax. It is a tracing of the patterns of the social heritage. Neurologically one wears down pathways. To study one's lessons means to appropriate or memorize them. This view of learning consorts well with the epistemological view of mind as spectator of its world and with the psychological theory of mind as a passive recipient. It is also well adapted to a metaphysical view of reality as relatively static. In view of these considerations, it is chiefly important that the teacher set a clear copy, so that the resulting impression or imitation be clean cut. The reduction of the novel to the familiar presents no particularly difficult problem here. The previously learned patterns of conduct are set in such plastic material that they offer hardly any resistance at all to the copy or cutting of new habits.

Such a theory, however, is too simple. Most notably it under-rates or overlooks the force and strength of any previous native or acquired set of learning. Consequently, this theory needs restatement. This may be found in the theory of association. Here the new is learned by being associated with the old. New ideas and habits are acquired because they occur simultaneously in the same context where old ones function. Later on, the context which calls the old habit into play will call up or recall the new one, even though that is not then present. Thus, if a scolding accompanies a child's piano lesson, the child may come to dislike the piano, although no scolding attaches to playing it. The more frequent, recent, and intensive this proximity, the more assuredly the new will become a regular part of the old. The behavioristic theory of learning, as set forth in conditioning, is largely a translation of associationism into objective terms. In the "conditioning" of Pavlov's dog the latter can be said to have "associated" the ringing bell with the sight of food. Learning becomes complete, the new becomes integrated with the old, when the bell can be substituted for the food in order to make the dog salivate, when the customary response will be called out even

though a new and previously strange stimulus stands in the stead of the familiar one. Repetition or frequency still holds to insure learning, but recency and intensity are replaced by the readiness of the learner to learn and the satisfying or annoying effect the learning has on him. Except for these qualifications, this theory is congenial to the general philosophic position already stated.

These theories of learning probably do not go far enough because they oversimplify the environmental factor. The implication so far is that practically any response can be attached to any stimulus, that the child can be trained to become a doctor, lawyer, merchant, or thief at will. Learning takes its cue from some preconceived end. Aim or purpose as the outgrowth of a problematical situation is overlooked or minimized. The further implication is that anything enigmatic has been ironed out by the teacher, so that no impediment stands in the way of the learner's copying or being conditioned to the solution. But suppose that the learning takes place under circumstances where no answers are evident in advance, perhaps not even to the teacher, or, if to him, he does not immediately or directly reveal them. Here learning must puzzle out a way to capture the new. Most theorists agree that this is done through a logic of similar or identical elements. The class of ideas to which the elements in the novel situation belong is worked out to be congruous with a class of ideas already known. But again, just how this operates is a subject of controversy.

One statement has it that learning is a unifying of the novel and the habitual through a special power of the mind. The two can be assimilated, because the novel is not thought of as contrasted or foreign to the learner. Rather has it subjective or personal qualities which are counterparts of the self that is learning. Thus, in learning a poem, the pupil is not content with memorization of mere sounds or written characters, but searches for the very living self of the author. Hence learning becomes a merging of personalities. There is a metabolism of learning that is as personal as that of digestion. This view, in some respects, coincides with the theory of mind as an entity with differentiated faculties.

Another statement abandons the personalistic phraseology and asserts that learning goes forward through the forming of con-

cepts. Concepts, of course, have mentalistic connotations. They are figments of imagination. To learn in terms of concepts rather than concrete realities has the advantage of enabling the learner to concentrate on the essence of a class of things, without being distracted by the mere accidents of circumstance surrounding each. Conquering new experiences with old habits through the formation of concepts is like handling fractions with different denominators. These fractions can only be combined by hunting out a common denominator which is large enough to contain each individual one. Old and new habits are to be fused in the same way. An idea or theory must be found with a meaning inclusive enough to underwrite both the other two. In this concept the pupil finds his future outlook on learning reconstructed, enlarged, and enriched. The concept is thus a mentalistic invention for dealing with particulars.

This theory of learning at least has the merit of being consonant with several different statements of the nature of mind. In one way or another, faculty, behavioristic, and organismic hypotheses posit concept formation as the theory on which they operate. It can be employed by both rationalists and instrumentalists to come at the truth of either a static or a dynamic world. But in spite of this apparent agreement important differences crop out. Any explanation by the faculty theory may be dismissed at once. It accounts for the conceptualizing process by assigning a faculty for that purpose. This cuts the pattern to the shape of the cloth, which is quite too convenient. It begs the question of a real explanation.

The behavioristic treatment of this theory affords a better defined issue for consideration. Here conceptualization is the problem of transfer of training. Learning, the integration of the new and the old, occurs through the logic of identity. Learnings acquired in one field of practice are transferred to or are connected with other fields only to the extent that there are identical elements in the two areas. The identical element or common denominator is to be found by a process of analysis. In fact, all learning is said to be analysis and connection. At first, the resultant learning may be random and may lead to a multiplicity of responses. Through trial and error the accidental and irrelevant gradually are eliminated or dissociated. Consequently, learning is never a matter of acquisition of a new pattern but always the elimination

of the irrelevant ones.¹ This is significant for it implies that the correct pattern of response has been present in the gross reaction from the beginning. It merely requires repetition under a variety of circumstances till the identical factor is analyzed out into the clear. Purpose reduces to connections and readinesses.

Considerable criticism has been directed against the adequacy of this application or interpretation of learning through concepts. The quarrel seems to center about the role of purpose in learning. From the description it would appear that the success of learning through analysis of the problematic situation is nearly a chance affair. One waits for the sheer weight of repetition to sort out the identical element from the chaos of responses. This clumsy procedure is alleged to be the result of neglecting or overlooking purpose. If the anticipated outcome were present at the beginning of learning in the form of purpose, much otherwise waste motion could be short-circuited. Selection in the behavioristic approach, however, is left to the law of effect. After an act has been performed, its pleasant or annoying effect determines whether it will be selected for repetition. This leaves the unsatisfactory conclusion that the appropriate act is selected by results which occur *after* the selection has been made. While purposes can only be tested by their effects, nevertheless the term selection is emptied of its vital meaning unless there has been at least an attempted prevision of eventualities.

Furthermore, without purpose, learning by analysis into elements seems to devolve into an atomistic emphasis. Too much stress is laid on the specificity of learning. Learning by conceptualization, on the contrary, ordinarily implies a more synthetic quality. One not only has to sort out the significant element, but he must also expand its meaning if it is to attain its maximum usefulness. As has been pointed out,² "fiveness" is not learned merely through having the learner presented with five marbles, five pencils, five dolls, and so on till the concept fiveness is able to walk on its own feet. Fiveness never exists by itself in nature and consequently is not waiting out there to be

¹ DEXTER, E. G., "Education through Survivals," *School and Society*, 23: 418, April, 1926.

BODE, B., *Modern Educational Theories*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. 180-181.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 180-186.

picked up. Nor is it in the learner's total response to the situation, waiting to have the inconsequentials dissociated from it that it may stand out in bold relief. Rather is the concept fiveness a figment of mind, something that has to be put together as well as analyzed. The learner must place it between four and six, see that it is the sum of two and three, one less than six, and so on into a variety of complicated relations.

Again, the atomism of the behavioristic approach is found unsatisfactory where the stimulus which is being analyzed is changing during the analysis. In a store problem, for instance, a pupil might have to add, then subtract, and finally divide or multiply before a sale could be completed. If he has learned each operation by conditioning, there will be a change of stimulus at the end of each operation. Each computation is a discrete operation. This being the case, there can be no purpose operating, but only a succession of jerks. Nor is there any guarantee that they will occur in the right sequence. Purpose implies that the total outcome was foreshadowed at the very outset and that the conception so formed has lent continuity to the whole process. Instead of a mere sequence, as in conditioning, there is a progressive coordination of activities in purpose. It is serial rather than successive.

This negative criticism can now be turned to a more positive exposition of the purposivist point of view. At the very outset, re-emphasis must be placed on the importance the pragmatic purposivist attaches to the character of the stimulus or environment. Learning is not just a logic of the psyche. There is, as well, a logic of the environment in which the psyche operates. Since the kind of world (environment) in which learning occurs is subject to various metaphysical interpretations, learning can never be a purely scientific problem but must always partake of a philosophical quality, too. In the pragmatist's metaphysics the world of reality is essentially dynamic.¹ On this account, learning cannot be conditioning to a preconceived end, because he anticipates possible changes in the end itself before it can be consummated. Consequently, learning is not reproduction but is

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., "The Relation of Philosophy and Science in the Study of Education," *School and Society*, 30: 47, July, 1929.

———, "A Theory of Progressive Education to Fit the Times," *Progressive Education*, 8: 288, April, 1931.

genuinely creative, emergent. Learning is the correlative way of living in a novelly developing world.

- But how does purpose aid in delineating the metamorphosis of learning? There are two ways of approaching an answer to this question. From the *Gestalt* point of view, changes in the environment keep the learner in a constant state of more or less unstable equilibrium. The configurations which the environment thus assumes throw the learner's nervous system into similar patterns of stresses and strains. But there are at the same time forms and figures to which the learner is predisposed by nature. These represent equilibrations of the whole personality of the learner and naturally go into action as purposes when any upset occurs. The importance of the whole has a double aspect here. The whole organization of the learner is enlisted in equilibration or learning, and the pattern of restoration is a more or less clearly perceived whole. Instead of a summation of stimuli or chaotic multiple responses, there is an initial integration operating here. Learning thus is not to be broken up into separate parts. Rather is it an elaboration of the patterns with which the learner starts life. The novel elements in the environment, which are abortive in developing the wholeness of the original configurations, are rejected. Those which aid in fulfillment are transformed and integrated with it.

This statement borrows heavily from biology. Since the tendency of psychology to assimilate biological content and methods has already been hinted, it may be well to present briefly a biological theory of learning.¹ In the world of organisms, education is a universal process. The learning organism finds itself surrounded by an environment in which some factors are favorable and some hostile to the organism's continued existence. The learner faces these circumstances with an hereditary identity which he seeks to maintain. The lack of harmony between the inner condition of the organism and the outer circumstances of the environment results in a struggle for better adjustment. At first, the learner will seek to adjust these unequal conditions by running through his repertoire of inherited and acquired patterns. These failing, he will attempt a departure from his established ways of doing things; in other words, he

¹ RAUP, R. B., *Complacency, the Foundation of Human Behavior*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930, *passim*.

will then *have* to learn. How this occurs is as difficult and baffling to explain as how organic variations come about.¹ Some are wont to call education conscious evolution.² Others think that the real significance of education is to be found in the continuance of organic existence to which evolutionary changes are a mere incident. In neither case is organic evolution to be ascribed to a theory of acquired characteristics, that is, to modifications acquired by learning. Neither does complete adaptation ever result. The organism is always in an uneasy state of equilibrium. Changes inside the organism and outside in the environment go on incessantly, making adaptation or learning necessary as long as life lasts.

Instead of expressing purpose in terms of *Gestalt* or biological learning, it is also possible to cast it in terms of concept formation different from behaviorism. It may be admitted that concept formation involves identities between the novel and the familiar. But one must distinguish between identities of substance and identities of procedure. To state the theory of learning in terms of the former—as by showing that multiplication is but a kind of addition—would presume that there are no real novelties in the world and thus reduce learning to the level of mechanical habit. The strategic feature in emphasizing the importance of procedure is to recall the way in which concept formation goes forward. Finding a common denominator for diverse fractions does not reduce the individual denominators to identities. Rather are they caught up and reconstructed into a larger one. So is it with learning through concepts. The concept is not a matter of finding identical elements underlying the learner and his problem, but of reconstructing the meanings of both into a new, broader, and more efficient meaning. It is purpose, foresight of the end, which suggests the kinds of concepts which are progressively necessary to keep up with a changing environment.

A concrete illustration may clinch the point. A child has a dog for a playmate. The dog is very friendly and permits the child to take liberties with it. A strange dog comes into the neighborhood. The child takes liberties with this dog, too, but

¹ HENDERSON, E. N., *A Textbook in the Principles of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910, p. 84.

² PARTRIDGE, G. E., *Genetic Philosophy of Education*, New York, Sturgis & Walton, 1912, p. 94.

the latter growls or snaps in return. The parent remarks that the child must be careful not to play with strange dogs as he does with his own. The child's outlook on dogs undergoes an alteration. The strange dog, which at first sight seems the same sort of animal to play with as his own dog, undergoes a transformation. The old habit which viewed all dogs as friendly also undergoes reconstruction. The novel and familiar aspects of the situation are both made over into an enlarged and more discriminating conception of dogs. This generalization of meanings, then, is literally what is meant by "learning" about dogs.

Finally, there are those who profess to see a miracle in the metamorphosis of learning. If learning be creative, it is no more possible to pry into its ultimate explanation than into that of the way in which metabolism and growth occur. This gives rise to a question asked long ago by Plato. How can anything absolutely new enter the mind? That great sage is reported to have held this to be impossible. His reasons can be readily understood. It has already been seen that if there are true identities underlying the new and the old, then there is no real learning in the sense of something creative or novel. But, likewise, if the thing to be learned is absolutely novel, the logic of identities cannot operate. Learning is again at a standstill. Plato escaped from this impasse by explaining the apparent novelty of learning as a recollection of what was implicitly known from some prior state of existence. The Catholic philosophy of education has a similar note.¹ It even goes farther and implies that only a minor part of a child's learning is due to the ministrations of his teacher, the major portion being attributable to omniscient and omnipotent deity.²

Enough now of these theories of the psyche, whose logic psychologists so earnestly seek to write down. Differences in teaching practices have been found to be based on differences in psychological theory of the learning process. It comes to light now that these theories of learning vary according to the assumptions which they make. At the level of assumptions it is proper for the educational philosopher to add such comment as he may. In this regard, it is chiefly significant to point out here that the theories just reviewed are, all of them, only theories. The facts

¹ *Supra*, p. 63.

² PACE, E. A., "St. Thomas' Theory of Education," *Catholic University Bulletin*, Number 8 (July, 1902), p. 302.

have not been found overwhelmingly to favor one theory or another. They are still just speculations on one of the most familiar and yet most intricate of man's activities, learning. Since this is so, it is probably well to be reminded from time to time that it is not long since educational psychology lived in the mansions of philosophy.

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CHAPTER VI

THE INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY, AND EDUCATION

It is commonly thought that in some things individuals are self-educated, while in others they need instruction from parents, friends, or teachers. When one contemplates the extent to which even the self-taught are dependent on such resources as tools, and especially books—and what are these but the vicarious teachings of their respective inventors and authors?—it does not seem extravagant to claim that by far the larger part of human learning is affected by the social process. If this be the case, learning, in addition to being a psychological process, is a social one as well. Approaching education from the social angle, then, introduces a new variable for inclusion in an educational philosophy. Its significance, however, varies according to the conception one has of the nature of society and the individuals who compose it.

Several specimens of varying or conflicting educational procedures may be pointed out to give a practical origin to the discussion. The states embracing fascism definitely subordinate the education of the individual to social ends. In fact, society, in addition to being made up of individuals, is a corporate entity over and above them. It develops individuality only insofar as the latter promotes the over-person of the state. In democratic states the reverse is more prone to be the case. The individuals composing them are likely to be the ultimate consideration. The state participates in the educational process as an instrument for liberating individuality. Moving from the macrocosm of the state to the microcosm of the classroom one finds similar differences. In some, instruction is highly individualized. Children initiate their own learning activities. Separate curricula are made up for each individual child. No course of action is undertaken unless the child accepts its objectives as his own. In other classes, almost the opposite practices prevail. Studies are initiated by the teacher. Instead of fitting the curriculum to the

child, he fits the latter to the curriculum as representing the demands of the community in which the school finds itself. The aims of instruction are thus determined externally to the classroom and handed down to it without soliciting the assent of its members, perhaps not even that of the teacher. Moral training may afford a final instance. In some families, churches, and schools, moral education consists in conforming conduct to a moral code. This precious possession, received from generations past, must be preserved to the next, unsullied and unimpaired. In other communities, a different attitude on the part of these same agencies may lead to a critical transmission of the moral tradition. Here, education will conserve the past but eventuate in a creative moral life for the individual as well. The mores of the group in turn are improved by being crossed with the individuality of the learning generation.

The critical points of theory toward which further exposition must be directed can be quickly sifted out. The fundamental interest in such problems as have been sampled is undoubtedly ethical. Several other phases, however, need preliminary treatment. (1) What is the nature of the social process? Take any school or classroom as a society; what is the initial assumption which the teacher should construct? Should he make the atomistic one that here are so many discrete individuals; that here is a class, school, or society only insofar as these individuals voluntarily will or contract? Or should he assume that these children have a corporate character which antedates their gathering at school, because society is not a contract but an organism or a transcendent idea? (2) But, whatever the nature of society, what is the nature of the individuals who compose it? What are the significant qualities of selfhood and individuality of which the teacher must be aware? (3) To what extent are the conceptions of selfhood and individuals social in origin? (4) Tentative answers to these basic questions pave the way for the climax. How far is the individual or society to be the measure of things, the yardstick of educational procedures?

1. It will be well to commence with the question as to initial assumptions. A number of critics are inclined to ascribe an allegedly excessive individualism in the schools to the fact that those responsible for educational policy proceed upon pluralistic assumptions. According to a certain type of metaphysics,

reality can be analyzed or broken down into basic particles or atoms.¹ These units can be moved about into a variety of relations, but each is so fundamentally discrete and indigenous that its character does not depend on its relationship to other units. Extended to social relations, the assumption implies that the individual, and not the social, is the ultimately real. The individual may be found in social constellations, but his obligations there will always be of his own free choice and not thrust upon him by the relations in which he finds himself. This being the case, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the social process is somehow an unnatural one. Consequently, the social arrangements of the school depend on what the mutually independent pupils and teacher want to do.

It is difficult to find an educator who openly espouses this theoretic statement of educational practice. There are a number of practices, however, which seem to imply it in greater or less degree. For instance, in some ultraprogressive schools pupil individuality is so revered that it is a desecration to bend it any way against its will. In other cases, the Dalton plan for example, where each child's work is prescribed by a separate contract, some teachers have been so overzealous to individualize instruction that no provision has been made for social activities. Finally, this individualization of instruction often culminates in breaking the instructional program down into (or building it up out of) a system of units, hours, and credits as discrete and interchangeable as the atoms in certain conceptions of the physical universe.

✓ The educational philosopher inclining toward idealism starts with entirely different premises. He starts with a whole. The interrelations of pupils and teachers or of the school and other social agencies are assumed to be unitary in both origin and aim. Society is presumed to be intrinsic or organic and not to blossom from contract. Individuality is not denied in this view, but the whole, of which the individual is a part, has a large office to execute in determining the latter's character. The individual differences of pupils will be recognized but they will only be realized through social cooperation.

But just how is the association of individuals possible? If individuality be unique, how can the pupil possibly enter into the

¹ *Supra*, p. 30.

experience of the teacher or the race? Or how can the teacher understand the difficulties which the child is experiencing? Because one's own experience is peculiar to himself, he seems precluded from ever knowing what his fellow's experience uniquely means to him. People's highly prized individuality would seem to keep them locked up in separate worlds and prevent the very existence of society, the school, or the class.

The idealist thinks he has a way of overcoming this impasse. In any given class there are at work not only the minds of the teacher and the individual pupils but, as he says, there is also a social mind.¹ The social mind is the corporate mind of the pupils and teacher organized around some principle of knowledge on which all minds are thinking as one. For an individual to learn the meaning of his lesson is equivalent to being a member of a class. There is a close relation here between class as a social grouping in school and class as a logical category or classification. So, defining what the individual has learned involves subsuming the species under the genus, the individual under the universal. The social tie which thus binds teacher and pupil together into a class is an ideal or spiritual factor. While the pupil and teacher are distinct from each other, yet neither achieves his full meaning except in opposition to the other. Thus a child can only be a pupil in relation to a teacher and an adult a teacher only in relation to a pupil. This thesis and antithesis of the pupil-teacher relation is finally mediated—and so the Hegelian triad is completed—in a synthesis of a higher third, the spiritual, which in its highest manifestation is the source of mankind and binds mankind together.

This particular metaphysical explanation of the way in which the social process operates in the educational one is quite unsatisfactory to another group of thinkers. They renounce the theory that individuals are caught up in the matrix of a superpersonal entity, but they claim that "spirit," in this doctrine, is a transcendental and blind name for what exhibits itself empirically in the constant remaking of both physical environment and living organism when the latter learns the culture of a human society. Indeed, that physical and animal nature are so trans-

¹ FLESHMAN, A. C., *The Educational Process*. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1908, p. 90.

formed in the process of education is much more a matter of fact than speculation.¹

Turning from negative criticism to affirmative statement, this school of educational philosophy also refuses to start with an atomistic assumption. 'It sees the initial estate as one in which everything is found in association, society being but one instance of the natural complexity of things. Society thus is an entirely natural rather than unnatural condition. It further empirically finds that society exists not only *by* communication but *in* communication. The community is what it is by virtue of the things which are held in common, and communication is the way in which things come to be possessed in common. The tie between the words common, community, and communication turns out to be more than accidental, or even verbal.

✓The school, or the class within the school, is but an extension of this principle. Each is a miniature community. The reciprocal relation of teaching and learning is but one instance of communication. For education to be consummated, however, communication must involve a like-mindedness. It would not, for instance, constitute an education for public-school children to attend the meetings of learned societies. To be sure, they would hear the words spoken, but they would hardly understand their import. To have an idea of a thing involves more than getting sensations from it. Neither communication nor education is consummated till the learner can act with the same meanings to things which others attach to them. Finally, since education and social life can both be equated to communication, it follows that the educational and social processes are one.

Whatever one's theory of the social process, it is obvious, of course, that the child is a member of a variety of societies, such as his school, his class, his family, and his gang. But the question now arises, is he also a member of a larger society which includes all these smaller ones, a society which can be spelled with a capital "S"? For those who pass over individuals and approach the social process from an initial assumption of wholeness, it is not uncommon to subordinate the plurality of societies to some single all-pervasive society. For them there is not only a whole but a whole of wholes.

¹ DEWEY, J., "The Social as a Category," *The Monist*, 38: 176, April, 1928.

Some of them find such an inclusive whole in the church society. This selection is bolstered by the claim of some churches to being catholic in their scope. Their employment of the word "catholic" in title or creed is not accidental, for etymologically it derives from the Greek expression meaning whole. In this light, the widespread activity of the Roman Catholic Church in education is not at all surprising. But there are others of this group who do not think that the church is actually an all-inclusive society. The fact is that there are many churches and not just one. Therefore they claim that if there is any all-inclusive society it is that of political society. Everyone, willy or nilly, is a citizen of the state. But it may be as readily retorted here that there are also many states and not just one superstate. Not even the League of Nations includes all the nations. This is not to deny that it is easily conceivable that it might become such. The present League may be but an approximation to an ideal brotherhood of man. So, too, present churches may be but a step toward the ideal of a truly Catholic church. If there is an all-inclusive society, then, it seems to exist in idea rather than in fact. The conception, therefore, is more congenial to the idealistic conception of the social and educational process.

The other two interpretations of the social process probably find no need for the conception of an all-inclusive society. One cannot contract with everyone else. Neither is it possible to communicate with the whole world of individuals. A society in general is an intellectual abstraction. One cannot go beyond or back of the many overlapping societies in which each child lives. This pluralistic outlook on the social process has direct bearings on education. Society only exists to the extent that there is a direct meeting of the minds of the pupil and teacher. To the extent that the child repeats the teacher's instruction but does not understand how to use it, there is a danger that the society whose culture is being taught will fail of continuing to exist. This view is thus at odds with one which holds to the origin and persistence of society, regardless of what exists or is in fact learned.

2. Whether society be formed by the initial compact of individuals, or whether individuals are unknown except through some form of association, the fact remains that a discussion of the nature of society does not exhaust the nature of the individual.

The nature of the pupil's or teacher's individuality, therefore, requires further consideration. The individual is the ultimate unit of the educational process. Literally, he is the undividable. He corresponds to what the physicists thought they had when first they broached the concept of the atom, a concept which denoted a unit of matter which could not be cut in two. Individuality also carries the connotation of uniqueness. Because of his bisexual origin, each person is necessarily more or less different from every other person in the educational process. So much will probably be conceded by all.

But teachers and pupils are not only individuals; they are also selves or personalities. Strictly speaking, the selfless individual virtually does not exist. With selves or personalities are associated feelings, thoughts, and choices. While these change and develop from moment to moment, it always seems to be the same self which is doing the feeling, thinking, or choosing. Although the child changes or grows as he studies at home or learns in his play outside of school hours, the teacher has no difficulty in identifying him on his return to school the next day. It is further of tremendous significance that the self can be aware of its own identity.¹ Through self-consciousness the self can distinguish between the self he is and, which is of great educational import, the self he might become. In this he reflects the very nature of the universe itself, which might be described to be a pent-up creative force struggling between potentiality and actuality. Correspondingly, the school sets the stage for a similar tension in which man struggles to realize or actualize the self he potentially might become.²

This paradox of identity amidst change raises a very difficult issue for the philosophy of education. Is selfhood, this principle of continuity or integration, an original datum which the child brings to the educational situation, or is it a subsequent acquisition which is gained in the social or educational process? Answers to this question tend to receive two different kinds of emphasis. When some raise the question, they have in mind the completely developed adult self. Is that pattern already formed in germ at birth, or is its form and content contingent on later

¹ TOMPKINS, A., *The Philosophy of Teaching*, Boston, Ginn & Company, 1898, p. 45.

² FLESHMAN, *op. cit.*, p. 216

circumstance? Others pass over the particular kind of adult the child will become, and stress the process or principles of integration. Is unity of experience something the child has from the start, or is it something he has to obtain from without?

On the latter point there seem to be several directions in which thoughtful opinion divides. Some incline to the view that selfhood is original, that it is a native tendency of the child to maintain his identity throughout the flow of his learning experiences. He is always integrating, but never integrated—save in death. They gain their chief support from biology with its conviction that organisms tend to act as wholes. From them, also, comes much of the emphasis on the education of “the whole child.”¹ In this they are careful to point out that they do not mean that the whole armory of a child’s impulses, habits, skills, and attitudes are simultaneously involved in learning. Such a coincidence of forces might rather result in confusion. The emphasis on wholeness here should rather be on integration, wherein each resource for action comes into play at a time and in an amount measured to some dominating design.

To hold that the child is an organic unity does not go far enough to satisfy others. They agree with the organic theory that the child is something “more” than an agglomeration, something “more” than the sum of his parts. Yet it is still not enough that selfhood is a biological emergent. That far, the “more” is but an empirical fact. The “whole” child is not yet a complete whole. Nor can he be, until there is some vital principle, a spiritual soul. Without this last there are many who believe there can be no integration, no selfhood at all. It is the principle of a substantive soul that unites behavior and saves selfhood from a mere stream of states of consciousness, wherein each state virtually becomes the thinker and actor.

Others, however, reject the theory of an immortal soul as the indispensable base for a satisfactory selfhood. Still others deny that the self is to be found through some biological interpretation, as in the continuity of instincts, habits, and ideas. Turning to

¹ R. M. Hutchins, in his article “Education and Social Improvement,” *Educational Trends*, 6: 7, June-July, 1938, completely misunderstands the technical meaning of the “whole child.” He erroneously identifies the phrase with making the school responsible for the whole education of the child.

affirmative statement, these unite in asserting that the true self is to be found in interaction with its environment. Thoughtful purposing in these surroundings is credited with producing unity. Selfhood is said to be functional, that is, its quality is determined by the circumstances which are attendant on it. Though woven out of transactions with the material and social environment, it is still something more than a psychological core to which experiences are added. If a child is reared in a chaotic environment where his parents quarrel, where the conduct of politics is at odds with the ethical teachings of his church, or where the gang has different ideals or loyalties from the Boy Scouts, his self is in danger of disintegration. The antidote for this situation and the surest guarantee for integrated selves according to this theory is a well-ordered social environment.

In whatever manner the self precedes or emerges from the educational process, there at least seems unanimity of opinion on the point that the selves of pupils, young and old, are in an incomplete state of development. How shall this deficiency be accounted for, and whither shall one look for its repair? According to one view of Christian teaching, perfect selfhood is something which, once possessed, has since been lost and now must be regained. In the original state of justice man's being is supposed to have been in order. Due to his initial fall from grace, however, the perfect equilibrium of his hierarchy of powers has been lost. Original sin—man's fallen nature, his disorderly inclinations, his lack of integration—thus naturally orients education to antecedent goals. From the outlook of the experimentalist, education is pointed the opposite way. Integration is something ahead, something yet to be attained for the first time.

This trend of the discussion necessitates a return to the other emphasis of this problem of selfhood. Is the self, not its principle of integration now, but the content integrated, an original datum or a later acquisition? What sort of matured adult self will the child grow to be, a doctor, lawyer, merchant, or thief? Or, less specifically, but more important, what kind of character traits will his self show forth, those of honesty, perseverance, sympathy, dependability, or their contraries?

Some educational practices seem to imply that the child comes to school with the expanded self, which he is going to be, already

complete, at least potentially so in germ. The school procedure which this theory seems to dictate is one of well-nigh unconditioned self-expression. Otherwise how can the child become himself, the self he potentially is? The child's self is thus not only unique, but something sacred, something with which there must be no interference. There would be a miscarriage of the universe if original nature did not take its course. Such a theory is reminiscent of the conception of education as an unfolding of activities already folded into the child before birth.¹

A wholly opposite view regards selfhood as constantly in a state of becoming. At birth the self is practically nonexistent. At that moment there is an almost infinite variety of selves which the child might become. In fact, following the lead of psychiatry, the possibility is now recognized of the development and coexistence of multiple minor selves in the same person. Each of these may have a unity all its own, but if these subselves become too loosely connected there is a threat to the unity of the total self. Following this theory it becomes increasingly obvious that the school has a moral responsibility for selecting the kind of self the child wants to, and ought to, become and for giving it a reasonable amount of coordination and integration. But important as it is for education to assure the pupil against inner conflict, some hold it would be a misfortune for him to be so equilibrated as to be immune to the impact of the conflicting social scene.

3. So far, the individual and society have been discussed in separate categories. In doing so the exposition has, in a sense, artificially put asunder what in nature seem inextricably united. The separation carried out for purposes of analysis, however, has only been undertaken in order to make clearer their synthesis. The want of a single category comprehending both individual and society handicaps this task at the very outset.

One approach to this synthesis seems to imply a fundamental antithesis between individual and society as a point of departure. The statement is baldly made that individual and society are in fact opposed to each other. The circumstance that each individual is unique from every other individual inescapably leads to a clash of interests between individuals, and hence between individuals and groups of individuals. This dissension

¹ *Supra*, pp. 43-45.

is even made the social counterpart of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit.¹ Though disagreement be the fact, it is not recognized or adopted as the ideal. Rather is a congruence of social and individual interests sought through minimizing the discord. Yet, proposals looking to a synthesis betray this underlying antagonism by speaking of attempting a "harmony" of interests or a "sublimation" of desires. This is further reflected in the admission that sometimes authoritarianism or even force may be required to effect a synthesis. But the conflict is so fundamental that stabilization never lasts long. This is one way of accounting for the dualisms of the child and the curriculum and of the pupil and the teacher. Here the biological urges of the individual are paired against the forces representing society. Genuine overlapping of interest leading to lasting truces in this warfare are rare indeed.

Another attempt at synthesis seeks to reach a plane where individual and society are thought of more as complementary to, rather than at odds with, each other. Here the synthesis is grounded in mutual sympathy and interdependence rather than in force or fear. The uniqueness of individuality is treated as an asset rather than a liability. Instead of stressing possible conflicts, emphasis is laid on the way individuality makes possible specialization and cooperation. Self-assertion as an educational slogan gives way to self-realization. One realizes himself in, and not against, society. It is a notable fact here that the fully civilized, rather than the unschooled, exhibit the maximum amount of individuality. While individuality originates biologically, it waits on a favorable social environment for its development. To be born with a rich talent in a poverty-stricken culture which affords no tools for its sharpening is a cosmic catastrophe. Beethoven could not have composed his ninth symphony except in a culture which contained the pianoforte on which to compose. But not only is the group culture the indispensable complement to the cultivation of the individual's uniqueness; that uniqueness, far from seen as in conflict with the

¹ See also G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 187, where it is asserted that the legitimate distinction between mind and body is that between social patterns and patterns of the biological organism. The author further endorses education to bring them close together.

habitual or traditional, is viewed as a necessary complement to social progress. Individual variation, especially in children, becomes the reforming agent of adult community life. The genius is cultivated for the advancement of society as well as on his own account.

4. The preceding discussion already foreshadows the kind of ethical emphases one will find in educational policies. On the one hand there are those who make society the measure of educational procedures. Their motives, as might be expected, are mixed. Some prefer a social yardstick of educational values because they think society is more fundamental than the individual. Since they naturally reject the idea of a social compact, they condemn any education which seeks the formation of a batch of personal entities who are free to fit themselves into society or not, as each may choose. Others exalt society because it is the educating agency. The individual is always educated for and by some external institution, such as the family, church, or state. Therefore, individual interests should only receive attention insofar as they coincide with the preservation or improvement of this social group. Others go even farther to claim that the teacher or pupil only exercises his true individual will when the will of his group, especially that of his national state, acts in his personal will.¹ And from here it is but a short step to subordinating the individual will to a world will and thence to the absolute or universal.² Here even the aim of social progress is left behind as education strives for the realization of the ideal values of life. Through thus universalizing his own narrow life, the socialization of the child becomes a result, if not the end, of the educational process.

This latter idealistic approach to a social emphasis on education must not be thought to immolate the individual completely. The child is, after all, not only a part of society but also part of the universal. The latter reveals itself in an infinite variety of forms which, from one angle, accounts for the individual differences of pupils. Such individuality as the child is born with constitutes the self he then is. In it there is an immanent design,

¹ GENTILE, G., *The Reform of Education* (Bigongiari, D., translator) New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1922, pp. 31-32.

² SHREVES, R. M., *The Philosophical Basis of Education*, Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1918, p. 207.

a self to be realized. Comprehension of this soul plan is necessary to assist the child to his full self-realization, to a unity of his real and ideal selves. To achieve self-realization, however, there must be self-activity. Self-realization is not only of the self but by the self as well. Only as the child puts forth endeavor and assumes responsibility for his conduct can he hope to realize his destiny.

This self-activity on the part of the pupil must not be confused with self-expression or self-assertion. These three phrases, apparently meaning the same thing, are generally distinguished in technical usage. Self-expression and self-assertion tend to emphasize the self one is at the level of the present. Self-activity, on the other hand, bears down not so much on the self as on the activity. It does not so much seek the intrenchment of the existing self as the realization of another, the self to be found in the social culture, the ideal self. This may sound as if the present self had to be sacrificed on the altar of the future, as if one had to choose between self-sacrifice and self-realization. As a matter of fact, this is not the case, for while some sacrifice naturally occurs in self-realization, the highest selfhood is often realized in sacrifice.

There are many who will go a considerable distance with the position just stated. They recognize the essential social determination of selfhood but they do not on that account make social consequences the ultimate criterion of educational practices. To them the social process is an instrument for molding personality, but not the ultimate measure of its value. Fully acknowledging the individual's social obligations, they still hold that the individual is of greater importance than society, that he is the final inherent value in the educational process. The scholastic would have the child fortified against losing his soul before social education is provided.¹ Such an outcome is not surprising for those whose metaphysic emphasizes the unique and the particular.² From this point of view, the real needs of the individual pupil impose inviolable obligations on society and the very cosmos itself. If the latter be personal, as some conceive it to be, the ethical conclusion is that those engaged in

¹ DeHovre, F., *Catholicism in Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934, pp. 155, 157.

² *Supra*, pp. 29-30, 32, 34-36.

the educative process should always treat each other as persons. As Immanuel Kant long ago pointed out, to treat a person as a person is to treat him ever as an end, never as a means merely. While at first only adults achieved the status of ends, the later tendency has been to extend the respect for personality to children as well. Thus the child should be educated for his own sake. Society, the state, and the church exist ultimately for the individual. Not even under the leadership of majorities should they reduce him to a means rather than an end.

Treating the individual always as an end is the very heart of the teacher's professional code of ethics. Because of the great differential of knowledge between the teacher and the pupil, and because of the growing differential in the technical art of teaching between the teacher and the lay parent, the regard which the teacher must have for the interests of his clients is by that much proportionately greater. Because of the advantage which his specialized knowledge affords him, he must be scrupulously careful that everything he does is to promote the child as an end and not merely as a means for his, the teacher's, own personal ends. Whether organized bodies of teachers should ever strike, whether it is ever proper for a teacher to break a contract, whether the teacher should ever divulge confidential information about his pupils, and a whole host of other controversies in practice are all to be settled in the light of this fundamental ethic—what is best for the child.¹

Against the accentuation of the individual as the measure of educational undertakings there has also been considerable outcry. On the one hand, there is apprehension that sound and solid learning will give way to that which is whimsical. The classical criticisms of pragmatism are resurrected.² This ghost, so the adherents of this view contend, is easily laid by remembering that the individual is to be treated as an end in a social matrix. This social reference gives the modicum of objectivity which saves it from the spectre of shallow learning.³ On the other hand,

¹ TAEUSCH, C. F., *Professional and Business Ethics*, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1926, p. 143.

BURTON, W. H., *Introduction to Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1934, p. 690.

² *Supra*, pp. 58-60.

³ COE, G. A., *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918, pp. 36-37.

it is feared that the logical train of circumstances will lead to the overthrow of public and private discipline and the installation of anarchy. But even with this calamity threatening, the adult has been resolutely urged to respect the child to the end.¹ Only by improving the moral disposition of the constituent members of society can the reform of society itself be effected. It is undeniable that the individual has social duties. But this educational philosophy aims to have the child obligate himself to these of his own accord, to achieve the incomparable value of moral autonomy.

Yet, even this ultimate responsibility of the child for himself does not free his parents and teachers from the injunction to be their brother's keeper. Child personality may well be respected as sacred, but this does not mean that the child is to be the only judge of what learning shall take place. Instead of maintaining a hands-off attitude, the wise educator will subtly and deftly insinuate himself into the child's life so that the latter may become the sort of self which can properly demand non-intervention. Again, in proportion as psychology extends our knowledge of individual potentialities, it seems inescapable that society must share in the decision for what kind of selfhood the individual is to be educated.² This is re-enforced by the gradual abandonment of aiming to educate each child for "complete living" or "the perfection of all of one's powers" and the substitution instead of the development of his special abilities.³

The argument has been put forward that neither the individual nor society is the true criterion of the educative process. The former is defective in that it generally sets up the well-being of the pupil as an objective of education, rather than letting it accrue as a result. The latter fails because social utilitarianism must finally measure educational procedures in terms of the kind of individuals it nourishes. The only escape from this impasse is to inquire as to man's ultimate end. This, of course, is to be found in God. Both the individual and society are capable of

¹ EMERSON, R. W., *Education*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909, pp. 19-20.

² BRIGGS, T. H., "Philosophy of Secondary Education," *Teachers College Record*, 36: 596, April, 1935.

³ THORNDIKE, E. L., and GATES, A. I., *Elementary Principles of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930, pp. 24-25.

only partial perfection while God, of course, is the source of all perfection.¹

A final conclusion seems temperamental at best. Those who incline to emphasize the conservation of values will stress society. Those whose bias leans toward the innovation of values will accent the individual. The former admit the contribution of the latter but hold it rare of occurrence. They would hold that by far the larger part of the refusal to learn and abide by the folkways is just random effort. Consequently, they place the burden of proof squarely on the individual to convince society that the innovation born of his uniqueness is an improvement on custom. And even then they reserve to posterity the right to review the verdict. His own generation will protect itself best by insisting that no one depart from the mores until he has thoroughly learned to understand the why and wherefore of what he is rejecting. But, even with these safeguards, the innovators think a fear of excessive individualism seems less reasonable than the danger of crushing promising individuality. Social institutions such as the church and state are only too likely to fail to reverence the uniqueness of the child. And it is fatally easy for the teacher to condemn as contrary to truth, goodness, and beauty what merely runs counter to conservative prejudice.

So far, the discussion of "the individual, society, and education" has been abstract and formal, for the most part. This is bound to be the case where the principles under consideration are not located in some particular space-time frame of reference. It is necessary now to go ahead and connect the foregoing generalities with different concrete arrangements of economic and political life as they affect education.

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¹ CRONIN, J. T., *A Basic Plan for Catholic Curriculum Construction*, Washington, 1927, pp. 36-38.

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CHAPTER VII

EDUCATION AND POLITICAL THEORY

Schoolmen almost universally have deplored the entrance of politics into school affairs. They generally deem the interests of politicians as too narrow or too likely to be at variance with the broader, innocent interests of children. Politics so conceived is the management of public relations so as to gain advantages for oneself or for one's party. The danger of such manipulations is that they are brought about through influence or "pull" and that their results too frequently work injustice because they are planned for such immediate and shallow ends. In some quarters, this studied attempt to keep the schools unsullied by politics is viewed as a grave misfortune. In the communistic ideology—and probably in the fascistic one as well—it is unthinkable that the schools should lie outside the political sphere. Since the school trains the future citizen, education is far too strategic an instrument to fall into the hands of any save the state. Politics so conceived is not a term of opprobrium; it is more synonymous with statemanship. It is that phase of ethics which treats of the duties of states. In this sense probably even bourgeois societies would agree that education can hardly be divorced from politics. In any event, it is the theory of politics conceived in its highest terms with which the philosophy of education has now to deal.

There are numerous school practices whose origin and trend seem best accounted for in terms of the conditioning political environment. Nearly every first- and even second-rate country provides universal elementary education. Beyond that level, however, practice divides sharply. Some provide secondary education for a select few. Others attempt to provide as unselected and universal education at the secondary level as at the elementary. In some countries, the years covered by the secondary school are not post-elementary but rather parallel to the elementary years. Thus the parent has to decide at the onset of

adolescence whether to continue his child in an elementary school or start him in a secondary one. This dual or parallel organization of elementary and secondary schools is necessitated because the two types of school have quite different objectives and curricula. The secondary school is designed for those who are expected to assume positions of leadership in adult society, while the elementary school is projected for those who are to be led. In other countries, the educational ladder is constructed as a single continuous unit, the secondary school following in direct temporal succession. But, even here, there are those who would identify the secondary school with a narrowly difficult curriculum or with such high passing standards that the secondary school would become as highly selective as in the countries just mentioned. Others, on the contrary, favor curricula and standards which will insure universal education for all adolescents, however modest their abilities or aptitudes.

Interesting differences, which must also reflect political inclinations, are to be found in the way in which lessons are taught. One will not have to visit many classrooms before realizing that some teachers are virtual autocrats. They dictate the order of the day and rule with an iron discipline. In other instances, one will find teachers who share with their pupils the direction of their programs. What is true of the relation between teacher and pupil is often true of that between administrator and teacher as well. In some school systems, little is expected of the teacher but to carry out the policies and orders of his principal or superintendent. In others, teachers are invited to share in the responsibility for forming school policies.

Further instances of diverse or even contradictory practices might be cited. The sampling, however, should now be complete enough to suggest the way in which these procedures are conditioned by political assumptions or preferences. Obviously, the variable which most persistently results, now in one educational practice and now in another, is the method of distributing political power. In any associated group, those who shoulder the responsibility for forming and executing policies are generally the ones for whom educational opportunities are and must be provided. Except this be the case, leadership will be faltering and undependable. Consequently, the quality and amount of educational opportunity vary according to whether (1) the one, (2) the few,

or (3) the many are vested with political power. This threefold division of political theories is as old as Aristotle and as modern as today. The relative merits of each type measured in terms of education now require detailed consideration.

1. There have been various types of rule by the one. Whether the ruler has been a king, tyrant, despot, or dictator, however, will make little difference, for the educational consequences of all will be much the same. Where one rules, the final decision on public policy rests with him. Obviously, such a ruler must have the best education that his times afford in order to make wise choices. While it would be a happy coincidence for all of the ruler's subjects to have an equally fine education, it is clearly not a necessity, as in the case of the ruler himself. Since it is not indispensable, it is an easy step to point out that neither is it desirable. Where there is differentiation of social function, it may well be claimed that there should be specialization in educational preparation. Thus, the ruler should have one kind of training, but the ruled another. The former should learn to choose and to lead, while the latter should learn not to question, but to follow.¹ The teachers under an absolute ruler will propagandize and indoctrinate the decisions made higher up. As in the army, the schools of an autocracy will more than likely emphasize drill and obedience at the expense of initiative and criticism.

The merits and demerits of such an educational philosophy are the same as those of the political theory after which it is patterned. There is undoubtedly an efficiency and expedition that is deserving of praise. The respect paid to the expert is indeed admirable. On the other hand, educational outcomes for the people as a whole are heavily staked on the superior education of just one person. This might fail at several points. If the ruler be an hereditary one, of course his education for leadership can commence very early. But there is no guarantee then that he has the native hereditary qualities which will improve or deserve the opportunities of his environment. If the ruler rises to power relatively late in life, as in the case of dictators, it is too late to educate him formally for his task. And this is

¹ For an instance see a quotation from Kaiser Wilhelm II, in F. Clarke, *Essays in the Politics of Education*, London, Oxford University Press, 1923, p. 34.

to say nothing of the waste of the undeveloped talent of the mass of the population.

2. It is rare that rule by the one is found in pure and simple form. Generally, the sovereign power is shared with a selected group of others. Sometimes this minority group may rule without elevating one of their number above the rest. In either event, this distribution of power results in rule by the few. These few may be variously recruited. Among the Greeks, they were the *oi áριστοι*, the best people; hence, our word aristocrats. Later on, the best people became an hereditary nobility. Aristocracy became plutocracy. Dictatorships which aim to preserve capitalism tend in this direction. But dictatorships of the proletariat generally result in rule by the few, where the few are a minority political party. Obviously, the way in which the few are constituted will have definite educational implications.

When the few have been a nobility, education has notoriously been an upper-class affair. The nobility and the wealthy bourgeois have virtually had a monopoly of education beyond the rudiments. European education, even as late as the twentieth century, still exhibits this influence in its two-class system of schools, one set for the masses, and another for the classes. The reasons are clear. Governmental policy is determined by a ruling class. Naturally they must have an education predicated on their responsibilities. The education of the rest of the people beyond what is absolutely necessary can be relatively neglected.

The fascistic philosophy of education has some points in common with this view. Here, education is chiefly for a dominant elite. The leadership principle of feudal times is made central. Sovereignty rests with a group of leaders who do not derive their power from the populace or its elected representatives, but from their ability to rule by rising above their own immediate private interests. It is no chance affair that those of exceptional endowment become the élite of power and influence in the affairs of life. This is but the inexorable logic of events. Furthermore, like produces like. Consequently, it is no more accidental that the great majority of gifted children are born in the families of the privileged classes. Education, therefore, does not make or unmake the dominant elite. It merely accentuates their excellence and in so doing increases their social distance from the

masses. It equips them to wield the power which is their lot. In this there should be nothing depressing. On the contrary, there is a sort of Platonic justice about it. Each person will be educated to the full extent of his potentialities, but none for a role beyond what his native endowment warrants. If some are discontented, it will be a simple exercise of educational technique to condition them to be content with what they have and to perform their role in the social whole.

This whole, which is the nation or the state, gives rise to a totalitarianism which is also a significant part of the fascistic theory of education. The essence of this concept is a subordination of the individual to the state. It recognizes that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The state, for instance, is greater than the individual, because it is the link between succeeding generations. Furthermore, it has ends of its own—cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, territorial—which, if in conflict with those of the individual, must be deemed superior because more farseeing and less selfish. The state itself thus becomes an end in the educational process. The individual becomes a means to its realization. His personality is made to emerge out of its narrow isolation into this larger social consciousness, which in the totalitarian ideology thus inspires and gives meaning to his life. The group culture which thus forms the core of the curriculum is in turn the expression of the will of the dominant elite.

Members of this select minority validate their choice of values by their power to enforce them. It is bluntly admitted that this is the only way to terminate the protracted arguments to which the more democratic methods of discussion and persuasion lead. Those in the adult generation who cannot see it this way must be repressed. In the younger generation, education can take the place of repression. But, even with them, what is taught is fixed in advance by the leaders. There is no free discussion of the educational ideal. Universities are no longer autonomous seats of learning where an argument can be pursued in Socratic fashion whithersoever it may lead. A science so pure and objective as not to reflect national bias has no place in the curriculum. Educational freedom in such a state does not mean self-realization, or emancipation of the individual, but rather the sublimation of the individual in the interests of the state.

Liberty is not a right but a concession of the state, contingent on what it deems its own interests. Consequently, the virtues in which the individual is schooled are those of discipline, duty, and self-sacrifice.

The communistic philosophy of education appears to court many of the same objectives that fascism does. Yet there are some notable differences. One may perhaps take a very serious exception, at the very start, to communism as an instance of the rule by the few. Since most communists agitate for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and since the proletariat far outnumbers any other class in society, this classification of communism may seem somewhat incongruous. On the other hand, whatever the manifold paper theories of communism call for, the fact is that in Russia, communism's most conspicuous exponent, sovereign power has been narrowly held by a minority political party whose head is a personal dictator. The educational corollaries of this paradoxical situation require some further elucidation.

On the point of educational method, the dictatorship of the proletariat seems to have most in common with the fascistic type of dictatorship. Communism just as frankly warps the school to its peculiar ideology as does fascism. The rising generation is instilled with the proletarian point of view through just as authoritarian indoctrination. Academic freedom or self-determination for other minorities can only be tolerated within the confines of communist doctrine.

Not everywhere, of course, is the proletariat powerful enough to dictate educational policy so unquestioningly. In countries where communism is a hope rather than a fact, methodology must be modified during the inevitable period of transition. For the evangelical teacher, persuasion is the first line of attack. He will openly persuade his pupils toward his viewpoint if the community does not interfere but will not hesitate to exercise his influence subtly if necessary. But, even so, the Marxist will have much less confidence than liberal educators as to what can be achieved through a democratic educational process. When balked by the counteropposition to communism, he will readily abandon education altogether as a means of social reform and

¹ BRAMELD, T. B., "Karl Marx and the American Teacher," *The Social Frontier*, 2: 54, November, 1935.

rely on force and violence just as the fascist does. If disobedience to law seems highly inconsistent for the teacher in the capitalist system, it may be looked upon as highly moral when viewed from the Marxist frame of reference.¹

In the matter of the creation of educational opportunities, the two types of dictatorship commence to diverge considerably. Rule by a minority political party is said to be only a temporary phase of communism. The benevolent despotism of fascism apparently is to last indefinitely. When communism has been made entirely secure, sovereignty is expected to be put on the widest possible base. Consequently, while opportunities for the best education may be narrowly limited at first, later it is hoped they will be extended to all. Far from cutting the educational pattern to meet the needs of a dominant elite, communism aims ultimately at a classless society where the limits of schooling will be set by ability alone. This recognition of the proletariat as the center of gravity in the communist philosophy of education is also emphasized in the curriculum, where the cultural problems of peasants and industrial workers are the absorbing interest. This is true even of the transition stage of rule by personal dictator and party leaders.

At this point, the philosophy of education consequent to rule by the few almost merges with that attendant upon rule by the many. Before taking up this next point, however, it will be well to glance at some objections to the philosophy of the education of the few. Several shafts of criticism have been loosed at supposedly vulnerable points in this theory. One of the chief snares said to lurk in this point of view is the assumption that only the few are capable of intellectual training. Certainly one must beware the insidious ease with which the holding of such a hypothesis can color one's estimate of the data it seeks to interpret.

No less misleading, so it is claimed, is the plausible way in which the ruling class justifies its superior education. The stock argument has it that higher education of the few is to be justified in the superior service which they thereby render to the masses and to society as a whole. If they have educational privileges not shared by the majority, they are a compensation or reward for the meritorious social function they perform. But

¹ *Ibid.*

one must be on the lookout for hypocrisy here.¹ While educational privileges might originate in this fashion, after the lapse of time, one will more than likely find them predicated on hereditary superiority. Surpassing educational advantages so readily increase one's social distance from his fellows that he all too quickly rationalizes his outstanding ability as due to innate endowment. For the argument to be really plausible, proof should be required that the underprivileged classes could not do so well if given equal educational opportunities. The privileged class has usually asserted the futility of any social maneuver to find this out, because they claim the masses, on the whole, have given practically no evidence of abilities worth cultivating. Here, it is alleged, they are caught in a logical fallacy. First, they oppress the masses by denying them an enriched opportunity to develop their innate capacities, and then they turn about and accuse them of lacking the very things they have been refused a chance to reveal.

But, even granting that the maximal education of the few is but commensurate with their peculiar function as rulers, there is still objection to such a philosophy of education. The further difficulty with this argument is that it is so dangerously easy, even with the best of intent, to mistake the selfish interests of one's class for the welfare of the whole. In practice, it must be admitted that only too frequently individuals use the educational gifts conferred on them by society for their own self-aggrandizement and correspondingly often fail to recognize the social obligation which such privilege creates. Indeed, in some instances, the privilege is even looked upon as a means of avoiding some of the more onerous social burdens. As a matter of fact, it ought to be axiomatic that it is a good thing for any man that his fellows obtain a superior education. But so long as any of the latter are propelled by narrowly selfish motives to use this education to exploit their neighbors, one can hardly give blanket approval to such a dictum.

3. An instance has already been noted where the educational pattern is cut after the interests of the many, although the many do not, at least as yet, participate broadly in the exercise of sovereign power. It is now in order to inspect a philosophy

¹ NIEBUHR, R., *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932, pp. 117-118.

where not only are the many the center of educational gravity, but where the government, too, is of the many, by the many, and for the many. This variance in political base does make a significant difference in educational theory. While the schools of benevolent despotism may be primarily devoted to the cultural concerns of the workers, they may still fall short of the development of personality found in a democracy, simply because they do not reach the moral autonomy which is possible with a universal franchise.

Making the many of such paramount political and educational importance is justified in a variety of ways. Central, however, is a moral or ethical conception of the value of human personality. This has deep roots.¹ One of these can be traced back to the teachings of Jesus himself. The Christian doctrine of the universal Fatherhood of God must necessarily imply that all his children are of infinite worth, and not just a few of them. Centuries later, Kant reasserted this principle in demanding that every individual be treated ever as an end and never as a means merely. Almost contemporaneously, Rousseau was revolutionizing education by claiming that the child was entitled to the same sort of respect as his elders. The same philosophy must also have influenced the framers of the American Declaration of Independence, for they enunciated the principle that the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is the inalienable right of all. Some find further justification for this point of view in the theory of organic evolution.² Here it is noted with approval that nature seems to have a tendency to produce the greatest possible number of varieties of individuals. This seems to lend factual support to the old saying, how uninteresting the cosmos would be if all people were alike! If, from the foregoing, one may conclude that there is value in variety, then each individual must have his own indigenous worth. This lays the moral injunction on democratic education that every human being

¹ FINNEY, R., "The Ultimate Aim of Education," *Educational Review*, 56: 309, November, 1918.

RYAN, J. H., "Education and Democracy," *Catholic Educational Review*, 21: 326, June, 1923.

COE, G. A., *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918, pp. 26-27.

² LEIGHTON, J. A., *Individuality and Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1928, p. 15.

must count and that the unique, distinctive, potential value of each must be realized.¹ But it is probably too much for any individual to expect as his due that he will have all his capacities, great and small, developed to their maximal extent. Again, if one thinks with some idealists, democracy is the logical outcome of a spiritual principle in the universe which is seeking perfection. Following this out, what is true of the universe is also true of each individual. If this be the case, nothing less than universal education, the education of each and every individual, will be necessary to attain this highest perfection.² With such an imposing array of moral forces, it is small wonder that in the democratic tradition government is organized to secure the welfare of all the governed and that the interests of the masses should be paramount and not subordinate to, or exploited by, the interests of any narrower group.

The personal virtues which democracy's schools inculcate can easily be imagined. Since the measure of a man is what he is and what he can do, the individual is under the duty of making the most he possibly can out of himself. Teachers will encourage qualities of initiative, enterprise, self-reliance, and perseverance in their pupils. On the economic side, there will be emphasis on hard work, the dignity of labor, and scorn of idleness and a leisure class.³ Stressing such traits of character, however, may make education very subjective. In the end, the needs of the individual rather than those of society, of the child rather than those of the adult will have prevailing weight. Such a democracy may be suited to an economy of unlimited opportunities, as nineteenth century America. But there are those who have grave misgivings that such an individualistic educational philosophy of democracy can continue far into the future.⁴ It must be pointed out, however, that this is not the only possible outcome. One may accept the paramount worth of the individual and yet

¹ DEWEY, J., and TUFTS, J. H., *Ethics*, rev. ed., New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1932, pp. 408-409.

² FLESHMAN, A. C., *Metaphysics of Education*, Boston, Mayhew Publishing Company, 1914, pp. 63-64.

³ KANDEL, I., "The Philosophy Underlying the System of Education in the United States," *International Institute, Educational Yearbook*, 1929, p. 518.

⁴ DE HAAS, J. A., "Economic Nationalism and Education," *Harvard Teachers Record*, 4: 64-67, April, 1934.

measure the values of democracy in social as well as individual terms. Instead of abandoning individualism, one may come to the realization of the necessity for organizing collectively to achieve it. Individualism will thus be harnessed to the ideal of social service. Children's subjective preferences may be subordinated to, or coalesced with, social necessity in the educational program.

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However inspiring the justification of the democratic theory of education may seem, there are many who deny its fundamental principles. The fight has been waged on many fronts, from the biological impossibility of democracy to its economic unsoundness. None are more outspoken in their criticism, probably, than those who incline to the political philosophy of rule by the few, especially the fascists and some communists. What to its advocates seems democracy's surest virtue, the pre-eminent worth of the individual, to the fascist and communist seems its gravest vice. The dangers of individualism are that it is materialistic and atomistic. For the school to find authority for its program in the wants and aptitudes of children but leads to the quest of self-interest. In a limited economy, where the means are insufficient for all to achieve the full stature of their personalities, individuals engage in competitive struggle for what economic and educational advantages there are. With no greater loyalty than self, individuals exploit the development of those less able to help themselves. Even democratic rule by majority is assailed as the attempt of a group to gain control of the government, for the time being, to pursue its own cultural interests. Furthermore, because the government is subject to the whims of passing majorities, it is attacked for being unsure of its own educational ends, for offering no steady object of allegiance.¹

¹ Even the asserted community of interest between democracy and Christianity has been questioned.² Objection is taken that "consent of the governed" is ultimate in a democracy. This implies that authority is immanent in man. This in turn makes man the center of reference in one's philosophy of education. But from a Catholic point of view this can hardly be the norm.

¹ LEIGHTON, J. A., *The Field of Philosophy*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1930, pp. 399-400.

² RABY, J. M., *A Critical Study of the New Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1932, pp. 55-63.

The right of man to command man cannot come from man, but must come from outside humanity. It is not society that is sovereign, but God. So the destiny of the child is not to be bound up with democracy; rather is he destined for God. Finally, this Christian philosophy of education emphatically is not democracy-centered. On the contrary it is "Theocentric, Christocentric, Ecclesiocentric."¹

But suppose, now, that one accepts the claims of rule by the many, and suppose that one agrees that the educational meaning of rule by the many is universal education, the phrase democracy in education is still in need of further refinement. Making each individual count is one thing. Transmuting this conception into terms of the quality and quantity of educational offering is another. One popularly held conception of the democratic tradition in education has its point of origin in another part of the American Declaration of Independence. Many assume the phrase "all men are born free and equal" to be literally true. Certainly no man's ballot when cast at the polls counts for more than his neighbor's. Starting with such a premise, they say that education should be measured out in equal kinds and amounts to all children. Thus they either deny or totally disregard the diverse capacities of children. Not infrequently an even more extreme position is taken, namely, that children are born with equal psychological endowment. Perhaps Locke was somewhat to blame for this. If each child's mind at birth could be equated to a blank, it was easy to conclude with almost arithmetical logic that minds equal to the same thing must be equal to each other. But again, if this extreme assumption be made, the educational corollary demands that the education of each be the equivalent of every other, at least so far as educational opportunity is offered at public expense. And even if one's purse enables him to gain superior educational advantages privately, this philosophy leads to the comforting theory that inequalities of education are due to accident rather than birth.

Of this view of democracy in education there has been growing criticism. It is no longer said to fit the facts. It cleaves to the interpretation of equality given by tradition instead of to that offered by science. Educational psychology has too clearly proved the definite existence of marked individual differences.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Some have ten talents, others five, some only one. Individuals are not only born different as to capacities and attitudes, but unequal with respect to the same capacities and attitudes. One is now no more justified in assuming that children have equal mental gifts than that they are all the same height and weight at birth. Consequently, it must be clearly recognized that democratic equality cannot mean a static identity of education for all.¹ Furthermore, since the demand for freedom in educational procedures is but a mandate to the schools to give reign to individual differences, it follows that democracy in education must choose between freedom and equality; school practice can hardly incorporate both these cherished opposites at the same time. Nor will any amount of education eliminate these differences. Education cannot endow a school generation; it can only develop it. Indeed, the more education there is provided, the more pronounced the innate differences of children will become.

If this criticism be true, obviously a naïve equalitarian theory of educational democracy is too simple to fit the facts. Easily *surrendering this outmoded position, some dig in on what seems* a more secure line for securing the kernel of value which lies in the equalitarian view. They take a more sophisticated view of the Declaration of Independence. To them its chief appeal is that it insists that the system of political power must be built on the likenesses of men, rather than on their differences. It does not deny their heterogeneity, but it does raise to first prominence their homogeneity.

Stated in terms of educational policy, the ideal aimed at is the formation of a community of equals where no man's job will be more respectable than another's, where in addition to training for his specific responsibility in the common life each enjoys all the luxuries of knowledge. It would be a mistake to conceive of this policy as merely giving to the underprivileged what is now enjoyed by the prosperous and well-educated. The true purpose is far more radical. It is not simply the sharing of a tradition that already exists, but the development of a competence in the art of living in common which does not yet exist. Of course, legislation will be required to define the minimum educational offering, and then this minimum must later be

¹ LASKI, H., *A Grammar of Politics*, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925, p. 114.

constantly and gradually elevated. This may often result in the standardization of education, in an emphasis on quantitative, rather than qualitative standards. Yet, if democracy levels education down, it must not be overlooked that it also levels it up. The results of intelligence tests to the contrary notwithstanding, democracy is obligated to erect on the various interests and abilities of its members a superstructure of common attitudes and knowledge. All of which is but to repeat that democracy prefers an education which recognizes, but tries to avoid increasing, the disparity between the extremes of its members' abilities.

There are many inclined to the democratic philosophy of education who are not satisfied with either one of these brands of equalitarianism. Among these are a number who insist on formulating an equalitarian doctrine which recognizes the heterogeneity of capacity and aptitude in the many. How equality and diversity can be reconciled in a single theory may seem a well-nigh impossible task to some. Nevertheless, the proposal is this. One must start by accepting individual differences as an empirical fact. Add to this premise the fact that the worth of persons is the basic assumption of democracy, and it seems to follow as a sound conclusion that democratic education must develop each person's worth in terms of his distinctive capacities. Since society can only be improved through the innovations made possible by the individuality of its members, it becomes morally imperative that democracy draw out this individuality in its schools and demand that it make a contribution to the common weal. In fact, one might even go farther and assert that it is positively unethical, undemocratic, to prevent a child who is strong in mind or body from accomplishing what nature has endowed him with power to do. So, it is just as much a crime against both the individual and society to keep an extraordinarily capable child down to the level of mediocrity as it is to prevent a weak child from developing his powers to their fullest extent in competition or cooperation with his fellows.

With such a start in the direction of difference and hence inequality, one may well wonder how equalitarianism can be painted in without confusing the whole picture. This difficulty is solved by giving the adjective "equal" a new object to modify. Instead of identifying equality with the assumed equivalence of

native endowment or with the leveling of diverse abilities to common parity, this section of opinion would extend it to equating as nearly as possible the material opportunities for developing such unique personality as each child has. Nature does not always distribute talent in the next generation according to the achievements of parents or the alertness of a community to take advantage of it. Therefore, chance barriers such as social class or economic status of parents or community should be razed, so that each child can have a fair or equal start in developing the worth that is in him. To this end, it may not only be necessary for democracy to provide schools for all, but to see to it, as well, that each pupil has sufficient food, shelter, and clothing to take advantage of these opportunities.¹

It may be objected that in the end not even equality of material circumstances is achieved by this democratic theory of education. The more highly gifted will be able to profit by advanced types of education which cannot profitably be opened to those of lesser sort. More material resources will therefore have to be set aside for the use of the former than for the latter. Pressed from so many points, it looks as if the fine old rallying cry of equality would have to be given up. But there is, perhaps, one final alternative. Some would substitute "equity" for "equality" of opportunity. The two words stem from the same root, but equity seems to have the advantage in common usage of recognizing that unusual circumstances may require modification of the rule.²

The more one nibbles away from equalitarianism and the more importance one attaches to individual differences, the more one gradually approaches another conception of democracy in education, wherein the development of leaders becomes the crucial issue. A start is made here in the fact that the numbers in modern democracies are so enormous that the populace will only mill about, unless leaders arise to direct their energies. According to this view, education has a twofold purpose: on the

¹ For further discussion of this point see *infra*, pp. 183-184.

² Historically, courts of law were so preoccupied with the equality of litigants before its bar that injustices frequently occurred because the law was too inelastic to make allowances for odd cases which did not fit the rule of precedent. As a correction, courts of equity grew up where remedies were made flexible enough to obtain justice in the unusual case.

one hand, to select out and educate the capable for leadership; and on the other hand, to train the balance of the population for intelligent followership.

This conception of an education, appropriate for rule by the many, seems to run a perilously close parallel to that suitable for rule by the few. It is even paradoxically said that democracy must foster an aristocracy, a rule by the best. The chief thing which appears to save this slant of opinion from being identical with a straight aristocratic philosophy of education is that it contemplates the democratic recruitment of future leaders. Thus democracy's aristocracy will not be artificially chosen on the basis of socially inherited privileges, but will rather be selected according to the excellence of native endowment. Moreover, it is hoped that a further safeguard on the side of democracy will be found in the debt of gratitude which the natural elite will feel toward the masses from whose flesh and blood they sprang and by whom their superior education was made possible. The obvious advantage of such a democratic elite is the superior initiative and ingenuity which they bring to the school. Not only that, but they will be capable of an education which will raise them above the passing interests of the moment, a thing of which democracy in the mass seems so seldom capable.

The fact that democracy's promising talent is to receive the best education its schools can afford should not, however, argue the neglect of the education of the rest of the people. In fact, it has just been stated that, according to this last conception of democracy, education has a twofold purpose, the other half of which is the education of the masses for wise followership. This latter purpose is really an indispensable complement to the effectiveness of the policy of educating for leadership. The mere fact that leaders are provided is far from a guarantee that the rest of the people will follow. They must know enough to see that their advantage lies that way. On the other hand, leaders cannot expect the populace to follow their initiative blindly. The danger here would be that the leaders might soon lull themselves into the easy self-assurance of infallibility. After all, leaders and led are one society. In a democracy where there is rule by the many, the many must have the final word on what direction social activity shall take. The leaders must, therefore, convince them what is best to do. Their only hope for this lies

in well-educated followers, people who can discriminate between the charlatan and the genuine leader. It has even been said that the best educated people are the most led.

However loftily one conceives the equalization of educational privileges, it must be confessed that the theory has not passed without blame in practice.¹ Adoption of the principle of universal education has not always been coincident with the extension of universal suffrage. Surprisingly enough, the latter has sometimes lagged behind the former. The upper classes have been quicker to yield to pressure on the issue of education, because education merely denotes privilege, while suffrage denotes both privilege and power. They have further preserved their tactical superiority in social affairs by magnanimously providing the masses with an education calculated to inculcate submissiveness. But the advantage promises to be only temporary. Education, if not power, is at least potential power.² It equips the disinherited with the means of an ever more efficient protection of their own interests.

From another angle comes the criticism that when democracy's schools have liberated individuality they have succeeded in breeding a race of vigorous, self-confident men, but unhappily a race unworthy of the trust of wealth and power because found wanting in self-criticism and unselfish political action.³ Perhaps this partially explains why education beyond literacy has sometimes been resented by the masses as a badge of undemocratic inequality. Consequently, the assumption that effective political equality can be achieved through educating all alike must be rejected. It may have served well historically as a hypothetical point of departure, but in practice it has too readily become a dogma incapable of necessary revision from time to time.

So far, the democratic philosophy of education has been approached from the angle of a government resting on popular suffrage. But there are those who claim that the significance of democracy for education is something more than a form of government. It is, in addition, a way of life. People associate for

¹ NIEBUHR, R., *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932, pp. 120-121.

² LASKI, *op. cit.*, pp. 114, 147.

³ HOCKING, W. E., "The Future of Liberalism," *Journal of Philosophy*, 32: 234, April, 1935.

numberless other purposes besides politics. It is the mode of association that is important. If society be an affair of shared purposes, every precaution must be taken that such artificial barriers as class, race, nationality, and others do not intrude to impede individuals from freely sharing the rich variety of experience which each brings to the common enterprise. From this emerges another measure of democracy. The worth of a society is to be judged by the number and variety of interests consciously shared within the group and between that group and other groups. Democracy is thus but a name for the fact that human personality is cultivated only when children and adults actively participate in the direction of those common undertakings for which groups are formed.

The yardstick for estimating the democracy of an educational enterprise in the classroom, school, or school system is the degree to which the area of shared concerns is being widened between the teacher and his pupils, between one classroom and another, between the school and the family, the school and the church, and a host of other social agencies. There is an obvious advantage to a way of life which keeps open the channels of communication in this manner. Crises occurring anywhere in the social system can quickly become the concern of all. If all have been educated to self-reliance and inventiveness, a formidable energy can be mobilized to solve the common problem. If the avenues of public conference become clogged with linguistic differences or sectional prejudices, there is every danger that people will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are caught and whose meanings they are unable to learn. The best guarantee of democratic efficiency is the liberation and employment of every individual's unique capacity for initiative, perseverance, and planning.

Some objection, however, is taken to finding a criterion of democracy in the extent to which a society has shared purposes. The criterion, it is complained, is merely quantitative.¹ A comparison of democratic education with fascistic or communistic education might well prove inconclusive on the basis of the number of shared purposes, for these societies share widely, too. The critical feature about sharing, therefore, is not the amount of

¹ BODE, B., *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, New York, Newson & Company, 1938, pp. 104-113.

culture shared but the tendency continually to widen the area of shared concerns. The good society, then, is the one that is growing in sharing. Just as the measure of growth is more growth,¹ so the measure of democracy is more democracy, more sharing. The only cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy. But to such a measure of democracy the same exception seems in order as was entered to growth. The indefinite expansion of sharing lacks finality and decisiveness. Such a criterion may satisfy the instrumentalist, but the absolutist would insist that democracy will lack in effectiveness unless at some point it can be based on a judgment that is absolute, unconditional.

It is already obvious that democracy, as a way of life, is more than a mode of associated living; it is, also, a method of thought. It stands for voluntary choice. Because variety of opinion is directly encouraged and freely exchanged in a democratic group, there must be some effective logic for selecting the particular varieties of opinion which promise most in achieving the group's purposes. Just as biological varieties are put to the test of survival, so many insist that social varieties of thought must be put to the experimental test, too. Thus they seek to identify experimentalism with democracy as the method peculiarly appropriate to democracy.² Both democracy and experimentalism lay great store by the particular and the individual. If democracy and experimentalism are not akin, why is it that in a democracy questions of right and wrong depend on the consequences action has for associated living? In the pragmatic theory of knowledge, each experience is made freely available to give added meaning to other experiences, just as there is free interchange of opinion in democracy. Earlier democracies may have been dependent on external circumstances, such as unlimited economic opportunities on the American frontier in the nineteenth century, but democracy in the future will be conditioned by the constructive use to which it puts the experimental method, by the extent to which its schools are alive

¹ *Supra*, pp. 43, 96-99.

² CHILDS, J. L., *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1931, pp. 30, 93.

KILPATRICK, W. H. (ed.), *The Educational Frontier*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1933, pp. 65, 317. "

to the ethical obligation of encouraging the freedom of mind in discovery and proof.

It needs to be pointed out, too, that if democracy and experimentalism are to be associated together, the significance of this union may go far deeper than just the discovery of truth. In discovery one uncovers what is already there. This is important and necessary. The thoroughgoing experimentalist, however, may go farther and seek to invent or bring into being realities which have not existed before. He literally creates the truth.¹ For him, education may become genuinely creative. Democratic education must, therefore, be progressive, progressive in the sense of genuinely creative. For the pupil to appreciate and understand democracy, there must be something more than the docile acceptance of a point of view. He must achieve a quality of mind and heart which makes him actively and eagerly disposed to the continuous reorganization of his life values.

Such a radical interpretation of democracy in education but serves to reiterate that democracy is more than a social doctrine. It now can be seen to have metaphysical and epistemological bearings as well. No democratic theory of education, some surmise, is entitled to confidence unless it faces up to such actualities.² The metaphysical base which is hinted at is obviously the one which favors a dynamic interpretation of ultimate reality.³ Just as no other form of life does or can stand still, so neither can democracy as a form of life stand still, either. Typical learning in a democracy is adventurous, the sort which comes from meeting up with a contingent universe. This, in turn, means that the activity program is also closely bound up with democracy. But with such a dynamic base one must not be surprised to learn that democracy accepts no form of social organization as necessarily final, not even democracy itself. It is at war with all forms of absolutism.

Some exception has been taken to the pragmatic implications just imputed to democracy. The stubborn fact is that there are many loyal adherents of democracy who are not pragmatists. Realists and idealists abound in the ranks of democracy as well. One of the latter, quite the contrary of the pragmatists, thinks

¹ *Supra*, p. 57.

² LEIGHTON, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

³ *Supra*, pp. 38-39.

democracy about impossible apart from an absolute eternal standard.¹ And if democracy were necessarily pragmatic, there are those whose fundamental philosophy is so opposed to pragmatism that they would apparently abandon democracy rather than accept such a philosophy of education.² The exalted place awarded to scientific method causes the individual to have an unwarranted and exaggerated confidence in his own abilities. If this be the case, it contradicts the very social significance which it is claimed the association with democracy confers upon it.

• However one formulates his own conception of democracy in education, there yet remains one further question of method. How are the rising and adult generations to be won to the support of the democratic ideology? On the one hand, there are those who would make a systematic effort to control the school environment in such a fashion that loyalty to democratic institutions would be virtually a foregone conclusion. In this way the ideal would be reborn in each succeeding generation. Doubtless this view would be particularly acceptable to those who think that democracy must not only educate inspiring creative leaders, but also train the duller half to be wise followers. They would teach both the bright and the dull the same slogans of democracy, but, while both would be taught the same "what" of democracy, only the bright would be taught the "why" also. In doing this they feel supported by the results of the intelligence-testing movement, which encourages them to no very optimistic estimate as to the average citizen's native abilities. Those who, in spite of this evidence, believe that democracy can be saved by the independent thinking of the average citizen are, they think, trapped in contradiction. For themselves, they would insist on different educational procedures for the more and less capable children. Teach the former to think, of course, but be content in succeeding to teach the latter what to think. In teaching the "what" of democracy to the less-promising group, liberal use would be made of such teaching techniques as emphasize imitation and *memoriter*, especially drill. Although it is advocated that teaching methods be differentiated according to the ability

¹ Hocking, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1923, pp. 11-13.

² Raby, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-61.

of those taught, it would be fatal to infer that these groups are to be segregated from each other during the process. Without intermingling of the two groups the homogeneity and integration so necessary for a democracy could hardly be possible.

On the other hand, there are others who would go about winning support for democracy in almost the directly opposite manner. The last thing they would have the schools do is to prescribe or foreordain the meaning of democracy. If democracy stands for the cultivation of human variability and the free interchange of opinion, it would be a contradiction of terms for democracy to guarantee in advance that it be the accepted outcome of instruction. And as to the skepticism that the common man, the average child, has the ability to profit by such an education, they doubt that all the evidence is yet in. All that history proves to them is the fact that this average citizen, young or old, has never had a fair chance to show what he really could do if adequate educational opportunities were freely put at his disposal. One is too likely to overlook the fact that the cleavage between heredity and environment, on the issue as to which is the more potent educational force, has a political as well as a scientific axis.¹ Examination only too frequently will show that those with conservative political leanings emphasize the unmodifiable status of heredity, while the hope of the radical lies in an alterable environment where privileges can be redistributed. So the ignorant and uncooperative should really be a challenge to democratic methods. Each one, however humble, should be entitled to the fullest growth, through unhampered participation in the social enterprise, before being brought in line by the exercise of authority. And even then such authority should be exercised to get individual growth rather than mere obedience.

In all this discussion of democratic techniques it is strongly implied that the pace of social transition will be marked by gradualism. Because minorities have a right to be heard in a democracy, social progress must frequently halt to compromise and almost always comes about piecemeal. Fundamental social change must await the formation of a majority opinion. This in turn awaits a cooperative effort at formal and informal education. But learning, whether in the individual or in the

¹ RUSSELL, B., *Education and the Modern World*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1932, p. 43.

group, is a relatively slow process, even with modern methods of instruction or the battering of the latest engines of organized opinion. Because the democratic technique borrows so largely from education, a democratic philosophy of education is committed to gradualism by necessity rather than accident.

The soundness of this principle has come under some adverse fire. Because social reconstruction comes in installments, gradualism is objected to as atomistic. The vulnerable point assigned for complaint is the implication that qualitative social changes can be brought about through quantitative means. If this implication be true, it would be equivalent to saying, for instance, that over a period of time society could change step by step from capitalism to collectivism. Such a transformation would mean that, however far apart these two doctrines might be in the minds of their adherents, they would nevertheless only differ from each other in degree, rather than in kind. That is why a gradual transition from the one to the other would be possible. But now suppose that capitalism and collectivism are actually different in kind, that they represent radical differences of quality. The change from one to the other must now occur through a drastic reorganization of outlook. It is like jumping a broad stream; one must do it in a single effort and not in a series of mincing steps. Instead of a slowly rising learning curve, the curve of normal learning, there must be nothing short of abrupt conversion. Socially there must be a revolution. But of course, sudden changes brought about by force imperil, if not defeat, the whole spirit of the democratic process. The initial criticism of gradualism, therefore, may well be widened at this point to inquire whether there are limits beyond which the democratic technique, the democratic way of life, cannot be effective.

The-skeptics of democracy claim that there is such a limit. This they draw at democracy's assumption that the diverse and frequently conflicting interests within the social structure can be peaceably resolved through education.¹ An elaboration of this assumption presupposes that social strife is due to a confusion and misunderstanding which can be cleared away by studying the facts and appealing to the judgment of intelligence. But, as the skeptics point out, man does not always decide conflicts

¹ NIEBUHR, *op. cit.*, pp. xii-xiv.

rationally. His feelings and emotions often reach quicker and more striking decisions. Democracy overestimates the strength of reason as a harness for these primitive irrational forces. Not only that, but those who employ her subtleties frequently find it as easy to disagree as to agree on basic policy. If biologic drives are primary in determining social choices, the enlightenment of education can only dispel social strife where the opposing classes are agreed in advance that study will lead to a formula broad enough to restate the immediate clash of interests in terms mutually acceptable to all. So, the democratic technique, eminently effective in resolving differences of opinion as to the measures to be employed to gain commonly accepted ends, seems incapable of selecting or enforcing the frame of reference itself.

As an instance, one may take those extra-school educational agencies, the radio and the press. If democracy's confidence in the potency of reason is to be upheld, these channels of communication must be kept equally available to all classes for educating majority opinion. But suppose now that these channels of communication are largely under the direct or indirect control of an owning class which does not sense the need for employing them for easing social tensions. At once it becomes evident that facts which a moment ago might have been studied rationally now become the subject of passionate wrangling. Resentment slowly but surely grows against such oppression, till it accumulates a head of pressure that escapes its bounds in an explosion of violence. When this occurs, democratic processes are at an end. Really, they never stood a chance. One party did not accept democracy's premises. It *felt* rather than thought no common ground could or need be found to compromise differences of opinion.

This is a very grave indictment indeed. But the supporters of democracy are not without a reply. They refuse to accept the assumption—and it is no more than that—that some conflicting interests are so flatly contradictory of each other that they cannot be rationally reconciled or reconstructed in the light of a larger, more inclusive set of values. Social reform of a radical rather than of an *ad hoc* character can be undertaken gradually. Social philosophies can be the subject of study and learning just as well as the measures of achieving them. There is not one kind of learning for aims and another for means, one for quantita-

tive and another for qualitative differences, one for reason and another for emotion. All these dualisms are bound together in the continuity of a single process. Of course, the conciliation of social cleavages is admittedly exceedingly difficult and will take a considerable time to learn. But learning rarely occurs suddenly. All one may learn, even under the pressure of a revolution, is to hate the abruptly accelerated changes.

Consider for a moment this alternative. If the lamp of reason is not lit, or if its light is blown out, it but remains to struggle to a decision in darkness.¹ And at what a cost! When rational processes are put aside, it is only too likely that clubs and machine guns will become the social arbiters. If stupid and obstinate minorities persist in obstructing the free flow of information through such channels of communication as the radio, press, and the schools, the majority will simply have to overrule them. It is through rule by the majority that democracy transcends the boundaries imposed by the assumptions of its critics. In other words, democracy does have means of enforcing its own processes.² Nor is this veiled force of the majority an admission of weakness in the democratic viewpoint. Longer than any other frame of reference will it patiently labor to win voluntary support for its policies. Confidence that such a policy will succeed in the long run is a consummate adventure in faith.

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¹ MERRIAM, C. E., in *The Obligations of Universities to the Social Order*, New York, New York University Press, 1932, pp. 252-253.

² HANS, N., *The Principles of Educational Policy*, London, P. S. King & Son, 1933, p. 44.

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CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER

It has already been stated that for a philosophy of education to have a significant content for the individual or society, it must be framed by the particular circumstances of time and place. One of the chief dimensions of such a frame of reference is the economic. Of the uncriticized assumptions which frequently underlie educational practice—even underlie conscious philosophies of education sometimes—perhaps the economic are the ones of which lay and professional people are least aware. Yet, in spite of this relative neglect or customary oversight, the economic factor is one of the most powerful ones conditioning the theory and practice of education.

The issues found in some conflicting educational practices may help to define the major points at which the economic order conditions the philosophy of education. In taking the measure of the political dimension of an educational philosophy, one description given to the democratic theory of education was that it stressed equality of educational opportunity. It was thought that equal political opportunities should be matched with equal educational ones. This ideal, however, is seldom realized in practice, because the parallel economic status of parents is so glaringly unequal that many cannot afford the kind and amount of education for their children which even approximates the ideal. Especially beyond the compulsory age limits is educational opportunity very irregular indeed. This disparity, even conflict, between political aims and economic means is peculiarly significant for the arena of educational philosophy.

Not only do differences in educational practice arise out of the uneven distribution of wealth, but they also are the outcome of different modes of economic production. It is surprising how different democracy in education can be when scaled to an agrarian society and when designed for an industrial one. A nation of small scattered landholders will have an independence and

resourcefulness which is bound to be reflected in their schools. But a nation with its population predominantly congested in cities and employed in factories has a mutual interdependence which eventually is certain to find a different educational expression. Furthermore, an agrarian society with free land to throw down the gauntlet to initiative, perseverance, and resourcefulness may well develop a rugged individualism in its pupils. But in a highly compact industrial society there is no chance to start from scratch. Organization and cooperation, rather than individualism, become school objectives. Finally, to mix these ideologies in the same educational prescription, as for instance to infuse education with the optimism of free economic opportunity after the frontier which gave it birth has disappeared, will surely brew educational confusion and social injustice.

Whether one works behind a plow, beside a machine, or at a desk, it is necessary to notice differences in educational practice which arise out of the way in which work is motivated. Ask the parents of children of almost any generation in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries the purpose of going to school, and it is better than an even chance that they will answer "to get ahead." Home work and the work of making a living are stoked by the same urge, personal profit. Just as one competes in business for profits, so too in many schools there is competition for the highest marks. But older and newer schools differ widely on the employment of competition as the motivation for improving the range and quality of learning. The prominent place awarded to examinations and marks in the former type of school finds its counterpart in a highly competitive capitalistic economic system. The schools which insist that no one shall fail, that a curriculum must be found in which the humblest can succeed, are only truly realistic in an economic system based on collectivistic effort.

Enough now of instances where conflicts in educational practice grow out of divergent economic outlook. What are the main issues with which the philosophy of education has to deal? They may be subsumed under three heads of economy: (1) production, (2) distribution, and (3) motivation. At each of these points the institutions of education and making a living come into close touch. When conflicts result, it is the duty of educational philosophy to attempt to restate them within the embrace of a

principle broad enough to secure the largest possible number of interests.

1. At the very outset, it is interesting to note the direct relation which exists and always has existed between education and the production of wealth. It is nowhere better illustrated than in the etymological derivation of the word "school." The Old English spelling was "schole," which was borrowed with the change of but one letter from the Latin "schola." The Romans in turn were indebted to the Greek σχολή. The primary meaning of this Greek word is "leisure"; only secondarily has it been associated with formal education. It came to this derived meaning because leisure time was an indispensable prerequisite to schooling. In those days most people operated on a bare subsistence economy; that is, they consumed practically everything which they produced. Not only that, but with unremitting toil they barely produced enough to insure a wavering balance between income and outgo. Fortunately, not everyone was so precariously situated. There were a few who had the advantage of a surplus of production over consumption. From time to time these could relax their bent position over the economic grindstone without endangering the equilibrium of subsistence because they had this reserve to fall back upon. In other words, they could afford to interrupt their work with moments of leisure. It is to the undying credit of the Greeks that instead of idling away their hard-purchased leisure time, they spent it in self-improvement, in education. So customary did this practice become that in the course of time the very word for leisure came to be adopted as the word for school.

Perhaps tracing the ancestry of the word school incidentally reveals the reason why school has so often been thought of as academic, as an institution set apart from the workaday concerns of men. But, even in culture patterns where it is claimed that the school should be closely identified with the dominant modes of economic production, there is still need for recognizing a prolonged period of social infancy during which the child will have economic leisure. The immediate consequences of earning a living can be learned on the job. To learn the more remote ones, however, one must have more time and freedom than steady employment yields. So it has come to be accepted in a complex civilization that education requires a period when the child will

live off the labor of others and be released from the responsibilities of self-support.

The dependence of the school upon the standard of living must now be reversed to see how the standard of living is reciprocally conditioned by the school. Suppose one starts with the rather simple formula that the standard of living is the quotient of the total amount of wealth of various kinds divided by the number of people who are to be supported by that wealth. Since education is a beneficiary of an improved standard of living, it is chiefly of interest here how education operates to raise it. Most obviously the school does this by either increasing the total stock of wealth or by decreasing the birth rate. Of course, under the former head, it could hardly increase the amount of land or raw materials. But it can go a long way in developing the technical skills which will make these more productive and valuable. It is also admirably suited to promoting such personal qualities as thrift, industry, and efficiency. Yet this assistance will be at least partially nullified unless education at the same time is utilized to encourage wise and discriminating consumption. In spite of these favorable circumstances, it is finally to be noted that the standard of living may still fall, and the quality of schooling with it, if the growth of population outdistances the discovery and development of natural resources. To thwart this, much might be done by the school in disseminating information about birth control, if public opinion were of one mind in this matter. Prevented from influencing the birth rate directly, nevertheless the school in all probability is affecting it indirectly. It not only widens the range of economic wants of future adults, but it also rearranges their order of urgency. In this reconstructed hierarchy large families seem to fall farther and farther down the list.

Here, then, is a happy formula—the higher the standard of living, the greater the improvement in educational offerings, and the better the education, the even higher standard of living. It seems like a panacea. But looks are often deceiving. Perhaps periods of economic prosperity and educational advance have frequently, even generally, been coincident. But none of them has lasted indefinitely. Why is this? There are at least three answers. First, there seems to be a human limit at which “wealth accumulates and men decay.” It is suggested that this

is because, when education is highly developed, it fosters mental activity far above what is required for bare subsistence.¹ This requires great effort, an effort which humans, being what they are, are put under great stress to sustain. Consequently, when they lapse and employ their excess wealth in physical ease instead of in increased educational endeavor, it is regrettable but not altogether surprising.

In the second place, it seems that the production of wealth is not limitless. For one thing, it appears to check itself. Especially in industrial societies does it seem subject to the infirmity of economic cycles. Surplus is reinvested in further machinery for production, but shortly the market's capacity to consume is exhausted, leading to a period of readjustment. Production is slowed down till consumption can catch up again. Producers are thrown out of work and the standard of living falls. Public and private financial retrenchment follows in the wake, with a resultant falling standard of living.

To get out of this cycle a new social ethic has been recommended to educators.² Since science and machines seem to guarantee society against the age-long fear of insufficient production—and that with fewer workers—new categories seem demanded. The previous emphasis on production must now be subordinated to one on consumption; expenditure must displace saving in importance. The vocational aim in education to produce workers must be tempered to the new economic age. Since there will be fewer workers, and they will work fewer hours, much more school time must be devoted toward turning out consumers in the arts of leisure. Free pursuit of the good, the beautiful, and the true will be encouraged as never before. For these purposes children must be kept out of early employment and in school longer.

This position has had to meet sharp criticism.³ The contention is that the price of more education is the production of more

¹ LOWELL, A. L., *At War with Academic Traditions in America*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1934, p. 51.

² HARTSHORNE, H., "Character Education and School Administration," *Educational Progress and School Administration* (Hill, C. M., ed.), New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936, pp. 326-327.

³ LIPPMANN, W., "Today and Tomorrow," *New York Herald Tribune*, April 16, 1936.

wealth. ✓ To maintain a larger group of young people in leisure, there must be either more work for somebody or a lower standard of living for all. One cannot get something for nothing. In defense of the proposal it is suggested that industrial surpluses have been unwisely invested. Instead of directly expanding production, it is recommended that business expand indirectly by reinvesting some of its surplus immediately in raising the level of salaries and wages. One of the consequences of such a redistribution would be the demand of the family for more and better schooling. This, in turn, would extend the horizon of wants and in the end lead to an expansion of consumer demand which would have to be met with increased production. ✓

A third limit is even more serious. It is to be found in the relatively fixed amount of natural resources. By the careful application of science, raw materials may be forced to make a more efficient yield, but the possibility of their increase in amount seems out of the question. People differ on how to interpret these facts for education. Traditionally, the American system of education has expanded as if there were no bottom to the nation's purse. Three centuries of an open frontier have left an almost indelibly optimistic mark upon the mind of the American educator. Even the disappearance of free land has not discouraged him. He has confidence that the school will so develop the arts and sciences that, through the inventive genius fostered by them, they will more than compensate for the end of the western frontier. But there is also a more sober educational estimate of the economic facts.¹ Here, there is foreboding that not only are geographic frontiers gone, but probably industrial ones as well. New inventions may still be expected, but not of a radical character. Rather will they be in the nature of enabling man to do better what he is already doing. Consequently, education like industry will have to beware of overproduction. In a settled, crowded society, both economic and educational opportunities will be more restricted.

From the foregoing, a hint has been thrown out that education is not only affected by the degree of economic prosperity, but

¹ DE HAAS, J. A., "Economic Nationalism and Education," *Harvard Teachers Record*, 4: 69, April, 1934.

FINNEY, R., *Sociological Philosophy of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928, p. 380.

also by the type of basic economy through which that surplus has been achieved. On the whole, industrial society has been more wealthy than the agrarian. Consequently, the former, through its greatly elevated standard of living, has made more education possible for more people than ever before. Much of industry's advantage has been due to its stimulation of science. Until agriculture took up science on the rebound from industry, it was much more governed by custom and rule-of-thumb procedures. So, too, were the contemporary crafts. With dependence on such methods, fundamental social change was very slow and relatively infrequent. The rate at which invention was spurred by industry, however, changed all this. Invention, with its handmaid science, tremendously accelerated change in all directions. This transformation impinged especially on education. Old and new came into conflict. Progressive philosophies of education collided with more conservative ones. The leisure which in agrarian and commercial societies had been devoted to schooling in a strictly liberal and mainly literary tradition was now challenged by an incipient scientific and vocational one. Dialectical methods were countered with experimental ones. This ferment was even reflected in the fact that urban areas, with their highly concentrated industrial wealth, offered educational opportunities markedly superior to those in rural ones. The threat to the cultural unity of the state is clear.

On one thing, however, agriculture and industry concurred in the United States. Both were notoriously competitive and individualistic. In winning and subduing the West both were highly exploitative. Both aided and abetted the individual success motive in education. As long as there was free land no one took occasion to question the system critically. Its infirmities were obscured by the sort of natural equality of opportunity it presented. It was even justified as in the genuine interests of children.¹ The end of the frontier process, however, has led to a re-examination of their position.² Rugged individualism in a highly industrialized economy seems to provide individualism

¹ CURTI, M., "The Social Ideas of American Educators," *Progressive Education*, 11: 29, January-February, 1934.

² CLARK, H. F., "Economic Forces and Education," *Teachers College Record*, 32: 326-327, January, 1931.

for the few, but only ruggedness for the many. In the face of these circumstances, what direction education shall take is becoming increasingly ambiguous. Some would abandon the agrarian individualism of the frontier and try to develop education around a new individualism which the corporateness of industry is to subserve. Others, however, seem to prefer to pattern their philosophy of education after individualism of the older type.

One of the most critical areas where this difference of opinion is breeding lies in the educational significance of work. On the farm, or in the crafts before the industrial revolution, almost all forms of work were closely articulated with family life. Consequently, it was an easy and natural thing for children to observe and even participate in economic production. Personal knowledge and ingenuity could be developed, because tools were under the general command of the worker. And not least was the fact that the enterprise was usually of such a size that the setting of one's labor in the total undertaking of production, distribution, and consumption could easily be held in mind as the worker toiled. In large-scale industry, these educational concomitants of work have been largely lost. Workers have often become mere appendages of machines which other people own. The more is the pity, since the intellectual possibilities of industry so far exceed those of hand crafts and agriculture. The science on which machineofacture is based and the complexly ramified social bearings of industrial pursuits present a rare educational opportunity.

There are many who favor throwing the burden of realizing this opportunity upon the schools. But if the schools are to bear the burden, the added question arises of the relation of the school to industry. Should the existing industrial conditions be reproduced in the school as preparation for jobs? Or should industry be utilized to make the schoolroom more meaningful? The likely consequences of both philosophies seem clear. If the school be made an adjunct of industry, guidance will turn into job placement. Training will be pointed to specific trades. Routine duties will be emphasized by drill exercises. Docility will be a school virtue. At the secondary level, different school plants with separate supervisory staffs will be approved for trade and general education.

On the other hand, if industry is to subserve the school and the development of personality, the opposite practices may be expected. General high schools will house all curricula under a single roof. There will be no separate schools for those destined to vocational and professional pursuits. Training will be broad rather than narrow. Through history, politics and economics, future workers will be made alert to the fact that present economic struggles are but the latest phase of the age-long battle for human liberties. Manual and motor skills will naturally be developed, but not of the automatic type. Personal initiative will be encouraged rather than abject docility.

Finally, there is a third view of the relation of school and industry which partakes of the nature of both those just described but is not adequately covered by either of them. It is that of communism. There, socially significant work is not a mere device upon which the school can call. Nor is the school a narrow utilitarian adjunct of industry. Rather is the social significance of the school to be found in the fact that the pupil feels himself a worker in a laboring society. The cultural problems of production, distribution, and consumption become the central ideological axis of the school. About this axis are concentrated and integrated the scientific, artistic, and social aspects of labor.

2. It is one thing to note the differences in educational philosophy which grow out of the production of wealth. The more serious clash of philosophies, however, runs on from this point. The surplus wealth necessary for leisure and schooling is very unevenly distributed throughout the mass of the population. While no strict lines can be drawn to divide the populace, it is common to recognize three different strata the wealthy, the poor, and the middle classes. The differences in the standards of living at these levels eventuate in corresponding divergencies of cultural outlook. Not infrequently these differences run at cross-purposes in the demands they make on education.

How the various class interests set up mutually incompatible tensions in the educational program can be illustrated at several points. Doubtless, it may be taken for granted as ethically appropriate that every child should achieve the optimum development of his individuality. Perhaps this ideal could be reasonably reached if there were an unlimited economic surplus that could be spent on education. The contrary being actually the case,

there has been more or less of a mad scramble for each to get as much of the goods of education as he could. In a capitalist society, the economically powerful have generally been most successful in encompassing self-realization for their children. In a proletarian society, the converse has obtained. In both cases, the oppressed class has had to content itself with a half or an even less portion. In neither instance has the dominant class been noted for the tenderness with which it has regarded other class interests, especially where any concession might impair or threaten its own aspirations.

The chief educational goods, control and possession of which is the object of class strife, are the length of time one's children shall stay in school and the kind of curriculum they shall study there. It has been argued that the distribution of intelligence among children generally coincides with the social privilege of their parents. This justification for intrenching the dominant economic class of the moment is stoutly rebutted in other quarters. While children usually inherit the social privileges or handicaps of their parents, it is claimed that children are too young and innocent to have done anything to deserve such social baggage. For just this reason society provides schooling which is free to all. Yet, much as this works for equality of opportunity, it really goes only half far enough. The children of the economically favored can make a prolonged stay in school, while all too frequently the children of the underprivileged must be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment in order to go to work.

Indeed, a child will be fortunate if his prospects for staying in school, rather than his native endowment, are not made the main basis for selecting his educational program. Those who can expect a long social and economic infancy usually elect a liberal or cultural education which has traditionally fitted for the governing and directive offices of life. The rest, since they must leave early, are often shunted off into trade education and a position of social subordination. Hard as these circumstances seem to be, they do not lack at least a qualified defense in underlying theory.¹ The doctrine that schools should cater to a

¹ CHANCELLOR, W. E., *Motives, Ideals, and Values in Education*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1907, pp. 11-13.

MACKENZIE, J. S., *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1921, pp. 105-107.

The class is justified because of the scholarship which it makes possible, the protection it affords ethics and morals, and the way in which it cultivates grace and beauty. This does not imply that those who labor continuously learn nothing at all. But it does mean that what they have learned is only immediately useful. The special distinction and usefulness of the leisure class is that it can study that which is more remotely significant. A great civilization does not live from hand to mouth, from moment to moment, but often centuries beyond its economic working period.

Obviously, in such a defense of a leisured class, leisure is not to be confused with idleness. Leisure is to be put to use, notably as the Greeks did, by devotion to education. But the recurrent danger of such a theory is that in pursuing the more remotely significant bearings of daily occupations, a leisure class may lose all contact with their immediate meanings. It may become so aloof that it is not aware of pressure for fundamental changes in basic conditions. And so, undisturbed, it continues to pursue meanings which, though they once had their origin in a socially significant situation, no longer do. From this point on, the culture of this class runs the grave risk of being merely ornamental. Such conspicuous social waste has even been cited as a highly reputable way for the leisure class to manifest its special privilege. Subjects maintained in the curriculum to preserve this tradition derive their prestige either from their asserted disciplinary value or from the class that studies them and not from the uses to which they are put.

Even at its best, the culture of a leisured class involves a possibly vulnerable dualism. Its antithesis is the culture of the working class. Whether the latter be slave or free, peasant or factory-hand, its training has almost from time immemorial been held at a discount in comparison with that of the upper class. Although the necessity of work is universally recognized, nevertheless it is generally thought of as a disagreeable experience. "Toil" and "drudgery" are dictionary meanings for work. Even religion has lent its sanction to some of the disesteem in which work is regarded. However much the education of a leisure class may have been the admiration and envy of agrarian and commercial societies, its position of preferment is energetically challenged by the proletarian culture of industrial

society. Of course, this has been carried farthest under communism. But even in democracy the culture of the common man has risen to a new prominence. Outstanding in his culture is the fact that he has to work for a living. The moral sentiment of democracy has come to demand that men and women assume responsibility for making a social return for their support. As a result there has developed an increased esteem for labor. No work is thought shameful except that which is slipshod.

Yet, in spite of the fact that the slowly growing political and economic emancipation of the masses has destroyed the notion that leisure and erudition is the monopoly of a small class, a strong tendency still persists to discount the vital connection between materials and processes. Curricula built upon the workaday culture of the common man incline to be narrowly confined to the routine and practical. Perhaps this is inescapable, seeing that the results which industrial workers achieve are done for a wage and are the results of working for their employers' ends and not their own. If this degradation of the worker's culture is accepted as the unavoidable consequence of mechanical invention, then educational salvation must be found in shorter hours of work and a compensating leisure life. But there is another way out of the sense of futility and cynicism engendered by modern industrial life. One might demand that industry make an accommodation which would regain for work its educational and cultural significance.¹ If work is an important part of education, then industry should be planned so that children can find happy self-expression in it, even at the expense of slowing it down and rendering it less technically efficient. That monotonous work can be wholly eliminated is perhaps too much to expect. But even the simplest operations can be made more meaningful in the degree that they are related to the complexity of the whole process. If the proletariat comes to assume a wider and more penetrating concern in the ends which control economic and political society, there is bound to be room for an education which takes in the more remote bearings of their work. When that occurs, perhaps liberal and vocational education will no longer be divorced, but united in efficient harmony.

¹ HARTSHORNE, H., *Character in Human Relations*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932, p. 288.

No separate attention has been paid so far to the cultural objectives which the middle class is struggling to realize. On the whole, this group feels itself superior to the poorer classes. It further prides itself on its liberality and humaneness.¹ But though it is usually genuinely distressed at the sight of misery and suffering, it is disinclined to make any great sacrifice of its own material comforts to ameliorate the acerbities of the economic order. In severe crises it is most likely to be found on the side of the "haves," rather than the "have nots." Generally the number of children in its families is low, its standard of living correspondingly high. Far from being a class maintained in leisure, nevertheless this group has a standard of living high enough to appreciate the advantage of superior educational opportunities for its children. But of chief significance here is the fact that the middle class has been unable to make its demands in this direction effective without help. The wealthy have been able to gain their educational ends through private schools. Since the purse of the middle class has been unequal to such a strain, this class has turned for aid to the state. Thus it was largely at the behest of middle-class idealists that universal education at public expense became a fact in the nineteenth century.

Maybe just because the public school was largely exploited in middle-class interest, it has not enjoyed the full confidence of the proletarian group. When the public school has been put forward as the way for the redemption of the injustices of the social order, there seems to be a suspicion that the taint of class prejudice may still lurk in the proposal. Perhaps one would prefer to think of the administration behind the public school as being impartial and without the bias of economic class, but the contrary seems more nearly to represent the truth of the matter. Not only is it alleged that the state is generally controlled by the dominant economic interest of the moment, but careful study has revealed that boards of education, instead of being drawn from all three economic strata, have their membership heavily weighted in favor of the middle and upper classes. It has been argued, by way of rationalizing the *status quo*, that such a personnel for the board of education would, because of

¹ COUNTS, G. S. *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* New York, John Day Company, Inc., 1932, pp. 7-9.

its own superior educational opportunities, be able to rise above class and formulate educational policies in terms of the common weal. Whether there are any board members who could be so disinterested is certainly a moot point.

The question is now in order as to the class point of view from which the teacher should make up his educational philosophy. On the whole, the tendency of teachers has been to identify themselves with the two upper classes. This affiliation is probably very natural, since the teaching personnel is most usually recruited from the middle class. Equally influential is the fact that they prefer to think of themselves as one of the learned professions. Such aspirations almost surely throw in the lot of teachers with the two upper classes, for the learned professions are notoriously identified with them.

Persistent influences have been at work, however, to convince teachers that their true interests really lie with the laboring proletariat. Teaching, it is argued, fails of status among the professions because teachers have no control over their remuneration, hours, and conditions of work, as do other professions. Furthermore, it is contended, because they do not own their own tools and equipment, they are wage earners pure and simple and should be organized as a skilled trade.¹ Instead of organizing academically, they have been urged to organize along economic lines. Only so, it is said, can they maneuver themselves into a position where they will be effective in future social reconstruction, especially if that reconstruction takes a radical turn. Teachers have so long been wont to think of themselves as professional people that a labor orientation on their part would doubtless require quite an intellectual and emotional adjustment. In support of making the change it is further argued that, just as it is a false dualism in epistemology to separate knowing and doing, so it is also a false dualism to organize teachers as intellectual workers apart from those who work with their hands.²

That class division and dualism in epistemology have anything in common seems to some philosophers a far cry. But, in addition, against the change it has been contended that since the

¹ RAUP, R. B., *Education and Organized Interests in America*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936, pp. 222-223.

² DEWEY, J., "United We Stand," *The Social Frontier*, 1: 11-12, April, 1935.

schools, at least the public ones of a democracy, belong to all of the people, the teachers should not play favorites with any economic class. They may unconsciously or uncritically betray a bourgeois orientation, but when they consciously take thought as to their class sympathy they should strive beyond the ordinary to escape any and all class preference. How else can the school maintain its public character?) As for thinking themselves an intellectual proletariat oppressed by supervisors and administrators who, to continue the analogy, constitute a sort of pedagogical capitalistic class, teachers could do nothing which would more quickly disrupt the close cooperation necessary between these two groups for successful learning experiences by children. Certainly such an interruption of free communication between the two groups would be educationally disastrous.

In order to develop one final point, suppose it be granted that a class orientation is inescapable for an educational philosophy. The question then arises whether such an orientation further involves class war as a method of solving the problems which arise out of the conflict of class interests. A number of thinkers have openly said that it does. They favor an education which capitalizes on social discontent for revolutionary purposes. They would even sharpen the lines of the class struggle by the formation, inside school and out, of militant organizations of teachers, pupils, and parents. While they would put an initial trust in the modifiability of human nature through logical persuasion, they would have little confidence that old habits of class interest would be readily reached by such means. Consequently, the solution of the struggle will not always proceed along pleasant lines. Power will have to be met with power. Coercion, unfortunately, will be necessary at times.¹ It will be postponed as long as possible, but when it comes, responsibility for it will fall, not on the teachers and working class, but on the shoulders of those who could not gracefully surrender their privileges in the face of popular decision. If the use of force in disobedience of law seems inconsistent with the office of being a teacher, it can only be said that successful insurrection against the capitalist class is altogether moral from the proletarian frame of reference.

¹ NIEBUHR, R., *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952, p. 15.

Great disappointment has been expressed at this conclusion, for it means that ultimately education has no important role to play in social transition. It merely conserves whatever social order happens to obtain. In Plato's Republic, education also was to conserve justice when by some happy accident a philosopher-king came to rule. But both the philosophies of waiting for chance occurrence to produce the ideal society and of forcing it with violence, break down, it is said, because they fail to effect social reconstruction through the more gradual processes of education. So it should be clear that no revolution can have enduring success unaccompanied by wholehearted transformation of mental and moral habits as well as the outward transfer of power from the old to the new order. Otherwise, the new order is sadly compromised at the very outset. It must use an instrument which, in bolstering the old order but yesterday, has already prepared the way for counterrevolution tomorrow. If the rebuilding of society is to be spared the setbacks of periodic quakes which shake it to the foundation, it must employ education before and during change and not just *ex post facto*.

Other students, whose philosophies of education just as clearly recognize the claims of the proletariat in the collision of class interests, fail to see why these terms of the social problem also constitute the method of its solution. They do not think that an ongoing clash of classes must necessarily be solved by open advocacy of class war. For those who have little or no faith in education as a means of social reconstruction, the class struggle may be a consistent procedure. But how can those who have adopted education as a career possibly subscribe to such doctrine? To do so is to repudiate and contradict their social function. On the contrary, educators should maintain faith in discussion and persuasion. Instead of intensifying class antagonisms or widening the breach between classes, they should endeavor to keep open the channels of communication between them. Nor should they think that their reliance on rational procedures necessarily leads to apathy or complacency. Although this body of opinion holds that teachers neither need, nor can, be neutral in the conflict of social interests, they do think that social reconstruction can and should be energetically undertaken in comprehensive social rather than in narrow class interest.

To advocate this line of thought and conduct is, in large measure, to press for the cause of democracy in education again. Democracy has frequently been said to stand for the abolition of class distinctions. But the Marxian class struggle is also to be continued till there is a classless society in which every one receives education according to his abilities. On the surface, it would appear as if the two positions on education and the class struggle were not so far apart after all. The apparent common ground between them is, however, quicksand. The Marxian society would be classless because only one class, the proletarian, would survive the class war.¹ The dictatorship of a single class, however, indicates a certain rigidity of principle. It implies that the evidence on social conflict is all in and that it all points one way. The educational corollary of such a position is education by inculcation. Ultimately, such a method could have little in common with democracy. No dominant class, whether it be a priesthood, a military clique, the bourgeoisie, or the proletariat, is without its own peculiar limitations when it comes to shaping educational policy. The democratic educational process, on the other hand, would so socialize intelligence that no group could, on account of superior knowledge, exploit another.²

To universalize intelligence to this extent necessitates raising the standard of living of the great masses of the people, so that they will be better able to afford the leisure which such improved education would demand. Making this point seems to indicate that the discussion has been describing a wide arc and is now about to circle back to the point of departure. The class struggle entered the philosophy of education as a means of protesting for a more equitable distribution of wealth so that educational opportunities might be more justly apportioned. Does democracy give effective promise of doing this? The critics of democracy are very skeptical indeed. America has had democracy in education, they say, not because of any inherent justice in the principle of democracy, but because of bountiful resources on

¹ Cf. R. Finney, *Sociological Philosophy of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928, p. 375, where the middle class is to be the only class.

² DEWEY, J., and TUFTS, J. H., *Ethics*, rev. ed., New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1932, p. 408.

the frontier. It has been said that democracy can only succeed in an agrarian society. Perhaps the reason for this position is that in an agricultural community inequalities of wealth are not so conspicuous as in an industrial one. But, in any event, the point is well made that in a dominantly industrial society there can be precious little political or educational democracy unless democracy permeates industry, too.

The democratization of economic opportunity for educational purposes need not necessarily mean the equal division of wealth throughout the community. But certainly something more must be done than to give scholarships to promising children in the economically underprivileged masses. Such a procedure may provide an open-class society wherein one may rise from the humblest to the highest ranks of life, but in the end it sterilizes the proletariat of its natural leaders and leaves the rest as subject to exploitation as before. This leads to plutocracy, rather than democracy.

An untried suggestion, whereby economic reconstruction might be coordinated with the increasing democratization of education, derives its best illustration from education itself. So far, in the exposition, economics has been discussed as a conditioning factor in educational philosophy. Perhaps, at this point, education has something to offer economics. Advanced educational administration has long insisted that there must be a minimum educational offering for all children. This minimum is generally determined by the quality of citizenship which, within the limits of its means, the state considers indispensable to its existence.¹ Many children will go beyond it but none should fall below it. The suggestion is now forthcoming that the state might similarly declare a minimum standard of living for all its people.² Thus, just as a minimum educational program designates a school term of a prescribed length, a teacher of a given grade of training, a curriculum of specified content, and other requirements, so legislative fiat might define minimum standards of food, shelter, and clothing. Out of this might grow a standard of leisure which would afford a genuine socialization of intelligence through the schools for all levels of the population.

¹ LASKI, H., *A Grammar of Politics*, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925, p. 114.

² DEWEY and TUTTS, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

3. The culture pattern over which one of the most critical phases of the class war is waged is that of private property and the profit motive. It should cause no surprise, therefore, if this part of the economic structure of society is also a crucial issue in its bearing on a philosophy of education. Since surplus wealth is indispensable for any education worthy of an advanced and complex civilization, not only is the distribution of wealth of significance for education, but so also is its control. Thus, any amendment in the amount or direction of the flow of economic surplus for educational purposes will depend on whether those who own and control the surplus are disposed to make the change.

An epitomized description of the system of private ownership and the quest for profit might run as follows. Ownership is thought to be a reward for one's labor. Unless a man can be secure in the possession of the fruits of his toil, apprehension arises whether work is worth the endeavor. Furthermore, man wants to be free, in competition with his fellows, to accumulate as much wealth as he can or wants. If one man works for another, the latter as employer is entitled to pay the former as employee a wage and to keep the balance for himself as profit. Indeed, without the prospect of profit, it is said, business cannot go on. Lastly, having acquired wealth, the owner reserves the right to dispose of it as he wills. Even in death his will reaches on into the future to control the uses to which his accumulated wealth shall be put.

The educational counterpart of the free competition to gain profits is to be found in the appeal to pupil interests, freedom for pupil self-expression, pupil planning, and kindred individualistic tendencies. More concretely, the pre-eminent purpose for going to school seems to be that of making money, improving one's economic class status, "getting on." Not only is education to get on, but it is to get ahead as well. Competition in commerce is matched in school with competition for marks, honors, prizes.¹

¹ DEWEY, J., *School and Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1900, pp. 29-30.

HOWERTH, I. W., *The Theory of Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1926, pp. 393-394.

DEMIASHKEVICH, M., *Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York, American Book Company, 1935, p. 319.

Children learn to glory not in their strength but in the fact that they are stronger. The less capable develop a debilitating sense of inferiority. Indeed, it is a school crime for a child to be detected in the act of helping a faltering fellow! When it is insisted that education be practical, it is the narrow sense of making a material living that is connoted. The wider meaning of practical, the way in which education may enlarge the horizon of action, is obscured from view. The individual success motive reigns supreme. Moreover, personal advancement is thought to coincide with the means of insuring the common weal.

There are several defenses for this point of view that might be mentioned. Some have cited Darwin's theory of evolution in support of competitive practices in business and in school. But as someone has pointed out, the fact is more likely that Darwin is indebted to the current economic doctrine of his day for his theory of the struggle for survival. Again, the worth of self-interest in trade can best be appreciated as a relief from the excessive regimentation of economic life under feudalism and later mercantilism. Correspondingly, in education it proved a boon to develop the individual's powers of self-reliance and self-expression.¹ Finally, in a frontier society, the appeal to individualistic energy rendered a genuine social service in furnishing the enterprise to subjugate the empire of natural resources to be found there. The contrast it provided between the ambitious and the lazy, the thrifty and the ne'er-do-well, even afforded a commendable moral significance. Traits such as thrift and industry have been based on the sacredness of property and even included as part of the distinctive contribution of religious education.

Doubt and conflict arise, however, when such a view continues to condition the aims of education in the more compact society engendered by industrialism. In a more settled, congested society, men may fail to achieve an economic subsistence through no fault of their own and in spite of their education. Under such conditions, to continue to motivate the school from the pioneer point of view may result in the excessive stimulation of the strong and the corresponding oppression of the weak. It then becomes time to put this philosophy of education in its

¹ HADLEY, A. T., "Educational Methods and Principles of the Nineteenth Century," *Educational Review*, 28: 332-334, November, 1904.

proper perspective.¹ That there was a century and a half when school could be revered as an instrument to make wealth in order to gain personal prestige must not obscure the eras when broader social motives were dominant—when economic doctrine was even irrelevant to the main purpose of life and education.

In fact, some see signs anticipating a return to circumstances which will incline the school toward social service rather than individual success. Industrialism leads in the direction of concentration and combination. Planned economy becomes increasingly necessary. The economies of fascism and communism are types of the trend. Under such a dispensation child interest will be secondary to social necessity as a gauge for the school program. Children's attitudes will be emphasized, as well as their rights. It will be of first importance to teach children how to organize and cooperate in the struggle against poverty and political knavery, rather than to sharpen their powers and prospects for individual success. Children will learn to find as much zest in pulling their weight in one big boat, as in paddling their individual canoes. Indeed, it has been said that until the profound unity of interest among students is uncovered and realized by educators, there cannot even be fruitful individualism.

But, even under these advanced circumstances, there are some who are unwilling to see competition completely disappear from the educative process. They prefer the motivation of cooperation as more economical and more moral but, nevertheless, they do not shut their eyes to the dangers of depending too uncritically on social motivation all by itself. Cooperation, they do not forget, is also the motivation of fascist schools. In a reconstructed view of things, their design would be to socialize the competitive incentive. Thus, they would have competition between groups, as between two or more schools or classes in a school, to see which could first complete its portion of a larger, planned cooperative enterprise. In such a rivalry, no individual would be outstripped and thrown into the social discard because his group would feel obliged to come to his assistance. Care

¹ TUGWELL, R., and KEYSERLING, L. H., *Redirecting Education*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1934-35, pp. 100-101.

COUNTS, G. S., *The American Road to Culture*, New York, John Day Co., 1930, pp. 68-69.

would only have to be taken here that the aid rendered him would be truly educational and not impoverish his scholastic abilities further.

One of the peculiar features of the profit system whose incidence on education must not be overlooked is the fact that economic production is for profit primarily, and for use only secondarily. Goods are produced for use, but only if a profit can be anticipated. Generally, too, those goods are produced which will yield the greatest profit. One of the points at which this characteristic of business is most pregnant with meaning for education is that of extra-school educational agencies, such as the cinema, the radio, and the press. Although the main purposes of these great instruments of public opinion lie in a different direction from the schools, their incidental educational consequences are admittedly profound. The critical point, for present purposes, is to note that those who control the educational consequences are governed, not by educational ends, but by the necessity of producing profit. Whether this assures the development of the best type of human personality in both the younger and the older generations may often be doubted.

Sometimes this confusion of interest infiltrates into the school itself. The pursuit of academic freedom, for instance, has been known to bring out points which, when taken seriously as a basis for student and popular action, have threatened the flow of some entrepreneur's stream of profits. If he protests and successfully carries the day, the cry goes up that truth is being subordinated to the quest for profits. Consequently, it has been said that the profits system is one of the greatest enemies of the free employment of intelligence. Another effect is the quality of work children are encouraged to do. Since the profits system looks first to the sale and only secondarily to the quality, so, too, it is alleged, children are thereby encouraged to do only a grade of work which will "get by."¹ Perhaps this is as much the fault of pragmatism's influence in education as it is the profit system's. Although it was probably only figuratively that pragmatism was early described as raising the question of the "cash value" of a culture pattern, nevertheless the pragmatic quality of profits has not escaped popular attention. In either

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., *Education and Emergent Man*. New York. Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1934, pp. 171-172.

event, the stimulating ideal of *fine workmanship* as an end in itself is in real danger of being lost. As a last instance, there is the hazard that profits will be put ahead of education itself. In order to raise the standard of living so that educational opportunities may be more equitable and widespread, school taxes will have to absorb a larger share of profits. What proportion of their profits to plow back into the business, into self-indulgence, or into a higher standard of living for the rest of the people is a problem which will tax the social vision of any owning class.

The problem is the more critical for the public school because in a capitalistic society it must draw its revenues from sources privately owned. Private schools, endowed universities, foundations for the promotion of research are a consistent offshoot of a society built on an economy of private property. What claim, however, has the public school on property vested with private rights? Very often the owning class is persuaded to support taxes for the public schools because they themselves are assured of a return on their investment. This return is described in terms of the more productive workers that educated employees make. Furthermore, it is estimated that people educated to a humble stake in the economic order will be less likely to commit crimes of violence against property. In the end, the support of public education is expected to lower the population that has to be supported in prisons and poorhouses. Private property thus is assumed to be the stabilizing keel of a civilized system of education.¹ Conversely, it can be argued that much of the value of property is due to the stability which culture gives to the social order. If that be the case, then not all of property's value is due to managerial capacity, but a large portion is a sort of unearned social increment. Of this the owner is not owner, but trustee. When the public taxes, then, it but appropriates that which is its own.

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¹ BLAIR, F. G., "Education in Relation to Material Values," *School and Society*, 31: 422-423, March, 1910.

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CHAPTER IX

THE CIVIL STATE AND EDUCATION

The way in which various political and economic forms of society condition the philosophy of education has been described at some length, with hardly any intimation whether the schools referred to by implication were schools supported and controlled by the government or by private effort. The distinction has not been insisted upon so far, because to make it is to uncover a whole new area of perplexities with which the philosophy of education must deal. While this area is undoubtedly directly related to the preceding ones, in a sense it is independent from them. Whether education is a suitable enterprise for governmental support and regulation may be a moot point, regardless of a society's political or economic pattern. While democracies, for instance, have usually been enthusiastic patrons of public education, there is nothing in the democratic principle which makes it mandatory for the public to maintain a system of schools. Historically, some democracies have been conspicuous for their governmental neglect of education. And equally, while societies governed by an aristocracy or plutocracy might be expected, through private schools, to monopolize education for their own children as the future rulers, there are many instances where such societies have provided extended educational opportunities for the masses at public expense. From these instances, then, it should be clear that the relation of the government to education presents a discrete problem for the philosophy of education.

The foregoing illustrations not only delimit the present topic from preceding ones, but they also serve to introduce one to the sort of conflicting educational practices one finds in this region. Only a few of these need to be indicated here, to define further the problem of this area. The fundamental difference of opinion and practice here concerns what parts of education shall be allocated to the sphere of government and what parts to the liberty of the private citizen. Formerly, all education fell in

the latter sphere. Latterly, more and more of it has come under the government. In some places, the government merely provides the school building and teacher. In others, it goes further and offers free textbooks and supplies. In still others, it furnishes such services as medical care, transportation to and from school, and noonday lunches.

The chief bulwark against this steady expansion of governmental effort is the private school. Here many parents still exercise liberty in directing the education of their children. Various purposes motivate this type of school. Some parents, disturbed by the heterogeneity of the public-school population, prefer a socially select school. They wish a school where there will be some homogeneity among the children with respect to their habits of language and health, to say nothing of manners and morals. Other parents want a school which makes curricular offerings not to be had in the public school. Most notable here is the instance of religion. Yet others, sympathetic to some novel scheme of education, want a school where the theory can be given an experimental trial.

In a democracy, these and other reasons for private schools become the target for considerable adverse criticism. Whether private schools are unfortunately divisive of the body politic is a perennially lively subject of popular disagreement. In some cases, laws have been enacted abolishing this sort of school and giving the government a monopoly of instruction. Whether or not the government goes this far, the growing sphere of government places great power in the hands of educational administration. In some cases, this power is highly centralized. In others, decentralization is preferred. If the central core is the nation, then there is the added problem of the influence of nationalism on the governmental administration of education. Nationalism reveals itself in educational practices in various ways. It is sometimes the avowed end of the educational process. At others it is merely a means to achieve ends otherwise determined. Whichever emphasis is underscored, distinctly different educational outcomes will be entailed.

The specific problems which emerge from the preceding practices can now be sharpened up. (1) Basic and prior to every other question is the conception one holds of the secular political state, that is, organized civil government. Is it coter-

minous with what is ordinarily meant by society? Or is it just one form of human association among others? In more technical terminology, should the state be conceived as monistic or pluralistic? (2) If the latter conception obtains, should the state concern itself with education (socialism) or should it leave that to the attention of other social agencies such as the family and the church (*laissez faire*)? Or can education be managed best without any state at all (anarchy)? (3) In case the state takes an active interest in education, and in case the interests of the family, church, and state overlap, how shall the sphere of influence of each be delimited? How shall possible conflicts be resolved? (4) If the state extends the arm of its police power as far as education, what form of organization should it assume in order best to promote the ends of education? Should the power of the state be widely shared, decentralized? Or should it be concentrated in a central authority? In the latter event, what part should nationalism be assigned in a philosophy of education?

1. In speaking of the relation of the state to education, one should be lucidly clear as to the meaning he attaches to the term state. In common observance, it has both a specific and a generic use. In the former sense, it may refer to education in some particular national state or to an administrative subdivision thereof, as, say, one of the forty-eight United States. In the generic sense, one has more in mind organized civil government in general, whether national or local. Here one thinks of society as organized for the exercise of police power in such directions as the maintenance of law and order, the administration of justice, the preservation of public health, and the regulation of a multitude of other public concerns. It is with this latter, the more generic, use that the term state will be associated in the subsequent discussion, unless otherwise specifically stated. In fact, the terms state and government will be employed almost interchangeably.

Will this definition of the state serve also to define what is meant by society? Many persons make no distinction. To them, people form associations for many purposes. The composition of these different groups varies according to the interests of their members. The totality of all these manifold groups is often inclusively referred to as society. In this sense, everyone

is inescapably a member of society. But everyone, too, is a member of the civil state. He is born into it; he does not enter it voluntarily. Since the state and society each includes everyone, it would seem as if the two could be considered identical. There can be only one all-inclusive whole. Hence, it will be all the same whether that whole be called society or the state.

If this be the case, then the state must be supreme in education. All schools must be under government control. No private agency to further education can have any autonomous standing. The pupil has only the status of a citizen. The state is not only sovereign politically, but ethically as well. The pupil's will is effective only when he wills what the state wants him to will. So completely is this the case that for him to endeavor to transgress against the law of the state is to attempt the impossible. This position will be recognized as closely akin to the organismic theory of society.¹ If society is a metaphysical entity over and above the individuals which constitute it, then the state is too. This unitary or totalitarian view of society and the state has found its clearest expression in education in the corporate state of fascism.

But fascism has no exclusive claim to the concept. Even democratic states have flirted with absolutism in educational matters. Particularly has this been the case where factions, tolerated and fostered by the individualism of democracy, have become so irreconcilable that they threaten to split the state wide apart. Under such circumstances, the state has shown an inclination to compel everyone to attend the state's schools, in order to close the rift through an enforced homogeneity of culture.²

No one yet has pressed the theory underlying such monopolistic state action in a democracy to its logical totalitarianism. A few have come close to it, however. Thus, it has been said by some exponents of democracy that, while the state is not to be confused with society, it is, as the organized aspect of society as a

¹ *Supra*, pp. 125-128.

² The most notable instance of this sort in the United States was the Oregon law of November 7, 1922, requiring all children to attend public elementary schools. The statute was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* 268 United States 510.

whole, more nearly synonymous with society than anything else. As far as this view goes, it is still short of totalitarianism, for according to it the state merely acts as a central point of reference to harmonize the composite efforts of all subsidiary organizations aiding the individual to realize his best self. The state very significantly does not gobble up these minor agencies. Others have a much more narrow margin between themselves and totalitarianism. They hold that the democratic state must control any social enterprise which vitally concerns the public and which tends to become a monopoly—as education does when left exclusively in private hands. The implication definitely is that it is better for the state to have a monopoly of education than for any one else.

On the whole, however, experience has taught democracies to be very cautious toward such aggrandizement of the state. A state, even though completely representative of its constituency, is, after all, a frail human instrument. Rule by majority can be just as tyrannical in matters of education as can the hand of a despot. So, while a state may have political sovereignty, it is altogether doubtful that it should possess complete ethical sovereignty as well, as is implied by a state that is coextensive with society. When the sovereign teaches, he performs a different function from what he does when ruling. Thus, at its best, the public school should personify the state surveying its vices as well as its virtues. Certainly there can be no public confidence in the state as educator unless one can feel free to encourage opinions which are variant from the stereotype sanctioned by the sovereign in his schools. Furthermore, looking at the problem geographically, it seems that the universal state is quite too arid to deal suitably with the rich diversity of local conditions to which education should give expression. So, far from augmenting the sphere of the state by synthesizing education along with other institutions into a state-society, there is opinion in favor of actually reducing the state to smaller pretensions in the interest of greater efficiency.

Unlike the fascist state, then, the pupil in a democracy is not merely a creature of the state. He is an individual, as well as a citizen. Starting with such a premise, one should not be surprised to find that the education which results from regarding the child as an individual may be very different from that which results

in the future citizen. This statement must not be interpreted to mean that there is a necessary antithesis between the good individual and the good citizen. On the other hand, it should serve as a reminder of one of democracy's most persistent problems.

At any rate, the tendency of democratic states to be pluralistic rather than monistic is well recognized. On this theory, one posits a plurality of societies without any all-inclusive oversociety.¹ Here the civil state is but one form of human association among others. Moreover, if the state is founded on a constitution, it will very explicitly have limited rather than absolute powers. Accordingly, the government may maintain schools, but it may not compel everyone to attend them. There is, consequently, a sphere of liberty for the individual which is of far-reaching significance for education.² In this area, the family and the church have rights and high duties which are not to be invaded by the state.

2. If the principle of liberty for the individual be granted and accepted, it becomes a matter of expediency which parts of education shall be assigned to the sphere of government and which to that of private effort. The two most obvious expedients are those of *laissez faire* and some form of socialism. In the former case, the government holds aloof from education, leaving it to such agencies as volunteer to provide it. In the latter instance, the state steps in to organize and maintain schools of its own. There is also a third expedient which, though less significant, must not be overlooked. Education might be carried on, not merely at the sufferance of the state, but with no state at all. This, of course, would be anarchy.

Only a theoretic statement can be made as to education under anarchy, for no society on record has ever been formally conducted on its philosophical assumptions. In an anarchistic society, as stated, there would be no political state. Such other organizations as might obtain would be quite voluntary. Because of man's disorderly inclinations, the proposed absence of civil government with power to enforce law and order has led many to fear that anarchism would lead to wild confusion, even chaos.

¹ *Supra*, p. 128.

² BUTLER, N. M., *The Meaning of Education*, rev. ed., New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915, pp. 323-330.

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¹ *Supra*, p. 128.

² BUTLER, N. M., *The Meaning of Education*, rev. ed., New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915, pp. 323-330.

Indeed, in the popular mind, anarchy passes as a synonym for disorder. Whether or not anarchy would actually lead to such a social condition need not be a matter of moment here. At the very least, anarchy can be said to be a brave and lofty aspiration to conceive of a society where each is able to hold his unruly animal nature in leash without constraint from his fellows. Such self-control would require long and intensive education. Where possible, social control would come about through education rather than through the coercion of government. Consequently, it is probably true that in the utopia of anarchy there would be more need and regard for education than in any other form of society.

It is chiefly important here to inquire how schooling would be provided where people held to such principles. Since there would be no frame of public government on which to depend, the provision of education would be a purely voluntary matter. The right of a child to education and the duty of his parent to enable him to get it would exist only in contract. Because an infant would be too young to contract with his parents, he would be at the mercy of his parents for an education till he should be old enough to assert himself in contract. The anarchist entertains no alarm here that there might be a serious miscarriage of social destiny, because he fully counts on parental instinct to fulfill its function at this point. Besides, the failure to provide suitable educational opportunities would be blamed by the anarchist upon the inequitable distribution of wealth in the capitalist system. Granted a suitable standard of living which would afford enough leisure for education, it is to be expected in an anarchist society that those who are fond of teaching would be only too willing to volunteer to teach their fellows and that, consequently, voluntary associations for educational purposes would spring up everywhere.¹

Of course, to trust the general welfare to anarchistic theory is quite too idyllic at the present time. While few have sufficient optimism to make a general trial of anarchism, it is surprising how many come unwittingly close to a limited application of it in the theory of *laissez faire*. The more rigorously strict government is in this attitude, the more nearly it approaches, at least in effect,

¹ JOAD, C. E. M., *Introduction to Modern Political Theory*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924, p. 106.

the anarchistic point of view. If there is a government, but the government does nothing, for example, for education, there might almost as well not be a government at all. Under such a regime education would be as dependent on the family, the church, and philanthropy as it would be under anarchism. Its chief advantage would accrue through whatever stability government might lend to the social milieu in which the school might find itself.

In spite of this similarity, there are some aspects of a *laissez-faire* attitude of government toward education which deserve separate treatment. The theory of *laissez faire* was originally a protest to be let alone in a period when the government was excessively prone to interfere in social affairs, particularly in business. The belief was that these very affairs would actually be better managed if left to the private initiative of each individual. Freedom for the play of self-interest was even thought to be the gateway to social service. The role of government, according to this theory, was to be restricted to protecting rights in life, liberty, and property. For the government to become a protector of other social or individual interests was regarded as an untenable invasion of personal liberty. Each individual was supposed to have an equal right to the fullest exercise of all his capacities compatible with the same right in others. Where the interests of individuals or groups conflicted, it was the duty of the government to balance or maintain justice between them.

This creed of *laissez faire* naturally found one of its applications in the field of education. Its supporters saw no cause why the state should interpose in the interests of children. Such action would only be justifiable if the rights or liberties of children were being infringed. This could only be the case where a child's previously existing power to pursue educational purposes had been cut off. Nothing of the sort is said to occur where a parent is delinquent in educating his child. The parent merely fails to enhance his child's experience; he does not diminish it. The child is no less free to exercise his native abilities after his parents' decision than he was before. A first glance at this theory would seem to reveal the child's chances for an adequate education as slim indeed. This anxiety is only mitigated by the hope that few children would be left exclusively to their own ineffective devices. The normal expectation of *laissez faire* is that, where

parents fail, the church and private philanthropy, exercising liberty of action in their own interests, would step in and volunteer aid.

Several difficulties have been found with this theory in practice. People become more absorbed in their liberties than in their duties, in the pursuit of private gain than in civic responsibilities. Hence, education becomes a means to self-aggrandizement rather than social service. While, theoretically, the pursuit of self-interest should lead to securing the common weal, practically, the provision of schools lags both in quality and in quantity. Even when pushed to the limit, private philanthropy has been unable to provide education rapidly or extensively enough. But more important yet, people have become disgruntled with a state uncertain of its own ends, a state which is merely a neutral umpire and protector of individual rights. They have come to see that the state is vested with an interest of its own in the education of its members. Once this stake is recognized, uneven and generally low educational standards of parents can no longer be the sole yardstick of what is for the common good.

Then again, there is a curious sort of backsliding which occurs under *laissez faire*. People who underwrite the theory have a tendency, in spite of their principles, to use the state when it better serves their individual ends. For instance, few people are *laissez faire* about a *laissez-faire* education. Strangely enough, *laissez faire*, originating as a cult of freedom, has latterly become a bulwark of the *status quo*. Its exponents have become more interested in maintaining their original social gains under this banner than in blessing further departures from the new *status quo*. Thus, according to their creed, they should be willing to let teachers alone in the teaching of vital social issues. But, instead, they all too often beseech their servant, the state, to prevent it.

In view of these criticisms, the state has generally abandoned its aloofness and become one of the most vigilant and energetic agencies in providing school facilities. Just what is the interest of the state in education has been variously stated. In the first place, it has been said that the state exists, not just to serve man, but primarily as educator to make men.¹ For another thing, it is

¹ Hocking, W. E., *Man and the State*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1926, p. 173.

said that the state views education as a long-term investment.¹ It is akin to the conservation of natural resources. In this way the state manages to perpetuate itself. It insures the tradition of the vital virtues and skills which have made the state what it is. If education is such a crucial enterprise, the state can hardly let it hang on uncertain benevolence. Rather must it be a necessity. The state must have power, if need be, to regulate child labor and compel school attendance. Nor need the grant of such authority be debited to the loss of freedom, for the socialist is convinced that there will be greater opportunities for all under social rather than individual control. Certainly, where popular education is so important, no agency less universal in its power and authority than government can be counted upon to secure those ends.² This is chiefly because the state has the means at its disposal to pass over the accidents of birth and to adjust educational opportunities to the quality of the individual's talent.

It is one thing for the state to claim an interest in education, but it is quite another to stake out the boundaries of the claim. Viewed from the course of history, they have been growing from practically nothing at all to a far-flung domain. At first, the state merely tried to regulate private education, but soon it found out that effective control would necessitate the creation and maintenance of schools of its own. Its initial venture here was in the precincts of elementary education. Later, this extended into the fields of secondary and higher education as well. Again, to begin with, attendance at the school was optional, but later, the state made it compulsory for all, at least during the elementary school period. Then, too, the early school term was pitifully short compared with the long one latterly required. For a long time after the state had embarked on the educational enterprise, it still remained quite *laissez-faire* about certain more or less important incidentals. Most notably, textbooks and supplies were still left to private initiative. But latterly, the long arm of the state has even extended to the provision of these, together with transportation, meals, medical care, and various other indispensable services of which children might fail if the state did not step in and supplement the home.

¹ BRIGGS, T. H., *The Great Investment*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1930, p. 8.

² WILSON, W., *The State*, Boston, D. C. Heath & Company, 1889, p. 638.

How much farther will the state go in arrogating power to itself? Of course, there is no exact telling. It has been predicted that it will come to preside over childbirth, regulate the housing of children, advise them in courtship, and, finally, instruct them in parentage and homemaking.¹ Perhaps this is no more unreasonable than the progress to date would have seemed a century ago.

This progressive enlargement of the state interest in education has not taken place without some protest. The socialistic theory which seems to underlie this expansion has been made the focus of adverse criticism. Its paternalistic features have been decried. The encroachment of the state on the sphere of the family is said to destroy the parent's sense of responsibility for his children. Justice, which is the object of all states, miscarries when the diligent and industrious parents are burdened with an added tax for the education of the children of the indolent and shiftless as well. Furthermore, the child, because he is not required to make any personal sacrifice for his education, fails to appreciate the benefice which he enjoys. Fear is even entertained that, accompanying the disintegration of the family, will be the collapse of the state, in spite of the fact that the duty of maintaining it is taught in the schools. Moreover, the time-honored cry that the wealth of the state must educate the children of the state is questioned, especially if it carries any communistic implication that all land and capital are to be publicized into one vast commune.

To accept this counsel is, of course, to return to the doctrine of *laissez faire*: But there are those who say it is impossible to turn back. One must go on in the same direction, only further. The lengthening period of economic minority before society can provide self-sustaining work for juveniles makes it imperative for the state to keep children off the street and in school where they will be beyond the reach of selfish exploitation. But whether the state should go so far as to turn the schools into asylums and provide protection instead of education is a moot point.²

¹ CHANCELLOR, W. E., *Motives, Ideals, and Values in Education*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1907, p. 254.

² SPAULDING, F. T., "A Brief for the Selection of Secondary School Pupils," *Harvard Teachers Record*, 1:107, November, 1931.

3. Of the three theories of the relation of the state to education,—anarchy, *laissez faire*, and socialism—only the latter two have any extensive hold on men's present loyalties. As to these, neither one holds exclusive sway. Rigid and unwavering *laissez faire* has proved unsatisfactory, and socialistic government monopoly has been rejected. The confronting situation, then, is one in which the government does not strictly keep its hands off education and neither does it lay its hands on everything educational in sight. Most societies are a peculiar mixture of *laissez faire* and socialism, as regards education. In such an intricate situation, the further elucidation of which parts of education may be expediently assigned to public and private effort will most adequately be pushed forward if the two major private agencies of the family and the church, with whom the state shares the responsibility for education, are now drawn into the discussion.

Of course, all three of these agencies are anxious to have the child turn out to the very best possible kind of a person. As to many qualities of personality, they reinforce each other by working toward common ends. As to certain others, their spheres of influence are so discrete that they readily supplement each other. What constitutes the problem in this area are those values on which there is a difference of opinion and wherein the child will have to declare his loyalty one way or another. Since the aims of the schools are bound to reflect some scheme of values, their control becomes of the utmost strategic importance. Naturally each institution, confident of the worth of its own ideals, wishes to incline youth in its direction. But how shall the choice be made?

One most naturally thinks of the family as having the initial decision here. For one thing, the family begets the child and from time immemorial has been charged with its earliest training. That this is a sound vested interest has been recognized by both church and state. Whether it is necessary or even desirable to go so far as to say that the parent "owns" the child is perhaps a matter of some doubt.¹ Among other reasons which account for

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., "Thinking in Childhood and Youth," *Religious Education*, 23: 132, February, 1928.

RUSSELL, B., *Education and the Modern World*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1932, pp. 69-70.

BUKHARIN, N., and PÆOBRAZHENIKY, E., *The A B C of Communism*

the priority of the family as an educational institution is the fact that it is unrivalled as society's basic affectional institution. Educational authorities at best are motivated by public spirit, a poor substitute for parental affection. It is doubtful whether even the teachers of the schools of the church, actuated by the deepest brotherly love, could do better. The security afforded by this family sentiment is simply invaluable.

While the family is entrusted with the education of the child in its tenderest years, it is the rare family indeed which would feel itself competent to administer the more formal instruction of later years. This is generally undertaken by some other agency. But because of the fundamental rights already recognized, it is usually further conceded that the family must be consulted as to the agency to which this subsequent education shall be delegated. Most parents discharge their educational obligations by sending their children to the public or state school. Doubtless, this is often because the schools of the sovereign, being tax-supported, are free to all. 'There are many, however, who send their children there out of loyalty to the principles of democracy. They sincerely believe in the necessity for the free and unimpeded interchange of opinion between the various members and groups of a democracy.¹ But democracy also stands for the recognition of individuality.² Some parents find the public school inadequate to give their children the kind of training they hold indispensable. Consequently, it is needful to assent to the maintenance of private schools which represent different convictions and diverse ways of life.

There are, roughly, three types of these schools. Some parents, concerned over the heterogeneity of the public-school population, wish to have their children attend a school where the pupils will come from a more homogeneous background of manners, morals, health, and language habits. These often turn out to be socially select schools. They generally offer superior opportunities for an education of the conventional type. Other parents are discontented with the public-school curriculum and prefer a school where a different content is offered. Most

New York, Lyceum Literature Department, Workers Party of America, 1921, pp. 233-234.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 157-158.

² *Supra*, pp. 148-155.

notable here is the Catholic parochial-school system, which grew up as a consequence of the exclusion of religion from the public-school offerings. (Finally are to be noted private schools of a frankly experimental character. Not infrequently a few parents are dissatisfied with conventional educational stereotypes and are willing to undertake educational risks which the public or other more conservative private schools are unwilling to do.

The obvious advantage of these private schools is the diversity of viewpoint they permit. If society had always to depend on the level of popular enlightenment for its educational advances, the rate of progress would be distressingly slow. Historically, many of the most notable improvements in education have resulted from the establishment of schools with purposes different from those of the state. This virtue of private schools is at the very same time the origin of their vice. The danger is that they will stratify society along the very lines of their differences. The difficulty here is not the encouragement of variety of cultural outlook, but that there will be no interpenetration of culture. Where this occurs, there is bound to be envy and misunderstanding. Some envisage a public school in which there will be both variety and socialization. Doubtless it is a noble ideal. Pending its achievement, however, the passing of education from the field of private enterprise should not be forced by legislation but should be the natural outcome of the improvement of the public school.

But even when the strongest case has been built for reposing certain educational responsibilities in the discretion of the parent, it is generally recognized that the family has its limitations, that it does not contain within itself all the means for its own development. Worthy as the diversity of families is as a bulwark against the uniformity which state education too frequently imposes on children, nevertheless the diversity often amounts to abysmal deficiencies on the part of parents as educators. Capacity for parenthood is not by any means highly correlated with capacity for educating. Furthermore, fundamental sociological conditions are profoundly affecting the efficiency of the home as an educational agency. The passing of home industry, the frequent employment of both parents, the invention of the automobile, and the development of commercial amusement, to mention but a few of the changes, have greatly undermined the

reverence and implicit obedience of the family discipline of not so long ago.

With the change in underlying conditions, new virtues are being emphasized. Perhaps the change has resulted in more tolerance abroad and greater breadth of social judgment. Some, even, are already counting the blessings to flow from the demise of the family as an educational institution.¹ Releasing mothers from the soul-destroying routine of family cares is expected to result in tremendous advances in self-culture and economic productivity. Of course, one must admit that there is no reliable evidence that children would in the long run profit by a public education instituted to protect them against the shortcomings of the family. Moreover, it is interesting to speculate what the influence of such a regime would be on adults.² Certainly it is not beyond the realm of possibility that, with no family responsibilities, men might be inclined to work less hard and that conjugal relations between men and women might become trivial.

In any event, once granted that the family labors under marked educational disabilities, it follows that its endeavors must be supplemented by other institutions, notably the state and the church. Thus, parents may and should give religious and moral instruction to their children, but the church must surely have the right to scrutinize and guide such instruction. So, too, the state must have the right in the sphere of citizenship to lay down minimum requirements both for children and for the training of their teachers. Since both state and church survive any particular generation, their standards are undoubtedly better criteria for education than those of any single family.

Some object to giving the state power to determine minimum standards. To do so, they say, is to abridge parental control of the child's education. They would have the state step in only where some right of the child is being impaired. This raises the question of what the rights of the child are. Some believe that the child has an absolute right to an education by the principles of natural law or ethics. Others hold that the right to an education is strictly social in origin. Since society may confer or withhold educational opportunities at its pleasure, it might also better be said that education is a privilege rather than a right.

¹ BUKHARIN, and PREOBRAZHENSĖY, *op. cit.* pp. 233-234.

² RUSSELL, *op. cit.* pp. 67-69.

What educational opportunities can the child expect from these rationalizations of his claims? According to the first view, apparently, he is entitled to no better education than will enable him to live in comfort in the condition of his parents. Following such a standard, not even the three R's would be universally necessary. Depending on state requirements, however, a child could expect at least the minimum necessary for citizenship. Even this standard will vary according to time and place, but practically everywhere it should include at least reading, writing, and arithmetic.

There is a notable difference between the church and the state as to the power each possesses to enforce its standards. The church, being a voluntary association, can only coerce its standards to the extent its membership willingly assents. The state, on the other hand, may go so far as to compel a child to get an education. That it has such extensive power, however, does not carry with it, as already seen, the right to be the sole teacher. That would obscure the difference between the state and society. The schools of the pluralistic state merely supplement the home. They are a convenient place where the parent may discharge his duties toward his child. If he wishes, of course, he may educate his child at home. But since the state can require education, it must be the judge of what a suitable education is. Should the parent prove so deficient or, worse yet, so morally corrupt that he gravely endangers the child's future, the state has the right to suspend the parent's supervision of the child's education. But with such great authority the state should only exercise when the family has clearly failed to fulfill its obligations. Indeed, on general principle it can be said that the school should be wary of encroaching on the domain of the family, for there are some things in which not even the very most efficient school can replace the home.¹

So far there is fairly general agreement on the division of educational responsibility in the triangular relation of the family, state, and church. The outlines of the reciprocal relations of family and state, and family and church, are pretty clear by now. The most difficult problem is from here on, in defining the mutual relation of state and church. Some would solve this problem

¹ W. F. RUSSELL, quoted in "The School and Other Educational Institutions," *School and Society*, 44: 787-788, December, 1936.

by eliminating it. They would simply exclude the church from participation in education and leave the field clear for the state.¹ But, again, this makes the state supreme over society. Taking the opposite view, others insist it is incumbent upon the state to make room for private agencies giving religious instruction.² Approaching the matter from the latter, the pluralistic point of view, separate spheres of influence have already been noted in the relation of these institutions to the family, the former in citizenship and the latter in religion and morals. What complicates this apparently simple situation is the fact that the public schools have made some endeavor to teach morals, and the church schools have laid extensive claim to educating for citizenship. When the jurisdiction of the state is challenged, it falls back on its right to compel education and on the right, incidental thereto, of judging what is a satisfactory accomplishment in citizenship. When the jurisdiction of the church is questioned, it generally invokes either its superior ethical position or its supernatural investiture of authority. With such rival claims, how shall the family know in which direction to cast its allegiance?

This issue has been most acute in Catholic educational philosophy. Protestant and Jewish groups have generally adopted a residuary theory of religious and moral education. They have simply taught what the public school did not. Since they have pretty strictly confined themselves to the sphere of religion and morals, and since the American state is generally forbidden by constitution to establish any religion, there has been little or no occasion for any conflict of interest to arise. With Catholics it is otherwise. They have sought to do more than just supplement the deficiencies of the public-school curriculum with religion and morals. It is of cardinal importance with them that religion and morals are not just another extra subject, but that they must suffuse the whole educational program. Consequently, they have had to erect a vast system of parochial schools wherein secular subjects could be taught with the proper admixture of religion and morals. In entering the field of citizenship, the Catholic parochial school finds itself directly in competition with the state's efforts. As the state has been more and more

¹ PINKEVITCH, A. P., *The New Education in the Soviet Republic*, New York, John Day Company, 1929, p. 153.

² HOCKING, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

aggressive in extending its interests in the field of education, a number of points have protruded at which the Catholic church has insisted on clearly defining the relation of church and state.

Catholics found the right of the church in educational matters in the supernatural order. The divine mission of the Catholic church to teach is derived by succession through Jesus' disciples, to whom he said, "All power is given to me in heaven and earth. Going therefore teach ye all nations . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."¹ Although, in the Catholic mind, this grant of power gives the church pre-eminence among all other educational institutions, it is not claimed to give the church exclusive jurisdiction over education. It is conceded that the family and the state have rights in education, too, but their rights are of the natural order. As the supernatural is higher than the natural, so it follows that the right of the church in educational matters is unqualifiedly superior to the title of the family and the state. Hence, any abridgement of the prerogatives of the church in education is palpably and deplorably unjust. And be it noted that the church is not less absolutely right on this point because the state may ignore her claim or even, through superior force, infringe upon her sacred precincts.

Just how education is to be divided between the ecclesiastical and civil authorities has occasioned some difference of opinion among Catholic authorities. They are generally agreed that the church is supreme as to teaching in the field of faith and morals. There, it is absolutely sure and independent of any earthly power. There is also agreement that the state has the right to insure instruction to its citizens in their civic responsibilities, military duties, and a certain degree of physical, intellectual, and moral culture. But when the church claims that it has a mission in these profane subjects as well, which is equal or superior to the state, an area of controversy arises.

One wing of Catholic opinion has held that the injunction "teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you" does not carry with it in the same degree the direction to teach human science as it does divine science. The context of the statement, "whatsoever I have commanded," it is asserted, requires limitation to revelation and morality. This

¹ Matthew 28: 18-20 (Douay version of the Bible).

should not be interpreted to mean that the church has no interest in the teaching of secular arts, sciences, and letters. By virtue of the harmony which reigns throughout the universe, secular learning may very well have, and frequently does have, a bearing on matters of faith and morals. When and where it does, the church will be concerned with its instruction. But such an interest will be incidental and secondary, not an object proper of the church. For the state, on the other hand, this type of instruction is of primary importance. The church should only teach in the secular realm as an act of charity where the arts and sciences are insufficiently taught, or as an act of necessity where they are improperly taught. To teach that science and religion are contradictory to each other would be an instance where the church would feel it incumbent of necessity to teach science to correct what it would regard as a false impression. But to make this branch of education a main object and direct mission of the church is to have devolve on the church the responsibility for the condition of the profane arts and sciences among Christian nations, an unnecessary responsibility.

Another wing of Catholic educational philosophy prefers to exalt the role of the church to a primacy in profane and secular learning, as well as in faith and morals. The Biblical mandate to teach they would make broad enough to include "But when the Spirit of truth is come, He will teach you all truth."¹ To this view the papacy has lent the great weight of its authority. All instruction, just as all human action, has a necessary connection with man's final destiny. That being the case, the church has an independent right to decide with regard to every kind of human learning what will either help or harm Christian education. The resulting situation, then, is one in which both state and church have a major stake in lay or secular instruction.

It would be fortunate if the state and church, with such a close identity of interest, could achieve their objectives in a common school. Unfortunately, however, the state is one and the churches are many. Ever since the nineteenth century this has led to the conviction that the only solution of public education is that the public, or state, school be neutral on religious matters. The Catholic church, however, has opposed the neutral school. At best, it can never more than tolerate it. The danger the

¹ John 16: 13 (Douay version of the Bible). "

church fears is that such a school soon will become positively irreligious. Subsequently, mixed schools were proposed, schools in which grouping by profession of faith is employed for religious instruction, but abandoned for lay or secular studies. The Catholic church has disapproved this administrative device on two counts. In the first place, religious instruction tends to be limited to a particular time of the day or week and is stinted in amount. In the second place, such a program indicates the separation of religion and morals from the secular. When one starts with the principle that all learning has an inevitable relation to man's final destiny, such a practice can hardly be countenanced. From the Catholic educational philosophy, every subject must be taught with the aim and purpose of true piety constantly in mind.

From the foregoing it would seem that the only solution of this problem is for the state and the church to erect and maintain separate schools. But this alternative is not without its own difficulties. In a democracy, it leads to a certain divisiveness and is an obstacle to the interpenetration of diverse cultural viewpoints. Whatever the effect here, the Catholic disavows any such intent. Indeed, on the contrary, he thinks his child is a better citizen because he has attended a school whose atmosphere is dominantly religious. But even here, different religious viewpoints lead to widely different types of citizenship. It is averred that schools of churches with the most rigorous ecclesiastical authority tend to inculcate rigorous obedience to the political sovereign. The schools of less authoritarian churches are generally less absorbed with the strict observance of duties to the sovereign and more concerned with the state's obligations toward them.

Agreeing that the parochial school is actually excellent preparation for citizenship poses yet one final problem. It seems to put the state in the debt of the church for performing, at its own expense, a social service which the state itself would otherwise have had to provide. If this is the case, the question next arises as to whether the church has any legitimate claim to public support for its schools. From the Catholic comes a strong inference that it does. They would not have the pupils of parochial schools the stepchildren of the state. Historically, such a policy has been opposed, because of the fear that a

multiplicity of denominations would spring up and drain the strength of state aid off into innumerable small, inefficient educational enterprises. Perhaps this difficulty of the subsidy of church schools could have been obviated by conserving the state's resources through a strong policy of supervision. But since the Catholic church claims its jurisdiction over education is altogether independent of any earthly power, there seems no possibility in principle of state supervision of parochial schools.¹

4. The issue between an all-pervasive state control of education and liberty for the family, church, and other private agencies to supply educational opportunities has a final counterpart within the system of state educational administration itself. Ordinarily, the geographical limits of the state are too great to permit of a single administrative agency for education. Consequently, the state is divided into smaller areas for the purposes of local educational administration. In some instances, these local agencies are still further subdivided for more efficient management. The question now arises whether the central administration should dominate educational policy, or whether a large measure of freedom should be left to the local authorities. Doubtless, much hinges on one's theory of the state. In the totalitarian state, centralization of educational administration with unitary control of educational policy seems a foregone conclusion. The spirit of the pluralistic state, with its toleration of private voluntary educational agencies, would seem to dictate the decentralization of educational administration in order to secure a large measure of initiative and experimentation from local educational authorities.² Decentralization also renders more difficult the introduction of any single propaganda into the schools and is thereby one effective way of guaranteeing academic freedom. Moreover, it seems logical to expect that political theory has some influence here. On the whole, one would surmise that rule by the one or few would be associated with centralization, while rule by the many with decentralization. In spite of

¹ Cf. C. M. Lischka, "Limitations of the Legislative Power to Compel Education," *Catholic Educational Review*, 27: 23, January, 1929, where the author concedes the right of the state to supervise all schools in "health, morals, and patriotism."

² MacKENZIE, J. S., *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1921, pp. 197-108.

this normal expectation, there are instances, especially in democracies, of highly centralized educational administration.

The same points which arise in educational administrative organization are also found reflected in the hierarchy of administrative personnel. According to some patterns of administration, power is concentrated in the hands of the superintendent or principal. Teachers participate in administration to the extent of carrying out policies already determined. Such an autocratic procedure is, of course, consistent with certain theories of the state and politics. There are patterns of educational administration, however, where the individuality and initiative of teachers are capitalized.¹ Here, there is a free and easy interchange of opinion between teacher and supervisory staff. Teachers are encouraged to make judgments, as well as the expert. It is obvious with which other social theories this pattern of administration is consistent.

The issues under consideration here are particularly acute where national states are involved. The virus of nationalism gives a complexion to the role of the state in education which otherwise is quite lacking. Nationalism binds a people together in a sense of corporate life. It is not necessarily based on race, language, religion, political sovereignty, or geographical enclosure. Various combinations of these factors will make up the sense of nationalism, depending on the circumstances at hand. Running through all, however, is a sense of common interest, common destiny, defeat, or common glory. When this corporate self-regard attaches itself to the state's interest in education, there are a number of possibilities which must be canvassed.

It should at once be obvious that here is an added factor making in the direction of centralization of educational administration. No doubt there are definite educational benefits to be derived from such a centrifugal force. For one thing, loyalty to the broader cultural outlook of the nation makes possible a better type of manhood and womanhood than is often afforded where sectionalism bounds the school horizon. For another thing, through its personnel and greater financial resources the

¹ DEWEY, J., "Democracy in Education," *Elementary School Teacher*, 4: 193-204, December, 1903.

THAYER, V., in *The Educational Frontier* (KILPATRICK, W. H., ed.), New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1933, p. 238.

national educational administrative organization can be made the instrument for making this higher type of personality possible. But social cooperation on a national scale to achieve this superior individual requires homogeneity of language and ideals on the part of every person. If this is an outgrowth from the life of the people and not something forced on them by the government, it can be a great force for good. Here, nationalism and democracy work toward common educational ends.

On the debit side several matters are to be noted. Nationalism is not always ready to be a humble means to the development of individuality as the end. All too frequently it becomes an educational end in itself, and the individual is turned into the means. Indeed, the individual may be completely engulfed and all but disappear in the nation.¹ Instead of developing free personality, it cultivates an enforced obedience and docility. Unfortunately, too, nationalism is easily turned into the channels of taking pride in the superiority of one's own nation and extending its influence in imperialistic fashion. Here it becomes the ready tool of the worst competitive features of capitalism. When nationalism becomes harnessed to such narrow and exclusive aims, broadly patriotic education gives way to jingoism and chauvinism.

At this point, nationalism finds itself in opposition to democratic educational objectives. Democracy demands not only the sharing of culture within the group, but between groups.² To be democratic, therefore, nationalistic education should be internationalistic as well. But is the state, the national state, capable of such breadth of educational vision? The cosmopolitan philosophy of education of the late eighteenth century collapsed, for one thing, because it lacked an administrative agency with cosmopolitan authority. For a while, national states supplied this deficiency. As nationalism became so exaggerated that states came to live either in a condition of suppressed hostility or open warfare with each other, the cosmopolitan character of education gave way to narrow nationalistic ends instead of broadly social or internationalistic ones. In this phase of its growth, it has been persistently in conflict with the educational-

¹ GENTILE, G., *The Reform of Education* (Bigongiari, D., translator), New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1922, p. 17.

² *Supra*, p. 157.

policies of the Catholic church, whose catholicity transcends national boundaries. There is much pious hope, however, that aggravated nationalism will abate and become again consistent with democratic educational procedures. Encouraging pronouncements in this direction have even emanated from educational philosophies identified with strongly nationalistic fascist states.¹ Some, however, see the only hope of a new cosmopolitanism in education when education is predicated, not on a national state, but on a world state whose educational system will produce loyalty to a world citizenship.²

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¹ GENTILE, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

KUMAJI YOSHIDA, "The Philosophy of Education Underlying the National System of Education in Japan," *International Institute, Educational Yearbook*, 1929, p. 457.

² RUSSELL, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

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CHAPTER X

THE SCHOOL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

The social order at any time is made up of a vast variety of interacting forces. In the action and reaction of these forces, stresses and strains are set up which in the long run tend to offset each other and thus result in a sort of balanced state of affairs. This condition is often referred to as the *status quo*. Such an equilibrium, however, is always uneasy and never static. The pressures of old forces wax and wane, or new ones are introduced, so that both the locus and direction of social tension are always shifting to a greater or less extent. If this dynamic quality were not present, social progress would be impossible.

On the whole, most people have their lives pretty well adjusted to the *status quo*. Of course, they expect progressive improvement, but usually inside the *status quo* as a frame of reference. More than likely they will resist any major disturbance requiring redistribution of social energies of so general a nature as to require a new frame of reference. Such extensive adaptation is quite too precarious for them. What they fear, of course, is that the advantages which they presently derive from the *status quo* will be jeopardized. Outwardly they do obeisance to the idea of progress, but inwardly they view it with suspicion and trepidation.

The individuality of some people, however, is so marked that it cannot be made congruent with things as they are. It cannot abide the *status quo*. Such people are aggressively progressive. Sometimes they are disgruntled with the *status quo* because the existing balance of forces is weighted against their own interests. In other cases, they produce novel ideas or inventions which require thoroughgoing readjustment of the tension of social forces. But, although they press their views in the name of progress, they run the risk of antagonizing their neighbors, who disagree as to what direction progress should take.

Not infrequently the school, or individual teachers in the school, has happened to be the agent of social disturbance. Teachers,

like other laymen, have had insights as to what a better social order might be. In spite of their vision, they have seldom had a chance to teach in this area because the curriculum has been derived from an honored antiquity. Preoccupied with the spoils of a past culture, the school has indirectly and inadvertently been a supporting pillar of the *status quo*. But, on occasion, when the curriculum has drawn its source from the contemporary grinding of social interests, the school and its staff have been instantly recognized as powerful potential forces for dislocating the equilibrium of the *status quo*. Both progressives and conservatives have seen this. Where the school has actually changed conditions, or seriously threatened to, communities have not infrequently been irritated by the disturbance of their complacency and have vented their wrath on the school, particularly on the teachers who have had the temerity to be different. This raises the question whether the school or its personnel should be penalized for an innovating spirit, or whether both should enjoy a privileged position in this regard.

Such an issue has come to the fore, in practice, in a variety of forms. Perhaps the earliest and most persistent is that of religion. Teachers have had strong convictions on this subject, as well as other people. In some places, they are permitted to shine forth according to their lights under the guise of religious liberty. Other places distinguish between the in-school and out-of-school situation, permitting freedom in the latter but not the former. Still others, especially where the community is homogeneous with regard to religion, would permit no trespass by the teacher on community preferences. Much the same situation arises where economic and political issues are substituted for religious ones. Some communities approve the public school's discussion of controversial social issues, but others give them a wide berth. In other quarters, a distinction is made between schooling at the different levels. They would permit the free study of socially disturbing and vexatious problems in the graduate school, and probably the college, but not in the secondary school. Others would permit at least a limited amount of freedom even there. In most places, much turns on the way teaching is carried on. Some teachers present a problem with a variety of answers. They seek to gain critical judgment. Others select a point of view and, whether radical or conservative, proceed to indoctrinate it.

These and similar conflicting practices all raise some very perplexing questions for the philosophy of education. (1) Basic and fundamental is the question as to the relation of the school to the social order. Should the school take its coloration from the social order as it is? Or should the school be viewed as an instrument of social progress? (2) These decisions will, to a certain extent, turn on the way in which the teacher handles controversial issues in the classroom. Should he propagandize or indoctrinate a certain point of view? Or should he give his students an opportunity to decide these issues for themselves? Should the teacher be free to express his own conviction? In sum, should there be academic freedom or, as it has been more comprehensively put in German, *Lehr-und-lernfreiheit*—freedom both to teach and to learn?

1. By far the oldest theory of the mutual relations of the school and the social order, and the one most widely honored in practice, is that the school should conserve the existing social culture. This culture was only won at a great cost of time and suffering. Confronted with the enigmas of life, mankind has only laboriously and at great sacrifice accumulated a stock of solutions. It would, obviously, be a great pity if any of these were to be lost through chance failure to teach them to the oncoming generation. Except culture patterns be conserved through the school, there is no way to shorten the period of trial and error which is incident and precedent to social progress. Especially is it important for the school to perform this conservative function if other social institutions neglect to do so. While, formerly, each institution tended to perpetuate its own mores, in the specialization of a more complex civilization this has been less and less possible. This has made room for the school as a supplementary or residual institution. In this role, the school takes over activities too difficult to be left to the possible bungling of informal instruction through other social agencies. It assumes others which, though ultimately of fundamental social interest, make no immediate practical appeal and are therefore in danger of being imprudently disregarded.
- Such a description of the conservative function of the school should lead one to be very wary in inferring that, therefore, the role of the school is reactionary. It may have been so in times past. But conservative and reactionary are not synonymous terms though they sometimes are treated as such. To treat

them as synonymous is to confuse the form with its content, the vehicle with its load. Proceeding on the conservative theory, it is entirely possible for the school to preserve social systems of the left as well as those of the right, radical ones as well as reactionary ones. Indeed, with this qualification, it is perhaps not too much to assert that nearly all educational philosophers agree that, to some extent at least, the school must be conservative in function.

Even conceding that conservation is indispensable, it must at once become evident that in an advanced civilization the school cannot conserve the whole social heritage through instruction. The total social culture is far too extensive to be crammed into the short span of years that even advanced students spend in school, to say nothing of the short period of compulsory attendance. And even if this were possible, it would probably be undesirable for the curriculum to mirror impartially both the good and the bad in racial experience. The school must exercise a normative function coincident with its conservative one.

This may take several directions. In the first place, the culture of an advanced civilization is not only overwhelming in quantity, but it is also baffling in complexity. One of the things that a school will have to do, therefore, is to simplify what is to be presented to the immature child. Furthermore, not only will it have to simplify it, it may also have to balance it. The time and place into which any child is born suffers under the limitations of its own space-time location. Fortunately, the child is not wholly at the mercy of his locality, for the school can compensate for this disadvantage through balancing the diet of the curriculum. Especially can the school transcend both time and place through such studies as history and geography. The more diverse the elements to which the school introduces the child, the more will there be need for yet another service from the school, that of coordinating the various pulls which different environments make upon him. Coordination, however, implies some system of values. This leads to the last and perhaps most controversial aspect of the normative function of the school, that of purifying the cultural heritage. It requires but a moment's reflection to realize the tremendous improvement which could be brought about through sifting out those culture patterns which are unworthy to be perpetuated. The potential-

ties are great even if the actualization has been somewhat short of expectation.

There are several difficulties with this further development of the conservative function of the school. At the outset, one must beware of simplifying and purifying the school environment so that it becomes but a pallid attenuation of the real society it represents. The question which next arises is what shall be the norm, what kind of a mesh shall the school use in its sieve? It is one thing to say that the school has a telic function, that it is the steering gear of society, but it is quite another to gain general agreement on any particular direction. Considerable objection is voiced against making children's interests and needs the criterion, rather than social demands. Perhaps most general acceptance would be lent to the system of values represented by the *status quo*. Then, whether the society of the moment were capitalistic or communistic, democratic or fascistic, there could be little ambiguity as to the resulting principle of conservation.

A final objection is raised by those who claim that the school should go beyond the *status quo* in its normative function. For them, schooling is not just for the purpose of catching up with and maintaining things as they are, but for forging ahead as well. To them, it is as absurd to think that education can preserve civilization from decaying, as it is that the science of medicine can keep one from dying. It must be the source of new ideas, of a social program that is constantly under reconstruction. A certain amount of this will, of course, take place inside the framework of the *status quo*. One would have to be ultra-reactionary indeed to claim that even the *status quo* could not be improved in minor ways, thus approximating more closely to the ideal on which it is based. What is hinted by this progressive group, however, is that the school in its normative function should originate major changes, changes possibly in the very frame of reference itself!

In this phase, the normative function of the school is creative rather than conservative. It introduces, therefore, the second outstanding theory on the relation of the school to the social order, namely, that it is the duty of the school to take some initiative and responsibility for social progress. Within the supporters of this theory there are two very distinct subdivisions of opinion. One is content to have the school an independent

critic of the *status quo*, with any social progress an indirect or incidental outcome of critical instruction. The other would be much more direct, purposeful, and aggressive. It would have the school form a conception of the better social order and then work with might and main to bring it into being.

Because the latter view stands in more marked contrast to the conservative theory of the relation of the school to the social order, it probably affords the more clear-cut point of departure for an exposition of the school as a pioneer in social progress. To have progress, so the protagonists of this view claim, one must have a plan that gives direction. It is just this, they think, that "progressive education" lacks. Although "progressive education" stresses individualism, it waits for progress to occur through chance variation, but these educational frontiersmen have no patience to wait for progress to occur in such casual, haphazard fashion. Furthermore, "progressive education" seems overawed by the precariousness of the future. On the one hand, this leads to its being too cautious. It seems willing to make only *ad hoc* disposition of each problem as it comes into view from behind the heavy veil of the future. On the other hand, the contingencies of circumstance have led to the cultivation of the agile, adaptable mind to a point where it appears incapable of attachment to some abiding plan or purpose. In place of such a policy of intellectual drift and *laissez faire*, they would recognize or substitute a deep loyalty to some fundamental social plan. If insistence on such a plan seems to smack of imposition and an infringement of freedom, they would not cringe from the indictment but frankly affirm that imposition is inescapable and the only assured road to vital achievement.

If the foregoing be the case, the only question which remains concerns the authorship of the plan. In the past, the school has at different times taken its direction from the clergy, soldiers, statesmen, and business men. It is here proposed that the teachers themselves should exercise leadership. Through the curriculum and methods of instruction the power lies in their hands to achieve major social reconstruction. The only way for teachers to influence the course of human events is boldly and unblushingly to take advantage of this strategic position in which they find themselves. If their competence to do this is challenged, it needs but be pointed out that no other class is

in such complete possession of the wisdom of the ages, nor under such heavy duty to use it in the interests of all the people. Audaciously as the adherents of this view speak of the need of a dominating vision, it is noteworthy that they do not think that the school should espouse particular reforms. But this is just a matter of degree. To act on such a theory of the relation of the school to the social order undoubtedly courts danger. It is to the credit of those subscribing to it that they appreciate its possible consequences. If they would be in the vanguard of social progress, it is realized teachers must accept responsibility for their actions, surrender their security in large measure, and suffer the consequent risk to reputation and fortune.

Courageous and challenging though such a point of view may be, many objections have been entered against it. Some have pointed out that it is preposterous to think that so enormously vast a task as the building of a new social order could be undertaken wholly or mainly by any single social institution such as the school. As a matter of fact, the world is far too complex for such an undertaking. Moreover, there are other institutions as powerful as the school which are equally interested in the amelioration of human ills. Certainly it would be fantastic to think that the school could rearrange social circumstances in opposition to, or without the assistance of, business, the family, or the church. Education can only become a cure when aided by favoring conditions from other departments of life.

A closely allied difficulty raises the question whether the rank and file of teachers is well enough trained to assume the responsibilities of leadership which the creative theory of the school's relation to the social order would demand. Many have grave doubts.¹ The conduct of public affairs is an art as well as an academic discipline. One can only become skillful in this art by actual participation in those affairs. Many teachers are well trained academically, but distressingly few of them have had experience in practical affairs as a background for better teaching, let alone to make them competent in the formation and execution of public policy. Indeed, in the Catholic parochial school,

¹ CHAPMAN, J. C., and COUNTS, G. S., *Principles of Education*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924, p. 624. The difference in Counts' position here and in his *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?*, pp. 27-31, is noteworthy.

where teachers are largely drawn from teaching orders, an advantage is claimed for the fact that the teacher is withdrawn from the turmoil of life.¹ But, even conceding this questioned proficiency, the further question may still be raised whether teachers could agree amongst themselves as to the line along which social regeneration is to occur. As a matter of fact, there seems no more reason to expect unanimity among them than from any other group of lay or professional people.

Realistic as the educational frontiersmen attempt to be in giving concrete space-time location to the social plan which is to command the loyalty of the school, it is surprising to some how close they hover to an unrealistic program. Thus, to adopt a frame of reference markedly different from the *status quo* is to make the school discontinuous with its social milieu.² So, too, a curriculum pitched in advance of the society contemporaneous to it, may be as unrealistic as one that lags too far behind it. Furthermore, if the public refuses to accept the reform program in the school, serious maladjustment may result for pupils who are prepared for a new social order but who are required to live in an old one. When the differential between the rates of educational and social change becomes too great, the antidote is to define a prospect of social amelioration proximate enough so that students will feel it is within realization. The educator must be a gradualist with a long-term view. Moreover, there is danger that the educators who would reform the social order too rapidly or too radically will defeat their own ends and that, at the conclusion of their struggle with the community, they will be worse off than at the beginning. When one bears in mind the slow and halting progress that has been made in achieving the limited freedom which the school has come to enjoy in democratic countries, one should be very cautious in provoking a public resentment which would wipe out the gains already made.

But foremost among objections is the oft-repeated argument that where the role of the school is cast in a democratic society, it is the adult community first and last which must decide what

¹ SHIELDS, T. E., *Philosophy of Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1921, pp. 424-425.

² PINKEVITCH, A. P., *The New Education in the Soviet Republic*, New York, John Day Co., Inc., 1929, pp. 153-154.

kind of social order the schools shall nourish. Where the sense of the community is ultimate, it is certainly too much to expect that it will long support a school which undermines the very foundation of that support. In fact, to teach contrary to its dictates, almost behind its back, so to speak, is positively unethical. The state has an instinct of self-perpetuation, as the individual has one of self-preservation. Moreover, it can be pointed out that, as a matter of the constitutional framework of government, it is the legislature and not the school that is entrusted with deciding broad matters of social policy. So, if the reform of the social order is a school matter at all, it seems that the only recourse is to adult education in its widest meaning.

A good argument can be made that the real source of social change is not to be found in the schools at all, but in much more powerful and elemental forces. The really basic factors which compel the alteration of social mores are such things as mechanical invention, military conquest, the strife of economic classes, racial migration, political revolution, and crusading religion. Certainly the school can hardly hope to harness the tides of such basic energies to its leadership. Rather is the school more likely to be carried in and out with them.

From these objections to the theory that the school should give direction to social progress, it would be an unfair inference, in most instances, that these same critics did not think the school had any role to play in social progress. On the contrary, they assign a very important part to the school. This part is to complete and consolidate changes in social policy when they have been decided upon—whether by bullets or by ballots. In this view, the school is the servant of social change, not its master. Or, perhaps more accurately yet, one should set aside as futile any discussion of which is cause and which effect, education or social change. The two are mutually interactive, circular, never ending. Each cross-fertilizes the other.

But many adherents of this latter position will admit that it would be unfortunate indeed if educational policies and programs were to shift with every variation in the conditions of social life. Certainly the school must be more than a weather vane. Yet it would be their further opinion that, if the school could even slightly modify the great elemental forces of society, it should exercise its influence to reduce the extremes of social oscillation.

In times of rapid change, they feel that the function of the school is to stabilize the period of transition, rather than to accelerate the flux of disturbing forces.¹ It is a time to emphasize the fundamental values which have maintained their position of eminence in the cultural heritage over long stretches of time. This does not mean that they favor a rigid static social order, but rather that they prefer stability to instability, security to insecurity. They would make haste slowly, realizing that it is one of the most puzzling of all social problems how to adapt old institutions to new conditions and yet maintain stability at the same time.

One way this difficulty has been solved has been through the private school. The public school, committed in the great majority of cases to the theory of conservation, acts as the fly-wheel of the social order, while the private school, addicted to variations from the public mold, is depended on for trying out new ideas. The chief progress, however, which has resulted from this arrangement has been in professional educational techniques. Naturally, such innovations have not often menaced vested social interests and drawn threats against the privileges of the private schools. That this security would long remain free from interference, if private schools were to espouse radically new social orders, is not very likely.

Perhaps another way is to return to that other subdivision of opinion which, while holding that the school has a responsibility for social progress, would discharge this obligation by attempting to maintain the school as an independent agency of criticism. According to this theory, the school would detach itself from single allegiance to any particular economic or political program which needed to be conserved or brought into being. Instead, it would be constituted as a place where all sorts of social programs would be studied, however varied and contradictory they might be. They would make the educational process a judicial rather than a legislative or executive one. School would be a place to become intelligently informed about human affairs and to learn to make discriminating judgments about them. Social progress would then be a by-product of a well-educated citizenry; not something directly and collectively aimed at by the school.

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., *Education and Emergent Man*. New York. Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1934, p. 155.

To have a governmental agency such as the school stand off and criticize the actions of the state will require a great amount of self-imposed restraint on the part of the sovereign. Under a monistic theory of the state¹ it would probably be too much to expect. With a pluralistic state,² however, it is quite possible, even desirable. Pushing beyond this, one hears the claim that education should not suffer its objectives to be externally imposed, but that it should be autonomous, free to erect its own ends.³ Further implying this pluralistic point of view, there are some who would go so far as to set up a school-state wholly independent of the political state.⁴ They would not make the school independent from the general electorate, but they would make the school directly responsible to them, and not indirectly so, through the legislative or executive branches of government. The various reasons which might be adduced for such a policy can be summed up in the statement that political interests are ephemeral, while the cultural interests of the school far outrun annual or even quadrennial elections. Politics must think and act in the present or immediate future. The cycle for maturing a new school generation with its set of ideas is much longer. Moreover, the transition from one political regime to the other would be much less of a shock to the schools if the administration of the latter had a long-term independent status. No periodic social convulsion would be required to transfer the schools from one regime to another, if freedom were their settled policy, no matter what faction commanded a political majority.

On first examination, it may seem as if the independence which this critical theory of the responsibility of the school for social progress demands for the school may result in a remoteness of the school from the social order. But not so. The formulation of educational ends should grow out of whatever is incomplete in the everyday lives of those who are learning. Indeed, they undoubtedly will if, as usual, participation in the vital activities of a social group leaves a sense of the unfinished. Under such

¹ *Supra*, pp. 194-196.

² *Supra*, pp. 196-197.

³ Dewey, J., *Sources of a Science of Education*, New York, Liveright Publishing Company, 1931, pp. 73-75.

⁴ *National Education Association, Department of Superintendence, Twelfth Yearbook*, pp. 65-66.

circumstances, any vital education will inescapably have a share in building the social order of the moment. Proceeding on such premises, education as well as politics is a process of discovering what values are of most worth. The school is one of the community's resources for social experimentation and, as such, should not be neglected. What the supporters of this critical theory seek is not an alienation of the school from life, but protection in a freedom to study life independently. According to this theory, the school is not the supine servant of the social order, nor will its leadership be so tactless as to flaunt in the face of the community doctrines which the latter overwhelmingly disapproves.

Various administrative devices have found their way into legislation to assure education independence of action. Chief here have been tenure laws for teachers. These have sought to protect teachers from dismissal for reasons irrelevant to their professional efficiency. Also looking to an emancipated status have been laws making boards of education financially independent from the usual local fiscal authorities. While such enactments may reveal a certain outward form of independence, unfortunately they do not always result in encouraging the critical attitude inside the school. Perhaps this is because there is some doubt about their real defensive strength, were an aroused public opinion to beat upon them. Perhaps, too, this security has sometimes been purchased at the price of freedom.

So, the question arises whether the school can have freedom and security at one and the same time. If the school is to criticize freely, must it not accept responsibility for any dislocation of the *status quo* which may result? In fact, would it be just for it to escape the consequences of its teaching, through a special privilege of security? Some take refuge from these pertinent queries in the legalistic argument that teachers are employees of the board of education and therefore must teach what it orders to be taught.¹ But the answer most often given to these questions is that in a pluralistic culture the school should be neutral on controversial issues. It is said that the school belongs to all the people and that the curriculum, therefore, should exclude the discussion of issues which divide the community and consequently

¹ KILPATRICK, W. H., *Sourcebook in the Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1934, Number 609, pp. 298-299.

endanger the community's wholehearted support of the school. This principle of neutrality originated first in the case of religion, but has since become an active tradition in the case of politics and economics as well.

A heavy barrage of criticism has been leveled at this position. That any school teacher or administrator can be completely nonpartisan or altogether objective about the fundamental problems which agitate society is scouted as idle pretension. Human beings are individuals. It is of the essence of individuality that one has a unique set of characteristics or preferences. Thus, an individual by his very nature stands for this or that, and not "neither," which is the etymological meaning of the word neutral. This being the case, neutrality is at best a remote possibility.

Yet, suppose that one concedes the achievement of neutrality by the school. On the one hand, there is the inevitable misfortune that some of the best places in the curriculum will have to be left blank.¹ On the other, there is the paradox that the neutral school unwittingly becomes the partisan of the *status quo*! For the school to refuse to take sides frequently amounts to denying what is left unsaid, or leaves the balance of social forces *in statu quo ante*—just as they were. Thus, it must be seen that a refusal to choose between social alternatives has just as definite moral consequences as an affirmative act of choice itself. This being the case, it would seem in the interest of clarity for the school to be forthright in its social inclinations. Needless to add, these are the scruples of a democratic state. In a totalitarian state of either the fascist or communist model neutrality is neither possible nor is it a desideratum.

Imagine it be granted now that neutrality on the part of the school must necessarily give way to partiality. If the school in its role of criticism shows partiality to the *status quo*, its security will doubtless be in no jeopardy at all. But can security be retained, where criticism is adverse to the present order? If it can, the state will have to exercise good-natured tolerance and self-control. And, what is equally important, the school, on its part, will have to give convincing assurance that it will act its role of criticism with the utmost fairness. It is fairness, really, rather than neutrality that should be the earnest for the school's

¹ Hocking, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1923, p. 260.

independence and security. Decision and preference are unavoidable. The real focus of attention, however, should be on whether they are fairly arrived at. This is the case with the courts. No one expects the courts to be neutral, that is, to refuse to decide for either the plaintiff or the defendant. But they do expect the courts to arrive at their decisions openly and without fear or favor. This same attitude of the public, it is urged, should also attach to the schools.

Some would reject even this concept of judicial fairness. To them, the judge whose bias does not creep into the "weight of the evidence" is a fiction. Or, they ask, how can all sides be fairly represented, when one side is entrenched in the prejudices of the *status quo*? Certainly, there should be no illusions about the difficulty of gaining fairness in instruction on controversial issues. It is, perhaps, only less difficult than being neutral. But, if confidence could be established in a human amount of it, the school might bear some modest responsibility for social progress.

2. This leads directly to a discussion of what may be considered proper methods for handling controversial issues in the classroom. There are several possibilities.¹ Issues might be presented as if they had but one side to them. This is variously called education by imposition, authority, indoctrination, or propaganda. This method is an admirable instrument to the hands of those who know in advance the kind of social order they want, whether it be the old or a new one. Another possibility is to present contrary viewpoints as well but assure a favorable outcome for a predetermined point of view. This sort of teaching registers some uneasiness about minority opinion but makes only a feeble gesture in its direction. Its long-term effect is but a slightly more circuitous route to regimenting a preconceived social order. A last option would have all sides of a problem presented, so that the students can independently think themselves through to their own personal conclusions. This would be the method of academic freedom. It fits very nicely, of course, with

¹ It has also been noted that there are several types of controversial issues: those that (1) once were controversial, (2) were controversial elsewhere, (3) are controversial only locally, (4) deal with highly dangerous problems, like religion, (5) are "dangerous but necessary," like economics. KILPATRICK, W. H., "The Teacher's Place in the Social Life of Today," *School and Society*, 46: 133, July, 1937.

the theory that the school should be a fearless critic of the *status quo*.

In a state with a relatively monolithic or totalitarian culture, for instance communism or fascism, teaching controversial issues is quickly disposed of, for there virtually are none. Here, there will be authoritative imposition through indoctrination of an official stereotype. Opposing views may be set up, but only to be mowed down by the official rebuttal. In a democracy, however, the problem is much more complex. At first glance, it might seem as if academic freedom is the peculiarly appropriate method of an individualistic, pluralistic culture such as democracy's and that, therefore, it should hold sway in democracy's schools as indoctrination does in authoritarian states. But, however that may be, the very freedom of democracy seems to tolerate diverse methods as well as varied substantive beliefs. Consequently, the method of authoritative imposition and the method of free discussion both find lodgment in a democratic school system. Their relative merits must now be explored in some detail.

On behalf of education through indoctrination or imposition, a number of supporting arguments can be made. At the very outset, the claim is advanced that it is inevitable. Merely to be born into a culture causes the child to adopt certain patterns of conduct, without the option of consciously weighing alternate possibilities. And even later, some decisions have to be made for the child before he is old enough to judge for himself. So much would probably be conceded by nearly all shades of opinion.

The more crucial problem is whether authoritarian methods should be continued in use when the child reaches later levels where conceivably he is mature enough to make his own decisions. Some would proclaim advantages from indoctrination at these points as well. If there is all but unanimous agreement on the merit of what is to be taught, they say an authoritative statement of the matter at hand is the only proper way to economize the time and energy of both pupil and teacher. Only so can society's long trail of trial and error be foreshortened for the plodding student generation.

Churches with absolutistic religions seem especially inclined to this sort of instructional method. Here, certitude does not even

wait on the common sense of the community but is usually the pronouncement of a hierarchical leadership concerning eternal verities. True, certain vistas of speculation are closed by this kind of teaching, but this loss is more than compensated for in the single-mindedness with which essential truths can be pursued. Much the same justification is made for indoctrination, where the subject matter is politics and economics. In these fields there is neither unanimity in the body politic as a whole, nor does any particular faction recognize an infallible leadership. But, in spite of these lacks, there are those who think that the energies released by overpowering loyalty to some social ideal more than offset the loss of such benefits as accrue from teaching which regards changing shades of opinion. The function of intelligence in education is not to choose a course of action from all the possible alternatives, but to discover what is socially necessary.

The underlying philosophy of this sort of teaching has been attacked from several sides. Those impressed with the basically changing and unsettled nature of the world look very skeptically at any teaching bottomed on absolutism, whether that absolutism be political, religious, or scientific. Inflexible viewpoints in a flexible world are unrealistic. In a contingent universe, there must be room for the critical weighing of alternative possibilities. This also implies a theory of intelligence as an instrument for reconstructing the social order, in preference to the one which views mind as a mirror of immutable and unquestioned truth.¹

Propagandistic or authoritative teaching has also been criticized as unethical. It is said to treat the child as a means rather than as an end.² Instead of learning to use his own intelligence independently, the pupil becomes more dependent on the thinking of others.³ This is especially unfortunate where these others slip into confusing the common good with their own selfish interests. Propaganda then becomes all the more insidious as a pretense at education, for its dogmatism and self-announced absolutism so easily cloud the eye of the immature and unwary to the intentionally biased opinions set forth.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 66-68.

² *Supra*, pp. 135-136.

³ DEWEY, J., *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1922, p. 64.

Probably the authoritarian teacher would object strenuously to the inference that his teaching failed to show a due ethical regard toward his pupils. On the contrary, he would more than likely claim that any views he might impose would be with the distinct purpose of improving the basis for discriminating judgment. If he were subtle, he would not wholly avoid the shoals of difficulty, but neither would he permit his charges to spend fruitless hours stranded upon them. Preferably, he would manipulate the present interests of children into the main currents of truth as quickly as possible. Doubtless the critics do not want to waste time on the reef either. They, too, would bring succor ultimately. The difference, then, between the authoritarians and their critics seems to be in locating the point at which the amount of trial-and-error learning conducted by the pupil results in too much error and not enough success. This conclusion might be stated in the form of the following question: Should the teacher hurry to the aid of the perplexed student, or should he bestir himself only as a last resort?

For those who flee from an education built on indoctrination, propaganda, or imposition, the logical recourse is to freedom. The reasons for preferring freedom in the teaching of controversial issues are varied. Whatever rational ones are brought forward, it is probably well to realize at the outset that ultimately the value of freedom rests on dogma, just as does the authoritarian position. So, fundamental to the position of freedom is the presupposition of the freedom of the will and the assumption that the teacher and the pupil face a precarious and contingent universe. Some things are more or less likely to happen in the future, but the precise details of their occurrence are shrouded in uncertainty. Consequently, there will always be a penumbra of doubt hanging over the outcome of present activities. Security can only be obtained by trying to anticipate how events will turn out. To perform this office, intelligence must be free. There must be no beliefs with a preferred status which have to be maintained by averting the searchlight of liberated mind. But individuals, because they are individuals, are bound to differ on this very vital point. In a sense, this contrariety of opinion seems to double the hazards of the future. Not only is the future something of a quandary, but people are perplexed what to do about it. Some try to reduce this risk by limiting the variability of

opinion. This is the direction to authoritarian instruction. Freedom, on the contrary, finds strength in augmenting the variety of thought. It feels that the wider the range of policies from which to choose, the greater the assurance of finding a solution to any difficulties which the future may propose, and the greater the prospect for social progress.

Acceptable as this statement may be in general, few of its supporters would accept it unqualifiedly. The vessel is shapely, but too light for the buffeting ahead. Many who would embark in it feel it ought to carry some ballast. There are learned and sincere people who believe in freedom, but only so long as it is exercised inside of, and consistent with, some basic frame of reference. In a private educational foundation, this frame may be the intent of the founders or the conditions on which donors make bequests. Another important illustration is that of the sectarian school or college. Here, so long as free inquiry ends by reaffirming the sectarian principles of the institution, it will be in favor. Yet, such a view is not limited to private or sectarian schools; it applies to public ones as well. Freedom of teaching there in matters of citizenship is hardly likely to transcend the political philosophy of the state. The communistic school produces communistic citizens, not capitalistic ones. So, in a democratic state, the teacher may employ the freest procedures so long as pupils graduate thoroughly inculcated with democracy. Any other kind of freedom is license.

There is a very respectable body of opinion, however, which thinks that academic freedom must be complete, that there must be no limits beyond which the inquiring mind cannot penetrate. They would doubt whether the question of academic freedom could even be raised in a sectarian or proprietary institution. Others, indeed, would extend this skepticism to limitations of the social order itself. For instance, they raise the pertinent question whether the profit motive of the capitalist order is not a distorting factor which makes the unhampered pursuit of truth almost impossible. Yet the same doubt can be raised about a collectivist society.¹ Planned societies are usually opposed to *laissez faire*, but what more is academic freedom than a sort of

¹ In *Capitalism and Its Culture*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1935, p. 371, J. Davis, a critic of capitalism, states it as a fact that there is more academic freedom in the capitalist system than in the communist.

laissez faire of the mind? If the argument for academic freedom is sound, it seems that both capitalist and collectivist societies have equal need of free teachers, if each would advance and progress with its own program. Both agree that there can be no freedom unless conditioned by economic security. But, strangely enough, each fails to see, when in power, how its proposed road to security is covertly a threat to the very integrity of freedom itself.

Yet, even if academic freedom escapes the restrictions of social or institutional doctrine, there are still other precautionary measures it must face. One of these would limit the teacher's liberty to the field of his specialization. Within these confines, there seems general agreement that he should be completely free to investigate, publish, and teach the truth as he sees it. This is the very core of academic freedom. Unless it be granted and protected, one avenue to social progress is seriously obstructed.

But suppose, now, that the teacher elects to speak outside the scope of his specialty. Policy here is not so clear. Some would guard against this by sharply restricting freedom at this point. Such excursions, it is said, are unfair to the student who elected the course for its announced content. It may also be misleading to the public, which will, as like as not, indiscriminately associate the prestige of the teacher's official status with anything he may say. Others, however, would regret such a digression, but nevertheless would permit it. The harm that might result from misinforming students and public, they think, is outweighed by the heavier responsibilities which might arise from censorship. Once the latter is set up, there is an implicit institutional approval of anything the teacher does succeed in saying.

Even in the precincts of specialization, some think academic freedom is such a sharp tool that further safety devices should be installed against accidents in use. Most notable here is the instructor's classroom method. The privilege of freely following an argument whithersoever it may lead is not unaccompanied with certain proprieties. Chief among these is for the teacher to remember that the freedom accorded him is not a purely personal privilege, but that it is primarily for the benefit of his students. His method, therefore, should not be to hand out ready-made conclusions but to encourage freedom on the part of his students. Opportunity should be afforded them for the independent exercise

of their own intellectual equipment. On the one hand, this will involve training in patterns of thought and feeling which will enable them to approach new problems. On the other hand, it will entail making accessible the more important sources of information. In this latter, the teacher should be scrupulously careful to present without suppression or innuendo the divergent opinions of competent investigators in the field. The instructor must steer a careful course between the Scylla of the "right answer" complex and the Charybdis of leaving the student's mind in a state of confusion.

As to whether he should include a statement of his own convictions among others, there seems some difference of opinion. Since the teaching function, especially in a public school, is representative rather than personal, some would carefully warn teachers against the injection of their own individual opinions into the discussion of controversial issues. They think it just as undesirable for the teacher to call his students' attention to his republican, democratic, or communistic sympathies as to his Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish faith. Some would not even have the pupils take sides, since there is no effective action which they can take until they grow older. For the interim, suspended judgment is recommended. Others think that the teacher's opinion should be thrown into the balance along with the rest. The only thing he must vigilantly guard against is that his position as teacher does not unduly influence his pupils in coming to their personal conclusions. This he can encompass by various artifices, such as delaying the presentation of his own views, encouraging students to be present where members of the teaching staff disagree, and when opponents are likely to be evenly matched in knowledge and persuasiveness, but above all by tempering both his written and oral statements with a certain dispassionateness and self-restraint—a professional and scholarly decorum.

But suppose, now, that teachers were to be successful in cultivating this even-tempered method of teaching, and suppose, further, that they were to succeed in getting their students to weigh controversial issues in the cool temperature of reason, is there danger that both will lose their ultimate effectiveness by sublimating their energizing emotions? Emotions may becloud reason, but they are also the reservoirs of the faith which can

move mountains. Again, if children are taught to face a world of flux and contingency in which there are no ideals to cling to unwaveringly, where shall one look for the strength of conviction which makes martyrs? To these questions there are no immediate or easy answers. History records no society that has been managed on such rational democratic principles, from school to legislature. The chief hope in the future seems to lie in seeing whether the principle of the open mind can find nourishment in the soil of emotional zeal, as have other great faiths like nationalism and religion.¹

The further question arises in connection with academic freedom, as with all other delicate and finely wrought instruments: What age levels in the school population shall be permitted to wield it. Originally, academic freedom was associated with instruction of university grade. There are those who would still confine it to that level and hold it inapplicable to the work of the secondary and elementary levels. There is some doubt, however, about the adequacy of this view. So small a percentage of students attend higher institutions of learning, and the exactions of democracy from the average man are so great, that schools can hardly start early enough to train the citizenry in habits of free criticism. At the opposite pole are those who would extend complete freedom to all the teachers throughout the whole school system. Even though children of tender years cannot understand the complex issues of the modern politico-economic system, nevertheless it is felt by this pole of thought that it will be a grave misfortune for children to learn—as it is feared they too soon will—that their teachers believe one thing and teach another.

The majority of those who have given this problem thought would be inclined to graduate the amount of academic freedom.² Some would make the degree of academic freedom dependent upon the maturity of the learner. In the university, freedom would be unlimited, with the possible exception of a tapering-off in the first two years of the undergraduate college. Below that,

¹ PRING, B., *Education, Capitalist and Socialist*, London, Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1937, pp. 265-266, 269.

² For a detailed consideration of freedom at the various levels of the educational ladder, see *John Dewey Society, Second Yearbook*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1938, Chaps. 4-7.

there would be a further gradual reduction down to the earliest grades. Others, commencing in the same way, would make concessions further down the educational ladder in proportion to the pressure from local custom and prejudice, especially from the parents concerned. Still others would take into account what is all too frequently overlooked in defending the claims of academic freedom, the qualifications of the teacher. They would hold that, if a teacher is to enjoy a special privilege, such as academic freedom, he must earn or deserve it by virtue of his training and experience. If the social order is to be criticized with the school as a sounding board, the community must have assurance of the competence of the educational leadership.

Reference has just been made to the traditions and idiosyncracies of the community. Perhaps a further word is in order with regard to the way in which they condition academic freedom. If one takes the democratic point of view that the community is the ultimate judge of its own mores, then the predispositions of the community are an inescapable dimension of the problem of academic freedom. The most painstaking formulation of the principle of freedom will be of no avail, if parents and citizens will have none of it. Teachers must, therefore, practice the golden rule and treat the community even as they would be treated in return. If the teacher craves freedom to express his own individuality, so too does the community, he must remember. But if the teacher takes a tactless delight in shocking and irritating local sympathies, he must not be surprised or provoked at any consequent alienation of public support. Such inconsiderate teachers do more harm to the cause of freedom than do many of its avowed enemies. Courteous persuasion, not insolent defiance, should be the teacher's manner.

Yet, even where freedom is hedged about by carefully thought-out precautions, there are still obstacles aplenty to surmount. Not infrequently the teacher himself stands in his own light. The inertia of the folkways is often strong upon him, and he complacently submits to restrictions which a little pluck on his part might have escaped. In spite of this probability, just where to stand one's ground and where to make a graceful retreat is a most difficult problem. There may be such an easy screen for lack of courage, and courage can so easily become foolhardiness. There are a few American folkways or habits of mind which have

particularly tended to put fear, rather than enterprise, in teachers' hearts and minds. Among these might be listed the survival of a certain authoritarianism from evangelical religion, the feeling that the school has a paternalistic responsibility for the beliefs of children, a corresponding blind spot to the fact that loyalty to institutions cannot be legislated but must be won by persuasion and conviction, and a confidence in majority rule in matters of intellectual investigation as well as those of politics. This latter is still manifest in some places where Jacksonian democracy makes the teacher's position a spoils of office.

In the foregoing treatment, academic freedom has been considered apart from any specification of a social time dimension. Nothing has been prescribed as to the contemporary state of law and order. Suppose, now, that there is either the external threat of foreign war or the internal menace of insurrection. Should these conditions lead to any compromise on the principles of academic freedom? Some think that then, more than ever, is needed every variant intellectual resource for meeting the common danger. Others fear that too great variety will lead to disunity, and disunion to weakness. Doubtless, in the end, this is an issue of fact. However that may be, communities pretty generally take the more conservative view and, at least temporarily, curtail the guarantees of academic freedom.

Up to this point, freedom has been discussed as a perquisite of the teacher. Freedom, however, also belongs to the citizen, and let no one forget that the teacher is a citizen as well as a teacher. In this overlapping of the roles of citizen and teacher may be found a fresh supply of issues with which a philosophy of education must deal. These problems can be brought to a focus in the resort teachers are wont to make to their civil liberties when their claim of academic freedom is insufficient to shield them from an aroused public opinion. Does the fact that teachers deal with the immature put them on a different footing from the general run of citizenry in the discussion of controversial issues?

There are a number who insist that the teacher must carefully differentiate his dual role. Some of this number make this emphasis to protect academic freedom, others to guard their rights as citizens. Approaching the problem from the former angle, one finds the view that academic freedom enjoys a greater

immunity from hostile public opinion than does the liberty of the citizen. This is because of the teacher's advanced training and his duty to inform children of conflicting viewpoints. Consequently, in order to guard this advantage, they would only extend its protecting cloak to the teacher while he teaches in his field of competence and with the precautions already noted. As soon as he makes digressions into other areas of learning, they would reduce his freedom to that of the ordinary citizen, because in these precincts the teacher's excellence is no greater than the layman's.

Coming at the same problem from the other side, there are some who are fearful lest this much of a restriction on academic freedom will have the further repercussion of a diminution of their rights as citizens. Among these, they claim the freedom to persuade their neighbors to new conceptions of the social order. At first inspection, it may appear as if preventing the teacher from saying anything he wants to in or outside the classroom is an abridgment of his liberties as a citizen. But this need not necessarily be the case, if one will agree that the teacher must differentiate between his capacities as teacher and citizen. There are many who would protect him as long as he agitates for social progress as a citizen but would be quick to withdraw this protection as soon as he carries on similar activities in the classroom.

But, even if the teacher scrupulously tries to differentiate his two functions, will the public and his pupils be equally careful to distinguish in which capacity he is acting? Will not the teacher's engaging in public affairs on one side or another become a matter of common information and thus be tantamount to an indirect form of teaching? The most impartial classroom instruction would then have an inferential bias. In view of this roundabout danger of confusing citizenship and teaching, teachers have been cautioned to have a sharp eye out for the educational consequences of insisting on their rights as citizens. If, in trying to maintain both his rights as a teacher and as a citizen, conflict should occur, the teacher is bound to strike the balance in favor of the best result educationally to pupil and community. More extreme would be the advice that the teacher should never be a partisan in community affairs. If his conscience makes him feel a hypocrite in not acting out his convictions, then his only

recourse is to detach himself from the teaching service and further advocate his cause as a private citizen. Some have pointed out that such action would almost be equivalent to disfranchisement of the teacher.¹

Opposed to all these views are those who think that being a teacher should not in any way handicap a person as citizen. How, they inquire, can a teacher produce good citizenship through teaching, unless he himself can participate to the full in the duties of being a citizen and make these experiences available for his students? For them, the question answers itself. For them, the citizen-schoolmaster must be an incarnation of the better self of the populace. They would have no restrictions placed on teachers, as teachers, to which other citizens are not subjected as citizens.

Particularly would they press this point in the matter of teacher loyalty oaths. They see no reason why they should be selected out, as teachers, to be compelled to avow their loyalty to state and national constitutions, when other citizens are not required to do so. If it be said that they should swear an oath like other officers of the state, the technical objection must be raised that teachers are not public officers. Certainly, to say that teachers as a class are peculiarly susceptible to disloyalty is contrary to fact. If it is the permanence of the *status quo* which is in danger, it needs pointing out that these very constitutions generally not only guarantee free inquiry and discussion but, what is decisively significant, they contemplate their own amendment. Furthermore, when a pluralistic state engages the services of a teacher, it acts as the representative of society. The obligation of the teacher is to serve society, not to protect the existing state from change.

Whether the teacher be relying on his academic freedom or his liberty as a citizen, the question is bound to arise, sooner or later, who is to determine whether or not he has violated his trust. Some think that the lay representatives of the community, notably the board of education, should be the judges. This is frequently the case. On the other hand, if the teacher's privilege of freedom is predicated on his superior learning, it may be doubted that laymen are capable of judging whether a teacher

¹ RAUP, R. B., *Education and Organized Interests in America*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936, p. 222.

has exceeded his authority or been unfaithful to his trust. Indeed, the profession is quite unanimous in insisting that such questions should be settled by a jury composed in whole, or at least in part, of the teacher's professional peers.

Many other devices have been advocated, from time to time, to secure the teacher in the exercise of his academic freedom, such as tenure laws, regulations for a larger share in educational administration, stronger professional organizations, contractual provisions, or better training of teachers.¹ But there is perhaps nothing so important as educating the public to the social significance of freedom. Here one meets a strange paradox. To secure the blessings of liberty, it is argued that freedom should be indoctrinated! Since freedom is as much a dogma as authoritarianism, it is said one may as well openly propagandize it. Nor need his conscience bother him, for such indoctrination would implant a way for testing the validity of all doctrines.

If this be indoctrination, then indeed it must needs be indoctrination of a very special kind, say others.² It is indoctrination in the position that the individual has a right to make his own decisions. Stated paradoxically again, it is indoctrination in the belief that indoctrination is wrong. Tongue twisting aside, it is difficult for many of freedom's friends to see wherein freedom can be made secure by entrusting its perpetuation to the nurture of educational procedures which are the antithesis of freedom.

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¹ For a brief review of the pros and cons of these devices, see H. K. Beale, *Are American Teachers Free?* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936, pp. 686-688.

² Cf. the kind of indoctrination described by T. H. Briggs, in "Should Education Indoctrinate?" *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 22: 583-584, November, 1936.

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CHAPTER XI

THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS—I

Ultimately, the focal point of any consideration of the educative process must be some act of learning. The outcome of this act will naturally vary immediately with the sort of curriculum and methods that are employed. More remotely but nonetheless powerfully, it will be conditioned by such considerations as political and economic theory. Yet more distantly but even more fundamentally, it will be influenced by the arguments of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Up to this point, the emphasis in the preceding philosophical exposition has been centrifugal from the immediate act of learning out toward these more remote ramifications. It is time now for this direction to be reversed and for the emphasis to be centripetal in toward the immediate workings of the educative process, toward a firsthand examination of the details of the teaching-learning strategy itself.

Whereas heretofore diverse schoolroom procedures have frequently furnished points of departure for excursions into underlying philosophies, they must now become themselves the main object of discussion. Formerly, a mere sampling of divergent practices was employed to anchor the subsequent abstractions of theory to concrete reality. This will no longer suffice. It will now be necessary to cover all these practices, to examine the whole inventory of patterns of the immediate teaching-learning process. No attempt, however, will be made to give a complete analysis of practical procedures. The treatment is only intended to be comprehensive in point of the general theory of curriculum and method.

The sequence in which these problems might be taken up is various. The following is suggested here. (1) Initial in importance is the matter of direction. How shall one conceive the nature of educational aims and objectives? Just how shall they be employed in guiding the educative process? (2) More

particularly, what bearing does the nature of aims have on the curriculum? Of course, much will hang here on the further question, how shall the nature of the curriculum itself be conceived? (3) Again, just how shall the values inherent in aims and curricula be utilized in motivating learning? What is the nature of interest and when should it be employed? Should the educative process be based rather on effort and discipline? (4) How do all these values enter into the evaluation or measurement of what has been learned? In fact, how can one be sure, at the conclusion of an episode in the educative process, that any learning has taken place? What are the appropriate roles of measurement and evaluation in education?

(5) In organizing the curriculum, what should be the temporal order in which materials are studied? Should the sequence follow the logic of the mature scholar or the psychological order of the immature learner? (6) In addition to the temporal, what sort of structural organization should the lesson have? What are the respective merits of dogmatic, authoritative exposition as over against problems requiring investigation? (7) Finally, what of the social dimension of the organization of the educative process? How important is a social context for learning? To what extent should there be freedom for pupil individuality to express itself? How shall the social discipline of the school be managed?

1. That educational aims are to be conceived primarily as a phase of educational values has already been dwelt upon.¹ In the earlier discussion, aims and values were approached from the twin angles of the psychologically desired and the ethically desirable. The endeavor was to improve the choice of educational values or ends. The present emphasis is not so much on which direction education should take as it is on the simple importance of taking some aim when learning or teaching.

To have an educational aim is to endeavor to anticipate the outcome of some present or projected educational activity. From this point of view, it is perhaps more graphic to speak of educational ends rather than aims. Not only does an aim try to envision what the termination of present educative effort will be, but this vision, once gained, is an instrument in guiding both pupil and teacher to that end. This service is twofold.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 84-89.

It helps in sizing up the means which are available for reaching the end and, in the second place, it suggests the order in which steps should be taken to get there. Conversely, if one fails to connect the logically foreseeable consequences of educative activity with that activity itself, then the educative process becomes random and even capricious. Indeed, without an aim it becomes unintelligent and irresponsible.

Before going further, it will probably be well to make two distinctions. In the first place, an aim or purpose is something more than a native impulse. It originates in impulse, to be sure, but it does not become an aim or purpose till some endeavor has been made to trace out what will be the probable consequences of acting on the impulse. In the second place, educational outcomes will sometimes be a surprise, compared to what was anticipated or aimed at. For this reason, it is important to distinguish aims or objectives from outcomes or results. The former are a matter of foresight, while the latter are a matter of hindsight. The former are what one tries to learn to teach; the latter, what one actually succeeds in learning or teaching. Since time inexorably marches on, education is bound to have outcomes or results, whether or not they have been preceded by thought-out aims or objectives. This being the case, there should be little objection to the conclusion that a careful use of aims is the only intelligent way to manage the educative process.

So far, there will probably be general agreement. Beyond this point, differences crop out. One of the first points of conflict concerns whether educational aims should have a fixed, immutable quality or whether they should be flexible and subject to continual reconstruction. There are many who favor the former sort of aim. The sort of metaphysic to which this group subscribes is obvious.¹ They feel no security or confidence in their educational endeavors unless they can strive toward a definite, unchanging ideal. If the objective keeps constantly shifting, they feel a persistent, sidelong anxiety which saps their best efforts. Paradoxical though it may seem, an immutable goal liberates rather than inhibits their powers. Nor does it have an undue rigidity in practice. On the contrary, it admits of a very considerable flexibility of application.

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 39-40.

Others, adopting the opposite metaphysic, find fixed aims not only inadequate, but almost a menace.¹ In a world composed of a mixture of the contingent and the recurrent, educational aims, to be realistic, must shift with the rest of the scenery. Instead of being final, they should be merely tentative. Thus, when an educational experience is evaluated at its conclusion, it may be found necessary to reconstruct the objective as well as to alter the procedure. The environment not only changes as one learns, but learning itself does something to the environment. On both these counts it would be unfortunate if aims did not keep pace with the transformation in attendant circumstances.

The flexibility or rigidity of educational aims is involved in the further problem, whether educational aims should arise out of an ongoing experience or whether they should be conceived as external to it. Scholastic educational philosophy favors the latter conception. Experience fluctuates too much to be a satisfactory source of educational aims. Aims arising out of such a flux could hardly be steady enough to give effective guidance to the educative process. What is needed is an aim which lies outside and above experience. It must lie outside, so that it may be fixed and not be subject to variation; it must lie above it, so that it may be perfect and achieve its full stature as an educational ideal.

The opposite view, that educational aims should emerge from experience, is almost a forced conclusion from the position that aims should be constantly reshaped to meet the needs of a dynamic environment. The advantage of this sort of aim to the teacher or learner is that he directly appreciates its relation to what is going on. He feels the problem and the need for anticipating its outcome. It is of crucial importance that he is seeking an answer to his *own* question, not someone else's. Educational aims are thus not only purposeful, but personal. It is in this sense, then, that it has been said that education has no aims, that only such as parents, pupils, and teachers have them. Such aims liberate intelligence because intelligence is employed in their selection.

The crucial difference between these views seems to center on the mutual relation of ends and means. The latter view holds that educational ends cannot be intelligently set forth without

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 38-39.

a consideration of the means that bring them within reach. From the former view, ends remain trusted and valuable no matter how inaccessible they are, no matter how difficult it is to improvise means for their realization. From the one view, ends, once achieved, become resources or means in the quest for further ends. Such a merging of ends and means is quite unacceptable to the other side. For them, there are some aims, like values,¹ which are not instrumental but final. They are ultimate; they are ends in and of themselves. This seems to relegate means to an inferior status in comparison with ends. Means become menial because they subserve ends. Furthermore, the immutable quality of ends stands in marked contrast to the variable nature of means. Ends are external to the educational process while means are internal. Herein lies a separation of ends and means which is very disquieting to those who think that ends and means are indivisible aspects of a single act. Such a divorce poses the artificial problem of how to bring present activities to bear on externally supplied ends. Indeed, one wonders whether the pupil and teacher are not being made means to the attainment of superimposed ends from without. Certainly it incurs the grave risk, so the argument runs, of treating the curriculum as something that must be gone through as a necessary evil. This requires effort, in contrast to interest. But this is far from a misfortune to those who prize the sense of oughtness which externally immutable aims impose on learning and teaching.

Sometimes, the externality of educational aims refers to their social origin rather than their metaphysical character. The source of the aims which are to guide the learner is the teacher rather than the learner himself. Even the teacher's aims may not be his own but those of his superior administrative officer. Such a hierarchy of authority is generally based, at any particular level, on the supposed incompetence of the one below, and the superior vision of the one above, to pick a suitable objective. Particularly is this the case where the objective itself is of the fixed external type and must therefore be insisted upon, in spite of the fact that its worth is not appreciated by those at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder. It has been alleged that the social philosophy which lies back of this view is undemocratic.²

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 80.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 154-155. •

The few pick the aims of the many. What is democratic in this situation may be a moot point. Some hold that it is better for the many to be assured of specific good aims, even at the expense of not being consulted on their selection. Others question whether the judgment of the few is so superior as to warrant such responsibility. But, even granting that, and granting that the many would choose more bad aims than would the few, these others would prefer to have the many choose and make mistakes, rather than never to choose at all.

The line of cleavage, which so far has divided opinions on the way educational aims are to serve the educative process, can be extended still further. In addition to the controversies over its other qualities, there also rages one on its temporal dimension.¹ Should pupil and teacher aims have a present reference, or a more remote one in the future? Should school be life or a preparation for life?

Perhaps the best approach to this phase of educational aims is to commence with what is fairly clearly agreed upon. There would probably be general assent to saying that the problem is not an either-or affair. Sober educational philosophy must take both periods into account. This is most easily done by recognizing no sharp razor-edged division between the present and the future, between childhood and adulthood. The future will be seen to grow imperceptibly out of the present, so that childhood and adulthood form one continuous development. This being the case, it is obvious that education disregards either period at its peril. Education must, therefore, be a judicious mixture of participation in present life and preparation for subsequent events. But what proportion of ingredients shall go into this formula?

Probably the answer to this question turns on the relative importance in which childhood and adulthood are regarded. In many quarters, the conviction has prevailed that the latter is the more important. Children are looked upon as candidates for society, rather than full-fledged members of it. Reaching maturity is a matter of drawing even with the cultural level of the adult. The aim of education, therefore, should properly put more stress on preparation for adulthood than on the present interests of childhood. If a man's years be three score and ten,

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 36-38.

then education should be primarily concerned with getting ready for the last fifty. For many, even adulthood is but a stage on the way to life eternal. Hence, for them, education as preparation has an even more distant goal. Some go so far as to conclude that there exists a more or less necessary opposition between life as lived in school and as encountered in the world at large. Biasing one's educational aims in favor of the future and the adult point of view probably, though not inescapably, finds added support in its congeniality with the further view that aims should be immutable and external.

Over against this position can be pitted those who underscore the claims of childhood and the present.¹ They do not view the immaturity of childhood as a liability but rather as an asset, not as a void but as a power to grow. Yet, if education is growth, it must necessarily be directed toward the future. The mistake is not in emphasizing the future, therefore, but in making it the mainspring of present effort. Since growth occurs in the present, the constant aim and function of education is to get out of the present the kind of growth that emerges from it. On this account, they emphasize his present interests and capacities. Preparation for the future, then, is but a by-product. Growing well in the present will then be the best preparation for the future. They are fearful of aims or values which are so deferred in time that, however sound, they may fail to enlist the native energies of the child, because of their very remoteness. They do not mean to disregard abiding values in the social heritage but they would prefer to sacrifice a little steadiness of direction rather than a part of the efficiency with which the child's drives are geared to his studies. Accordingly, school should aim at life, life here and now, not a preparation for it. There is additional warrant for this emphasis, if one is further inclined to think of aims as flexible and as arising inside rather than outside experience and learning.

¹ DEWEY, J., *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1922, p. 270.

———, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1920, pp. 183-185.

F. Bobbitt, in *Twenty-Sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Part II, p. 43. The apparent contradiction between this position and the one expressed by the author in *How to Make a Curriculum*, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1924, p. 7, can be accounted for only by the fact that the former is his later, more mature judgment.

In a contingent universe, the educator cannot bank too securely on deferred values, for they may be completely rescaled before achieving them. Consequently, it is urged that learning focus its energies where the changes are now occurring, the present—always, of course, defining the present, not as a point, but as a span of time which embraces at least a fraction of the future.

2. With the aim or direction of the educative process once determined, the next step is obviously one of ways and means. Among these, the curriculum demands first attention. According to its Latin origin, a curriculum is a "run-way," a course which one runs to reach a goal, as in a race. This figure of a course has been carried over into educational parlance, where it is sometimes called a curriculum, sometimes a course of study. Whatever its name, it describes the course which pupil and teacher cover to reach the goal or objective of education.

For this reason, it almost goes without saying that one will run a different course for different goals or aims. The curriculum being thus so dependent on the goal set, it is hardly surprising to find that learning the curriculum will be virtually equivalent to achieving one's objectives. In fact, so close is the relation between aim and curriculum that, as already mentioned, one may well say that the curriculum is nothing more than aims or values writ large in expanded form.¹ The curriculum, however, embodies theories of knowledge as well as theories of value. Thus the kinship of the curriculum with epistemology has also been touched upon.² Consideration has been given to whether the curriculum represents knowledge waiting to be learned or whether it is something which is forged in the heat of active learning.

It is time now, however, to restate these aspects of curriculum theory in more conventional terms. Most obviously, the fundamental ingredients of the educative process consist of a learner and something to be learned. But, now, shall this second ingredient, the curriculum, be conceived from the point of view of the first, the learner? Or shall it be conceived to have a more or less objective, independent status? The latter alternative seems to establish a dualism between the terms. The former finds an essential continuity between them.

¹ *Supra*, p. 84.

² *Supra*, pp. 72-74.

The conventional treatment of the curriculum has been definitely dualistic. The basic dualism has been that between mind and matter.¹ This has been matched with another, that between mind and subject matter, child and curriculum. This latter dualism, however, is more nearly one between the particular and the universal, the individual and society. Of the two, it is the latter term that is favored in determining the nature of the curriculum. Any resulting conflicts between child and curriculum are generally resolved in favor of the curriculum. The curriculum, representing the social culture, becomes a sort of Procrustean bed for the child. Instead of fitting the curriculum to child need, the child is fitted to the curriculum. Since the child's nature is ordinarily impulsive and narrowly self-centered, since his experience is crude, vague, and uncertain, it follows that it is incumbent on the school to prescribe a curriculum which will broaden him out and introduce him to the law and order of the universe.

The alternative to such a curriculum theory is to conceive of the curriculum more in terms of the nature of the learner. In order to do this, one must cease thinking of subject matter as something fixed and ready-made in advance. In like manner, one must give up thinking of the curriculum as something outside the child's experience, as something that can be gotten into the child from without. On the contrary, it is necessary to see that the content of child experience and the content of race experience—the curriculum—differ in degree rather than in kind. The content of the former already contains elements of the same sort as those to be found in the latter. The child's experience and his studies in school are but the initial and terminal aspects of a single reality or process—education, life. The one flows into the other, is continuous with it. It is one of the functions of method to discover the steps which intervene between the child's present experiences and their richer maturity in the social heritage. The curriculum is the stuff out of which the self realizes itself. To think of these as opposed to each other would produce the unnatural result of putting the nature and destiny of the child at war with each other.

The differences already noted between conceiving of the curriculum as opposed to or continuous with child nature can be

¹ *Supra*, pp. 103-108.

pursued and restated in terms of another controversy, that whether knowledge and value are determined instrumentally or whether they have an intrinsic merit in themselves.¹ Holding to the latter view, there are those who think that the value of certain arts and sciences has been so thoroughly established that a person should study them if for no other reason than that one cannot be a cultivated, cultured person without knowing them. Knowledge of them needs no justification. It is worth while in and of itself. Furthermore, it is supported by and itself re-enforces the dualistic view of the curriculum just set forth. The merit of this position, however, must not be obscured by the abuse it suffers in some quarters. Some schools have assigned fact after fact to be learned merely because the task was something that could be learned. Such learning, it might be conceded, is not even factual; it is merely verbal. It is almost of the order of incantation. The curriculum as properly conceived here is to be learned, not because it can be learned, but because it contains values which can be known for what they intrinsically are.

Paired against this theory of the curriculum is one wherein the curriculum has no independent footing but takes its character from the way in which it serves the purposes of the learner. [On this basis, the past has no significance of its own which is worth studying.] It is significant only as it enters into and illuminates the present. To study the past, as the past, makes the past a rival of the present and the present a futile imitation of what is past. Where such a curriculum theory obtains, culture is in danger of becoming an ornament and a solace, if not a refuge and an asylum as well. In contrast to such a result is proposed a curriculum which, far from being indifferent to the past, draws heavily on it, but always as a resource for learning the way out of some contemporary perplexity. In this theory, the culture of the past does not belong to another almost disconnected world—the dualistic view—but is continuous with the present. Indeed, education may be said to occur at exactly the point where current individual and social experience merges with, and is reconstructed by, that of the race.

But, even accepting this pragmatic or instrumentalistic curricular hypothesis, there are some who think that the question

¹ *Supra*, pp. 55-60, 79-84.

is still to be raised whether some things are not so useful that they must be learned, even though no immediate occasion presents itself in which learning can occur through use. The probable answer to this question is that material so important will not long want an occasion for revealing itself. Failing such an opportune opening, the farseeing teacher will adroitly maneuver the children into a situation where they will themselves demand it.

When these theories are stated more in terms of classroom use, their essential differences remain as clear as ever. On the one hand, one has the traditional view of the curriculum. Here, the basic units are facts or skills which have been homogeneously grouped into various subject fields, like arithmetic and history. Such a classification is not only inevitable but highly useful. The mind cannot grasp the race experience in its totality, so by analysis it breaks it up into different clusters of related interests. What makes the curriculum traditional is the fact that the particular differentiation and specialization of knowledge which obtains at present has been inherited largely from centuries past. Various epochs have organized their experiences as they would best serve their characteristic struggles and interests. These patterns have come down through the schools almost like geological strata. Each new subject, representing new life interests, is added on without reorganizing what preceded. This being the case, it is not surprising that in the course of time the subdivisions, in which the curriculum is inherited, are studied as something final and unalterable.

As a consequence, the curriculum comes to be prescribed without much regard to the interests and point of view of the learner. It is enough that the curriculum is backed by the authority of the teacher, who is backed by the authority of the centuries. The subjects of the time-honored divisions are learned one by one. Portions of each constitute the assignment of facts and skills to be learned from day to day. Unless one is very careful to insist that correlation is based on the idealistic assumption of the wholeness of culture,¹ a certain atomism settles down on the curriculum. Facts and skills are learned one at a time. Credits—and the subjects they represent—are accumulated like

¹ FLESHMAN, A. C., *The Educational Process*, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1908, pp. 76-77.

coupons and presented for diplomas. Attitudes, if important at all, are also learned separately and their concomitant significance minimized. Finally, the curriculum so learned remains stored away in memory till one assembles enough to be able to use it or is asked to bring it forth on demand in the recitation or examination.

On the other hand, one has the more child-centered type of curriculum. Since the child is living now, the curriculum becomes all the child's life for which the school is responsible. It includes emotional attitudes and moral ideals, as well as the usual sorts of information. The curriculum is concerned with the whole child. It is remembered that the verb "teach" takes a double accusative; it governs John and Mary as well as language and science. The unit element in such a curriculum is neither facts and skills nor subjects of instruction, but a novelly developing life situation. Experience is central. The curriculum uses subject matter but it does not wholly consist of it, nor are its conventional divisions allowed to become barriers against meeting new needs. Subject matter is called in to help in the recovery of the continuity of action which has been balked by some problematic situation.

The idea that subject matter is something that can be put in cold storage against some contingent day of use is rejected. The curriculum, it is said, is not like a deposit which is to be handed down from one generation to another. Nor is it an object which can be wrapped up in package form to be handed to students. Such conceptions are too static. Rather is the curriculum to be thought of as dynamic. From this view, such things as facts, knowledge, information, subject matter, all become ways of responding or reacting, patterns of behavior, plans of action. Consistent with this interpretation is the recommendation that the names of the different subjects be given as participial nouns rather than substantive ones.¹ Thus, for instance, reading, writing, and reckoning, to mention but the three R's, are preferred as more truly portraying the character of the curriculum than do literature, penmanship, and arithmetic.

Here a word must be interpolated with regard to conceiving the nature of the curriculum, as composed of activities. To

¹ MOORE, E. C., *What Is Education?* Boston, Ginn and Company, 1915, p. 344.

many who have accepted this view, activity tends to mean physical activity on the part of the child, as field trips or construction work. They generally take this position in protest against the sort of curriculum which is learned at desks, where quietness is a school virtue. It would, however, probably be an unwarranted inference to think no physical activity at all is involved in the latter type of curriculum. Even so passive a type of learning as listening involves a very definite physical coordination for attentiveness. The significance of the activity curriculum, therefore, if any, lies in the kind of activity rather than in its contrast with no activity at all.

For purposes of curriculum theory two kinds of activity may be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the kind of activity inherited as a legacy from the empiricism of Locke and Pestalozzi. Here, learning has been a matter of sense impression. The senses are supposed to be active in absorbing impressions of the world roundabout the learner. Education seems to be something that is done to the child from without. He undergoes it. Even if the content of the curriculum is made to appeal to the mind rather than the senses, any learning activity goes on chiefly inside the learner. The mind is occupied with mirroring its universe of knowledge and value. There is a minimum of overt behavior by way of trying to reconstruct it.

On the other hand, there is a more aggressive kind of activity. This sort does not wait for meanings to appear; it seeks them out. Such activity, ever reaching beyond its immediate self, forms an active curiosity which constantly forces new meanings to appear. Here, instead of learning through passive response, the pupil learns from noting the results which occur when he takes the initiative in manipulating his environment. In this view, one gets better impressions coincident to active expression. In accepting this more vigorous and energetic conception of activity, one must beware of activity in general or for its own sake, as in the case of mere "busy work." In the abstract, activity may be boisterous and random as well as guided and purposeful. If the activity curriculum is preferably to be known by the more overt sort of activities, the justification therefor must be found in their greater promise of educational growth. For one thing, such a case may be made out in the instance of health, which certainly demands physical exercise. Or, it may be said that

emotions can only be tempered through an adequate outlet for their expression. Or finally, and perhaps most important, it can be argued that such activities must be included in the curriculum in order to complete the cycle of experience. This cannot stop with stimulating the mind. Reflection must be elaborated and tested by active observation and experiment.¹

To describe the nature of the curriculum as made up of activities does not exhaust the problem of its dynamic character. There is yet the further question whether any particular curriculum, whether constituted and conceived of as activities or not, can ever be thought of as final or fixed, or whether this selection, too, must constantly undergo change. Obviously, if one's metaphysic finds reality in process rather than in substance, he will hold that no curriculum is ever a closed book beyond the need of revision.² Shifting goals, shifting curricula. While some will concede this to be the character of the curriculum where education pursues the method of the laboratory, they nevertheless cling to the belief that there are other respects in which the curriculum can be put down as permanent. But fixed educational objectives do not always necessarily lead to a static curriculum content. Some subscribe to an immutable goal but think the search for an adequate course to reach it may have to be put on an experimental basis.³

This consideration of the element of time in curriculum construction naturally leads to another moot curriculum problem, whether the curriculum can be made out in advance. In time-honored practice, it has been customary to lay out the curriculum in advance of either the year or day of its use. The more sure one is of his objectives, of the intrinsic worth of studies, of their enduring quality, the more assurance can he have in preparing his course in advance of meeting his class. Contrariwise, if subject matter is learned to meet the needs of the learner, and if educational aims represented by these needs constantly vary, then one's advance planning becomes by so much less precise. The curriculum then must be made as life and learning develop.

This, however, does not necessarily mean that the curriculum is always to be improvised extempore. Instead of rejecting

¹ *Supra*, pp. 69-70.

² *Supra*, pp. 38-39.

³ *Supra*, p. 72.

planning, what is really required is an even more difficult kind of planning, the kind that is so broad and flexible as to be prepared for a variety of contingencies. When unexpected events occur, it is doubtless well to depart from one's prior plans and to squeeze every educational advantage one can from the situation. But, in doing so, there is the ever-present danger that in retrospect the curriculum will appear fragmentary, discontinuous, and unrelated. The chief remedy for guarding against such a development is the selection of relatively large units of work requiring a relatively long time to accomplish. Moreover, there will have to be year-by-year cooperation among the different teachers. But, even here, unity is best found in the integrity of the pupil's purpose rather than in any external organization of the curriculum.

Because of his more mature experience, the teacher will be able to do much to guide this continuity of experience, to anticipate within limits what problems are most likely to press for solution in the child's life. To this extent, surely, he must be prepared with information and sources for its further procurement. Some prefer to call this general plan the course of study, or program of studies, in contradistinction to the curriculum. The term curriculum they prefer to reserve for the ongoing process of the learning situation. The curriculum can thus vary with the needs of the moment and yet have a steadying keel in the course of instruction.

If the curriculum must be flexible in point of time, then, there are others who think that it must also be flexible enough to meet the individual differences of children. Not only is the nature of the curriculum to be conceived in terms of child nature but, since that nature is infinitely variegated, the curriculum must be individualized. Since individuality is of the ultimate nature of reality, no educational authorities can make a uniform curriculum for a multitude of children. Accordingly, each child must have his own curriculum.

Perhaps not going quite so far in their individualism are those who, nevertheless, reserve an important place for it through the elective curriculum. Here, chiefly for democratic reasons,¹ they would insist on a curriculum broad enough that some element in it will strike a sympathetic chord in the capacity of

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 148-156.

every youth. It must not be forgotten, however, that the elective system is akin to the policy of *laissez faire*.¹ For educational authorities to hold back from prescribing curriculum values is to run much the same risks as when the state adopts a hands-off policy toward schools. If the educational staff does not take a hand, then the children are left to the mercy of the opinions of their parents, the attitudes of fellow students, and the popularity of certain instructors.

Indeed, the multiplication of studies leads to the constant danger of congestion, confusion, superficiality, and dispersiveness unless, as some say, there is some unifying social tendency. If the curriculum is to be conceived of as something learned in use, then it is well to remember that subjects like language and history become wholly technical and abstract unless taught in and with definite reference to their social context and use. Further, with regard to social use, essentials must be put first, refinements second. Essentials are those culture patterns in which the widest number share. These must come ahead of what appeals to special groups. Mere frequency of social use, however, is not enough for some in this camp. For them, there must be an underlying social philosophy as well which will insure that the use is worth perpetuating.

For such critics, then, there must be a measure of social control over the selection of the curriculum. A rigorously child-centered curriculum will not be acceptable. Rather will a social frame of reference be insisted upon.² Actually, it is only in such that it will be possible for the child to grow in the understanding of his own experience. One way to insure this social outlook is to have curriculum-making a joint project for pupils and teacher. The pupils will help to construct the curriculum, but under the guidance of the teacher. Data obtained from their interests will afford an indication of what is desired, but data taken from adult experience will be relied on as the test of what is desirable. In pooling this data, child needs may be made paramount, but only insofar as they are headed in the direction of what has been validated as socially desirable.

¹ MONTAGUE, W. P., *Ways of Knowing*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1925, p. 147.

Cf. *supra*, pp. 199-200.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 132-138.

From the foregoing it should be obvious that the problem of social control in the selection of the curriculum is a technically professional one. For that reason, some think that it cannot be relinquished to lay policy-forming bodies, like legislatures, as others have been willing to do.¹ The latter can properly formulate the general aims of education, but the task of discovering the appropriate materials for achieving them is one to be left to the professionally competent.

3. The close interpenetration of the two preceding subheadings of the educative process, aim and curriculum, has already been strongly hinted. Among other things, as was suggested, both of these are aspects of value theory. Out of these grows a third closely allied field of educational concern, that of motivation or interest. Interest, too, is a value word. To be interested in a study is to value it. Furthermore, it seems quite widely accepted that if interest or value is genuinely present in learning, the learning will be quicker, wider in extent, and more enduring than if it is absent. The main philosophical issue here does not so much concern the acceptance of this fact as how to mobilize interest and to what extent the teacher should go out of his way to do so.

While aim and curriculum can be thought of as external to the learner, interest cannot be. Interest is peculiarly personal to the pupil. But just what it is and how it can be induced is variously stated. In the first place, it may be well, as it has been on other occasions, to commence by consulting the etymology of the word. *Inter-est* is Latin for that which "is between." It is a word which establishes a relationship between things otherwise unrelated, as for instance, child and curriculum. But now, just what is it that lies between these poles of the educative process? From one quarter, it has been described as a kind of tension, a tension, however, which involves something more than is usually covered by attention. Indeed, one must be very much on his guard against the fallacy that attention bespeaks interest. To think that when a child accedes to the wishes of a teacher he necessarily does so for the same purpose that was in the mind of the teacher, may often turn out to be a sad delusion. From another quarter, interest is characterized as an emotional attachment of fascination which is self-active and propulsive. Accompanying this

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 225, 227-228.

emotion, it is generally agreed, is a feeling of worth and approval.¹ It manifests itself in such forms as curiosity, worship, and art. Thus, human nature, being what it is, tends to find its motivation in the agreeable rather than in the painful. Furthermore, interest, when felt, is spontaneous, whole-heartedly stirring;² it is freely willed.

In a sense this bipolar conception of interest means that the learner identifies himself with the kind of activity which his environment invites. It means that he wants to be that kind of self, that he "accepts" for himself the pattern of life presented. It literally becomes part of himself. He learns it all over and through and through. He lives it. In this sense, interest originates in individuality. Individuality is a kind of bias, and therefore to assert this bias, that is, to be oneself, is to be interested. In fact, the efficiency of learning increases directly in proportion to the extent to which the learner is wholly bound up in his task. If he is united in a singleness of purpose, if he is absorbed and engrossed in his occupation, there arises a mental integrity which is invaluable for learning.

From yet another quarter, interest is portrayed as being essentially purposeful. Its spontaneity is thought to be more than just random spontaneity. Interest and intent are made closely akin. The pupil is not only under tension to act but to act toward some end. When the continuity of his present experience is interrupted by some perplexity, he sees a connection between his predicament and the way some object or activity will reduce the disturbance and restore the even tenor of his life again. While interest frequently begins with a question or problem, the teacher will do well to remember that it may also cease with too early an answer or solution. This turn of the discussion casts interest in the role of means or instrument. Given a child attracted toward some aim, those things which lie "between" him and his objective become middle conditions, things that have to be done before he can achieve the consummation of his quest. These intermediate conditions are of interest precisely because,

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 78, 89-90.

² COUNTS, G. S., in *National Society for the Study of Education, Twenty-Sixth Yearbook*, Part II, pp. 78-79. The author distinguishes this sort of spontaneity of interest from spontaneity meaning unanticipated appearance of interest.

without their fulfillment, present activities cannot develop into the pupil's foreseen and desired end. Thus, to be between the pupil and his goal, to be the means for achieving that goal, to be of interest, are all ways of saying the same thing.

Others, however, recognizing the importance of interest as a means, nevertheless think that interest should also be an end of the educative process.¹ Thus, the fascinating attraction of some activities does not arise out of their being mediate to some more remote aim or value. Rather does engagement in the activity suffice as the source of interest. Here, interest may even be objectified as a property the curriculum has for the learner. Moreover, interest begets interest. One cannot hope to get interest on the part of the pupil unless the latter already has an interest. This will be recognized as the old doctrine of apperception. Interest depends on knowledge, and knowledge is the outgrowth of prior instruction. The interesting teacher, therefore, is the one who can make new things seem old. It is notable, in this view, that the pupil is thought of as "having" interests rather than of "being" interested.

Perhaps these points with regard to the function of interest in the dynamics of learning can be further sharpened by approaching the problem from the side of instruction that is uninteresting. Instruction is usually dull and mechanical just in the proportion that the curriculum, as presented, lacks connection with present reservoirs of pupil energy, or the connection, if there is any, is not perceived by him. The loss in learning efficiency under such circumstances very much resembles the way in which a slipping clutch fails to deliver the full power of a motor to an automobile's rear wheels. And let no one think that he can teach without tapping the pupil's powers. No activity, no learning. Somehow, sometime, motive must be enlisted. It is merely a question of source. If it does not grow out of the natural continuity between child nature and the curriculum, then the lesson must be *made* interesting. But this is at once a tacit admission that genuine interest is lacking. Consequently, resort must be had to external inducements. Artificial and fictitious stimuli must be applied, such as marks and examinations, or even rewards and punishments. This is virtually calling in the tow-car.

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 80.

This approach to interest has had one notable repercussion in curriculum construction which must not go neglected. If the handle to gaining interest is the child's present activities, then not just any sort of curriculum materials will make a nice fit. To many, the obvious conclusion has been that these materials must be taken from the real-life situations which surround the child. Indeed, incentives drawn from this area are supposed to be so real and compelling that they almost make interest pale into an artificial doctrine employed only in schools. Consequently, much has been done either to contact or simulate actual life conditions. But it has been suggested that there is real danger of a wrong emphasis here, too. It is quite possible for some people to be blasé when plunged into the very midst of some of the starkest realities of life. Or, sometimes, these realities themselves are altogether barren and colorless. And conversely, it is not at all infrequent that the fantastic, fairy tales for instance, may stir to a high pitch of interest. Important as life situations may often be, then, they are only a starting point. Interest is not to be defined or guaranteed in terms of the curriculum. Interest and value, it is reiterated, depend on what has significance and worth to the child.¹

Although the discussion so far has pretty largely centered on the nature of interest and how it is to be induced, there has been a strong implication that interest is a condition precedent to good instruction and learning. There are many, however, who take issue at this point. On the one hand, there is a feeling that this is distinctly soft pedagogy. If one teaches only at the level where he can obtain the interest of the child, there is a sizable fear that much of the social heritage will be neglected and that education will result in a sort of sentimental indulgence of child whims. Furthermore, there is added fear that the oncoming generation will form habits of selecting the path of least resistance and most comfort, that they will confuse the respective attitudes of work and play to the detriment of solid industry. They would not deny that at times work will be interesting, but neither would they have the teacher "humbug" himself into thinking that every time must be such a one. Such a thoroughgoing insistence on interest will make education wholly hedonistic. To make everything bow to the doctrine of child need or interest is to

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 78.

reduce truth and goodness to the level of expediency. On the other hand, it also is felt to be bad policy to compromise with interest by sugar-coating the more exacting parts of the curriculum to make them palatable. To offer children prizes to stimulate learning effort is thought in some quarters to be no better than a bribe. Such an appeal to external sources of motivation, however, does not totally lack apologists, since its effect is to infuse greater rigor into the educative process.

The antidote which is demanded to preserve education from these degeneracies is discipline.¹ The discipline thought to be imperative here is such as results from controlling conduct in the light of relatively long-range ends and well-established standards. When learning is prosecuted from this point of view, it will override immediate interest whenever it is inconsistent with the ideals in question. With this will come a renewed emphasis on hard work, doing things that are irksome under the duress of social pressure. To omit such a spirit from the school is to make the school unlike the social process and to work an unnecessary cruelty upon children. While the discipline projected here will probably have to be initiated through external control by teachers and parents, the ultimate objective will be the point where the child will be free because he can discipline himself.²

Interestingly enough, the defenders of the doctrine of interest are also severe in their condemnation of the abuses of interest. They agree that it is spoiling a child to indulge him at his present level of interest. The therapy, however, is not to discard interest but to treat it aright. The value of interest, they insist, lies in the leverage it affords to gain the next level of experience. It is neither play, amusement, ease, nor following the line of least resistance. Rather is it the inviting activity of engrossing occupation and attractive work. They therefore concur that it is a mistake to think of children's interests as accomplishments, as something finally significant.

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., *Education, Crime and Social Progress*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1931, pp. 104-108.

MCGUCKEN, W. J., *The Catholic Way in Education*, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company, 1934, p. 55.

DEMIASHKEVICH, M., *Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, New York, American Book Company, 1935, p. 308.

² *Infra*, pp. 300-302.

Similarly, the advocates of interest are insistent on the need for discipline, but they see no occasion for gaining it at the expense of interest. They define discipline much as do the disciplinarians, as the power to choose a course of action and to persist in the face of obstacles and distractions till its deferred values have been realized. What carries one through discouragement and distraction is not loyalty to duty or principle in the abstract, but interest in the personally accepted values of his job. The bare overcoming of difficulties has no more isolated value in and of itself than has the mere satisfaction of interest. This exercise is only truly disciplinary when it is seen and accepted as incident to the achievement of one's main objective.

The discussion of discipline, whichever way its value be conceived, brings out the fact that solid learning is rarely going to be a push-over for the learner, even when armed with a driving interest. He must also put forth effort. The mention of effort, however, brings forward an old controversy, that between interest and effort. Several positions may be distinguished here.

One position holds to what is probably the popular notion of effort. It holds that effort is an exercise of the will. It represents the strain one feels in doing distasteful tasks.¹ At such moments, one seems to need to make an extra exertion of voluntary attention to keep steadfastly at his task. Viewed in this light, effort seems to be the antithesis of interest. The latter furnishes the motivation for the agreeable, while effort is relied upon when the going is disagreeable. If a child does not put forth effort in his studies, the strategy is to make a direct frontal appeal to his volition.

A variation of this view finds the foregoing opposition of interest and effort a bit too rigid. A preferred interpretation would recognize an area in which interest and effort overlap and mutually aid each other. It would reject both the extreme of exerting effort without interest, because that would make education wearisome, and the extreme of being interested without the need of putting forth effort, for that would merely make education entertaining. Yet, this view stops short of making interest and

¹ J. M. Raby, in her *Critical Study of the New Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1932, pp. 88-92, specifically repudiates the opposition of interest and effort as the basis of asceticism in Catholic education.

effort identical. Interest and effort can go a long way in tandem style, but it may still not be far enough. Situations arise in which duty and obligation are binding on conduct even though interest points in another direction. Here, effort must be on the side of the sense of oughtness. If it is, it will many times ultimately beget interest. In fact, it is averred that the interest so begotten is often esteemed in proportion to the difficulty of the challenge. But effort must be on this side, even without interest, where obedience to conscience or moral law is involved.

Yet a third view treats interest and effort as unopposed to each other at any point. Instead of interest being sometimes an outgrowth of effort, here effort is made the henchman of interest. When obstacles slow down the learner's progress and almost distract him from the accomplishment of his project, it is one's purpose or interest that recruits the necessary extra exertion or effort to remain steadfastly at his task. Distasteful things are done because reference to one's purpose shows that he cannot otherwise continue along his chosen line of self-development. So viewed, it is purpose or interest rather than a sense of the disagreeable that stimulates effort. Indeed, it is often claimed that children will put forth much more effort in proportion to interest than they will in proportion to irksomeness. Moreover, greater moral value is claimed where effort is put forth on the side of an accepted purpose than where effort is an isolated exertion of volition. One always runs the risk of insincerity where one looks for moral worth in the learner's assumption of some required external posture. A better gauge of the moral significance of effort is to be found in the inner spirit in which the agent acts.

Finally, now, suppose the child is uninterested in his studies in spite of the most artful maneuvering on the part of the teacher, or, suppose that he will not put forth effort in spite of the most challenging appeal to his will and self-respect. Is it justifiable, under these circumstances, to use compulsion to insure learning? The usual answer seems to lend approval, but only as an emergency measure. Where objectives are vital and harm is otherwise likely to result, society itself will usually employ coercion as a last resort to gain its ends. Under similar circumstances, it seems that the school is justified in falling back on like expedients.

If it does so, however, it must be under no illusion as to the results that are obtained. The mere fact that a child is obedient in doing what he is put under duress to do, by no means should lead to the inference that he is moved by the same purpose that the teacher or parent is. As a matter of fact, the child may only be learning to respect superior might. Some are doubtful that education even results from such a display of force.¹ Their point would be that no one can be forced to be good, that one can only be good if he himself resolves to be good. But, even here, consent, while it may be an ultimate condition of learning, is not necessarily held to be a condition precedent thereto. To paraphrase the situation in other words, while one may not be able to make a child drink from the fountain of knowledge to which he has been led, it will often happen that after one gets him there he will be thirsty enough to drink.

4. Value theory not only underlies the aim, content, and motivation of the educative process, but it also has a service to perform in checking up on what learning has actually taken place. To both the individual and society, the amount and quality of learning is far from being a matter of indifference. Standards, therefore, are of first importance. Their significance resides in the yardstick of value they imply. Hence, examining what has been learned must be undertaken largely in the light of the aims and values which underly the educative process. There are two main practices here whose underlying theories require careful scrutiny. The one is that of measurement and the other is that of evaluation.

There have been various theories as to when learning may be said to have taken place. One of the most widely held views is that learning is the successful acquisition of material which has been set out to be learned. The pupil aims to store it away. His mind becomes a sort of warehouse. The logical test of such an objective is the ability to reproduce the material on demand. The pupil is asked to recite it, either orally or in a written examination. Sometimes, successful learning is measured by his ability to define the ideas involved. In practice, however, this has not changed the essential nature of testing learning, for

¹ HOCKING, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1923, pp. 258-259.

definitions are as easily stored away and brought forth for test purposes as other materials.

It is this theory of the consummation of learning which, on the whole, has been accepted as the basis of measurement by its proponents. Their chief contribution has been to render the application of the theory more exact. In spite of the rather external character of the curriculum implied by the storage concept, judgment of its mastery has usually been very subjective and hence unreliable. Consequently, the measurement movement has recommended itself to teachers chiefly because of the objectivity and reliability which it has introduced into assaying the educative process.

The way this has been done has been by aping more or less the same measurement techniques which have produced such brilliant results in the physical sciences. Particularly has this been accomplished by borrowing mathematics as an instrument for interpreting educational data. Pure mathematics is a form of logic. Its basic proposition can be stated as "if p , then q " or " p implies q ". The proposition merely states a relation between p and q . What p and q themselves stand for is immaterial. Their truth or falsity does not affect the proposition, nor does the proposition improve their truth or cure their falsity. This purely formal character of mathematics has led to the quip that in mathematics one never knows what he is talking about, or whether what he says is true. The point, however, is worth making, for it immediately appears that any data, even such human data as education, can be poured into the molds of its rigorous logic.

In measurement, the propositional relation between p and q must express an arithmetical proportion. The distinguishing feature of arithmetic is the fact that these ratios are expressed in cardinal numbers. The critical feature of cardinal numbers as compared with ordinal ones, it will be recollected, is the fact that they can be added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided. This is because cardinal numbers refer to the interchangeable characteristic of educational data with which it deals. Any unit is equal to or interchangeable with any other. This is obviously impossible where one is dealing with ordinal numbers. For instance, the second in rank is not interchangeable with the seventh. But in the system of cardinal numbers any given unit

may be added to either one or six in order to make two or seven. In either event, the increment is one. Being added to either one or six does not alter the character of the unit. It is interchangeable. Cardinal numbers, thus, have the formal character of *p* and *q*. They apply to any data. But, in addition, they express that data in terms of equal units.

If education can be interpreted by such a logic as mathematics offers, it appears as if at last an unequivocal judgment can be passed on learning achievement. The only question seems to arise as to whether the data of education can be reduced to such equal, interchangeable units. Here is introduced one of the most fundamental assumptions in educational measurement. This assumption is that everything that exists, exists in some amount, and what exists in amount can be measured.¹ And, needless to add, the measurement of amount implies the use of cardinal numbers. Furthermore, when it is said "measured," a very precise meaning is attached to the word. It means an objective and reliable estimate, one in which results agree for other observers and on other occasions.

Such a theory of measurement taken as a whole, however, implies a metaphysic as well as something more with regard to a theory of learning. The clear implication of measurement as described by cardinal numbers is that the world is ultimately made up of pre-existent entities, independent reals, and their relations.² It is atomistic, and it is these atoms which are so interchangeable that they can be subjected to such mathematical processes as addition and subtraction. The educational implication from measurement is similar. It assumes that the learning process can be broken down into equal units of subject matter which are capable of measurement in cardinal numbers. Furthermore, it limits itself to test questions concerning which there can be no subjective variation of opinion. Of these, there are two sorts, those which deal with facts and those which deal with relations. In both instances, the correctness of answers depends on their correspondence to objective reality. This obviously involves the correspondence theory of truth.³

¹ E. L. Thorndike, quoted in W. H. Kilpatrick, *Sourcebook in the Philosophy of Education*, The Macmillan Company, 1934, Number 58, pp. 38-39.

² *Supra*, pp. 30, 125.

³ *Supra*, pp. 55-56.

Considerable exception has been taken to this philosophy of measurement. To begin with, it has been pointed out that the application to education of the measurement techniques of the older, more established sciences does not necessarily constitute a science of education.¹ The techniques are merely borrowed and not necessarily indigenous to the materials of education. Such quantification would only be possible if mental or psychological phenomena could be reduced to units of space, time, motion, or mass, a condition obviously unfulfilled at present. Furthermore, it needs pointing out to those with an undue confidence in mathematics that even in mathematics quantity is not the basic concept.²

The spearhead of the objection to quantifying educational measurement is directed at the proposition that the cardinal numbers applied to the products of learning actually represent equal units of learning. Confusion chiefly arises here whether this proposition rests on mere assumption or on experimental demonstration. For the most part, educational measurement has only assumed that the increment of difficulty from one problem of a test to another in history, geography, or even arithmetic is equal. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether, with the exercise of care in this direction, these increments could be rendered more than approximately equal. To cure this defect, it is sometimes said that difficulties equally often observed are equal. This, however, is but another statistical assumption and one cannot substantiate one assumption with another.

But, even granting measurement's fundamental tenet that what exists in amount can be measured, by the same token it follows that what does not exist cannot be measured. And education is fundamentally interested in what does not yet exist, that is, in the child's potential development and growth. The judging of achievement where growth is incomplete and still going on is bound to be different from measurement where growth is finished, where its evidences already exist. Besides, exact quantitative determination of educational results requires repetition and uniformity. Children, however, have individual differences. No two are exactly alike. Even where overt performances or

¹ DEWEY, J., *Sources of a Science of Education*, New York, Liveright Publishing Company, 1931, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

responses appear alike, the complexity of human nature and experience renders extremely unlikely that the underlying subjective processes will be the same. No two educational situations, hence, are equally interchangeable, as measurement by cardinal numbers requires.

Doubtless, too, it is because of this dynamic variable quality of the educative process that complaint is also made of the way measurement tends to fix its attention on the short- rather than the long-range objectives of education. Only so, it appears, can reliable results be anticipated. But, as a matter of fact, even the shortest-range objectives cannot be made entirely dependable. By the time one gets to the end of measuring a child's achievement, one will find that the child has already changed in some aspects of what has already been measured. The one administering the test cannot measure fast enough, for the test itself seems to do something to alter the very child being measured.¹ Furthermore, even if one could bid time stand still till the process of measurement is complete, one would yet have the insuperable task of putting all the various results together to make an adequately integrated picture of the whole child.

Again, attention is called to the fact that quantitative measurement thrives best where factors of the educative process can be isolated, as in the case of learning specific skills or special bodies of facts. Isolation of variables is the very basis of scientific control. But the more numerous and interdependent these factors or variables become, the less possible it becomes to isolate and measure them.² Many measurement people recognize this limitation. They recognize that their tests must be valid, as well as objective and reliable. Validity, of course, means that the tests measure what they purport to measure. These people further know that statistical treatment of data cannot improve that data's validity. The imminent danger here is that, if one only measures what can be measured, teachers will only teach that which can be measured, namely the facts and skills which can be isolated. This, when it occurs, is lamentable indeed, for there is so much else that needs teaching. This

¹ *National Education Association, Department of Superintendence, Tenth Yearbook*, p. 404. Cf. *supra*, p. 49.

² DEWEY, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

means teachers must come to realize that some situations are so complex that qualitative rather than quantitative judgments are required to estimate the work done.

Not only is there danger that the measurable aspects of education will set its goals, but there is the further apprehension shared by some that measurement may become a tool for maintaining the social *status quo*. Thus, educational measurement is seen not only as an aping of the physical sciences but also as a copying of the efficiency studies in big industry. Because the latter have resulted in increased regimentation, it is feared that school administrators' use of measurement devices to test school efficiency will result in both mechanizing education and lining the school up in the same front of social forces.

Over against measurement, with its advantages and limitations, stands the theory and practice of evaluation. The central feature here is the value any learning has to the individual.¹ Here it is at once recognized that one is not dealing with single values but rather with a multiplicity of them. The balancing of values, one against another, leading to their ultimate integration, is held to be a problem for philosophic method rather than scientific measurement.² It is the total situation rather than isolated aspects of it which is of first importance. But totality here is not a matter of addition or subtraction. It is more than an arithmetical or algebraic sum of rights and wrongs. It is, rather, a matter of the reconstruction of old values in the light of new ones which have developed as the learner has pursued some accepted goal. Evaluation is an emergent and is therefore always more or less unique. Consequently, the goals in terms of which evaluation is made are themselves constantly undergoing redefinition. They do not stand still, as is required for measurement. Nor will adherents of this theory be dismayed if appraisal of such a process must needs be subjective. They refuse to abdicate personal judgment merely because it is difficult to make.

Obviously, such a way of checking on the educative process presupposes a different theory as to the consummation of learn-

¹ HOPKINS, L. T., *Integration—Its Meaning and Application*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1937, p. 299.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 6, 15-16, 86-88.

ing. Here, so the statement runs, one can only be sure learning has taken place when the learner actually uses some new item of experience for the solution of a present difficulty. Learning is said not only to arise out of an ongoing experience but also to be tested by its tendency to re-enter and reconstruct subsequent experience.¹ Moreover, it will not be enough that the learning re-enters experience for recitation purposes only. The learning must enter life outside the school. Indeed, it is claimed that one only learns what he actually lives.

That the foregoing represents a fundamental shift in the philosophical basis for judging learning accomplishment is keenly realized by the supporters of measurement. But after scrutinizing both the destructive and constructive aspects of the pragmatic position, the realists of measurement are still inclined to the method of scientific analysis. They are confident that it has been with this sharp tool that science has made its progress in the past and that it still will in the field of educational measurement in the future. Nor do they feel that their theory fails to account for relations between pre-existent entities which result in emergents, or for learning at the conceptual level as well as at the perceptual one. Some are even hoping for an improvement in the formula for multiple correlation which will weight a variety of quantitative and qualitative data to a multiple criterion.²

Finally, the social significance of measurement and evaluation must not be overlooked. However learning is assayed, it must not be forgotten that the ultimate result must be stated in terms of the welfare of society. Whatever standard is set up constitutes a criterion by which society determines the fitness of its members for a given social function. This may be for minimum civic efficiency, for the practice of a profession, or for advanced study in the schools. Because society is interested in all its members and not just a single individual, it is probable that statistical method as a way of studying group behavior will continue to play an important role, in spite of its alleged limitations.

¹ DEWEY, J., *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916, pp. 89-90.

KILPATRICK, W. H., *A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process*, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1935, pp. 29-30.

² MAY, M. A., "The Relative Value of Science and Philosophy in Appraisal," *National Society of College Teachers of Education, Twentieth Yearbook*, p. 91.

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CHAPTER XII

THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS—II

5. Up to this point, value theory has received the major emphasis in the exposition of the educative process. The curriculum has been studied in conjunction with aim, motivation, and evaluation, concepts which clearly direct attention to value phases. But different views on these matters have implied different ways to organize the educative process, although no separate treatment so far has been paid to organization itself. It is now in order to give major consideration to the logic and structure of method. And first, as to the temporal order in which any lesson is planned. Should the order in which materials are taken up vary with the present knowledge and interests of the student? Or should it conform to an external logical order, an order which is not subject to option and which, therefore, is "the" logical order, one that is appropriate for all occasions?

There are several ways of arriving at a conclusion favorable to this latter alternative. One way is to start with the basic premise that nature is organized according to certain very definite patterns. These patterns are just stubborn facts of existence. When these facts are arranged as curriculum material, the logical form which they have by nature is an inexorable item which the teacher must incorporate into his lesson plan. Logical order, thus, is not simply the longing of the human mind for system but is an invincible quality of the world about which the school endeavors to teach. The minds of both pupil and teacher must conform to and obey this objective order. On the whole, this is the view which modern science has encouraged.

Another approach to the conclusion that the logic of the lesson is relatively rigid is based on the assumption that mind itself has no predisposition toward logical form. This being the case, it becomes necessary to import logical order into the mind from without. The importer is naturally the teacher, who has already organized the material in final form. Being an expert in

the field, he has been able to survey the whole area and give it its proper definition and classification. This done, it but remains to transfer this perfected order bodily into the child mind which, according to assumption, has no native organizing tendencies of its own. In this way, the learner can not only be saved time and energy but he can be protected from needless errors because he can start where previous investigators in the field have left off.

Both these approaches to the logic of the lesson have been the butt of considerable criticism. One objection arises out of the social consequences of such a doctrine. Such a logic, it is feared, would be too powerful a weapon in the hands of an authoritarian regime. It would play directly into its hands to assume that logical organization exists independently of and prior to the act of learning. A preconceived social order could be entrenched in the learner's mind, almost secure from the attack of criticism. Indeed, is not indoctrination just this kind of educative process?

A further objection has been made to the conception of mind implied by this position. Far from being indifferent to logical activity, it is held that mind's earliest manifestation is positively in this direction. This native curiosity of the child is obviously predisposed to exploration, inference, and testing. Not only that, but it develops that the logical turn of the child's mind is not necessarily predisposed to learn either in the chronological order of history or the scientific order of proof.

Perhaps the most frequent objection, however, is that logic so construed is badly adjusted to the problem of motivation. The order of the lesson is made up from the point of view of the person who already knows, rather than commencing with the point of view of the person who is about to learn. By failing to start with the present powers of the child, there is every possibility that there will be a lack of interest in study, that whatever is learned of the logical organization presented will be mechanically memorized with a minimum of understanding of what it is all about. Indeed, the teacher will be fortunate if the child does not develop a positive aversion to intellectual application.

The cure proposed for these objections is to base the logical organization of the curriculum on a different premise. This premise is that there is no final order of experience, but that order is always relative to aims or values. Logic, like the pragmatic

conception of truth, is influenced by interest.¹ Instead of commencing with subject matter, it is argued that organization should take its point of departure from the interests and purposes of the child. Because purposes are many and diverse, the logical order in which to learn will differ from child to child, depending on the present point of his knowledge and interests. There will be many logical orders. None will be "the" logical order. This may take longer, but, because it maintains continuity with child nature, greater earnest is claimed that what the child learns he will at least understand.

Some push these conclusions even a step further. Since the minds of individual children are not to be made to fit any single one logical order, they conclude that logical order is of slight importance in the education of the young. To them, mind is more than just lacking in a predisposition toward logical order; it is by nature positively averse to it. In schools based on this theory, one finds free rein given to individuality, spontaneity, uninhibited self-expression, and natural growth.

Such a management of the educative process may well be convicted on its own testimony of being illogical rather than logical. But those who think that the purpose of the student is irrelevant in the logical organization of subject matter more than likely would hold that a logic biased by purpose is also distorted and therefore, in the end, illogical. And those who follow the lead of purpose think that those who disregard it are illogical. What is logical and what is illogical at this point is on the way to becoming very confusing. This ambiguity can only be cleared by inquiring as to one's initial definitions or assumptions. This is not always convenient or possible, however. Consequently, in order to avoid misunderstanding some have come to call the logic based on purpose the "psychological" organization of the educative process.

It may be well to pause, at this point, and examine more in detail the exact order of events entailed by both the logical and psychological arrangements of the lesson. It is often said that the logical order in which to teach is from the simple to the complex. Everything here, too, turns on the definition of terms. Simple to whom? is the strategic question. If one takes the view

¹ *Supra*, p. 57.

of the scholar, he will probably define the simple in terms of fundamental elements. One proceeds from the simple to the complex by building these elements up into wholes. In fact, is not this the very order of nature? In teaching science, for example, one finds electrons, protons, and neutrons the basic units. Put together, these constitute atoms. Atoms in turn make up molecules, and so on into the most complex studies of physics and chemistry. Since this is the organization the child is bound to come to, in the end, it seems only sensible to economize by starting with it.

On the other hand, if one takes the point of view of the beginner, the foregoing may not commence with what is simple to the child at all. As a matter of fact, atomic structure to him might be exceedingly complex. To the child, the simplest thing is some present purpose he wishes to fulfill. The psychological order of events in accomplishing purposes can be quickly stated. It may follow either the deductive or inductive order, but more likely will be a combination of both, as follows. First, one senses a problematic situation; then he localizes and defines the difficulty it presents. The next step is to form a plan or hypothesis for dealing with it. Next, the plan must be put in operation to see whether it will work. If one closely watches the working out of his plan, it may be necessary constantly to reconstruct it to meet unforeseen conditions which might otherwise arise to defeat its success. Finally, when the plan has been carried out and completed, one will glance backward to evaluate the whole process for future use. Out of this logic grows the pragmatic definition of education as such, a continuous reconstruction of experience as adds to the meaning of experience and increases ability in its subsequent direction.

It is at the last step in the psychological organization of the learning experience that one makes the closest approach to the logical. The psychological order of learning generally follows a tortuous, roundabout path. In reviewing it in the light of one's experience, it is often possible to see shortcuts that could have been made. These generally are taken when the new increment of wisdom is organized for retention in memory or for readiness in locating and solving difficulties in the next learning episode. It is of critical importance to note here that the more one summarizes his experience and the more he generalizes and simplifies

it, the more nearly he approaches the so-called logical organization of subject matter.

If this is the case, then the logical and psychological methods of organizing the educative process need not be opposed to each other at all. Rather, they will be seen to represent appropriate kinds of organization for different stages in the process. On the one hand, there is a logic of investigation, for finding out, for learning. On the other hand, there is a logic for organizing matters which have already been found out, which have already been learned. Both will be necessary for any rounded approach to the educative process. Bearing this out, it is interesting to note how those favoring psychological organization go out of their way to deny the impression that there is no place at all in their method for the logical organization of subject matter.

It is worth while to conclude this phase of educational philosophy by pointing out that considerable of the teacher's information must be organized in logical fashion. The more information he has and the more logically interrelated it is, the more flexible and sensitive he should be to perceive the uses for which it can be invoked in further developing the present interests of the child. The teacher must have logically organized subject matter at his finger tips, not as a show of scholarship, but so that he can free his immediate attention for observing the way in which the curriculum is interacting with the child's present attitudes and needs. But he must constantly remind himself that his scholarly method of organization is not that of the beginner. The logic of teaching and of learning have notable differences, because the teacher represents in achievement and maturity what the pupil only potentially is in his immaturity.

6. The earlier mention of simplicity and complexity in the organization of the educative process suggests that this process has a structural organization as well as a temporal one. The problem here is primarily one of method, of the shape and form in which the curriculum should be cast in order to accomplish chosen educational aims most suitably. This borders immediately on, and perhaps even overlaps, the way in which one conceives the nature of the curriculum.¹ Indeed, it has not been uncommon at times to treat method as but a phase of the major

¹ *Supra*, pp. 252-261.

curriculum problem. But with equal cogency it can be argued that the curriculum loses its identity in method.¹ Thus, it can be said that the curriculum is made up of methods of doing this and that, as for instance reading, writing, painting, and singing. Neither of these views, however, is entirely satisfactory. A philosophy of education will lack clarity if it fails to distinguish between the *what* and the *how* of the educative process.

The basic difference between curriculum and method is one which arises in the two aspects of experience already noted.² The active, contriving phase of experience corresponds to method, while experience as something undergone in consequence of the striving is identified with curriculum. Thus, on the one hand, there are such activities as doing, hearing, and reading, while on the other, there is the deed, and the things heard or read. It is to be observed that this distinction between method and curriculum has the advantage of considerable flexibility. What is method under one set of circumstances may be subject matter under another, and vice versa.

Yet, one must discriminate in the extent to which he pursues this distinction. Some are willing to go so far as to contend that method exists separately from content. Such a separation is clearly implied in such remarks as, one can teach the identical subject matter by several different methods, or, the same principles of method prevail whether one is teaching a sinner or a saint. Those who accept such statements probably think there is such a thing as general method. That the teacher's technique could be resident in his nervous system even when not engaged in dealing with the curriculum implies to some an outcropping, in effect, of a dualism between mind and matter.

Others claim that the educative process is not the interaction of two independent factors like curriculum and method. They contend that method is never something outside of the materials of instruction. For them, the distinction between method and curriculum is not a separation in existence but merely a distinction in thought within experience itself. Experience is a single process in which the individual perceives the connection between something he attempts to do and the consequences which flow

¹ CHARTERS, W. W., *Curriculum Construction*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929, pp. 74-75.

² *Supra*, p. 68.

from this attempt. Apart from the effort to control the course of this process, there is no noticeable difference between method and subject matter. Instead of a general method, one has more specific ones. The situation is one where to change the method alters the content and to change the latter inevitably results in the need for a readjustment in method.

Given, then, a child interacting with an environment, there are conceivably two ways in which this process might be organized or controlled for educative purposes. The first would be to operate in the field of eugenics and thus attempt directly to improve the stuff of which children are made, their heredity. The second would be to effect a control of the environment. Since the scientific exploration of eugenics is but in its infancy, and since social taboos prevent the use of what is known, it is with this second area of endeavor that educational method will be pre-eminently occupied. The teacher's method will, then, be to vary the environment with the hope that modification of the stimuli will produce modification in the pupil's intellectual and emotional response.

This may immediately sound as if teaching is to be thought of as mechanistic. As a matter of fact, it is not so intended. The intent is rather to locate its emphasis in the proper quarter. Indeed, the possibility of external direction of the child is gravely doubted.¹ The most that the teacher's method could possibly do is to redirect the child, for his existing instincts and habits are already exerting a tension in some direction or other. And, even here, one must be careful to distinguish the physical and moral results of redirection. If, in succeeding in redirecting the child's activities the teacher fails to enlist the latter's voluntary participation, fails to get his will on the side of the new course, one may well question whether there has been any educative effect of the teacher's method at all. A response can not be compelled; it can only be educed. The main peril in the educative process, then, is not that the child's will may be overborne by the teacher's method, but that he will not be exposed to a sufficiently enriched environment of stimuli to suggest what is most noble and generous in his own responses.

¹ HOCKING, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1923, pp. 258-260.

Cf. *supra*, pp. 46-50.

If this be so, it is probably well, at this point, to give a brief exposition of how one should conceive the environment, the medium in which the teacher plies his techniques. The chief thing to remember here is that the environment is something more than the objective surroundings which encompass the student. More exactly, it is also made up of anything which concerns him, which is continuous with his own interests and purposes. The advantage of such a definition of environment is that it can include things that are remote both in time and place, as, for instance, history and geography. So it has been remarked that the things with which a student varies constitute his most genuine environment. With the environment so broadly defined, the teacher should acutely realize how manifold are the resources which he can mobilize for gaining the aims of the educative process. The old environment consisted of pencils, paper, and books. This subsequently was enlarged to include shops and laboratories. But, even so, it still remained a pretty academic environment. More recently it has been expanded to include all of life outside the school as well, the home and the church, radio and the press, industry and recreation, to mention but a few general items.

In controlling the educative environment, there are a number of structural patterns into which the various factors can be organized or arranged. Perhaps the most familiar is some form of authoritative, more or less dogmatic teaching. It may be done impersonally, as in the case of reliance on a textbook, or personally, as where the teacher gives oral instruction. In the latter instance, the teacher may deliver a lecture, give closely supervised exposition, or perhaps conduct a recitation. In any case, there is no uncertainty as to the goal to be reached or the ground to be covered. In this method, there is much to commend itself. Given such a sympathetic understanding between pupil and teacher that the pupil gives direct personal obedience to the teacher, authoritative teaching puts the experience of the race at the disposition of the pupil quickly and without floundering experimentation. The teacher cites and the pupil recites. The experience of the child is utilized as deductive proof of the lesson taught rather than for inductive discovery. While the latter function of child experience is not to be ignored, neither should it be the preponderating emphasis in the arrangement of the

educative environment. There is but a very slight amount of the social heritage that the child could possibly rediscover for himself and practically no chance at all that through an experimental method of teaching he will add to it. To be sure, the method here recommended is the method of authority, of scholasticism, but if the authority is wholesome and reasonable there are many who think it should have a first claim on the attention of the teacher.

This method fits in very consistently with other aspects of the philosophy of education already discussed. A method based on the authority of the teacher, backed by the authority of the social heritage, implies relatively fixed educational aims.¹ It probably also assumes the kind of curriculum which is ready-made in advance and which, therefore, has a character independent of the learner.² Not only that, but authority is at its best when the materials dealt with are part of a fixed undeviating truth,³ and its values are thought to be intrinsic and ultimate.⁴ Such underlying theories, in turn, are supported by very definite metaphysical assumptions where reality is found in the immutable and eternal.⁵

Justification for this method can also be found in more psychological and sociological terms. If one falls back on a philosophy of mind as relatively passive or, if active, a mind which is chiefly cognitive in function, the teacher finds himself confronted with the necessity of forming the pupil's mind from without.⁶ He must instruct the child, that is, he must almost literally build structure into him. Naturally, such a method of instruction must rely heavily upon the authority of the teacher. Certainly, this is the theory which underlies the Herbartian method with its five steps of preparation, presentation, comparison, generalization, and application carefully controlled by the teacher.

On the other hand, if one prefers the social approach, there seem to be several presuppositions which might well support the method of authority. One thing to mention is the way in which the social process operates through social suggestion. In learning

¹ *Supra*, pp. 247, 249.

² *Supra*, pp. 253-255.

³ *Supra*, p. 55.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 80.

⁵ *Supra*, pp. 39-40.

⁶ *See* p. 160.

through this means, the mores are acquired by a process of habituation rather than ratiocination. The authority for the suggested mores may be vague, but it is nevertheless always omnipresent. Certainly, there can be little doubt of the momentum and efficiency with which people learn to conform under this method. Further social support for the theory of this method is also to be found in authoritarian political philosophies, such as fascism and communism, for instance. Both of these tend to favor indoctrination which is definitely authoritarian in the theory of its method.¹

Quite another method and quite another underlying theory is required where the learning situation is more indefinite and where a large measure of contingency enters in. Here, the structural form of the lesson materials is arranged in one of the various forms of a problem. To some, the perplexity implied here is problematical only to the student, the teacher already knowing the answer. So conceived, the problem method easily lends itself to authoritative uses and so requires no further theoretical exposition. Others conceive of this method as presenting something of the problematical to the teacher as well. Here, uncertainty is not merely something artificially injected into the educative process, but it arises out of the very nature of the universe itself.² Problems are not just school problems, but the enigmatical riddles of life itself. Instead of studying subjects, the student puzzles over projects and life situations.

There are several phases of the problem method which deserve separate theoretic treatment. To commence with, it is to be noted that the problem approach is based on a pragmatic epistemology.³ Pupil and teacher make a joint investigation of the problem. Both attack its solution experimentally—even where moral and religious principles are involved. Learning the truth will be no different in school than in the laboratory. The same criteria will apply. The truth of a problem's solution will depend on the achievement of purpose. Nor will success be known till operations have been undertaken and their consequences checked. Such a school will, therefore, naturally need

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 231-232.

² *Supra*, pp. 35-36.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 57-58.

a laboratory organization, field excursions, libraries, and shops whereby these consequences may be traced out.

Proceeding further, the role which the problem method gives to thinking must be pointed out. It is the conviction here that thinking on the part of the student is only aroused by the dubious and contingent in experience.¹ So long as experience flows smoothly, habit will take the place of thought. The teacher, then, will most succeed in stimulating thinking by interrupting the pupil's complacency. The teacher's method will be to show that the possibility of continued complacency on the part of the pupil is doubtful, problematical. He will endeavor to show, for example, that this present interest is incompatible with other of the pupil's interests. The discrepancy between the two will challenge him to think. Instead of using thinking to apprehend ready-made subject matter, the problem method employs it as an instrument for trying to control the baffling in experience.

In selecting problems, caution will have to be exercised as to the degree of difficulty. If reality is a mixture of the precarious and the familiar, the teacher must arrange the problem so that the mixture is neither too thin nor too heavy for the pupil. If it is weighted too predominantly toward the precarious and baffling, the pupil will be likely to fail and become discouraged. If it is weighted too heavily toward the familiar and habitual, the pupil's full powers will not be brought into play and he may fall to fooling or lose interest because of the vain repetition.

Another caution is in order for those instances where the teacher confronts the student with a problem and then tells him to figure it out for himself. This may be proper for developing initiative and self-reliance, but it is only fair that at the same time the student be supplied with the sort of environment necessary for initiating and guiding thought. Independent thinking is a very commendable outcome of education, but it is more than likely to be fruitless if unfertilized by, or done independently of, the social heritage. Such an environment having been provided, however, the teacher's obligation should end. He should have no responsibility for a specific outcome. If the problem involves genuine novelty or risk, it should be attacked jointly by pupil and teacher as a real adventure. Faith in democracy requires at least this much.²

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 66-67.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 158-159.

Moreover, thinking should be carried on under the supervision of those who are more skilled in the art of thinking.¹ But this is one of the most difficult tasks in the whole theory of the problem of method. It is so because it presents parents and teachers with a delicate dilemma. On the one hand, there is the danger that if the pupil does all his own thinking he may make decisions seriously hurtful to himself. On the other hand, there is the risk that if the parent or teacher steps in on occasion and does the thinking for the child, the latter will come to depend on them instead of himself. Which horn of the dilemma to seize at the moment will depend on the direction from which most learning can be expected in the long run. As a general principle, it may be laid down that instead of trying, as formerly, to "break the child's will," compelling him to follow the thinking of his elders, parents and teachers will do well to make themselves progressively less and less necessary as children grow up. This is the only way to prepare for the time when ultimately they must unreservedly yield the sovereignty of thinking to the rising generation.

In emphasizing the habit of thinking in the problem-solving method, one often hears the advice that the child should be taught *how* to think rather than *what* to think. In a changing world, it is said, there can be no enduring subject matter, and therefore it is agility of method that is most important. A little reflection, however, should reveal that the *what* and the *how* are inextricably interwoven. The *how* apart from the *what* becomes abstract and formal. Indeed, if one does not have a good store of previous experience with which to supplement his techniques of thinking, he will have to proceed at once to get it before he can attack the problem in hand. If too much of this preliminary work has to be done, it will greatly retard the efficiency of thinking as the heart of the problem method.

It would be a great mistake to think that thinking is all there is to the problem-solving method. It is important, also, that there be experience as well. The child must not only be skillful in manipulation of the symbols of thought but he must directly

¹ The criticism of the problem approach in H. H. Horne, *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 307, seems misconceived. The teacher does not prefer impersonal relations with the pupil in confronting him with a problem. The teacher retires from the problem only to build self-reliance and independence in the pupil.

experience the sorts of experience which they denote.¹ Language is only a pointer; it takes firsthand experience to clinch its meaning. But one must take care not to confuse this intuitive learning with the raw empiricism of sense impressions derived from "object lessons." This gymnastic of the senses was carried on in relative isolation. Thinking was not coincidentally involved here. That was something which was done later, after the sense impressions had been gathered together. And the thinking which did follow later was merely a matter of separating and arranging sensory units of experience. Or, if thinking did precede, sense impressions were employed merely to lend interest to learning its bare symbols.

Such a view, some assert, has severe limitations. In the first place, it overlooks the primary role of the motor organs, of active response.² Because the child is an individual, he is from the start organically biased; he has preferences. When disturbances in the environment upset him, these preferences go to work to attempt the restoration of the previous equilibrium. In this striving and activity, mind is intimately involved in contriving to solve the problem presented by the disturbance. But note that mind responds to meanings, not just physical stimuli. So, in the second place, mere sensationalism would hardly be adequate for the constructive tasks of solving learning problems through experimentation. The experimentalist fails to learn about things adequately, merely through his sense impressions of them. He must also do something to the objects about which he would learn.³ He must alter their conditions and then note the consequences which flow therefrom. Knowledge cannot remain celibate; it must mate with action.

There are many who recognize the educational significance of active experience in the thinking engendered by the problem method, but who, at the same time, think that such experience on the part of the student may be assumed. Thereafter, the tendency of such people is to concentrate on inner or mental activity with a minimum of overt action. Indeed, if one be an Aristotelian, he will aim at an educational activity which is exclusively mental as being the nearest approach to pure activity.

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 69.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 109.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 69-70.

While the experimentalist would admit that there are occasions when learning through symbols requires little perceptible overt action, nevertheless he would still insist that physical activity cannot be omitted from the complete cycle of thought. Consequently, he will never be content merely to assume experience but will demand that some actual empirical situation be the initiating and the concluding phases of the educative process.

Not only is it important to mark the kinds of experience or activity which are used in conjunction with thinking in the educative process but it is also significant to pay some added attention to the timing of the two. This may be well illustrated by those who compare learning to the building of a house.¹ Just as one cannot commence the latter till lumber and other building supplies have been brought together on the building site, just so, the analogy runs, one cannot commence to erect the house of knowledge till the student has amassed a store of facts and information. Till that is done, the sponsors of this view would postpone taking up controversial issues. Indeed, they inquire, how can problem solving by children be anything but wasteful of time and energy until these resources for mature and significant thinking have been garnered?

This method of teaching will be recognized as quite appropriate to the aims of education as preparation.² Several risks may be noted here. For one thing, there is the risk that by the time the facts and information are taken out of storage they will be out of date. For another, having learned these things in isolation, the likelihood of their being available under actual conditions of experience is shadowed in uncertainty. Consequently, the experimentalist would hold that thought and experience should go along hand in hand contemporaneously, each guiding the other.

Finally, there is one kind of activity which deserves special mention, and that is drill. The conventional view here is that the lesson must sometimes be organized for drill purposes because repetition is necessary to fix learning in the mind. Some hold that just mere repetition is all that is necessary. Others contend that to manage the lesson in this fashion reduces drill to so repellent a feature of school that it often becomes almost mean-

¹ MOREHOUSE, F. M., *Historical Outlook*, 15: 157, April, 1924.

² *Supra*, pp. 230-251.

ingless. The antidote for this situation, they contend, is to connect up drill with thought. It is thinking, perceiving the connection between what one is doing and some accepted objective, which saves drill from so dreary a fate. If the pupil sees the significance of drill, if he sees how it will help him achieve his own ends, drill will be accepted and gladly prosecuted.

Organization of the learning environment in the form of problems is not without its critics. Piercing to the very heart of the matter are those who think the problem or project method unduly minimizes transmissive education. The need for activity, especially personal experience, of the learner, they declare greatly exaggerated. For themselves, they still retain great confidence in education as "telling" children the race experience, in transferring the truth through testimony.¹

But most objections are not so much to the kind of method as to the degree of its use. The most general objection is that the problem approach unduly calls into question parts of the social heritage which should be taken as settled. Spending time in this fashion causes the school to neglect its transmissive function. Sound solutions are neglected while a mere problem-solving attitude is cultivated. Another objection would not so much restrict the range of problems as it would the children who are taught by this method. They would have only the talented taught, the difficult art of making inferences when faced with a problem. Moreover, the activity basis of learning they would reserve for only the lowest grades of intelligence. Others look on the activity or experimental basis of teaching as a very wasteful, trial-and-error sort of education, especially when old errors are allowed to be repeated. Then, again, there is a feeling from another quarter that not all life is problem-solving, that life is also contemplative, aesthetic. This being the case, it would be a great mistake if teachers so surrounded their children with problems that they missed the quiet wonder of life.² Children, accordingly, should not only be taught to *do* something, but to *be* something as well.

¹ SQUIRES, W. A., "Idealism, Mechanism and the Project Principle," *Religious Education*, 21: 464-465, October, 1926.

² HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. 221, 307-310.

RABY, J. M., *A Critical Study of the New Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1932, pp. 53-54 100

Finally, important as problem-solving is for learning to make new adjustments in a precarious world, there are ⁵few, at least, who raise a warning that problem-solving is by no means the only avenue to creative education.¹ In fact, they would distinguish problem-solving from the true creative act proper. In the former, the pupil is oriented outward because the problem is external to him. In the latter, his orientation is inward. The pupil has a subjective internal mood which must needs find expression in some medium, as painting or writing. In problem-solving, on the contrary, high emotional states are generally to be avoided as interfering with the accuracy of inference and generalization.

7. The structural organization of the learning environment has, in addition to the foregoing, a social dimension which now requires more than the inferential attention it has received so far. Such an emphasis may take two main directions. In the first place, there is the matter of orienting the curriculum in a social situation. It is said by some that the child should not only learn the social heritage but that he should learn it in and with definite reference to its social context and use. In fact, unless the subject materials of the curriculum be given this setting, it is feared that the subjects themselves will become wholly technical and abstract.

Taken seriously on the economic side, such a doctrine would require that every young person have an opportunity to participate in the production of wealth as an important part of his education.² Obviously, what is meant here is something more than mere cooperative labor in the school. What is intended, at this point, is the kind of participation which formerly was possible under the old domestic system of industrial production. If it be said that this is impossible in the era of *machinofacture*, then some stand ready to advocate the reorganization of industry to correct its distorted and narrow absorption in its own processes. Industry is part of a social whole. Viewed in its larger proportions, its educational significance must be recovered and a happy place for children found in it.

Much the same might be said in behalf of winning for children the unhampered opportunity to study and learn at firsthand the

¹ Rugg, H., *Culture and Education in America*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1931, pp. 364-370.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 174-175.

workings of the political institutions under which they live. Several obstacles impede the realization of this objective. Peculiarly enough here, there is a fear shared by small minds that the condition of public affairs is such that their close inspection by the school would be healthy neither for the morals of children nor for the nerves of the body politic. But quite apart from such a consideration of expediency, the law itself presents an odd hurdle. Statutes and constitutions defining the franchise draw an arbitrary age line, on one side of which the young adult can exercise the rights of citizenship and on the other side of which he cannot. Achieving one's majority, thus, results in a rather abrupt induction into its rights and responsibilities. The failure of the fundamental law to recognize degrees of civic capacity is obviously out of harmony with educational theory, which definitely recognizes that the learning curve rises through graduated levels of difficulty. This being the case, it is a pertinent inquiry how rearing or ruling children autocratically without representation on the one side of the age line can be considered a good preparation for self-government on the other. Perhaps it is this inefficient articulation of educational and political philosophy which all too frequently results in civic irresponsibility among the electorate.

To a certain extent, the disadvantages of this anomalous situation can be offset by organizing the social environment of the school so as to permit the students to participate with the faculty in forming and administering school policies. From one angle, this too is but an artificial school device and thus a poor substitute for what might be learned at firsthand in the community. But, from another angle, it partakes of genuine sovereign power. The authority exercised by teachers and administrators derives directly from the sovereign state. This being the case, it is possible for pupils to have preliminary training in citizenship if the principal and teachers will but share their sovereign power with them.

Roughly, there are two ways of managing this. One is to set up a frame of student self-government where on the surface there is every appearance of voluntary government by the pupils themselves but where underneath there is a school discipline as inflexible and final as that in the army. "To be sure, this iron hand is to be kept gloved and out of sight as much as possible,

but no doubt is to be left of its existence and the willingness of the school authorities to exercise it with irresistible force if necessary—both in the sphere of lessons and of school decorum.

The other way to manage here is to make the sharing of power the sort of enterprise which it actually purports to be. Here, it is a fundamental principle that such an adventure is not to be undertaken in the spirit of play.¹ Children will soon tire of that. Nor can self-government be effectively learned where power is dangled before the young as a toy or where it is only lent them. Power, then, must be real. Yet, it must not be thrust on children; it must be the expression of a common will. Moreover, its weight must be shifted to their shoulders gradually. It will take time to make over a child's caprice, his former sport of taunting the teacher's authority, into the law and order of society.

But, though real, should the total power of the school staff be shared with the students? Some seem to have the confidence to go far in this direction.² It no more worries them to put child and adult on a par in the government of a school than it does to contemplate the inequalities of ability which exist in any electorate. If democracy is applied seriously and wholeheartedly in the school, they feel every assurance that the children will rise worthily to their responsibilities. Others stop somewhere short of such an extension of power to children. There are some aspects of the sovereignty delegated to the school by the state which they think cannot be shifted to children. This they would frankly admit at the earliest possible moment to the students themselves. After all, they point out, the schools are a part of the total social enterprise, which has a stake in the schools as well as the children. The purposes at stake, then, may sometimes have to be arbitrarily insisted upon.

The second direction, from which the social structure of the learning environment needs to be organized, is not so much concerned with securing a social context for learning as it is with the place of pupil individuality in that situation. But first, as to the nature of individuality as a factor in the educative process.

¹ PRING, B., *Education, Capitalist and Socialist*, London, Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1937, pp. 237-238.

PINKEVITCH, A., *The New Education in the Soviet Republic*, New York, John Day Company, Inc., 1929, pp. 213-214.

² PRING, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-241.

There are several aspects which are worthy of note. For one thing, it should be observed that individuality emphasizes a certain intuitive quality of learning.¹ Learning is privy to the individual who does the learning. Only he can do it; no one can do it for him. Instruction can neither be "given" nor "received." It must be experienced. It is just as personal an operation as the digestion of food. For another thing, individuality points to the respects in which any particular child is different from other children. It is such variations as these that generally make difficult the application of any uniform educative procedures.

The rigidity of these differences is a matter of some dispute. Some are inclined to organize the educative environment with these as relatively fixed points of departure. Naturally, therefore, they accord pupil individuality a pre-eminent position.² To them, individuality represents nature as over against the school, which at its best is but an artificial *développement* of a complex civilization. They pride themselves on following nature. Not what should child nature be, but what is it, is the question which guides their research and practice. Since science reveals child nature as many rather than one, the child's individuality should be held sacred. Every effort should be made to keep out of nature's way. One should conform to a policy of *laissez faire* with regard to nature. Of course this may not always be possible, but nevertheless there is a presumption against interference. Disregard of this presumption must be justified in each case. Others arrive at this same result but not on naturalistic grounds.³ At its worst, they view the self-determination of the child-centered school as a counsel of despair in a period of rapidly changing social customs. At its best, it is justified as the outgrowth of political democracy.

From the main position as here depicted, there is vigorous dissent. The realization that nature is often ugly as well as

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 64-65, 69.

² KELLY, G. B., "Some Socialist and Anarchist Views of Education," *Educational Review*, 15: 13-16, January, 1898.

TUCKER, B. R., "Some Socialist and Anarchist Views of Education," *Educational Review*, 15: 8-9, January, 1898.

TOLSTOY, L. N., quoted in Pinkevitch, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

Cf. *supra*, p. 129.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 135-136, 148-149.

beautiful puts some critics on their guard. Frequently dissenters are inclined to think that social demands are about as rigid as their opponents hold individuality to be. From the supernatural point of view, they decry pedagogical naturalism as an undesirable weakening of the prerogatives of the teacher, to say nothing of divine law itself.¹ Without appealing to authority so high, another viewpoint has it that reason, not man, is the measure of all things, that universality and not individuality should be the norm of the educative process.² Here, it is admitted that civilization is different from the nature of the individual and that civilization cannot, therefore, be transmitted by a too faithful following of nature.

Yet another view finds the two foregoing positions standing in false antithesis to each other. The falsity of this antithesis, so it is claimed, arises out of a misconception of the nature of individuality itself. These contending camps seem to subscribe to a notion of individuality as something relatively fixed and rigid. On the contrary, the idea is advanced here that individuality is much more elastic and flexible. In fact, it is said to be merely a direction of movement, rather than something unvaryingly preformed. Similarly, there is probably an exaggerated notion of the fixity of social demands, too. If such be the circumstances, the educational problem is to discover within the child's present experience the interests which are akin to what the community prizes. By cultivating these, a long step will have been taken in the direction of harmonizing individual and social interest in the classroom.

The question further arises, at this point, which individuals should be collected together in a given classroom. Should they be grouped according to their likenesses or their differences, homogenously or heterogenously? Both qualities have their advantages. The more heterogenous the group, the greater variety of experience its members will have to share with each other, thus enriching the common experience of the group. A certain homogeneity of the group, however, is also necessary and desirable, in order to economize the teacher's effort and expedite

¹ PRUS, XI, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Educational Review*, 28: 149, March, 1930.

² FLESHMAN, A. C., *The Educational Process*, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1908, pp. 27-48.

the progress of the pupils. Yet, since individuality is unique, it is at once obvious that there can be no such thing as a strictly homogeneous group. Furthermore, there is a considerable unevenness in the distribution of any single individual's abilities and aptitudes. Consequently, a group that might be relatively homogeneous as to one trait will more than likely be very heterogeneous as to some other. The ethical import of this situation is very great. Fairness to the individual requires that groups formed on one basis should not necessarily hold for all other purposes as well. Especially is this the case in so-called ability grouping.¹ A child placed in a low group for one purpose may belong in a much higher one for some other. The membership of a group, therefore, should be reconsidered and perhaps reformed almost every time there is a change in the area of instruction.

Whatever degree of flexibility of individuality one underwrites, one must not overlook the importance of individuality as a source of originality or creativity. Social progress as well as progressive education has a large stake here. But just what the teacher is justified in expecting in this connection needs careful delineation. If one judges originality or creativity in terms of a contribution to the world's stock of ideas, needless to say there is perhaps little use to which pupil individuality can be put in the teacher's method, at least at the lower levels of the educational ladder. But, if one determines the novelty of a response from the standpoint of the student, much of the teacher's method can be organized about this point. Indeed, from this point of view, all learning is necessarily creative. Whatever a unique individual learns in the time continuum of a contingent world must be the first occasion of that learning for him. Not only that, but there is a well-authenticated joy attendant upon such discovery and invention. If the teacher can organize the social environment of the class to capture this feeling for each individual as he learns, he can count his work well done.

It has been customary in some circles to associate creativity with a limited range of studies, particularly music, literature, and the fine arts. Obviously, in the light of the foregoing, this is too narrow a classification. There is no reason why creative learning

¹ KELIHER, A. V., *A Critical Study of Homogeneous Grouping*, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1931, pp. 147-154.

should not occur in the shop, on the farm, and in the laboratory as well.¹ Moreover, it is well to realize that in none of these fields is any learning entirely original or creative. In each new act of learning a large proportion of elements of the process are bound to be drawn from habits and past experience. The fact that this is so should not betray one into thinking that learning the group culture and being creative are contradictory of each other. Learning the past is not just an appropriation of what already exists. Each individual, because he is an individual, creates his own response to the past. He reconstructs it as he uses it in the present. In this manner, the past is effective in creating the present and the future.

If the values resident in individuality are found acceptable and desirable, there is yet one indispensable condition precedent to their realization and that is freedom. The teacher's method must so organize the social environment of the school that pupil individuality will have an opportunity to be and express itself. Many definitions of freedom have accrued to the educative process.² Its essence, however, seems to simmer down to being a function of individuality. If pupils had no individual differences there would be no demand for freedom. Everyone would act alike. No one could even want to be different, to be free! But in identifying freedom with difference, there is an implied social reference. Children not only differ from each other but they associate with each other and live together with adults. Homogeneity, therefore, is as important as heterogeneity. A sound social group needs both these qualities.³ But just how much homogeneity and heterogeneity should there be? How much freedom and how much control should there be in the classroom? Obviously, to any one who stops to think, there is no single answer to this question. Any position is a matter of emphasis, based on one's attitude to a multiplicity of other phases of educational philosophy.

¹ For a similar view on education in aesthetic appreciation, see J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 276.

² McCallister, W. J., *The Growth of Freedom in Education*, New York, Ray Long and Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1931, p. 543.

Horn, E., "Educating for Freedom and Responsibility," *Religious Education*, 25: 631, September, 1930.

³ *Supra*, pp. 133-134.

Many lean to the side of freedom. They may do this because they incline to the view that individual differences are relatively inelastic. The more rigidly they hold this position, the more obdurate are they likely to be for freedom for the expression of these differences. Or they may tip the scales for freedom, because in that direction lies creativity and the possibility of social progress. Again, this may be their emphasis because of a predilection for democratic processes of social organization. Most fundamentally, they may favor it because of their metaphysical view of the universe. Where reality is composed of the changing, the temporal, and the varied, freedom is a moral necessity.¹

Many others lean to the side of control. Some of these would concede children freedom to think critically but not to revise fundamental concepts to suit a changing civilization. Freedom to them is a correlate of authority.² Without authority, freedom becomes license. Freedom in the classroom, then, is to evaluate a changing civilization in the light of an authoritative body of eternal truths and values. With others, freedom is a result, an end of the educational process, rather than a means or method of instruction. The child passes from discipline to freedom, and not vice versa. Less freedom and more control is also seen as a great support to the average pupil, the average citizen, who might otherwise easily be tempted into unwise departures from the mores. In fact, by some it is contended that the alternative to control is not freedom, but chaos! Such people would proceed directly to impose control on children in their own interests.

Those emphasizing freedom, however, do not accept chaos as the alternative to control. They would refuse both ends of such an either-or proposition. They would neither subordinate the world of things and persons to the inner wishes of the child nor would they hold that all constraint of the child by external conditions is bad. In the face of impending danger, the suitability of freedom as a hands-off policy must be carefully examined by the parent or teacher. What will the more remote consequences of such a policy be? Will a little suffering now help the child to grow in self-direction later, or will the present harm result in a more or less permanent disability to make responsible choices

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 48-49.

² RABY, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

later? Just how much responsibility should be carried by child and adult here is a matter for experiment in each individual case. Viewed in this light, freedom is more than the mere absence of outside interference. Instead of being negative, it is positive. It is found in being actively responsible for the intelligent ordering of one's own conduct.

With this conception of educational freedom freshly in mind, the moment is appropriate to glance at the position of those who think of freedom chiefly in terms of freedom of physical movement for the child. To such an identification there is some objection. Physical freedom, to elaborate the objection, must not be isolated from the inner freedom of the mind. Physical freedom which is in no way connected with, or guided by, the intellect becomes irresponsible. It tends to become destructive of shared cooperative activities, which are the usual source of order. Conversely, freedom of thought must have an opportunity to test its own consequences through overt behavior. The proper place of physical freedom, therefore, is as a means and not as an end.

The intimate relation of physical and intellectual freedom is also desirable to explain freedom described as self-control. To start at a little distance from the main point, it may be said that activity which arises out of mere impulse or desire can be said to be neither good nor bad until referred to a context. When this is done, it may occur that the values of the social context tend in a different direction from spontaneous impulse or desire. Some control, therefore, must be exercised, either to inhibit the latter or to turn them in the new direction. Many times this control is exercised by some agent external to the child, as the parent, policeman, or teacher. The aim of most ethical and moral systems, however, is to locate this control in the child, to have him exercise self-control. Yet, while the value of inhibition to achieve moral autonomy is readily conceded, as an end in and of itself inhibition is morally much depreciated in value. It is at this point that the importance of a close connection between physical and mental activity enters, that a mere physical freedom unconnected with the mind would be a misfortune. The familiar phrase "stop and think" exemplifies the relation very fittingly. Thinking is a stoppage of activity in its impulsive stage until its probable consequences have been connected up with other meanings and a more comprehensive plan of action is formed.

The larger the store of meanings and the more disposed the child is to think of them before he acts, the less external restraint he need be under and the more internal freedom or self-control he is entitled to.

This store of meanings perhaps deserves special emphasis as a condition of positive or internal freedom. Children cannot be left entirely free by adults to choose their own ways of life. That would reduce them to starting life where the race began. Command of the race experience, therefore, is an indispensable prerequisite of freedom. The mores, consequently, are not chains to bind the younger generation, but a ladder on which it may climb. Freedom to depart from time-tested mores must be accompanied with the assurance that the individual is thoroughly acquainted with them and therefore understands the risk he is taking. Perhaps, also, there should be some assurance to the social group that this deviation by the individual will not be harmful to it, and that ultimately the experiment may redound to the interest of the group. Freedom, thus, is not absolute but responsible. If the risk undertaken seems too great to the adult community, it must remember that there can be neither freedom nor progress without just this sort of jeopardy.

So far, the focus of the discussion has been on freedom for the pupil. What of freedom for the teacher? What of his individuality? Some would make a colossus out of it while others would reduce it to near the vanishing point. The former would constitute the teacher a final authority and require direct personal obedience from the pupil. The latter would have a social situation in the school bordering on anarchism, wherein the pupil's individuality would never be subordinated to that of the teacher. Both of these extremes seem predicated on the theory that the total amount of freedom in the school situation is so limited that the more the pupil or the teacher enjoys the less the other possesses. As a matter of fact, this is not necessarily the case. It may well be that the more freedom the teacher has the more the child will enjoy also.

Most people reject both the extremes just alluded to and actually try to find freedom for each in freedom for the other. Education is a social process, a process of sharing between the various members of the group. This being the case, nothing could be more absurd than to exclude from the group the person

who has the most to contribute, the teacher.¹ But it is equally absurd to think that the teacher is the only one who has anything to share. Freedom, thus, is not something for children but not for the teacher, for the immature but not the mature. On the contrary, children can only grow in freedom if the teacher is free to advise how the capacities of individuals can be brought to richer fruition. Such a function he must perform, however, not as a dictator but as a counselor.

Proceeding on such principles, the wise teacher will not allow himself to be maneuvered into a social relation with his class where the sole initiative for planning the work of the school has passed over to the children. He will adroitly avoid being committed in advance to such answers as he may get from directly putting the question to children, "What do you want to do today?" The reason for this is that the child, more than likely unacquainted with what are the enduring phases of his own underlying interests, will respond by snatching at some passing trifle or purely accidental affair. The teacher can best avoid this artificial consulting of interest by being so close a student of children's interests that he will often know them better than the children do themselves. Children will then not so much do what they want to, as want to do what they do. Instead of leading to freedom, to do as one pleases may actually lead into a new bondage, the bondage of impulse or ignorance.

Finally, there is a special instance of the social structure of the teacher's method which deserves separate mention. That is discipline. Whether one's educational philosophy calls for much or little freedom, there are certain social conditions which must obtain in the school in order that any learning at all may take place. These conditions are those of law and order. Peace and security are as necessary for the carrying on of instruction as for the ordinary pursuits of everyday life. This much may be taken for granted. The main question, however, is how this discipline, this law and order, is to be maintained in the school.

One method makes discipline a condition precedent to instruction. There must be a certain amount of order and quiet before instruction can begin. Indeed, maintaining order and giving instruction are almost two different functions of the teacher.

¹ DEWEY, J., *Art and Education*, Merion, Pa., Barnes Foundation Press, 1929, pp. 180-181.

Under such conditions, codes of discipline are not infrequent. In these, prompt obedience to the will of the teacher is the first and great commandment.¹ The parent or teacher may give reasons for his request, but he need not. Children should obey simply because the parent—or the teacher *in loco parentis*—wills it. In doing so, they are really obedient to the moral law itself. If anything, the discipline of the school should be even more strict than that of the home.

A second method makes discipline coincident to interesting instruction. Here it is thought that the teacher, whose enthusiasm for his field of specialization is so contagious that it spreads to his pupils, need not bother about discipline as a separate concern. Children will be so engrossed in the curriculum that their interest will afford a self-discipline. According to this theory, there is such a spiritual unity between pupil and teacher that the docility of the former as a condition precedent to instruction never arises. The happy schoolroom 'is like the happy society. Children, as well as adults, who have significant work to do, are seldom the source of disciplinary problems for either the teacher or the policeman.

A third method, utilizing interest, goes even beyond, to transfer the locus of authority for maintaining discipline from the teacher alone to the class as a whole. Rule by the one gives way to rule by the many. Social order in the school becomes a function of a group purpose. If children are cooperatively engaged with the teacher in a joint project, pursuit of the common end will enforce its own order.² Discipline will be administered by the children to themselves in order to gain the accepted objective. Here, each member of the group exercises compulsion on the other and submits to compulsion from him. Under such a regime, there may not be the same kind of quiet and order as where the teacher alone "keeps order" but, it is claimed, it will be nonetheless effective.

¹ PARTRIDGE, G., *Genetic Philosophy of Education*, New York, Sturgis and Walton, 1912, p. 168.

PÉCAUT, F., "The Philosophy Underlying the National System of Education in France, *International Institute, Educational Yearbook*, 1929, pp. 169-171.

² DEWEY, J., *School and Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916, pp. 30-31.

Whatever one's basis for maintaining discipline, suppose, now, that after the teacher has done the best he can within the limits of his capacities, some individual child still remains recalcitrant. Should the parent or teacher ever punish such a child? Some are frankly skeptical whether there are occasions when punishment should be resorted to. And if there are, they are no less skeptical of the results that are achieved. Others are by no means prepared to eschew punishment entirely.¹ As a last resort, they would probably employ some form of coercion proportioned to the circumstances of the case in order to achieve the ends of the family or the class. Certainly they would not have the teacher's authority completely shorn of the weapon of discipline.

Where punishment is administered, the theory on which it has been meted out has taken various forms. Attention may first be paid to the theory of retribution or retaliation. According to this view, punishment is a sort of revenge. Harm done to others can only be wiped out by a harm done to the offender. It is the age-old law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Some justification for this theory is found in the further thought that infractions are "willfully" perpetrated.² The child or criminal knew his intended act was wrong, but did it in spite of his knowledge, with malice aforethought. For such a flaunting of the moral law, it is declared, nothing less than punishment as expiation will suffice.

Another theory is that punishment is administered to protect the class by making an example of the offender. The emphasis, in this instance, is not on cleansing the individual of his fault so much as insuring the group against similar infractions of its peace and security. Antisocial behavior is a threat to the very existence of the power and prestige of the state or the classroom group. The social group must therefore be protected. The chief

¹ COURTIS, S. A., "The Problem of Immaturity," *Progressive Education*, 8: 703-705, June, 1931.

HYDE, W. D., *The Teacher's Philosophy*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910, pp. 10-11.

PIUS XI, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Mind*, 28: 78, February, 1930.

² Cf. RAGSDALE, C. E., *Modern Psychologies of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932, pp. 39-40.

danger in this motive for punishment is that it may be too severe and therefore create a feeling of resentment rather than warning.

A final theory of punishment is educative.¹ The shortcoming of the previous theories of punishment is that they are so largely negative and that they do not positively point the way to rehabilitate the recalcitrant child. The point of this third theory is that no punishment should be administered which does not reconstruct or re-educate him. In this sense, punishment is an expression of social hope. The offender is given a chance to see himself as others see him. But if he fails to see and accept the principle at stake, then even punishment has failed.

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¹ BODE, B., *Democracy as a Way of Life*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937, pp. 80-82.

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CHAPTER XIII

RELIGION, MORALS, AND EDUCATION

Incidental notice has already been taken at various points of the impact of religion and morals on a philosophy of education.¹ It is time now, if ever, that a more thorough account of the religious and moral bases of education be given. Yet, at the very outset, doubts arise in the minds of many as to the wisdom of giving separate consideration in a philosophy of education to religion and morals. Why, they inquire, should religion and morals receive individual treatment any more than mathematics, the social studies, or literature? Are not the general grounds of a philosophy of education the same, whatever the particular content of the curriculum under consideration? Furthermore, is there not danger that a philosophical discussion of education in religion and morals will trespass on a philosophy of religion and morals themselves, a precinct beyond the scope of this treatise?

Without stopping now to give specific and detailed answers to these questions on their merits, suffice it to say that it is just because there is any issue at all on this point that separate attention to a philosophy of religious and moral education is given in the instant presentation. If this be undertaken, however, it may as well be admitted at once that it will probably be impossible to avoid some discussion of the nature of religion and morals in discussing the philosophy of education appropriate for the teaching of these branches. It is a matter of common knowledge that the curriculum content of religion and morals is more largely tinged by metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics or value theory than is the curriculum content of such profane or secular subjects as mathematics, social studies, or literature. But metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, however, are also basic affinities of a philosophy of education. Therefore, differences in philosophy of education can hardly be argued except in terms of the fundamental rifts in philosophies of religion and morals.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 28-29, 63-64, 89, 106-107, 128, 148, 150-151, 207-212.

There are various conflicting practices which illustrate and suggest the major issues in a philosophy of religious and moral education. The most common practice is for families to see to it that their children get a modicum of religious and moral instruction. The practice, however, is not universal. Many families are apathetic, while a small minority are actively opposed to any such instruction at all. But the chief conflicts in practice are to be found in the camp of those who favor instruction in religion and morals. † To be mentioned at the top of the list here is the brand of religion and morals that shall be taught. Here, the differences between sects appear so irreconcilable that they have forced upon the public schools the practice of excluding religion and morals from the course of study. This has left the responsibility for religious and moral instruction almost wholly in the hands of the family, and particularly the church. But practice under these private auspices differs widely. Some provide religious and moral instruction in Sunday schools as a supplement to the public school. Others, thinking that religion and morals should be the center of, rather than a supplement to, the secular curriculum, have erected a system of parochial schools paralleling the public ones, where their ideas can be carried out. Some have sought to mitigate this sectarian quarrel by separating instruction in morals from that in religion. This has resulted in numerous schemes for character education, both in and outside the public school. Others, granting that these are good as far as they go, insist that they do not go far enough. It is their practice to reinforce moral instruction by teaching the sanctions of religion in close conjunction with it. Where religion and morals are taught along with the secular subjects, a final conflict in practice arises over the place of religious and moral instruction in the curriculum. Some give this instruction a separate status. It is made a separate subject with a special time of day allotted for it. Yet others make religious and moral instruction coincident to instruction in the lay or secular curriculum.

From these diverse practices, of course, many issues emerge. Only a few selected ones can be treated here. (1) Do the principles of philosophy formulated so far for education in general hold for religious and moral instruction in particular? Are these principles sufficiently similar that lay instruction and religious

and moral instruction can be given together? Or is the curriculum content of the latter branches of such a different character as to necessitate new principles and separate, or distinctive instruction? (2) How shall religion and morals be conceived? What differences will different conception of these branches entail for the philosophy of education?

1. Among both Catholic and Protestant educational theorists there is a considerable following who think that when instruction turns from lay themes to religious and moral ones the underlying theory of instruction must also alter to some degree. They concede the high development of lay educational techniques and their large usefulness in teaching religion and morals. But, nevertheless, they find them deficient in a certain vital quality when they are transferred from studies like geography and mathematics to more sacred ones. What this added something is, has been variously stated.

(Some think that the theory of religious and moral education stands on a different footing from general education because it is based on a different theory of human nature. General education has pretty much followed the lead of Rousseau, at this point, in holding to the essential goodness of child nature.¹ Theologians, on the other hand, have frequently been inclined to postulate the fallen nature of man.² Seeking to give an account of the presence of evil in this world, they have assigned its origin to the inherent depravity of man's nature. Since religious and moral education is designed to redeem man from the disorderly inclinations of original sin, it is to be expected that its underlying theory will be different from that which undergirds the secular curriculum.)

Starting with such a premise, religious and moral education may be further differentiated from that in profane subjects by its theory of learning. In spite of the child's heritage of evil,

¹ *Supra*, p. 78.

² SHIELDS, T. E., "Principles in the Teaching of Religion," *Catholic Educational Review*, 1: 341, April 1, 1911. This same author states the case slightly differently, in his *Philosophy of Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1921, p. 178, where he says: "... human instincts of themselves are not evil. They lead to evil conduct only when left to themselves and when denied the direction which should be supplied to them by divine authority and by the experience and wisdom of the race."

his outlook is not hopeless. He can be saved by being born again.¹ The doctrine of regeneration provides that the child's originally corrupt nature can be reoriented toward the good through the grace of God. The channel through which this grace reaches him is the sacrament of baptism. But one must neither confuse this sacrament with the process of education nor think that the consummation of the sacrament renders further education unnecessary. Baptism does not completely purge the soul of its evil tendencies; it merely marks the point at which a new effort has begun. There will still be a lifelong struggle between the child's good and bad inclinations. When he does wrong, it will be accounted as an outcropping of the old Adam in him. When he does good, it will be explained as a victory of the grace of God.

For guidance in this struggle he will need a curriculum whose construction is also based on different principles from those of the secular course of study. While the latter may be a selection from human experience, the former will have its source in revelation. Furthermore, the secular curriculum will be subject to evolution from time to time, while the curriculum of religion and morals will be taken from a source already complete in matters of doctrine and faith. These dogmas represent a divine deposit given by God for the child's acceptance. This difference does not mean that life experiences are to be neglected in curriculum construction. It merely means that they are to be used as avenues by which religious materials are to be brought to bear on life. In no sense, however, are they to be thought of as limiting the scope of religious and moral instruction. It hardly needs adding that the pre-eminent textbook for this curriculum is the Christian Bible.

The method of instruction suitable to such a curriculum may still further distinguish religious education from instruction in the secular branches.² In the latter, the experimental method is appropriate, with its analysis and verification through demonstration. The skepticism generated by this method, however, is not

¹ If it is already predestined who shall be saved and who shall be damned, of course speculation on the theory of religious and moral education will obviously be of no further avail.

² HARRIS, W. T., "The Separation of the Church from the Tax Supported School," *Educational Review*, 26: 224-225, October, 1903.

congenial to religious truths. The deepest insights of religious consciousness are matters of revelation. For any one steering by such a steady light, religious education cannot be taught as a voyage of discovery through uncharted seas. It is more fitting here to employ the method of authority. Youth would fail to grasp the true nature of reality if religion were submitted to the criticism of his immature intellect.

Some would make the same point for moral instruction by going on record as opposed to giving ethical instruction to children. Morals emphasize performance; ethics stress knowledge. What they prize in children is swift and sure moral responses. If children stop to be rationally ethical, they fear that their goodness will become demoralized into a calculated expediency. If ethical instruction is to be given—and of course it cannot be postponed indefinitely—it should be reserved for the pupil's more mature years. Religious instruction, however, is so necessary to insure one's immortal salvation that it cannot be postponed till the child's intellect grows more mature. Hence, the obligation is the more clear to make instruction in these fields more narrowly transmissive and dogmatic for younger children. Indeed, separate schools for sacred and secular instruction are positively welcomed by some in order to keep the secular method from contaminating the moral and religious one.¹

Independently operated schools are welcomed by others for just the opposite reason, namely, to protect secular instruction from the baneful influences of religion. Just because religion is peculiarly or privately revealed, because it is not communicated and tested in the manner other studies are, they would crowd it out of the public school into the curriculum of some other type of school, such as a Sunday or a parochial school. Concerning religion so conceived, it is fatefully easy to have profound differences of opinion. If to this be added the fact that such differences tend to be stated as absolutes and therefore to be taught authoritatively, it is clear there can be no yielding or conciliation; between opposing positions. Hence arises a divisiveness which threatens the very existence of the secular public school. But this statement of position should not lead one to think that its supporters think religion *must* be so treated, only that it is so treated by most ecclesiastical bodies: when such a view of religion

¹ *Ibid.*

obtains, it must be excluded from the lay school. Of course, the positively irreligious would probably take an even more extreme position in separating religious from secular instruction. But, in the last analysis, it is not so much the atheists and agnostics who have stripped the secular public school of religion as it is those who have spoken on behalf of religion. Rather is it the contestants in the internecine warring of the sects that have kept religion out of the public-school curriculum.

Coming back to sacramentalism, it needs pointing out that not everyone bases his philosophy of religious and moral education on such a rite. How a mere baptismal ceremony could encompass a radical transformation of the learner's nature, especially an infant's, puts too much of a burden on their credulity. Instead, they propose an evangelical theory of regeneration. According to this theory, divine grace is received when child or adult learns to repent of his sins. While the sacrament of baptism conditions subsequent education, it is not an educational experience itself. Conversion, on the other hand, not only affects subsequent educational experiences but partakes of an inherently learning character itself. It is something which, under the right circumstances, can be induced by the religious guide or teacher. Indeed, some would make it the obligation of the community to see that children have an opportunity to make the decision of conversion sometime during adolescence. The educational product, however, is sufficiently mystical in nature to be incapable of the more or less standardized results possible in secular instruction like the three R's.

This theory commits education to lay great emphasis on the motive of the child's conduct. Character education will thereby be concerned more with what the child is than with what he does. In a sense, morality becomes an internal affair depending on good intention. If the child has a good will, if he means well, then he may be relieved in a measure from responsibility for the full consequences of his conduct. The goodness of his act will be measured, not by its results, but by the quality of the impulse which prompted it.

The mysticism already mentioned has also led to another type of learning experience, which may distinguish religious instruction from that in lay subjects. This is learning through worship. The theory underlying this sort of learning is that, by putting

the learner in an attitude of contemplation in a fitting environment, the windows of his soul will be opened to divine truths which otherwise he might never learn to know. Public religious worship may even have the effect of creating a spiritual bond in the school and community of considerable social significance. Learning, in such instances, is peculiarly direct, intuitive, aesthetic. As a type, however, it is not altogether unlike the approach to art and music in the lay curriculum.

Finally, improvement in mastery of the secular branches can generally be plotted by a learning curve. But this curve, it is the claim of certain philosophers, does not hold for increase in moral stature.¹ The reason for this is rather subtle. In secular subjects like the three R's there is a clearly defined subject matter to be learned. The target to be aimed at is unmistakable. But, in spite of the best of intent to strike it, a degree of failure is almost certain to attend the beginner's efforts. Obstacles of imperfect organization and control will interfere. He will have to practice to become perfect. In the moral situation, all this is declared to be different. One's effort to do the right does not fall short for want of habits of organization and control, for it is of the very nature of right always to be within reach. If it were not within reach, it could exert no moral obligation on the individual. Failure to do what is within reach, therefore, must be due to a lack of will to reach for the right. Thus sin results, not from falling short of a morality organically beyond the learner's reach, but out of a defection from what was admittedly definitely within the pupil's power. If the individual is under obligation to do right, then he ought to do it the first time. There should be no need of practice. Hence, there is no law or curve of learning for morality, as in the secular branches.

Not every theorist of religious and moral education accepts the distinctions made so far. Many think that religion and morals can be taught according to the same theoretical bases that underpin the lay curriculum. First to be noted here are those who would redefine the foregoing positions with a new content. Instead of commencing with the assumption that child nature has a proclivity for evil, some would start with the opposite assumption, the essential goodness of the raw material of child-

¹ Hocking, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1923, pp. 151-152.

hood. Yet others would reject both these theological assumptions. They would prefer to base their philosophy of religious and moral education on sociological theory. Thus, the child's biological inheritance is conceived as neither good nor bad except in terms of the mores which form the child's environment.

Such a modification of the concept of human nature must necessarily entail a reconstructed view of regeneration. The rite and sacrament of baptism as an essential point of departure for religious and moral education would probably be put in the garret as outworn magic by some. Others still insist that religious education cannot remain Christian if it omits an understanding of sin and the means of its redemption. But, while still insisting that religious education be evangelical, they reject any scheme of evangelism which is antithetical to the educational process. Thus, there will be many turning points or decisions for the child to make as the countless situations of life roll up. It is even possible that one of these decisions may overtop and influence all the rest as *the* decision. But what appears to be an instantaneous conversion, a mystical rebirth, they would prefer to interpret as the accumulated effect of prior, if perhaps submerged and unnoted, decisions. Learning to dedicate one's life to God's way becomes a matter of process rather than crisis. And certainly this group of evangelical religious educators would unite to insist that, unless momentary conversion be followed and supported by an extended period of education, the chances for a resulting stable religious character are not too promising.

Furthermore, there seems to be definite objection to any theory that religious experience comes by way of an inner illumination, independent from the ordinary channels of learning. The prime difficulty with this theory is that it may render religion incapable of being taught to some people. According to such a pattern, there may be emotionally stolid people who can no more sense a religious experience than color-blind people can recognize color, or tone-deaf ones, music. It seems preferable to many, therefore, to state the curriculum in psychological terms, that is, as a mode of child-experience and growth, for only so can its ethical or moral potentialities be realized.

Continuing the same line of thinking, there is further objection to making moral or character education so largely dependent on the child's internal disposition to be good. The difficulty is

that character becomes too inaccessible to the teacher or the parent. The antidote recommended here is to look for the development of a child's character in what he does, more than in what he is. What one wants is not only inner character but force of character, that is, efficiency in the execution of overt action. This same emphasis on conduct is also a good antidote for those who identify moral education too exclusively with rational or intellectual education.¹ Especially is this the case where moral knowledge is thought to be in a separate category from ordinary, everyday knowledge. If there is anything from which moral instruction suffers, it is lapsing into instruction "about" morals instead of directly affecting character and moral conduct themselves. Children all too frequently learn abstract virtues without becoming virtuous in social conduct.

More particularly as to the nature of the curriculum, there is a strong feeling in certain quarters that the division of truth into the two classes of sacred and secular has been a grave misfortune. Because this has been done, it is felt, the religious significance of much of the secular curriculum has been lost. But, in pointing the two toward union again, this shade of opinion proposes that neither education nor religion be thought of as a subordinate branch of the other. Properly conceived, religion is education itself, they say, but education so enlarged as to encompass the whole of life. Since religion is nothing if it is not an all-inclusive, all-commanding principle, it follows that religious education is simply education in the most complete sense of the term. From this point of view, progressive education with its emphasis on the "whole" child and on learning by "wholes" has much that is implicitly religious in emphasis. For similar reasons, the public school, from which religion is usually excluded, has inescapable, if unintentional, religious influences. Religion, therefore, does not require a distinctive educational philosophy of its own. Rather is it an integral enrichment of the more general phases of philosophy of education.

The point just checked in the case of religion can be double checked for the curriculum in morals. Here, too, there is a

¹ Important as child activity is in moral education, it is obviously absurd, as M. Demiashkevich points out in his *Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, New York, American Book Company, 1935, pp. 298-299, to go to the extreme of insisting that one must learn the bad as well as the good by direct participation.

considerable opposition to dividing learning materials into moral and unmoral or even amoral. All conduct, it is declared, has potential moral consequences, and therefore moral choice is one with the process of education. For the same reason, moral education does not have to be introduced into the school for it is already there. It is there in the habits formed in the preparation of lessons, in the cooperative attitudes learned on the playground, and in the loyalties aroused for the ideals of the school, community, and nation. Indeed, it has been well said that all good teaching is insofar character education. If intellectual and moral education have unfortunately been separated, it is due to a failure to conceive the weekday school as a social institution.

Furthermore, guidance in the selection of the curriculum in morals will not depend on the certainty of sanctified tradition or dogma. On the contrary, its selection will depend much more on the continued use of intelligence to trace out the novelty emerging consequences of everyday life affairs. But, as important as this makes the training of private judgment in moral matters, it is definitely cautioned not to make the intellect carry too much of the burden of moral education. Any complete moral reckoning must be liberally weighted by the factor of emotion. Indeed, save as reason be aided and abetted by emotion, the moral temperature of the pupil is not likely to rise very high.

2. It is probably highly suspected by this time that all or most of the foregoing differences as to the proper form of a philosophy of religious and moral education stem directly from differences as to the general nature of religion and morals themselves. Any further exposition of philosophy of education at this point, then, must make at least a brief excursion into these fields. If the controversies current in religion and morals could be limited to those fields, perhaps no sound reason could be found for such a digression or trespass into a special subject-matter field. But the fact has already been pointed out that secular education has religious and moral significance, even though religion and morals as specific subjects have already been excluded from the curriculum. This being the case, some consideration of the disputed issues in religion and morals seems necessary to enlighten educational theory in both sacred and secular branches. The discus-

sion, however, must be limited to differences with educational bearings.

To come to the main point at once, it seems that most of the controversies in both religious education and moral education center about the factor of supernaturalism.¹ Can religion and morals be effective on a simply naturalistic basis? Or is supernaturalism the very kernel of their appeal? Is the religious and moral experience cut from the same cloth as the ordinary, everyday experiences served by reading, writing, and arithmetic? Or must the patterns of religion and morals be cut out of a different texture of experience?

Perhaps most attention has been given this issue in the field of moral education. The storm center here is located in the area of the sanction to be employed for securing moral conduct. A very considerable body of opinion endorses the view that the sanction for moral behavior is in no wise different from that in other types of secular learning. Oughtness is defined in terms of the psychological facts of original nature, which is the same for all types of learning. Hence, learning has no more ultimate sanction than its own effects. Chief among these are the social. Because conduct has social consequences, morality is treated as a group phenomenon. Conscience turns out to be a response to social approvals and disapprovals. From this, it follows that moral education in the school should be based on a conception of the school as a miniature society, as the life of the community in embryo. Moral and intellectual education must not be kept apart. Neither should the school and the out-of-school, town and gown. Duties should not be simply school duties but life duties as well. The motives for conduct in school should be the same as for adults outside.

Another large body of opinion finds it confusing to identify the moral with the social. Conceding that the foregoing naturalistic motivation of morality is undoubtedly good as far as it goes, they declare that it does not go far enough. Social pressures may be very powerful, but the habituation they represent will not be sufficient by itself alone. There must be, in addition, a religious sanction. Without a divine source of authority, moral education becomes superficial. To be sure, morality implies duty, but, apart from a revealed God, there is no obligation to obey the

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 28-29.

moral law. Without God as the lawgiver, morality degenerates into expediency. But with Him, conscience is more than the echo of social custom; it is a celestial sense of oughtness.

As the history of religion might lead one to suspect, the advocates of religious support for moral education are by no means in agreement as to the nature of religion. They seem to agree, but only very generally, that, like philosophy, it emphasizes a certain wholeness or singleness of life. Beyond that, however, theories of religion and religious education mainly divide down the same line as do theories of morals and moral education. Here, too, there is the party which holds that the religious experience is something unique which enters children's lives as a special kind of experience. It cannot be made an object of study, like history, nor does it consist in instruction in a textbook like the Bible. Neither is it just a social or ethical theory. Its quintessence is the acknowledgment of a transcendent, personal, self-existent God, with whom as Father of mankind the child seeks to get in rapport. Man's finite span of life, however, is too short a time in which to complete and perfect this rapport, even though he seems to have unlimited capacities for growth through education. Hence, if the imperfect implies the perfect, and if the temporal is any guarantee of the eternal, religion must, finally, give assurance of immortality. There must be an infinity of time in which the human person can complete his education, unabridged by the incident of death.¹

Over against this supernaturalistic view is the section of opinion which gives religion, as it did morals, a naturalistic, social interpretation. They subscribe to a social conception of the great salvation. The church is emphasized as a community, and religious education as participation therein. The individual's relation to God is found in his relation to the social group. Indeed, instead of invoking His kingdom, Christian education is urged to seek the democracy of God! And many public schools are said to be actually achieving it, to the extent that they manage to assimilate children of varying nationalities, traditions, and creeds upon the basis of what is common and public in achievement and endeavor. By promoting social unity, they are planting the seed out of which in the end any successful religious unity must flower. It is just because they

¹ HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Co., 1927, pp. 283.

fear that the divisiveness of sectarian religion will interrupt this process that they often resist its introduction into the public-school curriculum. In fact, some are so humanistic in point of view that they virtually advocate the paradox of secularizing religious education. They go so far as to say that there can be ecclesiastical religious education in which such concepts as Providence and prayer, God and worship, are not indispensable.

Obviously, if religion can be stated in secularized terms, that is, the terms in which the rest of the curriculum is stated, there will be no need of a separate or distinct philosophy of education. Reducing religion to social ethics and depriving it of its supernatural character certainly seem to put religious and any dependent moral education on a purely naturalistic basis. At this level, one philosophy of education will easily cover the whole length and breadth of the curriculum. But once grant that religious education is something more, then some restatement of educational philosophy is inescapable.

It but remains now to conclude with a word about education *as a religion*.¹ Up to this point religion has been treated as an object of education. Inquiry has been directed to whether a philosophy of education needs restatement when religion becomes the main content of the curriculum. What now of making education the object of religion? In religion's long history many things have been declared to be god. At a time when race, nationality, and the state have each been raised up as objects of worship, one could certainly do worse than to make education a religion. The fundamental principle of faith of such a religion would be belief in the possibility of human achievement. Education would then become at once the symbol of humanity's as yet unrealized potentialities and the means of its salvation. Such a religion, however, would have the drawback of the political religions already mentioned. It would only be fragmentary; it would be worshipping the part for the whole. This might be a misdirection of religious endeavor if religion be taken, as it generally is, to denote inclusiveness of viewpoint. On the other hand, at least one outstanding advantage could be claimed for such a religion. It would not be in conflict with science! On the contrary, it would be based on science. Indeed without the invigorating vitality of science, such a religion would be in danger

¹ DEWEY, J., "Education as a Religion," *The New Republic*, 32: 64-65, August, 1922.

of lapsing into "the dogmas of pedagogy and the rituals of educational administration. At all events in view of man's innumerable previous mistakes and discouraging backslidings, it takes courage, if nothing else, to hold to a faith in education as a religion.

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CHAPTER XIV

SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

Up to this point the exposition of philosophy has been organized to shed light on specific problems which arise in the study and practice of education. Each problem has served as a nucleus for organizing the different theories or philosophies on which its solution has been based. So far, however, no attempt has been made to maintain continuity in the discourse, in terms of particular philosophies of education themselves. It is time now to assemble the like segments of these various educational philosophies into their respective systems of thought. As important as it is to see the wider ramifications of each of the numerous problems already discussed, it is of no less importance to test each position one has taken so far against every other for which he has stood. It is chiefly in the light of some total harmony that the strength of any individual stand can be assured. If it contradicts any of the others, then one must be on his guard against weakness somewhere. But the search for this larger comprehensive statement is just what the purpose of philosophy is. This being the case, one would fail to be true to the spirit of philosophy if he did not essay to reduce his manifold convictions to some single, inclusive, consistent scheme of thought.

There are two ways in which this summation of viewpoints might be undertaken. On the one hand, they might be subsumed under categories which are already the familiar stock in trade of school people, and even the lay public. On this basis, there are two more or less clearly defined schools of educational philosophy. One is composed of the followers of Dewey, and is known largely under the title of "progressive education." The other, not so easily named, consists of the defenders of more conservative practices. Among other titles they have been variously styled as "traditionalists" or "essentialists." The lack of a commonly recognized name, however, is unimportant and certainly confesses to no weakness of conviction. The other way to classify educa-

tional philosophies is according to categories long familiar to philosophers. Here, the schools of thought which have had the most significance for modern education have been pragmatism, naturalism, idealism, and realism, especially scholastic realism or supernaturalism. Other categories have also had parts to play, but their educational implications have never been so systematically worked out as have those of the four mentioned. But, as for that matter, no school has worked out a complete philosophy of education.

Different as are these two ways for pulling together the strands of philosophical position dispersed throughout the preceding exposition, they are not mutually exclusive or unrelated to each other. The point at which an overlapping can most easily be established is the identity of outlook shared by progressive education and pragmatism. Indeed, so close is this identity that progressive education would probably cease to be a distinctive educational movement without its support. The next clearest point at which these two sorts of classification overlap is found in the support which traditionalism and essentialism draw from scholastic realism. The direction of support which other schools of philosophy offer is not so unequivocal. Perhaps naturalism points fairly definitely in the direction of progressive education, but idealism is more ambiguous. Its strains are obvious in its offspring, pragmatism, but at the same time idealism has not hesitated to chide and even almost disinherit its progeny. But, however these and remaining schools of philosophy are grouped, the best plan for recapitulating and systematizing the various philosophies of education now seems clear. There are two main themes around which to weave the continuity of the succeeding exposition: (1) progressivism, where pains must be taken to show the distinct characteristics of (a) pragmatic and (b) naturalistic educational philosophy; and (2) traditionalism or essentialism, wherein separate attention must be given to its defense by (a) idealism and (b) realism.

1. Since progressive education has largely carried the initiative in the reconstruction of modern education, it may be well to commence with a summary and integration of its position. There are various aspects of progressive education which most readily leap to the eye as the representative features of the system. Notable at once is the emphasis which progressive schools put

on pupil freedom. The child is not only encouraged to exercise physical freedom but to do his own independent thinking. Initiative and self-reliance are cardinal virtues which the progressively educated child is encouraged to develop. Freedom such as this is predicated on an acceptance of the fact of individual differences and a disposition to capitalize upon them.

Individuality in capacity and aptitude lay an inescapable imperative on curriculum and methods. What interests the individual is made the basis for the motivation of instruction. This interest, however, is not whimsical but definitely guided by the pupil's own purposes. The fact that his purposes in and out of school are constantly being balked by the uncertainties of everyday living affords an excellent point of departure for the life of the school. Herein lies the challenge to learn, to apply one's intelligence to the control of the precarious factors of his environment. Out of this will come a felt need for the aid of the social heritage and help or instruction from the teacher. Restoration of the continuity of the interrupted purpose will need to be tested in appropriate activities. These will be selected with a view to the development of the whole child. Emotional as well as intellectual activities will be borne in mind. The outcome of these activities will be measured or evaluated by the extent to which they accomplish the purposes entertained.

Finally, it is not overlooked that such a scheme of education has definite social implications. Membership in society is recognized as the surest access to the social treasures necessary for the development of the pupil's personality. Of the various forms of social organization, democracy is favored as most consonant with the progressive principles just laid down. Not only does a democracy have the highest regard for individual freedom but it also is more inclined toward a progressive reconstruction of the social order.

One cannot stop, however, with such a running summary of progressive educational practices. The educational philosopher must inquire what is the warrant for such a scheme of education. The moment one probes beneath the surface to examine the underpinning of this position, he will find himself confronted with a very intricate intellectual structure. This must now be inspected systematically.

a. Examined from the angle of pragmatism, the wider implications of progressive education become quite clear.¹ The fact that such practices as those epitomized are called "progressive" gives the first clue. Progress implies change. Change further implies novelty. And novelty is set down as genuine rather than the revelation of an antecedently complete reality. Since all things neither change at the same time nor at the same rate, novelty is relative to the familiar. In fact, the world which confronts the pupil is a peculiar mixture of these two characteristics. Given such a metaphysic, it is small wonder that progressive education should emphasize the problem-solving attitude of mind, or that it should try to develop initiative and self-reliance in its devotees. The challenge to the intellect is to employ the familiar as a means of exploring the novel and bringing it under control in order to meet future novel situations.

• One of the chief channels through which an emergent evolution works is that of individual differences. Both biological and social reproduction always occurs with variations. Each variation, each species, however, is not necessarily a new genus. Yet, on the other hand, neither does subsuming the species under the genus exhaust the unique individuality of the species. Its individuality is still incomparably precious. Without it, there could be no progress at all. Consequently, the stress laid by progressive education on a cultivation of individual differences of pupils is easily understood. Their development is not only

¹ The best single statement of this point of view is to be found in J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916, already a classic in the field of educational philosophy. Good, but less important treatments are: MOORE, E. C., *What Is Education?* Boston, Ginn & Company, 1915; DOUGHTON, I., *Modern Public Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1935; CHILDS, J. L., *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1931; BODE, B., *Fundamentals of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1931; PARTRIDGE, G. E., *Genetic Philosophy of Education*, New York, Sturgis & Walton, 1912. For systematic criticisms see: HORNE, H. H., *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1935; HORNE, H. H., *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927, Chap. 9; O'HARA, J. H., *The Limitations of the Educational Philosophy of John Dewey*, Washington, Catholic University Press, 1929; RABY, J. M., *A Critical Study of the New Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1932.

indispensable to self-realization but of inestimable value as a social resource.

But the question arises, how is one to know when change and individual variation will lead to progress? Progress is, after all, a value word. From the pragmatic point of view values are instrumental. They implement a person to gain ends. Progress occurs if these ends are achieved. But, of course, the inquiring mind will still want to know whether the ends were worthy or good. The pragmatist can only answer this question by asking another, good for what? In other words, the value of any particular ends must themselves be instrumentally judged against yet other ends. But, of course, such a process is endless unless one is willing to start with some interest as the given or accepted invaluable of that situation. Which of several lines of conduct is most likely to lead to progress will then be *judged* in terms of that specific situation. The criterion of the progressive, then, is always specific. He has no general formula for total progress because he has no final or fixed values. Indeed, how could he, in a world in which he sees a constantly emerging novelty!

From this, it is easy to see why the progressive educator gives so much attention to pupil interest. It is, after all, the core of educational value theory. It is both a guide to the selection of curriculum materials and the single best dynamo by which to motivate them. Of course, the danger with this theory is that interest, like progress, will have a very limited application or duration. Children's interests are, for instance, notorious for their vacillation and lack of sustained drive. The defect, however, is not fatal, but something against which to guard. Some interests as they novelly emerge are, to be sure, only ephemeral. Others, of course, are much more intense, grip attention longer, and even change little, if any, over long periods of time. The pragmatist senses no contradiction in his position in entertaining such long-range interests. The point at which he wants to save his integrity is in being able to adhere to these values tentatively or experimentally. Consequently, the pragmatist or progressive would count it very shortsighted if children were not taught persistence and stick-to-it-iveness. The distinctive merit which he ascribes to his position is the fact that the child is driven to persevere by values which he himself sees and voluntarily accepts as his own.

The progressive's or pragmatist's theory of value not only lends importance to the role of interest in learning, but it also adds significance to several aspects of educational aims. Most readily deducible is the fact that the progressive has no fixed aims or values in advance. Educational aims, no matter how well authenticated by the past, are not to be projected indefinitely into the future. In a world rendered precarious and contingent by a compounding of the novel and the customary, educational aims must be held subject to revision as one advances into the future. If education has any general aim in the light of which these successive revisions can take place, it is only that of pupil growth. But growth itself has no end beyond further growth. In other words, education is its own end. Progressive education is not progressive because it is making steady advance toward some definite goal but because it is growing in whatever direction a novel emerging future renders most feasible.

From the foregoing, it must further be evident by now that educational ends are not terminal to the road of education, but that they are, paradoxically enough, employed as means or instruments for finding the way. As such, they are used experimentally. No way to education is the true way. Rather it becomes true. To the pragmatist, truth is to be conceived dynamically. Verification is not just figuratively, but literally, truth-making. What turns out to be true will depend, at least in part, on the aims or values with which one started. The true and the good are thus next of kin to each other. Commencing with such premises, it is more easily comprehended why learning in the progressive school must be purposeful. The truth the child learns will inescapably be affected by his purposes or aims.

This pragmatic theory of truth implies a very distinctive role for intelligence in the world order. It is to be thought of as an instrument of verification. In a precariously shifting environment, intelligence implements one to make satisfactory adaptations, to use the old and familiar as a tool for subjugating the novel and contingent. It is the chief means of survival. This is its biological evolution and its epistemological significance. Again, this background of pragmatism sheds light on the emphasis which progressive education places on the experimental way of

both learning and teaching. When pupil and teacher enter on a project, there are no preconceived ends at which they must come out. The mutual challenge is to think their way out.

Crucial in the pragmatic or experimental way of gaining truth is its methodology. As already noted several times, a precarious universe sets the problem. After defining the difficulty as precisely as possible and surveying the resources available for its solution, an hypothesis is proposed. After this has been dramatically acted out in imagination, it is put to the test. Activities are overtly initiated in the precarious environment to see whether their consequences will square with those anticipated. Other activities are later undertaken to generalize the first results. Again, there is a clue to the practices of progressive education. The importance of the "activity" curriculum centers right here. Activities are necessary both to make education lifelike and to make life yield the truth.

The pragmatic theory of knowledge is further strategic in the progressive's conception of the curriculum. For the pragmatist, knowledge is something which is wrought out in action. Before it is used, it is merely information. Information becomes knowledge when it is judged to be relevant to the solution of a particular problem, and that judgment is tested in the crucible of experience. It is for reasons such as these that the progressive educator tends to distinguish between the curriculum drawn up in advance and the curriculum which the child actually learns in action. For him, knowledge does not antedate learning but is forged as the pupil and teacher adapt means to ends as their project develops.

Because the pragmatist approaches both value and truth through the concrete experience of some individual, it must not be thought that he is overlooking the experience of others. As a matter of fact, he rates the social very highly. Simply stated, society is a mode of shared experience. Participation in society is one of the most important ways in which education takes place. The way in which society is organized for sharing is, of course, the critical point. The more free and unimpeded this sharing is; the more democratic the society is said to be, and certainly the greater is the educational opportunity. Herein one can see at a glance the great dependency of a democracy on education. All this is very pragmatic, because the free flow of social inter-

course makes more experience available for judging what is true and good in the individual's experience.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the progressive educator is warmly attached to the democratic process. The two have much in common because both encourage the individual to specialize in cultivating his unique talents. Happily, the more different individuals get to be, the more things they have to share and the more socially interdependent they necessarily become. Consequently, progressive education is opposed to any barriers which inhibit the easy interchange of diverse cultural viewpoints, such as the segregation of the sexes or separate high schools for vocational and college preparation. Besides, in the classroom the progressive teacher democratically shares with the children as many decisions as to objectives, curriculum, and discipline as possible. What he expects between pupil and teacher he also recommends between teacher and administrative or supervisory staff.

Of course, all this means a larger measure of freedom in the progressive school. Freedom will be predicated upon the importance of individuality. Its effectiveness, however, will be enhanced in proportion to the richness of the culture that is appropriated through democratic sharing. Furthermore, freedom is not just for the pupil, but for the teacher as well. The progressive will especially value his academic freedom, for without it the school is powerless to be an effective instrument of social progress. But, on the question whether the school should lead the way to building a new social order, progressives themselves disagree. Suffice it to say that the efficiency of the democratic school in meeting social change lies in its insistence on a free flow of social intercourse. In this way it is able to mobilize the maximum resources at any given point of the front of social progress.

This social orientation is, finally, the characteristic feature of the progressive's religious and moral education. Moral education is education in the mores. But, like a good pragmatist, he wants the child to be intelligent about the mores. The mores, in other words, are to be applied tentatively and experimentally. Their sanction is to depend on their consequences, not on religion. Indeed, religious education is not essentially different from moral or even secular education. It, too, consists

in a zealous participation in the enterprises of the community. If it has a distinguishing feature, it is an endeavor to direct the child's attention to a certain inclusiveness of point of view.

This wholeness of viewpoint, of course, is also the aim of educational philosophy itself. The pragmatist recommends it as a way to enlighten learning activities in the school, the home, and the community. Educational philosophy, then, like value and knowledge theory, is instrumental, pragmatic.

b. There are many who prefer to classify the philosophy of progressive education under the title of naturalism.¹ Especially is this true of some of its critics. From the naturalism of Rousseau it sprang, and naturalism it still remains for them, in spite of being dressed up under the nomenclature of pragmatism. Naturalism as a philosophical category may first be briefly defined by what it negates. It denies that educational philosophy in its inclusive sweep need take into account concepts of the supernatural. 'If there is anything hidden from man in his search for the solution of educational problems, it must lie hidden in the system of nature of which he himself is a part. Any materials for its solution must lie within the compass of space and time. Man's mind is thus to be naturalized in, and not to be contrasted with, nature. Ultimate reality is materialistic or at least energistic.

The progressive or pragmatic philosophy of education fits these specifications pretty well. For its followers, education is

¹ Because many consider pragmatism as a phase of naturalism, perhaps the titles quoted *supra*, p. 327, should be repeated and mentioned first here. In addition, however, there are several titles which, while they in turn might just as well have been included under pragmatism, may be of a sufficiently different hue to be listed separately under this heading. I. W. Howerth, in his *Theory of Education*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1929, makes biological evolution the core of his frankly avowed naturalistic philosophy of education. D. B. Leary, *Living and Learning*, New York, Ray Long and Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1931, states his position largely in terms of the implications of a behavioristic educational psychology. R. Finney, *Sociological Philosophy of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928, does the same from the point of view of educational sociology. This latter volume, together with the evolutionism of W. C. Bagley, *Education and Emergent Man*, New York, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1934, has one foot in essentialism as well as one in naturalism. The chief criticism of the naturalistic position has been offered by G. O'Connell, *Naturalism in American Education*, Washington, Catholic University of America, 1936.

primarily concerned with the world of nature as it is here and now. The universe, to them, is really a multiverse in which there is an inescapable degree of randomness afloat. On this account, they find themselves incapable of perceiving any ultimate underlying purpose to which education should give allegiance. Not even progress is such, because it is neither inevitable nor are they sure of its direction. Its only criterion is adaptation or biological survival, a naturalistic yardstick of value if ever there was one. Mind, too, is thoroughly at home in the natural order because its pedigree shows its evolution as an instrument of adaptation to a changing environment.

Since naturalism as a philosophy of education crops out more prominently in some places than others, only these will be given special attention here. Perhaps the best place to begin is with that famous assumption of Rousseau's, that child nature is good, rather than fallen, as was the habit of his contemporaries. The implication here is that human nature develops according to laws as inexorable as those which heavenly bodies obey in their orbits. The duty of educators is to learn what these laws are. Once found out, it is their further duty to invoke, rather than interfere with, their operation. From this origin, then, stems the whole child-study movement. Child nature becomes the norm.

From these premises, the conclusion has been drawn that what is, is all right. Whatever the child is striving to do must be because of some basic urge that is trying to assert itself. The attention, therefore, paid to children's interests is entirely proper and natural. Indeed, one must be very careful not to thwart these native drives any more than can possibly be avoided. If one would fashion a list of the objectives of the school, he should have immediate recourse to child psychology. From its inventory of the instincts which are seeking expression, one can make up a catalogue of child needs. These, then, become the objectives which education should try to liberate and satisfy.

Probably most naturalistic educators would be unwilling to stop at this point. At the level of mere desire there is bound to be competition and conflict as to which desire is to gain the ascendancy in the child's conduct. Therefore mind will have to be invoked to arbitrate between them. Yet even if mind comes to construct a criterion of progress or growth, how will one know what is progress or growth? The reply of many progres-

sive educators is that growth is to be measured by that which leads on to further growth. What promotes life, then, or in other words biological survival, becomes the measure of value. But, here again, in spite of the introduction of intelligence, one finds himself back to a purely naturalistic philosophy of education.

The introduction of mind has afforded no escape because the view taken of mind is itself so naturalistic. The role of mind is determined biologically. It is a way of adjusting to a precarious nature. The mind of *homo sapiens* is a comparatively recent addition to nature. It appeared late in evolutionary history. Mind is not some primordial stuff which has antedated nature herself. Instead of merely contemplating the glory of God's handiwork, mind itself has work to do in reconstructing an imperfect environment. The natural classroom method, therefore, is problem-solving.

This point of view is, furthermore, the attitude of much scientific study of educational psychology. Particularly is it true of behaviorism. Here, the investigator contents himself only with what he sees in the way of overt behavior. The idea that the psyche of the child has a supernature, a soul, finds no place in his account. Pretty much the same comment is in order for the neurological and physiological approaches to educational psychology. There is often a materialism and mechanism inherent here which is thoroughly naturalistic.

The modern naturalistic educational philosopher probably accords the social process a more natural status in the education of the child than did its famous earlier advocate, Rousseau. But even so, the center of gravity of the educational process is still quite heavily weighted toward the independence and autonomy of the individual. The natural rights of man are matched with a bill of rights of childhood. Indeed, these rights often seem to crowd his duties off to the back or side of the educational stage. The inhibitions of social taboos are sometimes rejected as unnatural. The natural state of man is supposed to be freedom. While discipline and self-restraint are worthy objectives, they are incidental to the more positive virtues of a school program emphasizing self-expression.

This thinly veiled injunction laid on parents and teachers not to interfere with the natural development of children blossoms

into the doctrine of *laissez faire* on the larger social scale. A governmental hands-off policy toward education has more than once been advocated on naturalistic grounds. In place of the artificial promptings of government, the natural self-interest of people is relied on to provide schools when needed. Where the natural instincts of parenthood fail, those of philanthropy will come forward. If the government steps in at all, it should only be as a last resort in order to see that no injustice is done to any child. Such a philosophy of education, of course, accentuates opportunities for the self-assertiveness of the strong and capable. But even in this, there is a sort of natural justice. It seems to be a social application of natural selection and survival of the fittest.

Underlying both pragmatism and progressive education is a certain presentism or temporalism which finds an easy lodgment in a naturalistic philosophy of education. In a novelly developing universe, one can hardly afford to take his eye off the point at which the new emergents are constantly coming into view. That point, of course, is the ever-moving present. If he averts his gaze too long to the past or future, the rush of oncoming events may run him down. This being the case, it is small wonder that progressives advocate that education be life now rather than a preparation for adulthood or life at some contingent future date. If the child lives well in the present, then as the future imperceptibly grows out of the present, he will be as well prepared as he can be for whatever the future has in store.

By confining educational aims within the bounds of the here and now, one but fits his educational philosophy to the dimensions of nature. He omits the eternal, the timeless, from his space-time frame of reference. Man does this because he feels at home in nature. He may not have a complete list of answers to all his problems but he takes comfort and gains confidence in thinking that none of them is hidden in mysterious riddles of a superhuman or supernatural character. If religion enters his philosophy of education, it is only as a deified nature. God is immanent in nature, and nature is His temple of worship.

Moral education likewise is put on a naturalistic basis. Morals originate in the folkways or mores. These are either enforced by social pressures or are self-enforcing through their natural conse-

quences. Character education, therefore, has no need of an appeal to an authority external to nature. Conscience becomes an echo of social custom rather than divine command.

2. Over against the philosophy of progressive education supported by pragmatism and naturalism stands that of essentialism or traditionalism. The spirit of this educational philosophy can, perhaps, best be caught from the word essentialism.¹ In the midst of the welter of change and diversity, the essentialist believes that there are some points of the educational compass which are relatively fixed. He will recognize that there are many educational values by which one might steer but that there are some by which he must steer. Convinced of what are the essentials of education, he firmly and resolutely insists that the child experience them. If he does not believe that the whole curriculum should be prescribed, he at least believes that a considerable part of it should be. In the traditional curriculum he finds certain classics in literature, mathematics, religion, history, science, and others whose value is independent of the place and time they are studied. These, educated men must know. They are essentials. They must be learned even though their significance is not made clear in the fulfillment of some present purpose. Till such occasion arises later, they are to be learned and stored away.

Variations in pupil interest are to be expected, but these chance variations should seldom, if ever, take precedence over the essentials. If a child has a genuine interest in the essentials, well and good. If not, pressure must be brought to bear to incline him in that direction. In learning to put forth effort where interest may lag or even be wanting, a certain moral stamina will result. Education will possess a vertebrate oughtness which should afford the child a much-needed discipline. In this process, there need be no fear that educational freedom is denied. Instead of being employed as a means, it will be made an end; or an outcome; of the educative process. Freedom will be regarded as a well-deserved reward for the youth who has learned to discipline himself through a mastery of the social experience of the ages.

¹ BAGLEY, W. C., "An Essentialist's Platform for the Advancement of American Education," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 24: 241-256, April, 1938.

Deriving the essentials of education from tradition has strong social implications for a philosophy of education. Its main strength lies in the trust which is placed in the experience of other people and other times. Experience refined and generalized in the mill of preceding generations must have an authority which surpasses that of any individual child and his epoch. The more confidence one has in this authority, the more authoritarian is the structure of society likely to be. The latitude for discretion for the common run of people is correspondingly narrowed and restricted. This is the acknowledged trend in dictatorial states, and its influence is even to be detected in democratic ones as well. The educational corollary is clear. As the classroom is dominated by the teacher, so the school is by the principal and the system by the superintendent.

Adult society, however, is not the final seat of authority for many essentialists. For them, the essential values in education are ultimately sanctioned and consecrated by religion. Hence, religious education must necessarily be pitched at a higher level than the naturalism of participation in social institutions. Its concern is with an unassailable authority, an authority which is above and beyond nature, the supernatural. Its main inspiration is a divine being, God, the author of all values, educational and otherwise. With such backing, there can be no misgiving about the essentials of either sacred or secular learning.

In passing from the philosophy of progressive education to that of the essentialists or traditionalists, one should not necessarily regard the transition as an abrupt one. Both philosophies have right and left wings. Among the naturalists, for instance, is a group of sociological or positivistic philosophers of education which has some unmistakable essentialist sympathies. It is naturalistic in that it approaches education and other social institutions from the Darwinian point of view. It is progressive in that it recognizes the social value of individuality in the pupil or teacher and the freedom that is demanded for its realization. But, at the same time, this group is essentialist in being fully aware of the relentless pressure with which society enforces the customs which are basic or essential for maintaining its unique character. Consequently, this brand of naturalism bears down almost unsparingly on conformity to certain social demands on education.

a. Also somewhat on the borderline is idealism as a philosophy of education.¹ It was parent to much of the educational innovation of the nineteenth century. Yet it has been unwilling to sponsor the second generation of its intellectual offspring in the twentieth century. Idealism is to be credited with a high regard for individuality and freedom in education. Moreover, its activity program has been voluntaristic and developmental. Yet, in spite of all this, there is a measure of absolutism in idealistic philosophy of education which seems more properly to align it with the essentialists.

This classification seems clearly justified where the idealistic pattern of modern educational philosophy is Platonic. Here ideas are of ultimate cosmic significance. But by ideas much more is meant than mere mental states. Ideas are rather the essences or archetypes which give form to the cosmos. They are the immaterial molds into which all matter is cast. They are the ideals or standards by which the things of sense are to be judged. While matter is known through the senses, its idea or principle is grasped by the mind. But most important for the educational philosophy of essentialism is the fact that these ideas or forms are eternal, unchanging. The objects of sense,

¹ The idealistic school of educational philosophy has been represented by several writers, most notable of whom is probably H. H. Horne. See his *Philosophy of Education*, rev. ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927; *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1935; and *Idealism in Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923. Less important are the expositions of A. C. Fleshman, *The Educational Process*, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1908; A. Tompkins, *The Philosophy of Teaching*, Boston, Ginn & Company, 1898; and R. M. Shrevves, *The Philosophical Basis of Education*, Boston, Richard G. Badger, The Gorham Press, 1918. For a treatment of fascist philosophy of education as a phase of idealism, see G. Gentile, *The Reform of Education* (translated by D. Bigongiari,) New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1922; and M. M. Thompson, *The Educational Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile*, Los Angeles, University of Southern California, 1934. Although not so easily classified, probably M. Demiashkevich, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York, American Book Company, 1935, belongs with the idealists. The chief criticisms of the idealistic philosophy of education are to be found scattered throughout J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916. For a more limited assessment see H. E. Langan, *The Philosophy of Personalism and Its Educational Applications*, Washington, Catholic University Press, 1935.

on the other hand, seem to be in a continual state of flux. Archetypal ideas do not become; they simply are.

If the ideas conditioning the very pattern of the world in which the child lives are in fixed and final form, they must necessarily constitute the essentials of his education. There can be no avoiding making them the backbone of the curriculum. They become a "must" program for the school. This does not mean that education of the senses, and particularly physical education, is to be neglected. But in any hierarchy of educational values it will not be surprising if they occupy a lower status. Formal intellectual studies and methods will rank highest.

Moreover, there seems to be a definite organismic bearing to the idealistic essentialist's educational philosophy. It appears to side with Aristotle in declaring that what a developing organism is to become, the organism already latently is. The idea or ideal toward which his mind matures must potentially exist within the child before he starts to learn. Learning merely makes definite what formerly was inchoate. This position, clearly, is cousin to the account of learning given by *Gestalt* psychology.

Modern idealism has given a somewhat different turn to educational philosophy. In its modern meaning, idealism has more to do with ideas as mental states. In this sense idealism might more properly be called a philosophy of idea-ism—the "I" of idealism being inserted for euphony. On careful analysis, it has occurred to some that the only knowledge one has of his environment is his idea of it. The environment in itself can never be known directly. It can only be known through the intermediary ideas of a human knower. The form which the learner's knowledge takes, therefore, is bound to be in part the product of his human way of apprehending it. The space or time occupied by a learning activity affords a good illustration. Whether space or time has an external objective existence is beyond human proof. Nonetheless, men do have definite ideas of space and time. The conclusion, therefore, is that such concepts are supplied by the mind of the human learner. They are a priori categories of thought.

If such a theory of knowledge be sound, some idealists have gone a step further to argue that reality itself must be idea-istic. What the more exact nature of reality as idea happens to be, is

answered by a variety of idealisms. The one which has most found its way into educational philosophy is that of absolute idealism. According to this view the heart of reality is to be found in thought or reason. Reason is absolute; in fact it is *the* Absolute. Being absolute, it is also One, monistic. In it, everything is interrelated, all contradictions reconciled. Furthermore, the complete cause of any single occurrence involves the whole of reality. The cosmos, then, is a great thought process and the Absolute is God thinking. Whatever has happened or whatever will happen, is the result of the self-willed idea of the Absolute. Yet, at the same time, the Absolute is already complete, self-realized. Nature, not to forget it, is the medium through which the Absolute progressively reveals itself in external form. Mind in man partakes of the nature of this absolute Mind. The mind of man, however, is but a part of this absolute whole. It is, therefore, finite and incomplete. Consequently, its objective is to strive to realize itself, to become what it was meant to be.

On the whole, the essentialist's philosophy of education is quite appropriately enclosed in this frame of reference. Obviously, what is absolute is essential. This unmistakably sets the end of the educational process. It is the ever-increasing realization of the absolute idea. This statement of objectives also determines the function and purpose of educational philosophy. Its quest is an understanding of ultimate reality. The Absolute being the whole and education being a part thereof, it may be that study of the fragment may reveal important facets of the totality.

✓ The absolute idea, of course, is never fully learned because the Absolute is infinite. Hence, each learning achievement of the educator but reveals that his goal is farther off. At this point, the idealistic philosophy of education not only seems to satisfy essentialism but to be progressive as well. It seems at once to be both stable and flexible. But the weight of this philosophy rests more heavily on the one foot than on the other. ~~Its~~ Absolute is only infinite, limitless, in the sense of being all-inclusive. This means that absolute Mind requires no further development. It is already complete and fully self-realized. Development or learning is only for the mind of the child, of finite man. And even he becomes, in time, what he eternally is.

Nothing evolves which was not already involved. Thus, in the end, essentialism prevails over progressivism.

Since the Absolute is all-inclusive of everything that ever has been or ever will be, truth and goodness must be an open book to the mind of the Absolute. This extension of the idealist position further increases the gap between essentialism and progressivism. It at once determines a different and distinct pattern for the educative process. Truth and goodness set the models to which the child's learning should conform. They set the bounds of what is essential. Learning is not a creation, but a realization, of the absolute idea of truth and goodness. In the idealistic school, ideas do not become true because of the value they have for accomplishing some pupil project. Rather, ideas work well there because they are true. Their worth is intrinsic, not instrumental. They are representative of ultimate reality and are, therefore, worth learning as ends in and of themselves. Truth has always been true; it does not become true. Hence, the essentialist's curriculum, insofar as it is constituted of knowledge that is consistently true, can be made up and learned in advance of its use.

Exact and direct correspondence of the child's efforts with objective truth of course is impossible for the idealistic essentialist. For him, the test of truth is better derived from the logical consistency among his various ideas about truth. From this and the foregoing, one can deduce the role of mind in both the educative and world process. Mind is not merely a recent biological acquisition. Rather is it a primordial stuff which is the very essence of reality itself. Since the world is the child's idea, education is a sort of world-building in which the child tries to construct an inner world-view which as nearly as possible approximates outer reality, the Absolute. He endeavors to form a *Weltanschauung*, to use the German word which has so precisely and popularly expressed the philosophy of idealism.

The mentalistic approach to idealism on the whole has committed this educational philosophy to the pre-eminent importance of consciousness. Mind is ultimately spiritual, not materialistic. Partaking of the nature of the absolute, it could not be otherwise. A body and an environment there are, to be sure, but ultimately these are reducible to mind. Consequently, any educational psychology which overlooks the data revealed by introspection

must necessarily be untrustworthy. The child is to be viewed as more than a behaving organism responding to the stimuli of his environment. This is too atomistic. Idealism stresses a certain wholeness. Nothing happens in any part of the system that does not affect all the rest. Herein lies theoretical support both for education of the whole child and, to a degree, organismic educational psychology.

-Some idealists are inclined to exalt will rather than intellect or reason to the position of Absolute. On analysis, they find that primacy must be awarded to a certain activity or striving as the heart of reality. This theory is notably different from the pragmatic in accounting for the activity principle in education. It puts an education squarely up to the individual. Neither teacher nor parent, school nor church can educate him. Only through a voluntary effort of his will can he educate himself. He will be particularly called upon to make this effort when interest fails to motivate his learning activities. This assures the essentialist that essentials will be learned despite the failure of easier approaches.

Whether idea or will be made the absolute, each is peculiarly private to the individual. The idealist must therefore be at especial pains to avoid the egocentric predicament of solipsism. His educational theory must avoid the uncompromising insistence of the pupil or teacher that reality exists exclusively as he views it. Otherwise, the operation of mind on mind would be impossible, and both the social and educational processes would be without meaning. The idealist escapes this predicament by objectifying mind, that is, he reduces everything to mind but admits that there are other minds than his. Most important here, of course, is absolute mind. All individual minds are encompassed in the absolute mind. Out of this grows a conception of the social mind. In addition to individual minds is the over-mind of society in which all share. It is the whole, of which the rest are parts.

The educational significance of this rather abstruse and compact statement is tremendous. On the one hand, it projects individuality to front-rank importance. Much is made of the spiritual autonomy of the individual. In this respect, idealism can lay definite claim to favoring a democracy as the social soil in which its educational theory is to grow. On the other hand,

the individual seems subordinated to the social whole. About this whole there is a definite oneness; it is monistic. This has led to invoking idealism as the underpinning for totalitarian theories of education, especially that of fascism. Of course not all essentialists are fascists, but there is an undeniable essentialism about fascism.

Little need be said, in conclusion, about the idealistic point of view on religious and moral education. Its definition of the Absolute has unmistakable theistic characteristics. Since the aim of education is the increasing realization of the absolute, all education appears tinged with religious significance. This includes moral education as well. Reason being absolute, the universe is one of law and order. So, too, there is a moral law in the universe backed by the authority of the Absolute. This lays an inescapable moral imperative on education.

(6) So far, the stability and firmness on which the essentialist philosophy of education prides itself has been rooted in a reality that has been idealistic. Ideas rather than external objects have constituted ultimate reality. Some essentialists, however, think that a more solid foundation can be found for their philosophy of education in a theory that these objects have a reality independent of mental phenomena. This philosophy is known as realism. In its more materialistic phases, it even reduces mind itself to an aspect of matter. Possibly excepting this last statement, realism seems a very common-sense point of view. It seems essentialist in that it bluntly recognizes the uncompromising limits within which human educational endeavors must be undertaken.

One very important group of educational realists are the scientific realists.¹ Unfortunately, however, being scientists, they have not been at pains to state the underlying philosophy of their position. It is, therefore, largely implicit and lacking formal statement. The fundamental assumption lying back of most educational science is that the object of research has a definite, external physical reality. The educational scientist may fail to describe it accurately, but he never doubts the objective existence

¹ The nearest approach to a systematic presentation of the philosophical bases of scientific realism in education has been made by F. S. Breed, *Education and the New Realism*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939. Before this book appeared an attempt was made to criticize this position, where it appeared by implication, by W. L. Patty, *A Study of Mechanism in Education*, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1938.

of what he is trying to study. This is true whether he is studying the material or the social environment. In either case their external existence sets an undeniably common point of reference for the educational enterprise. It is here that subjective differences of opinion must ultimately come for arbitration. Not even the fact that the objective reality so revered may be subject to evolutionary processes alters this conclusion. Under such conditions education, especially its scientific study, should endeavor to approximate the laws according to which these changes take place. Clearly, the realism depicted in these rugged and unyielding terms has a strong essentialist flavor.

Reality so defined is to be distinguished from truth. Reality simply is; truth is what reality is reported to be. The test of truth, hence, is its correspondence to reality. If ideas work, it is because they are true to reality and not vice versa. Truth may be the product of the human mind but not so reality. A creative intelligence, which creates reality, is discounted in advance. Consequently the theory of education as a reconstruction of the universe around us must give way to a theory of education as conformity to it. The curriculum, therefore, is composed of the best data on reality to date. Because this must be determined by the most competent investigators, the realist's curriculum tends to be sponsored in an authoritarian manner. For the same reason, it can readily be required as essential. Indeed there is an inherent and welcome discipline in letting the learner know that his education is conditioned by the inexorable quality of an external reality.

Given such premises, the educational realist is quite naturally committed to a stimulus-response type of educational psychology. In the strictest sense stimuli are objective. On this account each stimulus and its response is capable of objective study. This in turn paves the way to the theory underlying scientific measurement in education. Tests are found to measure the qualities objectively observable in pupil reactions. The quality most frequently measured is that of accuracy and it hardly needs mention what the standard of accuracy is where the correspondence theory of truth is assumed.

The same philosophy is implied in the movement to make a scientific determination of educational objectives. What a community values is held to be an objective fact. As such it

should be as susceptible to investigation and definition as any other object of scientific research. And once given the authenticity of science—to most minds incontestable—it becomes invested with the spirit of essentialism. The social or cultural tradition stands for external reality, as it is best known to date. Education in moral obligation, therefore, is but an invitation to accept the universe.

The most clear-cut statement of a realistic philosophy of education, however, is to be found in the position of scholastic realism.¹ It is here, too, that essentialism finds its staunchest defense. The profound differences between progressive and essentialist philosophies of education stand most strikingly revealed when one contrasts their respective props, pragmatism and scholastic realism. This latter is the official philosophy of the Catholic church and its parochial-school system. It takes its name scholasticism from the famous medieval schoolmen, pre-eminently Thomas Aquinas, who did so much to develop it as a system.

This philosophy is fundamentally dualistic. It recognizes both an order of nature and a supernatural order. Central in the latter is the divine being of God, the author of all. While change and time characterize the former, God Himself is changeless and eternal. Novelty, so evident in the natural order, turns out to be only apparent when viewed from the standpoint of an immutable eternity. Individuality, likewise, is accidental and merely an instance of an already complete reality. Indeed, God could not be omniscient and omnipotent if He were to grow

¹ Several treatises have been written from the point of view of scholastic realism, but an outstanding Catholic philosophy of education remains to be published. Oldest is T. E. Shields, *Philosophy of Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1921. More recent are the two volumes of F. DeHovre, *Philosophy and Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1931; and *Catholicism in Education*, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934. Still more recent, though more elementary, is P. S. Marique, *The Philosophy of Christian Education*, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939. The *De Magistro* of Thomas Aquinas has been translated and commented on by M. H. Mayer, *The Philosophy of Teaching of Thomas Aquinas*, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company, 1929; but the scope of the *De Magistro* is, on the whole, quite limited. So, too, is the encyclical of Pius XI, "The Christian Education of Youth," *Catholic Educational Review*, 28: 129-164, March, 1930. No major criticism of Catholic educational philosophy has been attempted to date.

or learn, if He did not both antedate and postdate time, and if there were anything that could be novel to Him.

With such premises granted, it is easy to understand why many educators insist on essentialism. What is fixed and unalterable through all time is undeniably essential. It is so essential that failure to insist on it would be folly indeed. It justifies any educator in holding to certain unwavering educational objectives. Furthermore, it is sufficient warrant for a prescribed curriculum. Educational values which partake of an immutable character remove any difficulty from selecting a program of minimum essentials.

Of course, change is not completely eliminated from this scholastic system. If there were no change, there could be no learning. But learning is a necessity of finite man in the natural order. Education is the process by which he lifts himself up to the eternal. Progress is measured by advance toward this goal. This progress, however, is primarily a matter of improving the means of gaining the final objective. It takes place within nature. There is no progress in the ultimate end or supernatural destiny of man. This is final, unchangeable, eternal. The scholastic essentialist, thus, is progressive only within very definite and fixed boundaries. He rejects the radical philosophy of progressive education in which there are no limits or ends that are not subject to further evolution. Indeed, without the eternal verities as a fixed point of reference, the scholastic essentialist finds it impossible to calculate progress at all.

Among these verities, the nature of truth and goodness has peculiar significance for the philosophy of education. To commence with the former, it is obvious that knowledge, the chief commerce of the school, should be true. But when is knowledge true? If truth is an eternal verity to be regarded as forever the same, an objective external reality is imputed to truth. Truth is not the victim of subjective personal opinion or mental states. Rather, is it universal. This characteristic of truth is especially congenial to the essentialist. Learning it does not alter its character. Learning experimentally involves verification, but verification is not literally truth-making. Truth is not made—much less is it manufactured by a child learning. Verification is merely testing the correspondence of what is

learned with objective truth. Learning, therefore, is more to be likened to copying or mirroring truth.

Of course, the entire truth has never been vouchsafed to man's keeping, not even to that of the essentialist's. Much of man's knowledge is only an approximation to truth itself. Nevertheless, the assumption that there is a prototype of truth leaves its mark on the way the curriculum is conceived. The fact that truth is ever the same enables the teacher to make the curriculum up in advance of any learning activity. Essentials can be determined before school opens. Moreover, the knowledge of truth to be imbibed can be set out to be learned. The formal knowledge of the school is rarely something to be learned incidentally or indirectly as the outcome of fulfilling pupil purpose. It antedates any project he may wish to carry out. It is waiting to be learned. Consequently, it is something which can be appropriated directly. Being objectively conceived, it can, when learned, be stored away till called up on demand.

Accordingly, the primary role of mind in the world order is that of cognition. Its business is to know. Since the truth is not always clear, it may first have to find out, to judge, what corresponds to the truth. But ultimately, its function is to record what is true. So school becomes a place where one takes unto himself the rich deposit of humanistic, scientific, and religious truth. He acquires the essentials of culture. Although, as already indicated, judging is by no means excluded, nevertheless *memoriter* is the main prop of the learning process.

The nature of mind further bears out the essential dualism in the scholastic philosophy of education. Mind is to be carefully distinguished from the body or matter. One must be especially on his guard in identifying mind with the brain or any other part of the neural system of physiology. The dualism of mind and body consists chiefly in that the latter is a material, while the former is an immaterial, substance. This difference should not lead one to think that there is a schism in the learner's personality. The oneness of the learner is fundamental in spite of the fact that that oneness is compounded of an immaterial mind with a material body. Just how an immaterial substance can interact with a material one or vice versa is a mystery of the dualism. But, in any event, the difference between mind and

body is sufficiently great to warn the scholastic teacher not to place too great confidence in the conclusions of behavioristic psychology.

It is, of course, not enough for the educator to know what is true. He must also know what is good. Truth and goodness are separate categories. Much that is true is not good. Happily for the essentialist, values are to be regarded just as externally and objectively as truth. They inhere in objects or studies even though unrecognized by pupils or teachers. If they originated solely in bodily states, they would be too vacillating, for the instability of feelings is notorious. Besides, man's original nature is fallen, not wholly in order, thus undermining any assumption that what he desires is *ipso facto* good. What is good must also be judged good. Through reason, one will be able to apprehend what it is in any object or study that endows it with inherent and abiding value. Of course, it is this objectivity of value, it is the fact that the good is eternally good, that recommends it to the essentialist of the scholastic persuasion. So, as has been so well said, education is the means whereby one acquaints himself with the best that has been thought and said.

This philosophy of educational values has an important bearing on the employment of interest in learning. Interest is an assertion by the learner of a recognition of value in the object of his studies. As such, it is entirely normal and should be capitalized on if possible. But if the learner manifests no interest in the eternal verities presented to him in the curriculum, which should take precedence, interest or curriculum? The essentialist definitely aligns himself with the latter. In this, he is consistent with the rest of the scholastic position. The permanent obviously is to be preferred to the transient. Because it is permanent and enduring, it generates an obligation. It must, or ought to, be learned even in the absence of interest. Effort must be summoned up so that duty may be discharged.

The immutability of truth and goodness lays yet a further imperative upon the teacher. If he is imparting what is unmistakable and eternal truth, or what are well-known essentials, it will be legitimate for him to indoctrinate. He will even be inclined to this procedure where there is uncertainty as to the final form of truth or goodness, for then his duty will be to pass

on the most approved view to date. To let the child arrive at his own conclusions independently may result in an extravagant waste of time, to say nothing of his running the risk of failing to put in at the proper port in the end. If this method of instruction seems to disregard minority or contrary opinions, suffice it to say that the truth, if it really is *the* truth, must be intolerant of error.

At first glance, it may appear as if there were no room for freedom in the scholastic philosophy of education. However, there are two important points at which it is quite marked. In the first place, there is individual freedom of the will. The will of the pupil is free to accept or reject the authority of the teacher. To have to choose between the true and the false, or between the good and the bad, may not seem to be much of an option, but its exercise is nonetheless a fateful decision. In the second place, freedom is a social privilege. It is awarded to pupils in proportion to their command of the accumulated wisdom of social ages past. In this sense, freedom is an outcome or end of education. It is predicated on a knowledge of, and respect for, the essentials of tradition. Academic freedom thus is not absolute, but limited.

The importance of individuality in the scholastic philosophy of education may be inferred from its position on freedom. Individuality is obviously recognized. Indeed, individuals are of supreme worth. Individual differences in school children, however, are accidental, to use the word in its scholastic meaning. These differences are cultivated, to be sure, but they are not of the essence of childhood or humanity. It is the pupil's immortal soul that is most important to save through education. There is no difference in the quality of immortality. Salvation through education is accomplished by enabling the child to perceive and act on what is universal in truth and goodness, not what is accidental or transient. It is the universal that is essential, not the particular.

The sort of social structure in which the scholastic philosophy of education most readily roots may be either aristocratic or democratic. Its dependence on authority and the people who know best ordinarily enables it to work well with states where political power is rather narrowly and autocratically held. At the same time, the fact that it opens the highest careers to talent,

in whatever social strata it is born, has a sound democratic ring. But in the relation of state and church the scholastic philosophy of education maintains its fundamental dualism between the natural and the supernatural, the temporal and the spiritual. The state's interest in education being of the natural order, therefore, is of a lower estate than that of the church. The educational philosophy of essentialism reaches its most extreme point in the supreme sureness of the Catholic church in the infallibility of its mandate to teach.

The scholastic philosophy of education comes to a final focus in religious and moral education. Although religion and morals are to be included right along with the secular or lay subjects, nonetheless the fundamental dualism of scholasticism is recognized in the distinction between profane and sacred studies. The approach to the latter, as might be expected, is from the supernatural side. The lay teaching of morals independent of religious instruction is thought woefully inadequate. Goodness is commended to children as a divine command. Religious education is orienting the child toward his Creator and final destiny.

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INDEX

A

Abilities, special, 137
 Ability grouping, 297-298
 Absolute, the, 14*n.*, 34, 38, 96, 340-341
 Absolutism, 16*n.*, 39, 56, 57, 87, 88, 120, 134, 197, 206, 232, 338, 342, 343
 in democracy, 158, 159-160, 195
 and freedom, 47, 50, 302
 • in religion, 209, 231-232, 313
 Academic freedom, 8, 26, 46, 145, 188, 212, 230-231, 234-242, 331, 349
 (See also Freedom)
 Academic instruction, 54, 70, 169, 223
 Academic organization of teachers, 180
 Acceptance, interest as, 262, 266
 Accident, 115, 345, 349
 Accountability, 50
 Accuracy, 11, 13, 55, 344
 Activity, 61, 98, 105, 257, 263, 290, 291, 301-302, 326, 338, 342
 child, 38, 54, 123, 317*n.*
 Activity curriculum, 38, 54, 69, 74, 159, 256-258, 330
 Activity theory of education, 63, 69-72, 70*n.*, 73, 257, 330
 Administration, 193, 212-213, 227, 242, 322, 331
 Adolescence, 314
 Adult education, 225
 Adulthood, distinction from childhood, 250-251
 Aesthetic, the, 68, 74, 77, 292, 315
 Agnostic, 314
 Agrarian society, 173-174, 177, 184

Aim, 84*n.*, 96, 163-164, 186
 in curriculum, 252
 determination of, 6-7, 15, 86-88, 114, 124
 outgrowth of problem, 114
 distinguished from result, 47
 final and fixed, 89, 286
 general, 84-85, 261
 interest and, 262-263
 in logic and truth, 57, 279-281, 329
 specific, 26, 71, 84-85, 88-89, 93, 134, 137, 291, 343
 theories of, 246-252
 as value, 76, 84*n.*, 95, 203
 (See also End; Goal; Objective)
 Analysis and synthesis, 14, 115
 Anarchy, defined, 197-199, 302
 Answer, the, 72, 236, 252, 270
 Appearance and reality, 5, 40-41, 55, 56, 341, 344, 345
 of freedom, 45
 Apperception, 109, 263
 Appreciation, 96
 A priori, 21
 (See also Category)
 Aquinas, Thomas, 107, 345
 Aptitude, 150
 Aristocracy, 143, 155, 192, 349
 Aristotle, 41, 71, 142, 290, 339
 Arithmetic, 207, 255, 256, 271, 319
 in measurement, 269
 Art, compared to science and philosophy, 18-19
 of public affairs, 223
 as subject, 71, 262, 315
 Artist teacher, 83
 Arts and sciences, 172, 254
 Asceticism, 266*n.*
 Association, 104
 in learning, 108, 113
 in social theory, 125-127

- Assumption, 24, 31, 120, 124-125,
127, 146, 153, 197, 233, 255,
270, 271, 280, 286, 290, 315-
316, 333
education as, 162-164
Phase of philosophy, 6, 8-9, 14
Atheist, 314
Atomism, 30, 117, 125, 150, 162,
255, 270, 342
Attention, 261, 266
Attitude, 130, 255, 282, 318
Authoritarian political philosophy,
287
Authoritarian teaching method, 58,
233, 234, 285-287, 313
Authoritarianism, 59, 133, 239, 242,
279, 344
Authority, 94, 150, 208, 210, 230,
311n., 319-320, 336
freedom correlate of, 300
intelligence dependent on, 64
of the teacher, 255, 294, 302, 349
Autonomy, 60, 137, 148, 227, 301,
334, 342
Avocation, 82
- B
- Baptism, 312, 314, 316
Beauty, 89, 92, 138, 171, 177
Behavior, objectivity of, 103
Behavior pattern, 256
Behaviorism, 106, 107, 117, 334,
347-348
as theory of learning, 103, 104-
105, 113, 115-117
Behavioristic philosophy of educa-
tion, 64
Behavioristic psychology, 103
Being, compared to doing, 58
Bias, of economic class, 15, 49, 179,
230, 240, 290
in logic, 280
in philosophy, 6, 11
related to value, 76, 262
and science, 11, 86, 144
Bible, the Christian, 210, 312, 320
Biological evolution, 332n.
Biological impossibility of democ-
racy, 150
Biological theory of learning, 118-
119
Biology, 8, 29, 39, 86, 105, 130
influence on psychology, 101
Birth control, 170
Birth rate, 179-180
Board of education, 228-229, 241
Bobbitt, Franklin, 251n.
Bourgeoisie, 140, 143, 181, 183
Brain, 104, 106, 347
Busy work, 257
- C
- Capitalism, 143, 146, 162, 176, 189,
198, 221
educational counterpart of, 168
and freedom, 234-235, 234n.
Capitalistic class, 181
Cardinal numbers, 269-270, 272
Cardinal principles of education,
85n.
Categories, of thought, 109-110, 339
Catholic church, 40, 64, 128, 208-212
Catholic philosophy, 18, 37, 41, 58,
58n.-59n., 63-64, 67, 111, 150-
151, 345-350
dualism in, 106, 107, 345
theory of knowledge, 63-64
(See also Scholastic realism)
Catholic theory of education, 29,
63-64, 120, 266n., 311
infallibility of, 350
parochial school, 205, 223-224
Catholicism, and nationalism, 214-
215
Causation, as category, 109
Cause, and effect, 36, 104, 225
efficient and final, 30, 30n.-31n.,
43
first, 29, 42, 47
Censorship, 235
Centralization of administration,
193, 212-213
Certainty, 33, 39, 42, 50, 231-232

- Change, 11, 13, 21, 25, 39, 42, 45, 82-83, 96, 232, 241, 258, 289 327, 328, 336, 345, 346
 - as appearance, 35, 40-41
 - as condition of freedom, 48-49, 300
 - defined, 38
 - distinguished from progress, 97
 - and time, 37
 - as ultimate, 43, 232
- Chauvinism, 214
- Child, and curriculum, 133, 253, 260, 261, 263
 - the whole, 11, 130, 130n., 256, 271, 317, 326
- Child activity, 38, 54, 123, 317n.
- Child-centered school, 296
- Child labor, 201
- Child nature, 78, 90, 93
- Child need, 87, 90
- Child study, 333
- Childhood, distinction from adulthood, 234-235
- Character, 131, 316, 317
- Character education, 310, 314, 316-318, 336
- Christian education, 131, 210, 316, 320
- Christianity, 150, 210
- Church, 4, 26, 128, 131, 285, 320
 - educational sphere of, 206, 310
 - relation to family and state, 134, 136, 138, 197, 199-200, 203, 207-212, 310
- Citizen, 93, 128, 140, 196-197
 - rights of, 239-241
- Citizenship, 81, 85, 89, 96, 184, 201, 207, 209, 211, 294
 - sphere of state, 201, 209
- Civil state (*see* State)
- Class, economic, 143, 147, 149, 152, 156, 157, 163, 175-183, 225
 - as logical category, 33, 114, 115, 126
- Class discipline, 304
- Class war, 181-183, 225
- Classics, the, 34, 336
- Classless society, 146, 183, 183n.
- Code, 124, 304
 - of professional ethics, 136
- Coercion, in class struggle, 181
 - of learning, 267-268
 - in punishment, 305
 - as social control, 198
- Cognition, 347
- Cognitive faculty, 110
- Coherence, theory of truth, 72
- Collectivism, 162, 168
 - freedom under, 234-235
- Commercial society, 173, 177
- Common sense, 9, 120-121
- Common weal, self-interest and, 200
- Communication, 104, 127, 157, 163, 182
- Communism, 140, 145, 150, 157, 278, 187, 202
 - controversial issues in, 229, 231, 232n., 287
 - fascism and, 145
 - freedom under, 234n.
 - school and industry in, 175
- Communitistic philosophy of education, 145-146
- Community, church as, 320
 - school as, 127
- Competition, 174-175, 187, 214
 - educational counterpart of, 185-188
 - as motivation, 168
- Complete living, as aim, 137
- Compulsion, of learning, 267-268, 284
 - by pupils, 304
- Compulsory education, 197, 201, 207, 208, 220
- Conceptualization, 108, 114-120
- Concomitant, educational, of work, 174
- Conditioning, in learning, 92, 104, 113-114, 117
- Configuration (*see* Gestalt psychology)
- Conscience, 267, 319, 340, 336n.
- Consciousness, 105, 107, 108, 130, 341
- Consensus of opinion, 6, 87

- Conservation, of value, 138
 Conservative function of school, 219-221
 Consistency, role in philosophy, 2, 5, 6, 8, 14, 324
 as theory of truth, 56, 341
 Constant, change as a, 39
 Constitution, as limitation of state, 197
 Construction work, 54, 257
 Consummatory value, 77
 Consumption, economic setting of, 171, 174
 education and, 170, 172, 175
 Contingency, 35, 36, 38, 58, 68, 232, 233, 237, 252, 287, 298, 329
 Continuity, 34, 39, 117, 129, 130, 164, 250-251, 252, 259, 260
 Contract, as basis of rights and duties, 198
 in Dalton Plan, 125
 teacher's, 136, 242
 theory of society, 124-125
 Control, of environment, as method, 284-293
 proportioned to freedom, 299-301
 Controversial issues, 200, 218, 228-230, 230n., 236, 239, 291
 Conversion, 162, 314, 316
 Conviction, of opinion, 59, 236, 237
 Cooperation, morality of, 187, 214
 Copy theory of intellect, 62, 66, 68-69, 72-73
 Correctness, as correspondence, 270
 Correlation, multiple, 16, 274
 Correspondence theory of truth, 55-56, 66, 72, 270, 341, 344, 347
 Cosmopolitanism, 214-215
 Cosmos, 29, 135, 148, 338, 340
 Counts, G. S., 223n.
 Course of study, 33, 73, 252, 310, 312
 distinguished from curriculum, 73-74, 259
 (See also Curriculum)
 Creative education, 36, 38, 46, 65n., 66, 159, 292
 Creative function of school, 221-226
 Creative intelligence, 67, 344
 Creative learning, 117-118
 Creativity, 32, 297-298, 300
 Credits, 125, 255-256
 Crime, school, 186
 Criminal, as willful wrongdoer, 305
 Critical function of school, 226-230
 Criticism, 7, 65-66, 218, 237
 Culture, 89, 112, 177-178, 195, 254, 255
 Culture epoch, 44-45
 Curiosity, 262, 279
 Curriculum, 31, 32n., 40, 62, 63n., 79, 83, 88, 89, 110, 141, 144, 175, 177, 184, 204-205, 224, 249, 265, 269, 321, 330, 331, 336, 339, 341, 344, 346, 348
 activity, 38, 54, 69, 74, 256-258, 330
 based on psychology, 110, 316
 child and, 2, 31, 62, 124, 133, 253
 - 263, 282
 classics, the, in, 34
 compared with course of study, 73-74, 259
 controversial issues in, 228-229
 distinguished from method, 282-284
 economic class and, 146, 168, 176, 178
 elective, 26, 76, 259-260
 epistemological theory of, 63-64, 72-74
 individualized, 123, 326
 learning and, 54, 72-74, 245, 286
 made in advance, 73, 286
 moral and religious, 193, 208-211, 309, 312, 313, 317-318
 organization of, 54, 278, 282
 in the past, 73, 218
 prescribed, 58, 76, 336, 346
 role of interest in, 261, 263-264, 328, 348
 secular, 310, 311, 312, 315, 317, 318, 350
 selection of, 26, 92, 220, 312
 social basis of, 222, 292
 subject matter in, 54
 theories of, 45, 250-261

- Epistemology, theories, of mind and intellect, 60-72, 113
 - of truth, 35-60
 - theory of knowledge, 72-74
(See also Knowledge; Learning)
 - Equality, 154n.
 - of opportunity, 167, 173, 176
 - theory of democracy, 151-154
 - in units of measurement, 269-271
 - Equilibrium, 78, 217, 218, 290
 - in *gestalt* theory, 118
 - Equity, 153-154, 153n.
 - Essence, 41, 63, 115, 338-339, 349
 - Essentialism, 324, 332n., 336-350
 - Eternal, 37, 42, 55, 72, 160, 335, 338, 345
 - Eternity, freedom in, 47
 - Ethical character, 85
 - Ethical potentialities of curriculum, 316
 - Ethical value of personality, 148-150
 - Ethics, 140, 159, 177, 206, 233, 245, 246, 301, 309, 313, 320, 321
 - individual and social, 133-138, 171, 175, 298
 - phase of philosophy, 6, 8, 22
 - professional, 32, 136
(See also Value)
 - Eugenics, 284
 - Evaluation, 15, 268, 273, 274, 326
 - Evangelism, 314, 316
 - Evil, 311, 311n., 315
 - Evolution, 29, 39, 42, 49, 66, 96, 105, 118, 119, 148, 186, 312, 327, 340-341, 344, 346
 - distinguished from progress, 42
 - of mind, 60, 104, 333
 - verification as part of, 57
 - Examination, 168, 256, 263, 268
 - Example, as theory of punishment, 305-306
 - Existence, 30, 36, 56, 273, 339
 - Expediency, 12, 59, 313, 320
 - Experience, 61, 64, 73, 248, 258, 279, 283, 285-286, 289-291, 292, 299, 320, 330
 - defined, 61
 - Experience, generalized, 281-282, 337
 - relation of curriculum to, 253, 266, 283, 312
 - Experimental method of instruction, 205, 285-286, 312
 - Experimentalism, 25, 60, 68, 70, 71, 173, 258, 290, 291, 328-331
 - as method of democracy, 158-159
 - in theory of truth, 66, 72
(See also Instrumentalism; Pragmatism)
 - Experimentation, 69-72, 228
 - Expert, 142
 - Expiation, 305
 - Exploitation, 147, 183, 184, 202
 - Externality, of aims, 249-250
 - of discipline, 265
 - Extra-school educational agency, 163, 188
- F
- Fact, 8, 12, 15-16, 57
 - in educative process, 73, 254, 255-256, 270, 275, 291
 - Faculty, sharing of administration, 294
 - Faculty psychology, 110-111, 114, 115
 - will as, 111-112
 - Failure, 168, 288, 315
 - Fairness, in grouping, 298
 - preferred to neutrality, 229-230
 - Faith, 64, 209-210, 236
 - in democracy, 164, 268
 - Family, 134, 170, 174, 209, 223
 - liberty in education, 197, 199-200, 202
 - relation with state and church, 203-206, 310
 - Fascism, 2, 123, 140, 146, 187, 195, 215, 221, 343
 - compared, 145, 150, 187, 196-197
 - controversial issues in, 229, 231, 287
 - Fascistic philosophy of education, 143-145, 338n.
 - Feeling, 107, 110, 163, 348

- Feudalism, 143, 186
 Finality, 58, 65, 70, 158, 159, 249, 258
 Finance, independence in, 228
 Folkways, 1, 238, 335
 Followership, education for, 155-156
 Force, 146, 162, 268
 Form, 91
 Formal discipline, 110n.
 Foundation, educational, 189, 234
 Frame of reference, 146, 163, 164, 181, 217, 234, 260, 335, 340
 Franchise and education, 148, 294
 Free criticism, 176, 204, 237
 Freedom, 32, 60, 88, 159, 200, 201, 212, 222, 227-228, 233, 265, 299, 326, 331, 336, 337, 349
 academic, 8, 26, 46, 145, 188, 212, 230-231, 233-242, 331, 349
 of citizen, 239-241
 under fascism, 144-145
 as method of instruction, 46, 280, 299-303
 pupil, 185-188, 326
 and security, 228-230
 of the will, 45-50, 233, 349
 Frequency, 113, 114, 230
 Froebel, Friederich, 94n.
 Frontier, 158, 168, 172, 173-174, 184, 186
 Function, compared to structure, 107
 as measure of value, 91
 as theory of mind, 107-108
 Future, the, 13, 26, 35-37, 66, 109, 222, 233, 250-251
- G
- General method, 283
 General and trade education, 174
 Generalization, 281-282, 286
 Geography, 213, 220, 271, 285, 311
 Gestalt psychology, 111, 118, 339
 Goals, 258, 272-273
 (See also Aim; End; Objective)
 God, 29, 30, 42-44, 63, 63n., 89, 94, 137-138, 148, 151, 312, 316, 319-321, 334, 335, 337, 340, 345-346
 Good, the, 59, 82-83, 89, 92, 138, 171, 200, 265, 268, 313, 328, 341, 348
 ingredient of the true, 57, 59, 66, 329
 (See also Value)
 Good will, 314, 316-317
 Government, 192-194, 335
 student self-, 294-295
 (See also State)
 Grace, aesthetic, 177
 theological, 29, 64, 93, 131, 312, 314
 Gradualism, 161-164, 182, 224
 Grouping, 297-298
 Growth, 8, 21, 93-94, 96, 97, 316, 319, 333-334
 as an absolute, 96-99
 education as, 39, 43, 251, 280
 its own end, 43, 329
 measure of, 158, 257, 271, 334
 Guidance, 174
- H
- Habit, 68, 119, 130, 182, 288
 Habits, manners, etc., 193
 Health, 84, 193, 212n., 257
 Hedonism, 90, 264
 Hegel, G. W. F., 33, 33n., 94n., 126
 Herbartian method, 286
 Heredity and environment, 45, 49, 161, 316
 (See also Environment)
 Hierarchy, of church, 232
 of value, 76, 339
 History, 44-45, 74, 175, 220, 255, 260, 271, 285, 320, 336
 chronological order of, 279
 ingredient of philosophy, 2, 3, 8
 as personal, 32
 Home, 202, 285
 (See also Family)
 Homogenous grouping, 297-298
 Honors, school, 185
 Hours, of credit, 125
 Humanism, 57, 59, 321
 (See also Experimentalism, Instrumentalism, Pragmatism)

I

- Idea, 106, 130
 as archetype, 338-339
 as mental state, 339-341
 self-willed, 340
- Ideal, the, 5, 31-32, 33, 91, 92, 144, 167, 189, 237, 247
- Ideal self, 135
- Ideal society, 182
- Ideal value, as aim, 134
- Idealism, 62, 93, 109-110, 125, 128, 134, 255
 democratic theory in, 149, 159-160
 philosophy of, 14n., 31-33, 5d, 67, 325, 338-343
 theory of society, 125-126, 128
- Identical elements, in learning, 103, 114
- Identity, logic of, in learning, 115, 119-120, 129
- Imagination, 115
- Imitation, 113, 160
- Immanence, 43, 150, 335
- Immaturity, 109, 251, 282
- Immortality, 81, 106, 251, 320
- Immutability, 55, 247-249, 345
- Imposition, 222, 230-233
- Impression, sense, 108, 110, 290
 as theory of learning, 113
- Impulse, 110, 130, 301, 303
 aim more than, 247
- Independence, Declaration of, 148, 151, 152
 of school from politics, 228
- Indeterminism, 48-49
- Individual, 91, 144, 196-197, 302
 ethical value of, 88, 123, 135-136, 148-150
 and society, 26, 86, 123, 136, 144, 149
 fundamental problems of, 124
 mutual relation of, 132-134
 theories of, 128-132
 (See also Society)
- Individual differences, 33, 112, 125, 134, 138, 271, 327
- Individual differences, as basis of freedom, 259, 326
 in curriculum, 259-260
 under democracy, 151-156
 flexibility of, 296-298
- Individual success motive, 173, 186, 187
- Individualism, 124-125, 150, 173, 187, 222, 231
 in democracy, 123, 156, 195, 204, 231, 296
 rugged, 168, 173-174
- Individuality, 2, 2n., 34, 36, 49, 65, 80, 112, 123, 125, 133, 134, 153, 175, 204, 214, 238, 262, 327, 331, 337, 342-343, 345, 347
 as basis of freedom, 48-50, 299, 331
 factor in instructional method, 92, 125, 280, 295-299, 326
 nature of, 229, 296-298
 of pupil and teacher, 213, 238, 302
 as trait of reality, 30, 125, 259
 uniqueness of, 125-126, 298, 331
- Individualized instruction, 123, 125
- Indoctrination, 58, 142, 145, 218, 231, 279, 348-349
 defined, 230
 of freedom, 242
 as method of instruction, 231-233, 287
- Industrial Revolution, 174
- Industrial society, 173-174, 177-178
- Industrialism, compactness of, 186-187
- Industry, 26, 170, 172-175, 186, 205, 273, 285, 293
 democracy in, 184
 intellectual possibilities of, 174
 relation to school, 174-175
- Infallibility, 155, 232, 350
- Inferiority, pupil sense of, 186
- Infinity, 94
- Information, 256-282, 291
 compared to knowledge, 73-74, 330
 (See also Knowledge; Truth)
- Inhibition, 301, 334

- Initiative, 149, 168, 175, 213, 288,
 • 303, 326, 327
 Innovation, 138, 153
 Instinct, 64, 78, 87, 110-111, 130,
 311*n.*, 333
 Instruction, 123, 125, 263, 264, 285,
 286, 296, 303-304
 Instrument, 34, 115, 123, 135, 187,
 214, 249, 254, 262, 263, 329, 331
 curriculum *as*, 254-255, 288
 mind and intelligence *as*, 60, 68,
 92*n.*, 232, 233
 philosophy *as*, 3, 332
 truth *as*, 57*n.*, 66
 value *as*, 77, 254
 Instrumentalism, 94, 98, 158, 328,
 329
 (See also Experimentalism;
 Pragmatism)
 Integration, 34, 107, 109, 115, 273
 of self, 34, 129-132
 Intelligence, 28, 31, 41, 43, 104, 107,
 111, 146, 183, 184, 248, 292,
 317-319, 326, 329, 334, 344
 as basis of freedom, 50, 233, 301
 instrumental theory of, 60-68,
 92*n.*, 232, 326, 329-330
 in value theory, 66, 78, 92
 (See also Mind)
 Intensity, 90, 113, 114
 Interactionism, 106*r*
 Interest, 16, 35, 185-188, 221, 251,
 297, 303, 304, 326, 328, 333,
 336, 342, 343
 and effort, 2, 249, 266-267
 as ingredient of truth, 57, 76,
 77, 78, 280-281
 logic and, 54, 280-281, 282
 theories of, 261-268
 Internationalism, 214-215
 Intolerance, 343
 Intrinsic truth, 341
 Intrinsic value, 80, 254, 341
 Introspection, 341-342
 Intuition, 64-66, 68, 69, 82, 290,
 296, 315
 Invention, 159, 172, 173, 178, 225,
 298
 Investigation, logic of, 282
 Investment, education *as*, 201

J

 Jackson, Andrew, 239
 James, William, 36
 Jeopardy, 302
 Jesus, 93, 148-149, 209
 Jewish theory of church and state,
 208
 Jingoism, 214
 Job analysis, 87
 Judgment, 57, 236, 330
 faculty of, 110
 in knowledge theory, 66, 67-69,
 330
 in value theory, 82
 Judicial function of school, 226
 Justice, 27, 335
 Juvenile, provision for, 202

K

 Kant, Immanuel, 93, 135, 148
 King, education of, 142
 Kingdom of God, 320
 Knowing and doing, 111, 180
 Knowledge, 53, 73, 109
 for its own sake, 54, 73, 254
 prior to interest, 263
 theory of, 72-74, 76, 254, 290,
 330, 346
 (See also Epistemology; In-
 formation; Learning)

L

 Labor, dignity of, 149
 Laboratory, 41, 70, 78, 258, 285,
 287, 288, 299
 Laissez faire, 222, 260, 296, 335
 defined, 197
 and freedom, 234-235
 and socialism, 202-203
 theory of state and school, 198-
 201
 Language, 193, 213, 214, 260, 290

- Law, of effect, 90
 natural, 206
 and order, 194, 239, 253, 295, 303
 of parsimony, 79-80
 Layman, as judge of academic freedom, 241-242
 Leaders, development of, 154-156, 184, 222
 Learner, nature of, 108-112
 Learning, 1, 13, 67, 70-72, 83, 109-111, 123, 127, 161-162, 168, 245, 246, 248, 263, 265, 268, 274, 299, 314-315, 319, 346, 348
 as active, 69-72, 257, 263
 aesthetic quality of, 109, 315
 coercion of, 267-268
 curriculum emergent from, 72-74
 curve of, 162, 294, 315
 defined, 62, 65, 67, 68, 126, 257, 263
 ineffable, 65
 interest in, 261, 264
 judgment in, 261, 264
 as passive, 108, 257
 as process, 316, 340
 as purposeful, 59, 102, 329
 theories of, 65, 101, 103, 104, 110, 112-121, 163-164, 268-269, 273-274, 290, 296, 311-312, 315, 316, 319, 339, 341, 347
 (See also Epistemology; Knowledge)
 Lecture, as method, 285
 Legislative function of school, 226
 Legislature, 225, 237, 261
 Leisure, 171, 173, 175, 178, 184
 as basis of schooling, 169-170, 172, 183
 distinguished from idleness, 177
 Leisure class, 149, 177
 Lesson, 278, 303, 318
 Liberal education, 173, 176-177, 178
 Libertarian, 46, 47, 48
 Liberty, 175, 192, 193, 197, 199, 200
 concession of state, 145
 religious, 218
 (See also Freedom)
 License, freedom and, 234, 300
 Life, as aim, 250-251
 Life situation, 256, 287
 Like-mindedness, 127
 Literary tradition, 173
 Literature, 32, 98, 256, 298, 309, 336
 Locke, John, 108, 151, 257
 Logic, 14, 114, 115, 151, 269-270
 of instructional method, 278-282
 in philosophy and science, 5-6, 8, 12-14, 17
 Loyalty oaths, 241
- M
- Majority, 146, 150, 161, 164, 196, 239
 Marks, 168, 185, 263
 Marx, Karl, 146, 183
 Masses, the, 147, 149, 155, 156, 178
 Material opportunity, equality of, 154
 Materialism, 29, 30, 32, 105, 106, 150, 332, 334, 343
 (See also Atomism; Mechanism)
 Mathematics, 16, 94, 309, 311, 336
 as form of logic, 269-270
 in measurement, 269
 quantity of basic in, 271
 Maturity, 92, 237
 Meaning, 107-108, 257, 290
 Means, 15, 71, 80, 111, 163-164, 193, 262-263, 336
 and ends, 85, 247, 248-249, 262, 304, 329, 330
 individual as, 93, 136, 144, 214, 232, 249
 Measurement, 12n., 16, 87, 107, 268-274, 326, 344
 Mechanical instruction, 70, 263, 273
 Mechanism, 29, 46, 103, 105-106, 334
 Melioristic philosophy, 83
 Memoriter, 54, 67, 73, 160, 347
 Memory, 256, 282
 Mental imagery, 107
 Mentalistic psychology, 103
 Metabolism, of learning, 114

- Metaphysics, 22, 24-25, 27, 29, 31-33, 53, 117, 124-126, 195, 245, 247-248, 258, 309, 327
 change and the changeless, 38-40
 cosmic purpose in, 41-45
 is, educational method, 286
 and freedom, 45-50, 300
 in measurement, 270
 nature and supernature, 28-29
 novelty, 35-36
 one and the many, 29-34
 phase of philosophy, 4, 18, 22
 related to democracy, 159
 time in, 36-38
 (*See also* Reality)
- Method of instruction, 25, 63-64, 98, 222, 245, 278, 300, 312, 326, 330, 334
 authoritative, 58, 285-287
 in controversial issues, 230-242
 distinguished from curriculum, 282-284
 Herbartian, 286
 simple to complex, 280-281
 social theories of, 293-306
 structural theories of, 282-293
 in teaching democracy, 160-161
 (*See also* Logic)
- Middle class, 178-180, 183*n.*
- Mind, 62, 109, 110, 114, 117, 120, 126, 159, 237, 263, 271, 290, 333, 338, 340-342, 347
 and body, 2, 103-108, 138*n.*, 341, 347
 categories of, 109-110, 339
 dualistic theory of, 106-107
 formation of, 108-109, 286
 and matter, 31, 253, 283
 as passive, 113, 286
 predisposition to logic, 278-280
 role in knowledge theory, 60-68, 286-333, 347
 social, 126, 342
 theories of, 104-105, 108-110, 113, 114, 151, 257, 332-333, 343, 347
 (*See also* Intelligence)
- Minimum standard, 152-153, 184, 206-207
- Minority, in a democracy, 143-147, 161, 164, 202
- Minority opinion, 230
- Mixed school, 211
- Monism, 2, 29, 32, 34, 107, 197, 227, 340, 343
- Monopoly, in democracy, 178, 192, 193, 195
- Moral autonomy, 137, 148, 301
- Moral code, 124
- Moral education, 26, 71, 77*n.*, 124, 335, 212*n.*
 and religious, 208-211, 309-322
- Moral law, 267, 304, 305, 343
- Moral necessity of freedom, 300
- Moral obligation, 315, 345
- Moral potentialities of curriculum, 316
- Moral responsibility, 50, 132
- Moral value, of effort, 267
 of personality, 148-150
- Morality, 88, 284
 of refusal to choose, 229
- Morals, 2, 193, 294
 protected by leisure class, 177
 (*See also* Religion)
- Mores, the, 138, 219, 225, 238, 287, 302, 316, 331, 335
- Motivation, 47, 57, 76, 96, 263, 265, 266, 279, 326, 328, 342
 good will as, 314
 and value theory, 76, 261
- Motive, 168, 187
 of individual success, 173, 186
 profit, 168, 185-189
- Multiple correlation, 274
- Multiple response, 118
- Mysticism, 64-66, 68, 314-315
- N
- Nationalism, 134, 144, 157, 193, 213-215, 237, 318, 320, 321
- Natural, and supernatural, 28-29, 350
- Natural law, 206

- Natural order, the, 209, 281
- Natural resources, 172
- Natural rights, 334
- Naturalism, 28-29, 297, 319-321, 325, 332-337
- Naturalization of mind, 28, 60
- Nature, 60-61, 64, 92, 181, 198, 253, 262, 334, 335, 340, 345
 - child, 69, 131, 271, 311, 315, 319, 333, 348
 - defined, 28
 - education according to, 296-297
- Need, child, 149, 258, 260, 264-265, 326, 333, 282
 - related to value, 59, 79, 221
- Nervous system, 104
- Neurology, 105, 113, 334
- Neutral school, the, 210-211
- Neutrality in controversial issues, 182, 228-230
- Nobility, education of, 143
- Norm, the, 39, 333
- Normal school, 32
- Normative function of school, 220
- Novelty, 13, 35, 40-41, 45, 49, 113, 120, 298, 318, 327-329, 345
 - as aspect of value, 82-83
 - and freedom, 48
 - as metaphysically real, 35-36
 - and problem method, 288
 - role in learning, 119
- O
- Oath, loyalty, 26, 241
- Obedience, 214, 267, 268, 285, 302, 304, 319-320
- Object lessons, 290
- Objective, 26, 123, 141, 168, 178, 214, 247, 252, 265, 266, 294, 304, 334, 340, 346
 - determination of, 86-87, 249-250, 331, 344-345
 - external, 227, 249
 - in measurement, 271
 - static, 83, 249, 258, 346
 - (See also Aim; Goal; Purpose; Value)
- Objective knowledge, 56
- Objective truth, 55, 58, 59
- Objective value, 80, 344-345, 348
- Objectivity, 10, 11, 229, 252, 263
 - of interest, 263
 - of logic, 278
 - of measurement, 269, 270, 272
- Obligation, moral, 315, 319-320
- Occidental philosophy, 97
- Officer, public, 244
- Omnipotence and omniscience, 33, 47, 345-346
- Opinion, 6, 10, 87, 158, 230
- Opportunism, 59
- Opportunity, 168, 198
 - equality of, 154, 167, 173, 176
- Oral instruction, 285
- Ordinal numbers, 269
- Oregon school law, 195n.
- Organism, acting as whole, 130
- Organismic nature of idealism, 339, 342
- Organismic psychology, 111, 115, 342
- Organismic theory of society, 125, 195
- Organization of educative process, 54, 108, 278
 - professional, 180, 242
- Oriental philosophy, 97
- Origin of knowledge, 63
- Originality, based on individuality, 208
- Oughtness, 15, 88, 249, 267, 319, 320, 336
- Over-mind, 342
- Over-person, of the state, 123
- Over-production, 172
- Over-society, 197
- Ownership, of the child, 203
- P
- Papacy, the, 210
- Parallelism, 106n.
- Parent, 198, 202, 203-205, 207
- Parentage, instruction in, 202
- Parochial school, 212, 223, 224, 310, 313, 345

- Parsimony, law of, 79-80
 Particular, 115, 158, 253, 349
 Passivity, 54, 61, 69, 102, 113
 Past, 36, 66, 74, 109, 254, 299
 Paternalism, 202, 239
 Patriotism, 212*n.*, 214
 Pavlov, A., 113
 Pedagogy, 297, 322
 compared to philosophy, 18
 "soft," 264
 Perception, 105, 109
 Perfectability, as life purpose, 92
 Perfection, 42, 63, 93, 137, 138, 149
 Perfectionism, 83, 91-94,
 Personal theism, 32
 Personality, 65, 129, 154, 175, 214,
 347
 integration of, 34, 109, 112, 108
 respect for, 8, 32, 136
 social development of, 135, 144,
 214, 326
 value of, 148-150
 Pestalozzi, Heinrich, 237
 Philanthropy, 199, 335
 Philosophy, compared to art, 18-19
 to religion, 320
 to science, 9-18, 21, 87, 94, 117
 educational and general, 19-20
 fundamental problems of, 1, 21-22
 history of, 20-21
 psychology, subdivision of, 101
 scope and function of, 1-9, 324,
 332, 340
 systems of, 2, 3, 10, 14*n.*, 21,
 38-40, 55, 66, 111, 120, 143,
 145, 149, 155, 162, 208, 214,
 215, 248, 260, 287, 294, 309,
 311, 317, 321, 324-325, 332,
 332*n.*, 338*n.*, 340
 (See also Idealism; Naturalism;
 Pragmatism; Realism)
 Physical freedom, 301-302
 Pierce, v. Society of Sisters, 195*n.*
 Plan, lesson, 278, 303
 social, 222
 Plasticity, as basis of freedom, 50
 Plato, 5, 41, 120, 144, 182, 338
 Play, 264-265
 Pleasure, factor in value theory, 90,
 91, 96
 Pluralism, 2, 32, 34-35, 124-125,
 228-230
 democracy akin to, 197, 231
 as metaphysics, 29, 30, 124-125
 as social theory of state, 128, 207,
 208, 212, 227, 241
 as theory of state, 227, 241
 Plutoeracy, 143, 184, 192
 Police power, 194
 Political philosophy, 287, 294
 Political power held, by the one
 142-143
 by the few, 143-147
 by the many, 147-164
 Political preference of teacher, 236
 Political religion, 321
 Political society, 128
 Political theory and administration,
 212-213
 Politics, 131, 140, 175, 178, 213, 218,
 225, 227-229, 232, 234, 245,
 294
 as factor in philosophy, 2, 3, 8
 fundamental problems of, 141
 similarity to education, 228
 Positivism, 24, 337
 Postulate, 7
 Potential, and actual, 63
 Power, education as potential, 156
 knowledge as, 73
 Practice, 9-10, 315
 Pragmatic purposivist, 117
 Pragmatism, 67, 117, 136, 188, 254-
 255, 274, 281, 345
 related to democracy, 158-160
 as system of philosophy, 2, 10,
 70*n.*, 325, 327-332
 theory of truth, 57-60, 61, 69,
 279-280, 287
 (See also Experimentalism; In-
 strumentalism)
 Prayer, 321
 Precarious, the, 8, 48, 222, 233, 326,
 329, 330
 Predestination, 312*n.*
 Pre-existence of knowledge, 63

- Preference, 78, 229, 290
 role in philosophy, 6, 15-16
 Preparation, as aim, 26, 250-251,
 291, 335
 step in Herbartian method, 286
 Prescribed curriculum, 26, 76, 253,
 255, 260, 346
 Present, the, 26, 37, 66, 250-251,
 254, 299, 335
 Presentation, as step in Herbartian
 method, 286
 Press, the, 163, 164, 188, 285
 Pressure group, 32
 Priesthood, 183
 Principle, 18, 26, 130, 149, 206, 266
 as archetypal, 338
 first, 24-26, 53
 Private foundation, 234
 Private property, 185-189
 Private school, 179, 189, 192, 193,
 204-205, 226
 Prizes, 59, 185, 265
 Problem-method of instruction, 35-
 36, 65, 67, 74, 287-293, 327,
 330, 334
 Problematic situation, 57, 73, 114,
 248, 256, 262
 Process, 39, 258, 316
 educative, fundamental problems
 of, 245-246
 Production of wealth, 167, 293
 Profession, 175, 180, 228, 274
 Professional code of ethics, 136
 Professional organization, 242
 Profit motive, 168, 185-189, 234-235
 Progress, 42, 43, 218, 226, 300, 327,
 333-334, 346
 formula for, 43
 social, school and, 25-26, 134, 217,
 219-230, 331
 theory of, 42-43
 Progressive education, 42-43, 60-61,
 68, 72, 94, 159, 222, 298-299,
 346
 compared to essentialism, 337,
 340-341, 345
 philosophy of, 324-336
 religious quality of, 317
 Project, 54, 83, 287, 330, 341, 347
 Protection, social, as theory of
 punishment, 305-306
 Protestantism, 208, 311
 Psyche, 105, 110, 334
 Psychiatry, 132
 Psychological organization, 54, 280-
 281
 Psychology, 24, 29, 101, 103, 137,
 151-152, 271, 316, 333, 334,
 341-342, 344, 348
 compared to epistemology, 101-
 102
 fundamental problems of, 103
 mind-body problem in, 103-108
 nature of the learner, 103-112
 philosophy and, 2, 3, 8, 101
 schools of, 103, 110-111, 339, 342,
 348
 theory of learning, 112-120
 Public affairs, 223, 240, 294
 Public education, supported by
 democracy, 192
 Public opinion, 188, 228
 Public school, 179, 181, 189, 192,
 196, 204, 226, 236
 religion and the, 208, 210-211,
 310, 313, 317, 320-321
 Punishment, 263, 305-306
 Pupil, 31, 133, 175, 196-197, 304
 Purpose, 6, 31, 61, 74, 79, 83, 105,
 114, 116, 117, 119, 131, 157,
 197, 222, 247, 248, 254, 257,
 262, 280, 281, 304, 326, 336
 cosmic, 30, 42-45, 333
 in learning, 59, 102, 103, 107-108,
 116, 262, 267, 329
 pupil, 54, 268, 326, 347

 R
 Raby, Joseph M., 70n., 266n.
 Race, 157, 213, 225, 321
 Race experience, as basis of freedom,
 302
 Radio, 163, 164, 188, 285
 Randomness, 5, 13, 32, 333
 Rationalism, 64, 67, 115
 Rationality, 31-33, 92, 164, 317

- Rationalization, as role of philosophy, 5
 Reactionary, school as, 219-220
 Readiness, 114, 116
 Real-life situation, 264
 Realism, 56, 67, 159-160, 274
 scholastic, 345-350
 scientific, 86, 343-345
 as system of philosophy, 325, 343-350
 Reality, 24, 32, 53, 57, 76, 88, 258, 286, 313, 327, 332, 340
 appearance and, 5, 40-41, 55, 56, 341, 344, 345
 completeness of, 35, 36, 56, 61, 62, 66
 nature of, 5, 30, 31, 34-37, 39, 47, 60, 113, 117, 125, 159, 259, 288, 300, 332, 342
 philosophy as quest for, 3, 4, 5, 20
 theories of, 64, 270, 327, 332, 339-340, 342-345
 (See also Metaphysics)
 Reals, independent, 270
 Reason, 30, 31, 61, 64, 92, 110, 163, 164, 236-237, 297, 318, 340-341, 343
 Recapitulation, theory of, 44-45
 Recency, law of, 113, 114
 Recitation, 256, 274, 285
 Recollection, 105, 120
 Reconstruction, of experience, 247, 273-274
 Redemption, 316
 Regeneration, 312, 314, 316
 Regimentation, 186, 230, 273
 Relations, 30, 125, 270
 Relativity, 40, 58, 82
 Reliability, of measurement, 269, 270, 272
 Religion, 85, 89, 186, 208, 210, 213, 218, 225, 231-232, 236, 237, 239, 336
 in curriculum, 40, 85, 193, 205, 218, 229, 230n.
 factor in philosophy, 2, 3
 and morals, 206, 208-211
 theories of, 309-322, 331, 335, 337, 343, 350
 Repentance, 314
 Repetition, 54, 114, 271, 288, 291
 Research, 55, 67
 philosophy as method of, 8
 Residuary theory, 208, 219
 Responsibility, 50, 132, 135, 141, 202, 227
 as condition of freedom, 301, 302
 good will as measure of, 314
 Result, compared to aim, 247
 Retaliation as theory of punishment, 305
 Retribution as theory of punishment, 305
 Revelation, 29, 64, 209, 312, 313
 Revolution, 162, 164, 182, 225
 Reward, 263
 Right, nature of, 315
 and wrong, 78n., 158
 Rights, of child, 198, 206-207, 334
 of citizen, 239-241, 294
 natural, 334
 social in origin, 206
 Roman Catholic Church, 128
 Rousseau, J. J., 28, 78, 148, 311, 332-334
 Rugg, H. O., 65n.,
 Russia, 145

S

 Sacrament, 312, 314, 316
 Salvation, 313, 320, 321, 349
 Sanction, 27, 319, 331
 Scholarship, 177, 282
 as subsidy, 184
 Scholastic philosophy, 248, 286
 realism, 325, 345, 350
 theory of knowledge, 63, 64
 (See also Catholic philosophy)
 School, 31-32, 54, 127, 169, 187, 202, 237, 316
 autonomous, 227-228
 industry and, 174-175
 separate religious and secular, 313-314
 and social progress, 219-230, 292, 331
 School discipline, 294
 School equipment, 33, 91

- School-state, 227
- Science, 14n., 15, 25, 32, 62, 144, 272, 281, 336
 - compared with philosophy, 9-18, 21, 87, 94, 117
 - of education, 271
 - as a philosophy, 17-18
 - and religion, 210, 321-322
- Scientific absolutism, 322
- Scientific method, 9, 16n., 86-87, 160
- Scientific realism, 343-345
- Secondary education, 140, 201, 218, 237
- Sectarianism, 234, 310, 313-314, 321
- Secular curriculum, 210, 211, 310-312, 315, 317, 318, 350
- Secularization of religious education, 321
- Security, 38, 223, 247, 303
 - and freedom, 228-230, 235
- Segregation of sexes, 331
- Selection, of curriculum, 260-261
 - natural, 335
- Selective secondary school, 141
- Self, 92, 134, 135, 262
 - theories of, 129-132
 - (See also Individual; Individuality; Personality)
- Self-activity, 47, 135, 261
- Self-assertion, 133, 135, 335
- Self-consciousness, 129
- Self-control, 198, 229, 301-302
- Self-criticism, 156
- Self-determination, 145, 196
- Self-discipline, 265, 304
- Self-education, 48, 123
- Self-expression, 93, 132, 135, 178, 185-188, 280, 334
- Self-government, 294-295
- Self-interest, 150, 186, 200, 335
- Self-realization, 8, 88, 89, 92, 93, 133, 134-135, 144, 176, 253, 328
- Self-reliance, 149, 186, 288, 289n., 326, 327
- Self-willed, 340
- Sensationalism, compared to experimentalism, 290
- Sense impression, 61, 108, 257, 290
- Senses, 41, 55, 52, 71, 338, 339
- Service, social, as aim, 187
- Sexes, segregation of, 331
- Sharing, of authority, 141, 294-295
 - as basis, of democracy, 157-158, 214
 - of society, 330
 - as method of instruction, 302-303
- Simple to complex, 280-281
- Sin, 29, 78, 131, 311, 314-316
- Skepticism, 53, 60, 161, 312
- Skill, 54, 130, 175, 255-256, 272
- Social compact, 134
- Social conflict, resolution by education, 162-164
- Social control, 198, 260-261
- Social distance, 143, 147
- Social efficiency, 89
- Social infancy, 169-170, 176
- Social mind, 126, 342
- Social nature of morals and religion, 319-321
- Social order, relation to school, 219-230
- Social plan, 224
- Social process, 123, 135, 302
- Social progress, 134, 146, 161, 181, 217, 234, 240, 298-299
 - role of school in, 145, 219-230
- Social whole, 144
- Socialism, 197, 200-203
- Socialization, 134
- Socially select school, 193, 204
- Society, 89, 123, 134-135, 182, 195, 267, 319, 337
 - classes in, 146, 183, 184
 - and individual, mutual relations of, 132-136, 331
 - problems of, 124
 - related to state, 194-195, 207, 241
 - teacher representative of, 241
 - theories of, 124-128, 195, 330
- Sociology, 8, 86, 316, 332n.
- Socrates, 144
- Solipsism, 342
- Sophists, 21, 58
- Soul, 43, 89, 93, 110, 130, 334, 349

- Sovereign, 154, 195
 - Sovereignty, 196, 294, 295
 - Space, and time, 138, 220, 224, 332, 335
 - Special abilities, 137
 - Special method, 234
 - Specialization, as basis of freedom, 235-236, 241
 - Specificity of learning, 114, 116-118
 - Spectator, theory of mind, 62, 63, 113
 - Speculation, 71
 - Spirit, 93, 107, 126, 133, 210, 341
 - Spiritual, the, 28
 - Spiritual faculties, 110
 - Spiritual principle, 149
 - Spoiling the child, 265
 - Spontaneity, as interest, 262, 262*n.*, 280
 - Stability, 39, 226
 - Standard, 95, 198, 206-207, 268, 274
 - of living, 170-173, 175, 179, 183, 184, 189
 - Standardization of education, 153
 - State, the, 4, 81, 91, 123, 128, 134, 140, 144, 145, 179, 206-207, 212*n.*, 224-225, 234, 241, 294-295, 305, 321, 337, 350
 - church and family, 203, 206-212, 350
 - and individual, 123, 136, 138, 144
 - fundamental problems of, 26, 193-194
 - relation to schools, 197-202, 227
 - relation to society, 144, 194-195, 207, 241
 - theories of, 194-197, 212-213, 227, 229, 231, 241
 - world, 215
 - Static curriculum, 256
 - Static philosophy, 38
 - Statistics, 39, 271, 272, 274
 - Status quo*, 25, 106, 179, 200, 217-218, 221, 222, 224, 228-231, 241, 273
 - Stimulus and response, 104, 114, 284, 290, 344
 - Storage theory of learning, 336, 347
 - Stratification of society, 205
 - Strike, of teachers, 136
 - Structure, 107, 278
 - Student self-government, 294-295
 - Study, 54
 - Subconsciousness, 104
 - Subject matter, 54, 102, 108, 253, 256, 288, 289
 - Subjective theory of value, 78
 - Subjectivity, 269, 273
 - Subjects, curriculum divided into, 255-256, 260, 287, 311
 - Sublimation, 133, 236-237
 - Subsidy, public, of church school, 211-212
 - Substance, 39, 258, 347
 - Success, individual, 89, 173, 186, 187
 - Suffrage, universal and education, 156
 - Sunday school, 313
 - Supernatural order, church as of, 209
 - Supernaturalism, 28-29, 64, 319-321, 325, 337, 345
 - and naturalism, 28-29, 297, 332, 335, 350
 - Supervision, democracy in, 331
 - state, of parochial school, 212, 212*n.*
 - Support, public, for church school, 211-212
 - Survival, biological, 60, 158, 329, 334
 - Symbols, in learning, 69
- T
- Taxes, school, 189
 - Teacher, 31, 63, 133, 180, 222, 228-229, 263, 297, 302-304
 - authority of, 294, 302, 349
 - as citizen, 239-241
 - economic-class loyalty of, 180-183
 - freedom for, 237, 302-303
 - participation in administration, 213
 - representative of society, 236, 241
 - training of, 44, 98, 223, 242
 - Teacher-centered school, 102, 123
 - Teaching, 108, 106, 127, 196, 236, 240, 246, 282, 284

- Teaching, trade or profession, 180
 - Teleology, in *gestalt* psychology, 111
 - Telic function of school, 221
 - Temporal, the, 36, 278, 300, 335
 - Tenure laws, 228, 242
 - Terminology, 11-12, 12*n.*, 20-21
 - Test, influence on child measured, 268-271
 - Textbook, 193, 201, 285, 312, 320
 - Theocentricism, 2, 151
 - Theology, on nature of child, 78, 311, 316
 - Theory and practice, 9, 167
 - Things-in-themselves, 56
 - Thinking, 105, 107, 326
 - Dewey's five steps in, 70
 - related to activity, 301-302
 - role in method, 288-292
 - Thought, 2, 9-10, 66, 71-72
 - categories of, 109-110
 - as ultimate, 31-33, 31*n.*
 - Time, 45, 83, 250, 271, 320, 345-346
 - as condition, of education, 26, 34-36, 92
 - of freedom, 48-49
 - factor in curriculum construction, 258-259
 - as infirmity of truth, 58, 58*n.*
 - and place, 5, 9, 13, 22, 34, 35, 40, 80, 167, 207, 220, 336, 339
 - in philosophy and science, 12-13
 - related to novelty, 35
 - Tolerance, 210-212, 229
 - Totalitarianism, 2, 144, 212-213, 229, 231
 - based on idealism, 343
 - and democracy, 195
 - of society and state, 195
 - Totality, 65, 273, 324, 340
 - Tradition, 9, 16, 87, 255
 - Traditionalism, 324, 336
 - (See also Essentialism)
 - Training of teachers, 44, 98, 223, 242
 - Traits of character, 131
 - Transcendentalism, 29, 43, 44, 47-48, 56, 126, 320
 - Transfer of training, 175
 - Transition of political regimes, 227
 - Transmissive function of school, 292, 313
 - Trial and error, 115, 231, 292
 - Truth, 66, 84, 138, 159, 171, 188, 210, 232, 234, 235, 265, 287, 292, 315, 349
 - as antecedently complete, 62, 66, 72
 - as changeless, 40, 63, 286
 - compared to reality, 56, 344
 - final and eternal, 4, 5, 63, 66, 72, 300
 - and knowledge compared to information, 74
 - as objective, 84, 346-347
 - relative, 72
 - revelation of, 64
 - sacred and secular, 317
 - as subjective, 84, 346
 - tested by physical changes, 69-70
 - theories of, 55-60, 66, 68, 72, 77, 270, 329-330, 341, 344, 346-348
 - and value, 66, 83-84, 89, 92, 279-280, 287, 329, 341, 348
 - workability of, 57, 58*n.*, 341
 - Tyranny of majority, 196
- U
- Ultimate aim, 249
 - Ultimate value, 80
 - Unfoldment theory of education, 48, 122
 - Uniformity, in measurement, 271
 - Uniqueness, 13, 14, 125, 129, 132, 138, 154, 229, 298, 320, 331
 - Unit, of curriculum, 255-256
 - individual as ultimate, 129
 - of measurement, 269-271
 - as school credit, 125
 - Unity, 33, 65, 88, 106, 131, 135, 259-260, 320
 - as purpose of philosophy, 2, 5, 324
 - Universal, 33-35, 41, 126
 - and particular, 18, 63, 134, 253
 - Universal education, 140, 149, 156, 179

Universe, 4, 28, 31, 36, 79, 91, 125,
129, 149, 210, 333, 335, 343, 345
contingent, 8, 29, 32, 36, 48, 232,
233, 252, 287, 330
dynamic, 38-40
teleology of, 42-45
Utilitarianism, 137

V

Validity, 272
Valuc, -6, 16, 16n., 26, 32, 134, 138,
159, 189, 203, 220, 226, 228,
251, 254, 266, 268, 278, 286,
300, 334, 336
as aim, 84-85, 246, 249
comparison of, 79-84
curriculum related to, 177, 252
deferred, 252, 266
excluded from science, 11
factor in logic, 279-281
fundamental problems of, 76-77
hierarchy of, 85-93, 339
of individual personality, 135-
136, 148-150
interest as, 261, 348
locus of, 77-79, 344-345, 348
nature of, 77-79
related to epistemology, 83-84,
348
related to metaphysics, 82-83
theories of, 73-99, 264, 328-329,
341, 344-346, 343
validated by enforcement, 144
in variety, 148
(See also Aim; Good; Interest;
Purpose)
Variables, 11, 13, 18, 39, 49, 272
Variety, 30, 35, 82-83, 96, 148, 157,
158
freedom, progress, and, 234, 300
Verification, 3, 57, 70, 312, 329
Verities, eternal, 232, 346, 348
Vicarious experience, 61
Violence, as social instrument, 146,
163
Virtue, 145, 149, 317

Virtue, docility as, 174
quietness as, 257
Vocation, 82, 84, 89, 91
Vocational education, 33, 173, 175,
178
Volition, 73, 111, 266, 267
Voluntarism, 60, 338
Voluntary education, 197-198, 212

W

Wealth, 170, 173, 185
distribution of, 167, 175-184, 198
production of, 167, 169-175
related to education, 187, 202,
293
Week-day school, 318
Whim, child, 264, 326
Whole, the, 34, 45, 317, 340
in *gestalt* learning, 111, 118, 130
in Idealism, 125
in pluralism, 34
social, 144, 195
Whole child, 11, 130, 130n., 256, 721,
317, 326
Wholeness, 102, 127, 130, 255, 342
in evaluation, 273
scope, of philosophy, 2, 13, 14, 17,
20, 332
of religion, 332
Will, 60-61, 107, 134, 195, 267, 284,
304, 315, 342
breaking of the, 289
common, 295
as faculty, 49, 110
freedom of the, 45-50, 233, 349
good, 314
metaphysical concepts of, 31n.,
134, 342
of testator, 185
theories of, 112-113
Work, 168, 177, 264
educational significance of, 174-
175, 178
Worker, 93, 146, 148, 171, 175
World citizenship, 215
World state, 215
Worship, 262, 314-315, 321, 335

